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Abstract 
 
 
 
This thesis is an exploration into the consequential interrelation of official British 
discourse, identity, securitization, and counterterrorism from 1968 to 2011. 
Through a relational-securitization approach, the thesis narrative explains how 
discourse is both constitutive and causal for outcomes in a particular case. It is a 
relational mechanism based analysis that investigates how observed rhetorical 
commonplaces came together to influence intersubjective understanding and 
security practice. The ways that identities were temporarily stabilized across 
discourse through particular configurations was essential to how British 
counterterrorism emerged, was maintained, and became normalized. 
 
The thesis does not argue that possible insecurities categorized as “terrorism” do 
not exist, or that a security response is in itself surprising. However, how this 
response unfolded was not predetermined, and instead depended upon a 
securitization of terrorism along distinctive patterns of us/them construction. These 
patterns influenced the trajectory of counterterrorism by enabling certain outcomes 
to arise over others.  
 
Collective understandings of identity shape the conditions of possibility for 
political action. As such, discourses of securitization have a causal impact over 
intersubjective understanding and counterterrorism practice. Historical moments, 
such as the 1974 Birmingham pub bombings or 11 September 2001 attacks, can 
facilitate a more rapid passage of exceptional measures. But the maintenance and 
normalization of these powers depends upon us/them and inside/outside boundary 
markers. Violent acts may thus influence outcomes, but they do not determine 
their substance or direction. Reasserted and/or reconfigured perceptions of 
distance and danger stabilizing the threat and referent in particular ways played a 
key role in counterterrorism’s transition from emergency response to permanent 
practice.  
 
Through a relational-securitization approach, analysis can better map out how 
processes of identity construction were essential to the securitization of terrorism, 
and contributed to the emergence, legitimation, and normalization of British 
counterterrorism from 1968 to 2011.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
Political violence is a phenomenon that knows no spatial or temporal boundaries. 
It has no historical starting point we can research “back to”, and no future endpoint to 
confidently work toward. It is a constant of social and political relations, ebbing and 
flowing in different intensities. How we identify particular threats of political violence 
is, however, more discriminatory and consequential. These processes of identification 
depend upon changing contexts, power relations, and knowledge structures that delimit 
how we respond to such phenomena over time. In a relatively short period, the terrorist 
label and evolving derivatives, such as “domestic” and “international” terrorism, have 
become unquestioned terms used to categorize political violence, and justify exceptional 
security practice.  
 
Labels of terrorism may come across as value-neutral or self-evident. However, 
such rhetorical means of identification are not predetermined. They are instead tied to 
self/other intersubjective understandings that result from social and political practices of 
meaning making. The way terrorism is securitized depends upon particular, and 
consequential, relational configurations of threat/referent identity construction. These 
constructions influence collective understanding and material outcomes of 
counterterrorism, affecting security and insecurity. In order to better explain and 
understand how social constructions influence outcomes, the use of a relational 
mechanism approach to discourse analysis holds significant analytic potential. A critical 
sensibility drawn from terrorism studies and political sociology further develops 
securitization theory’s conceptual logic and empirical application. Elaborated in chapter 
three but put simply here, securitization is the acceptance of an issue as a security issue 
 14
 
through the construction of an existential threat as risking the survival of a referent 
object, enabling action “outside the normal bounds of political procedure”.2 
 
As explained by Jef Huysmans in the context of Copenhagen School (CS) 
research, “it may be useful for the School to find a way to open its agenda to changes in 
the logic of security so that the logic itself becomes an object of research in the 
empirical study of security dynamics”.3 Huysmans goes on to state that: 
 
A cultural-historical interpretation of the rhetorical structure would reduce a 
tendency to universalize a specific logic of security. There is no internal 
limitation in the Copenhagen agenda which would prevent an introduction of this 
question of the cultural specificity of the rhetorical structure. Delving deeper into 
the specific characteristics of the logic of security, e .g. by means of genealogy of 
security practices or a comparative anthropology, would be a major contribution 
to security studies.4 
 
 
The relevance of this call remains a challenge for inquiries into how language, structure, 
and security, are consequentially interwoven over time. This thesis provides one 
response by mapping out how discourse, identity and practice are mutually constituted 
and causally interrelated in the context of British counterterrorism from 1968 to 2011. 
 
 
I. Setting the scene 
 
In an effort to clarify types of terrorism, Paul Wilkinson distinguished 
international terrorism as involving “the citizens or jurisdiction of more than one 
country”, and domestic terrorism as “confined within the borders of a single state and 
involves no foreign citizens or property”.5 This distinction based on political boundaries 
at first glance provides a useful starting point. But when viewed with a deeper historical 
                                                 
2
 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynn 
Rienner Publishers, 1998), 24. 
3
 Jef Huysmans, “Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda 
in Europe,” European Journal of International Relations 4, no. 4 (1998): 501. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Paul Wilkinson, “Introduction”, in Homeland Security in the UK: Future Preparedness for Terrorist 
Attack Since 9/11, ed. Paul Wilkinson (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 6-7. 
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lens and a critical eye, this inside/outside boundary making becomes problematic. 
Wilkinson in fact goes on to acknowledge possible overlaps between domestic and 
international dimensions.6 However, acknowledgement does not clarify this 
terminological blurring, or remedy its possibly negative consequences. Definitional 
indeterminacy is not just a question of theoretical coherence, but influences broader 
understandings and counterterrorism practice. The implications are significant in areas 
of counterterrorism law where material power is particularly dependent on language.  
 
Legal moves are a useful source to identify the way discourse is both constitutive 
and causal for outcomes over time. The substance of new state powers is established 
through acts of law, and the connected discourses of legitimation surrounding these 
material moves reassert certain intersubjective understandings over others. As of 20 
September 2012, since the first law with terrorism in its title was introduced in 1974 (the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA)), there have been 177 UK legal measures with 
terrorism in their title. This includes 156 statutory instruments, 13 public general acts, 6 
Scottish statutory instruments, and 2 Northern Ireland statutory rules.7 The increase in 
such legal measures along titles of “terrorism” is demonstrated by the graph below, with 
each legal act considered one unit on the y axis: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/all?title=terrorism (Search performed 20 September 2012). 
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Figure 1.0 – UK Legislation with “Terrorism” Explicitly in the Title of the Measure, 1950-20128 
 
Counterterrorism laws became permanent twenty-seven years after being introduced and 
renewed as temporary powers. From 1974 to 2012, legal moves with terrorism in their 
title, including UK Statutory Instruments, UK Public General Acts, Scottish Statutory 
Instruments, and Northern Ireland Statutory Rules, increased at a rate of 1.59 acts per 
year. By starting in 1950, the recent growth is put into a broader perspective considering 
a history without any measures titled with “terrorism”. Identifying a quantitative shift in 
the terminology of terrorism in legal acts is not itself conclusive in terms of a sense of 
how shifts in counterterrorism discourse and practice led to normalization. However, it 
does set a useful parameter with which to identify significant time periods and specific 
texts that call for a detailed relational discourse analysis.9 Alongside new 
counterterrorism laws were new strategies and policies, and exceptional measures 
formed and justified through an explicit language of “terrorism” became normalized.  
 
                                                 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Though further theorization on “the quantification of words” is needed, this is a starting response to the 
important question “What should we draw as implications from such quantitative data?” (Stuart Croft, 14 
December 2012). 
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This legal permanence alongside ambiguous definitions of terrorism makes 
identifications of future success over terrorism or a use of security measures that are not 
constituted by the discursive construction of “terrorist” others elusive, if not impossible. 
Though the intensity of extraordinary legal power is justified as acting within the rule of 
law, the “rule of law” is itself a contested concept. There is no predetermined guide to 
lawmaking, with even “basic rights” often under intense debate. Social and political 
processes reinforce and/or reconstruct modes of legality, borders of control, and 
dominant (or dominating) norms of behaviour. Counterterrorism and national security 
practices modify rule of law guidelines over time, reconfiguring the parameters of 
accepted state power. New legal measures can be activated during moments of crisis. 
But, as explained by Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster, they are also “constitutive 
of sovereignty, modern law and political communities” [emphasis added].10 Thus new 
powers are not just reflective of reality, but contribute to the content of that reality itself 
through new understandings and material practices. As new counterterrorism laws are 
implemented, the benchmark for subsequent lawmaking and legitimate levels of state 
power is continually recalibrated. Measures formed through the rule of law but going 
beyond normal politics expand the very meaning of the “rules” by which they are 
legitimized. Through their very formation, counterterrorism laws change democratic 
rules of state security practice by reconfiguring the rule of law itself.  
 
As Joseba Zulaika points out, exceptional practices contribute to a self-fulfilling 
prophecy of counterterrorism and terrorism, of security and insecurity.11 The 
impossibility for an objective definition of terrorism builds a perception of terrorist 
danger as a “known unknown”.12 When paired with the political goal of eradicating 
terrorism, this perception reinforces preemptive measures as unquestionable necessity. A 
self-perpetuating cycle of discourse and practice then normalizes exceptional security 
practice even if there are no acts of violence or measures are considered to be 
counterproductive. The case of Britain from 1968 to 2011 provides an instructive 
                                                 
10
 Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster, “Exceptionalism and the ‘War on Terror’: Criminology Meets 
International Relations,” British Journal of Criminology 49 (2009): 689. 
11
 Joseba Zulaika, Terrorism: The Self-fulfilling Prophecy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
12
 Christopher Daase and Oliver Kessler, “Knowns and Unknowns in the ‘War on Terror’: Uncertainty and 
the Political Construction of Danger,” Security Dialogue 38 (2007): 411-434. 
 18
 
empirical study. This case helps illustrate how counterterrorism became normalized 
through a particular securitization of terrorism crossing different groups, spaces, and 
temporal moments. Identity is at the heart of securitization in theory and in practice. As 
explained by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever: 
 
To the extent that securitisation is rooted in the identity politics of Self and 
Other, similarity and difference are at the heart of the matter. But it is the 
particular nature of similarity or difference that matters most, not the mere fact of 
it.13  
 
 
Buzan and Waever highlight how identity is not based solely on objective facts but is a 
relational component to the “deep understandings of processes of securitisation”.14 In 
1998, Buzan, Waever, and Jaap de Wilde wrote “the exact definition and criteria of 
securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat 
with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects”.15 But how can analysis 
better understand and explain this “particular nature of similarity or difference,” and the 
way that intersubjectivity is established? Identity is and has been central to securitization 
theory and its development, as seen in Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda 
in Europe.16 However, identity remains a site of conceptual tension demanding further 
theoretical and empirical analysis.  
 
It is this focus on identity that situates this thesis: how threat/referent labels come 
to be relationally situated and temporarily stabilized across discourse and time to 
influence counterterrorism outcomes. Counterterrorism law emerged in 1973 with the 
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act (EPA), and became permanent in 2000 
with the Terrorism Act (TA 2000). The way that British counterterrorism law was 
legitimized and normalized was not inevitable, but depended upon particular patterns of 
identity construction. The Irish threat dominated official counterterrorism discourse and 
practice to the 1990s. But by the 21st century, even as Irish insecurity remained, the label 
                                                 
13
 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, “Macrosecuritisation and security constellations: reconsidering scale in 
securitisation theory,” Review of International Studies 35, no. 2 (2009): 261. 
14
 Ibid., 257. 
15
 Buzan et al., Security, 25. 
16
 Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, and Pierre Lemaitre, Identity, Migration and the New 
Security Agenda in Europe (London: Printer Publishers Ltd, 1993). 
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“international terrorism” established a new category distinct from Irish and domestic 
threats. From the mid-1980s on, international terrorism was constructed along 
geographic and cultural assumptions of distance separate from the core referent identity 
and other terrorist others. “International” did not indicate actors from multiple 
citizenships or transnational operations as in Wilkinson’s definition mentioned earlier. 
Rather, the term international was based on persistent patterns of externalization 
irrespective of political boundaries.  
 
International terrorism was positioned as non-domestic and non-British, an 
enemy from outside. “International” represented a foreign other distinct from Irish and 
domestic terrorists. Framings demarcated enemies “within” from enemies “without” 
even as the distinction between international and domestic terrorism was dubious, as 
concluded by Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca and Luis de la Calle.17 As will be discussed 
throughout this thesis, the way that terrorism was constructed in official discourse had a 
causal influence over the trajectory of counterterrorism practice. This trajectory cannot 
be explained simply as in line with an empirical pattern of rising international terrorism 
and declining Irish terrorism. Insecurity in Northern Ireland continued after the peace 
process in 1998, and in fact was on the rise through the early 21st century. This could 
have pointed to a need for maintained exceptionality targeting Northern Ireland instead 
of the de-escalation of practice and discourse targeting the “Irish” threat. At the same 
time, when “international terrorism” was deployed in official discourse during the mid-
1980s and then with more force during the mid- to late-1990s, the threat from 
international terrorism was minimal relative to other possible insecurities at the time. 
Measures could have reverted to existing criminal law, or counterterrorism could have 
been formed through processes of securitization that did not rely upon particularizing 
types of terrorist others. “International terrorism” is not a pre-existing or natural 
category. The vague yet polarizing assumptions of what international terrorism “is” then 
exacerbated perceptions of international terrorists as more difficult to understand than 
other threats.  
                                                 
17
 Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca and Luis de la Calle,‘‘Domestic Terrorism: The Hidden Side of Political 
Violence,” Annual Review of Political Science 12 (2009): 32. 
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Governments do face a duty to act when actual (or perceived) threats to security 
present themselves. But, the way that this action is formed and legitimized is not 
predetermined and still depends upon actors making choices within certain structures of 
meaning. This thesis narrative will help lay out how the particular way that British 
counterterrorism and discourse developed relied upon processes of threat/referent 
construction based on varying degrees of danger and distance. By externalizing the 
international other as more foreign than other types of terrorists, official discourse was 
able to maintain and normalize exceptional measures even if they were seen to be 
counterproductive. Without exceptional counterterrorism, the perceived threat of Islamic 
extremist terrorism from outside Britain was presented as wreaking havoc on the British 
self and democratic society. It is not that material aspects of possible threats do not 
matter. Rather, that the way “Irish” or “international” threats depends upon how labels 
of identification that resonate with certain meanings over others irrespective of the 
“actual” threat. As stated by Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde: 
 
it is neither politically nor analytically helpful to try to define “real security” 
outside of the world of politics…Such rationalist universalism will easily be 
“right” on its own terms, but it will be of very little help in political analysis. It is 
more relevant to grasp the processes and dynamics of securitization18  
 
 
They continue by explaining how securitization theory “has the basic merit of 
conceptualizing security as a labeling for which actors can be held responsible rather 
than an objective feature of threats”.19 In this thesis discourse analysis brings value to 
existing literature by discussing how consequential self/other intersubjective 
understandings arose during the securitization of terrorism to affect outcomes by tracing 
relational configurations of identity. In so doing, the thesis provides a new account of 
how observed relational transactions in a particular case influences identity and 
counterterrorism more broadly. 
 
                                                 
18
 Buzan et al. Security, 31. 
19
 Ibid., 212. 
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As terrorism continued to be securitized over time, rhetorical packages of 
identity construction contributed to evolving “degrees of Otherness”20 by differentiating 
the threat along labels of Irish, domestic, and international. Processes of othering were 
not themselves new to the Irish-British context. As stated by D.G. Boyce with relation to 
the early 20th century, “As far as Liberal and Labour men were concerned Unionist 
Ulster had been, still was, and undoubtedly always would be the bête noire of Irish 
politics – bigoted, self-assertive, and, above all, aggressive.”21 In 1422 in Oxford, the 
English legislated against “wild Irishmen”.22 In the late 1400s, laws were made against 
Gaelic “style” and fashion.23 During parliamentary debate around the British Nationality 
Act 1948, Irish was explicitly categorized as “alien”.24 Interestingly at the same time it 
was said “the people of Eire and the people of Britain should not be foreign to one 
another”.25 Perceptions of difference separating Irish and British (and English) in the 
context of counterterrorism has slowly minimized over time through social and political 
change. With respect to terrorism, Irish related threats were always constructed as a type 
of other. But by the late 20th century, reference to “international terrorism” provided a 
new threat image that was perceived as more foreign, and more dangerous.  
 
By establishing types of terrorist others, exceptional powers introduced as 
temporary measures were normalized into everyday practice. The threat was constructed 
along physical and ideational assumptions of distance. Foreign international terrorists 
were positioned as threatening western civilization and a particular way of life. This 
distance and separation justified a suspension of civil liberties and alienation of 
marginalized groups. As pointed out by Cerwyn Moore and Stuart Croft, following 11 
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September 2001 there was a failure of agreement on “the name of the enemy”.26 A 
variety of Islamic-related threat identifiers were deployed, but in the context of official 
British discourse these identifiers were all funneled into the category of “international 
terrorism”. Events such as the 2005 London bombings contradicted notions of 
international as foreign, but the construction of international terrorism as from outside 
had taken on a consequential durability. An overarching aim of this thesis is to 
analytically demonstrate that the way that terrorism was securitized in official discourse 
was essential to how British counterterrorism emerged, was justified, and became 
normalized. The research is focused on how relational processes of threat/referent 
construction enabled, limited, and/or constituted particular discourses and practice, and 
thus had a causal significance for outcomes. It is one empirical illustration of how 
security and identity are co-constituted over time in a specific case. 
 
At first glance securitization may seem to be a straightforward logic. 
“Utterances” and speech acts matter. But claiming that discourse “matters” is an 
assumption, not an explanation.27 Thus discourse matters for understanding and action, 
but how? To better answer this demands an attentive analytic deconstruction of the 
relational complexities surrounding “threat” and “referent” construction. According to 
the social constructionist view of John Shotter: 
 
the utterances of dialogic speech constituted a two-way, psychological ‘flow’ or 
‘movement’ in which a prosthetic outflow of activity for one speaker constitutes 
the resulting, inflowing, responsive activity for the other, and the speakers, in 
their utterances, in the ‘movement’ between their sense of what they want to 
achieve in their utterance and their use of particular words, attempt successively 
to develop suitable expressions.28  
 
 
This sits well with securitization theory’s focus on intersubjectivity, but it also points to 
the need for further development in how securitization in practice is analytically 
explained. If intersubjective understandings are what establish threat and referent 
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identities to securitize an issue and legitimize exceptional practice, how is such 
intersubjectivity formed? Again with reference to Shotter, “How can an expression be 
‘developmentally’ formulated in a more or less routine way, word by word, and checked 
in the course of its ‘construction’ for its appropriateness?”29  
 
The thesis begins in large part through guidelines established by Lene Hansen. 
Empirics are based in official discourses that are widely read (publicly accessible), 
authored by those in a position of authority (political elites), provide observable 
articulations of identity (explicit constructions around “terrorism”), and contribute to a 
comparative study (spanning space, time, and events).30 Sources were specified by 
focusing on an explicit terminology of “terror”, institutional power shifts, historical 
context, and attention to intertextuality.31 As explained by Vincent Pouliot, 
“intertextual” represents the web-like nature of meaning making and role of 
interpretation over intentionality.32 Primary sources consist of legal acts, policy 
strategies, reports and reviews, parliamentary debates, and official websites.33 Different 
temporal moments led to a prioritization of different sources for analysis. The first two 
empirical chapters rely heavily on legal acts and official reports in light of the newness 
of counterterrorism during these periods. By contrast, the latter three empirical chapters 
incorporate a wider range of material considering the institutionalization of 
counterterrorism and growth in sites whereby terrorism explicitly referenced.  
 
Securitization is the starting logic for conceptualizing the consequential 
interrelation of discourse, identity, and security practice. But the empirical narrative is in 
some ways dominated by a discussion of relational configurations. Securitization should 
not be interpreted as “dropping out” of analysis. But the investigation of securitization as 
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a practice and as a theory is explored through a relational mechanism based empirical 
illustration. British counterterrorism outcomes over the past forty-three years were not 
predictable to arise in the way that they did. Measures were passed in the aftermath of 
significant events and in times of relative calm, led by Conservative and Labour 
governments, and continued along a similar path despite repeated miscarriages of justice 
and counterproductive consequences. By problematizing identity and the securitization 
of terrorism across official discourse and counterterrorism from 1968 to 2011, we can 
better explain how particular threat and referent constructions were causally 
consequential for the way that British counterterrorism unfolded.  
 
Processes of securitization were causally consequential in that discourses and 
practices of counterterrorism both delimited, and were delimited by, particular 
constructions of identity. These constructions established temporarily stabilized 
parameters of us/them understanding through particular processes of boundary making. 
It is not that such structures determined the decisions of actors, and in terms of actors 
making choices agency still has a role to play in outcomes. However, processes of 
identity construction do have limiting and enabling influences on the spaces of possible 
agency considering how threat/referent identities come to influence particular 
perceptions of illegitimate versus legitimate action. This enabling/limiting effect of 
structures of identity is not necessarily an indication of persuasive intent, and in this way 
the relationality of securitization discourse can have consequences on outcomes 
irrespective of individual actor motivations.  
 
This is in line with views of “meanings and identities” as playing “a constitutive 
role in social ties and networks,” but diverges from notions of structural determinism.34 
For this thesis causally consequential does not imply causally deterministic, as seen 
through “constraints” and “opportunities” as discussed by Gabriel A. Almond and 
Stephen Guenca.35 Agency is not removed from a relational-securitization analysis of 
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official counterterrorism discourse and practice, and actors are not physically coerced 
into an “aye” or a “no” vote during parliamentary debate. However, particular 
threat/referent identity configurations associated with terrorism constituted the 
legitimizing discourses of exceptional counterterrorism practice, and as such imparted a 
significant impact on intersubjective structures of meaning and spaces for agency.  
 
The danger associated with “terrorists” was intensified by boundary 
constructions that reasserted distinctive and polarized self/other binaries. Even as the 
definition of terrorism remained ambiguous, the term came “to constitute the 
epistemological space that acts as a gatekeeper of which ideas may appear”.36 To better 
explain the development of terrorism as a conceptual gatekeeper demands a historically 
informed and theoretically guided inquiry to question notions that the way things are 
today is the way they have to be.37 Real risks of violence may lie behind some actors 
associated with terrorism. But in line with securitization theory, this thesis narrative does 
not identify which threats are “real” or which policies are “correct”.38 Rather, the focus 
is on how observable patterns in discourse contributed to the stabilization of particular 
identities, thereby influencing intersubjective understanding and security practice. Terms 
of “terrorism” delimit what political responses are “politically possible”.39 As explained 
by Judith Butler, frames of terror work “to preclude certain kinds of questions, certain 
kinds of historical inquiries, and to function as a moral justification for retaliation”.40 
These frames also decide “what we can hear”.41 Because of how we have allowed 
perceptions of terrorism to evolve, counterterrorism discourse has changed the rules of 
the game. By situating terrorists as morally reprehensible and non-negotiable others, the 
potential for research and practice has become increasingly restrained.  
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II. Discourse, security, and IR: Why identity matters  
 
In 2007, the journal Foreign Affairs hosted an article by Tony Blair called, “A 
Battle for Global Values”. In this article, Blair writes: 
 
We have to show that our values are not Western, still less American or Anglo-
Saxon, but values in the common ownership of humanity, universal values that 
should be the right of the Global Citizen...The answer to terrorism is the 
universal application of global values...They represent humanity’s progress 
throughout the ages. At each point we have had to fight for them and defend 
them. As a new age beckons, it is time to fight for them again.42 
 
 
Though this language comes after 9/11, the reference to universal values is tied to 
broader discourse and policy from earlier “western” discourse.43 By the time this article 
was published, terrorist threat construction had instilled a palpable and unquestioned 
fear of pending future risk.44 While British counterterrorism laws from the early 1970s 
were framed in terms of public order against hooliganism, the securitization of terrorism 
evolved to construct terrorists as brute facts, the ultimate enemy-other. Counterterrorism 
transcends traditional security boundaries by connecting military with law enforcement, 
and national identity with Western civilization. Such overlap encourages a continuance 
of approaches that both broaden and deepen security studies.45 
 
Specific events can influence security measures, as seen with the British Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (2001) passed within two months of 11 September 
2001. But it takes more than events to sustain exceptional practice over time. Combined 
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with “historical punctuation marks” such as 11 September 2001 or 7 July 2005 are 
patterns of threat/referent construction embedding particular understandings of the 
other.46 Securitizing discourse enables the extraordinary to become the ordinary, so that 
what forty years ago was referred to as a temporary response is now accepted as 
everyday necessity. Identities are not just socially constructed or historically contingent, 
but materially constitutive and consequential. Mapping these relational connections 
helps form a better understanding of how terrorism was securitized to influence a 
distinctive set of outcomes for a specific case. Terrorism is not a singular truth or 
atemporal essence, but a term whose stickiness depends upon negotiated and 
renegotiated social and political practices that categorize risk and violence as terrorism-
related.  
 
Historical analysis reveals the boundaries around types of terrorism as 
indeterminate markers of identification. But the meanings connected to labels such as 
“Irish” and “international” continue to exert formidable influence on intersubjective 
understanding and counterterrorism practice. These labels are viewed as “rhetorical 
commonplaces”, defined as “those vague notions that command more or less general 
assent in the abstract but which stand in need of detailed specification before they can be 
determinately linked to specific courses of action”.47 As explained by Patrick Jackson, 
“what is of interest is how actual arguments produced relatively stable boundaries of 
acceptable action, by drawing on the common stock of rhetorical commonplaces making 
up the relevant social environment”.48  
 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, official British discourse positioned terrorism 
as internal disorder from rioters and hooligans threatening the peace. As measures were 
renewed throughout the 1970s and 1980s the threat was criminalized, distinguished from 
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ordinary criminality and political grievance. In the mid-1980s, there was an introductory 
use of the international terrorist label. The 1990s brought a growing peace process, and 
Irish actors formerly associated with terrorism were connected to legitimate politics. 
Post-Cold War security dynamics devoid of a common threat to the West renewed 
attention to other sources of insecurity. Terrorism as an explicit threat was presented as 
new to this era despite being a part of social and political relations for hundreds of 
years.49 Late 1990s official British discourse was no longer dominated by the Irish 
question, with framings instead differentiating “Irish”, “international”, and “domestic” 
terrorist labels. International terrorism was constructed as more foreign and more 
dangerous than other threats, enabling an amplification of 21st century measures.  
 
The international label lengthened presumed physical and cultural distances 
between types of terrorism and the referent in need of protection. Associated temporal 
and spatial understandings were essential to stabilizing notions of the terrorist enemy. 
Inside/outside generalizations exacerbated existing tensions. The danger of international 
terrorism was interwoven with boundary drawing along issues of race, religion, and 
ethnicity, further alienating already marginalized groups. Cycles of security and 
insecurity were intensified through patterns of inclusion and exclusion. It is not that 
processes of identity construction are structurally determining. Rather, it is that these 
routines limit and/or enable certain understandings and actions over others. Language 
does not itself dictate behavior, but particular discourses do influence the politically 
acceptable spaces within which decisions are made and legitimized. By linking threats of 
terrorism to spatial and symbolic boundaries of difference, the securitization of terrorism 
enabled exceptional counterterrorism practice, and situations of insecurity, to become 
increasingly normalized. 
 
The overarching approach guiding this thesis is of agents and structures as 
mutually constituted, identity and interests as subject to change, and the collective 
knowledge underpinning counterterrorism as from processes of social construction and 
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material influences.50 Power is physical and ideational, with certain configurations of 
behavior “a result of material or economic power working in concert with ideological 
structures, social practices, institutionalized norms, and intersubjective webs of 
meaning”.51 With respect to identity and discourse “the theoretical—and ontological—
core assumption is that representations and policy are mutually constitutive and 
discursively linked”.52 This encourages a processual view of counterterrorism and 
identity that does not ignore substance. Self/other dichotomies constitute and justify 
exceptional practice by demarcating acceptable action in light of perceived threats to 
survival. We cannot fully understand security without investigating the role of identity, 
and we cannot fully understand the role of identity without investigating the 
interdependence of knowledge, discourse, and practice.  
 
The influence of identity labels depends upon an allocation of boundaries based 
on socially constructed categories of understanding. These boundaries are a cause and 
effect of labeling, and provide a sense of structure to reality’s complexity. This points to 
how the co-constitutive nature of identity and policy relies on political perspectives 
based in terms of difference. Regardless of how secure we believe self/other tags to be, 
identities are temporary stabilizations that are always open to renegotiation. 
Acknowledging identity labels as open to renegotiation, however, does not imply a 
hollowness of meaning or lack of substance. Identities in practice, such as “civilizational 
identity”, reinforce the durability of materially consequential boundary structures over 
time.53 The substance of counterterrorism law is constituted by phrases like “terrorist 
offenses”, “terrorist activity”, and “suspected international terrorist”. Thus sources of 
intersubjective understanding and political legitimacy are also sources of material 
power. 
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The securitization of terrorism and associated patterns of threat/referent 
construction contribute to rule-making structures, with “modern life disciplined by 
discourses that tell us what to fear”.54 Discourse analysis underlines how state identity is 
“tenuously constituted in time”, reinforced as a particular entity through “a regulated 
process of repetition”.55 A goal of the thesis is not to locate a universal law connecting 
identity and policy. Rather it is through the use of relational mechanisms, to demonstrate 
how processes of identity construction influence British counterterrorism in particular 
ways over time. The thesis is a narrative that links to sites of interpretation and 
reinforces a “perspectival” view of social science research.56 The influence from such a 
perspective begins with the methodological decision to incorporate rhetorical 
commonplaces. Tracing observed commonplaces helps identify patterns of 
threat/referent construction through shifting or stabilizing identity signposts. This helps 
map out how, where, and when threat/referent identities are constituted in securitization. 
It is a type of textual ethnography guided by a mechanism-based approach to enable an 
empirical discussion of how identity and counterterrorism interrelate for one particular 
case, from one particular vantage point. 
 
Some may not be convinced by this argument to problematize threat/referent 
labels of identity underlying the securitization of terrorism. They may claim that a 
relational-securitization framework is based in an unhelpful postmodern relativity. Or 
they may declare that any story of identity and counterterrorism is misguided because, 
quite simply, terrorists “exist” and so must counterterrorism. However, while a security 
response to possible insecurity is unsurprising, the substance of such measures, how they 
were introduced, and the way they were legitimized, was neither predetermined nor 
fixed. The definition of terrorism remains imprecise, and counterterrorism’s efficacy 
continues to be questioned.57 Some attacks have indeed been thwarted, such as the 
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copycat attempt following the 2005 London bombings and the 2006 plot to explode 
multiple trans-Atlantic passenger jets. However, other plots such as Nicky Reilly’s failed 
Exeter bombing in 2010, and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s failed underpants bombing 
in 2009, were halted by actor ineptitude, not counterterrorism. During times where 
violence was reduced, this was due largely to political negotiations, an approach 
discouraged by the contemporary militarization of counterterrorism.58 
 
While some measures are passed in light of specific violence, the normalization 
of preemptive counterterrorism required a forceful “language of legitimation” in 
addition to material evidence of risk.59 The way rhetorical constructions were accepted, 
or not, did not depend on individual actor preferences, motivation, or intentionality. 
These individual influences hold limited explanatory potential considering how 
intersubjective understanding is established through public sites of interpretation. Thus 
identity, language, and discourse matters for security practice, but how do they matter in 
particular cases? How can we best explore this causally consequential interrelation 
empirically? 
 
 
III. Explaining the case  
 
The time period from 1968 to 2011 and the focus on British official 
counterterrorism discourse were chosen for specific reasons. One reason was to 
investigate the official public discourses and counterterrorism practices of a state with 
international influence. Calls to go beyond state centric analysis are important for the 
development of IR, but considering the national level of most counterterrorism, a focus 
on state measures in this context remains vital. Domestic counterterrorism has bolstered 
state purpose, power, and identity despite international initiatives for cooperation or 
interdependent consequences of globalization. Jurisdictions and resources have blurred 
                                                 
58
 Jonathan Powell, “Security is Not Enough: Ten Lessons for Conflict Resolution from Northern Ireland,” 
The Lessons of Northern Ireland, IDEAS reports - special reports, Kitchen, Nicholas, ed., LSE IDEAS, 
London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK [cited 1 June 2012]; available from 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR008/powell.pdf. 
59
 Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy, 13-45. 
 32
 
military and law enforcement authority, underscoring a distinctive power emanating 
from the state.  
 
It was also important to have a case that included temporal moments before and 
after major 21st century events such as 11 September 2001. This event and the “post-
9/11” environment are of significant consequence for security measures and terrorism 
studies. But we must not overemphasize this event considering the lineage of 
exceptional state security practice and political violence going back many years. 
Tendencies for historic forgetfulness and amnesia are obstacles to greater understanding 
in theory and in practice.60 As explained by David Campbell, events can silence prior 
views by squeezing them “to the margins of recent history”.61 The broader contextual 
lens of this thesis contributes then to a more historical approach to terrorism studies, 
helping to provide a dynamic rather than static research framework.62 Single case studies 
can in fact provide a comparative and deep account by investigating varied temporalities 
and spatialities of violence, shifts in political leadership, and challenges to identity.  
 
The choice to start the thesis in 1968 is due to a 5 October march led by the 
Derry Housing Action Committee (DHAC) in Derry/Londonderry that was supported by 
the recently formed Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA, est. 1967).63 
Ensuing violence between communities and police around this event is often cited as the 
start of the most recent Troubles. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was 
formed in 1969, and internment was reinstated in 1971. As security operations escalated, 
the tragedy of Bloody Sunday on 30 January 1972 provided for a surge in recruitment 
for the PIRA and use of violence.64 In 1973 and 1974 the first laws formed through an 
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explicit language of “terrorist” threat were introduced, the EPA and PTA. Indeed 
exceptional state practice is not itself new, as documented by Laura Donohue, Gerard 
Hogan, and Clive Walker.65 In the context of British and Ireland, the British had used 
special powers for centuries, a history well known to counterterrorism lawmakers:  
 
Acts to suspend habeas corpus (Coercion Acts) were regular features in the 18th 
and 19th centuries, and the law was virtually codified in the Criminal Law and 
Procedures (Ireland) Act 1887, which was aimed primarily at "agrarian 
outrages". This was insufficient to deal with the rebellions of 1916 and 1918, for 
which powers under the Defence of the Realm Act 1914 and 1915 were used. 
Next came the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act 1920. Stormont, when it was 
set in place, passed an equivalent to the 1887 Act, which was never 
implemented; reliance for years was placed instead on the Civil Authorities 
(Special Powers) Act 1922 and Regulations made under it, until the advent of the 
Emergency Provisions Act 1973. It must therefore be conceded that "normality" 
in the rule of law, as it is enjoyed in the rest of the UK, has never been quite the 
same in Northern Ireland. I can readily understand why there is a concern about 
human rights; and many nationalists would say that I have not gone far enough 
into history.66 
 
 
However, while the history of such powers is long, the formation of measures along 
explicit terms of terrorism is more recent. It is this formation and normalization of 
special powers along an explicit terminology of terrorism that stands in need of 
explanation. This empirical analysis unfolds in chapters four through eight, but as an 
overview, each chapter is summarized as follows.  
 
Chapter four, “1968-1979: Troubling times, temporary laws”, marks a period of 
civil rights marches, cycles of violence and counterterrorism practice, recruitment in 
groups using political violence, and spread of the Troubles to mainland Britain. Early 
laws constituted by an explicit language of terrorism (EPA and PTA) were formed and 
justified through a securitization of terrorism that constructed hooligan gangs and 
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brutality as threats to the referent of domestic order, peace, and rule of law. The 
dominant discourse was initially connected to historic notions of public order more than 
terrorists as enemy-entities in their own right. Divergent political actors were brokered 
through similar framings during debate, establishing ties that reinforced particular 
identity understandings over others. The securitization of terrorism asserted a view of 
ordinary law as inadequate considering the ruthless criminality of terrorist actors. 
Special category status was removed from prisoners suspected of terrorism, and 
counterterrorism practice was bolstered. 
 
The next chapter, “1980-1989: Criminalizing terrorism, maintaining emergency 
measures”, was a moment of heightened domestic tension. A building criminalization 
fueled protests and hunger strikes. Officials interpreted ongoing violence was as a failure 
of counterterrorism and a reason to keep such measures in force. As throughout history 
terrorism and political violence were evident beyond Northern Ireland. The reference to 
an “international” threat was newly apparent, but the securitization of terrorism in 
official discourse during the 1980s remained largely focused on Northern Ireland. The 
frequency of terms based on a terrorist terminology continued to increase alongside 
commonplaces of criminality. This encouraged EPA and PTA renewals despite domestic 
protest, continuing violence, and bilateral political commitments, such as the 1985 
Anglo-Irish Agreement. Terrorists were differentiated from “ordinary criminals” and 
from political dissidents. 
  
Chapter six, “1990-1999: A change in legal course, from temporary status to 
permanent feature”, marks the beginning of a major shift in British counterterrorism and 
identity construction. Negotiations in Northern Ireland linked previous “terrorists” with 
British politicians, creating new boundary structures of legitimate and illegitimate 
actors. In 1998, the Good Friday Agreement promised peace even as the Omagh attack 
represented the single most fatal act of violence throughout the Troubles. Despite years 
of political promises to remove EPA and PTA measures, after the 1997 Labour election, 
these laws were collapsed into the single, and permanent, TA 2000. This change in 
policy was made politically possible due to the securitization of terrorism along three 
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threat labels, or “forms”: Irish, domestic, and international. Though similar threat 
distinctions had been made in earlier years, these forms were hardened from the late-
1990s on. Intersubjective understandings basing each threat label represented perceived 
degrees of otherness, distance, and danger. 
 
The following chapter, “2000-2006: Amplifying 21st century exception”, 
discusses the first six years of the 21st century following this shift to permanent 
counterterrorism. This period not only introduced the TA 2000, but also the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCS 2001), Prevention of Terrorism Act 
2005 (PTA 2005), Terrorism Act 2006 (TA 2006), and CONTEST, “The United 
Kingdom’s Strategy for Combating International Terrorism” (formed in 2003, made 
public in 2006). There was a building language of evil international terrorist threat 
opposing a democratic civilizational referent in official discourse. This led to the 
introduction, constitution, and legitimation of expanded powers. For example, 28 day 
pre-charge detention, stop and search powers without reasonable suspicion, indefinite 
detention of “suspected international terrorists”, control orders, and new offenses such as 
the glorification of terrorism. The international threat was framed as a foreign other 
opposed to a value-based way of life. Events such as 11 September 2001 were presented 
as confirmation of a distinct “international terrorist essence”. However, just under four 
years later, the 7 July 2005 London attacks underscored the reality of “international 
terrorism” as much from within as from without. Despite this event, assumptions 
surrounding inside/outside boundaries of identification had become remarkably durable, 
and continued to influence the maintenance of exceptional measures.  
 
The final empirical chapter, “2007-2011: A plateau of exceptionality”, discusses 
how counterterrorism became normalized. New offices (Office for Security and 
Counterterrorism 2007), strategies (National Security Strategy 2008/2009, CONTEST 
2009/2011), and laws (Counterterrorism Act 2008, Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures 2011) ensured that exceptional measures were institutionalized. 
Even as violence linked to international terrorism in Britain could be interpreted as 
decreasing, counterterrorism measures that just a few decades earlier were positioned as 
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temporary were a part of daily security practice. There remained no decisive 
understanding of what terrorism was, or what counterterrorism success would mean. 
Miscarriages of justice, international human rights concerns, and the alienation of 
Muslim suspect communities garnered more attention, but did not significantly redirect 
counterterrorism trajectory.  
 
The proposal for 42-day pre-charge detention was opposed in 2008, but the CT 
2008 was still passed. CONTEST underwent two revised versions, and though 
“international” was removed from the 2011 title, a securitization of terrorism based in 
perceptions of inclusion/exclusion persisted. Official reviews of counterterrorism did 
lead to a reduction of pre-charge detention and removal of some powers. Control orders 
that were introduced through the 2005 Prevention of Terrorism Act lapsed in 2010, but 
they were quickly replaced by similar “Terrorism Prevention Investigatory Measures” in 
2011, and detention remained at 14 days. A self-perpetuating cycle of threat/referent 
construction and extraordinary measures ensured that terrorism and counterterrorism 
remained prominent parts of 21st century discourse and practice. By 2011, exceptional 
counterterrorism was resting on a kind of atemporal plateau of normalized exception.  
 
 
IV. Introducing targeted audiences   
 
The thesis has three specific audiences in mind in addition to issues of identity 
and security more generally: terrorism studies, securitization, and relationalism. 
Stemming from CS peace research during the 1980s and Barry Buzan’s seminal work 
People, States, and Fear, securitization was introduced in 1995 and developed 
significantly in 1998.67 Securitization theory lays out “a conceptual framework for 
security analysis which is then used as a universal tool to categorize different security 
dynamics in different regions”.68 Processes of securitization legitimatize exceptional 
measures because something is accepted by the necessary audience as “posing an 
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existential threat to a designated referent object”.69 Both official and unofficial 
audiences are important depending on the context. But for this investigation into the 
changing dynamics of British counterterrorism practice from 1968 to 2011, it is essential 
to focus on official discourse, speakers, authors, and audiences.70  
 
Perception plays a key role in processes of securitization, and physical proof is 
not necessary for an issue to be securitized.71 To incorporate a securitization logic is to:  
 
open up difficult and complex questions not only of method, but also of the 
relationship of theory to practice, and of the constitutive place of particular forms 
of knowledge and conceptions of identity in the political constitution of modern 
societies72  
 
 
This thesis builds upon securitization by relationally unpacking the under-examined 
notions of referent object and existential threat through empirical illustration. This 
problematizes the position of identities as entities in their own right. In so doing, the 
thesis draws on critical terrorism studies by underlining how social and political 
practices of labeling are essential for the securitization of terrorism.73  
 
The way that this unpacking takes place in research practice leads us to the 
second audience, relationalism. Securitization supports discourse analysis, but there is 
room for methodological development and a specification of methods. The use of 
relational mechanisms, explained in chapter three, attends to the dynamics of identity 
observed in micro level transactions and broader boundary shifts. This helps take into 
account both the material and the symbolic consequences of identity in areas of security. 
For example, by examining how particular legal moves and an overarching 
normalization are connected to interrelations of identity, discourse, and security. The 
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focus on securitization and British counterterrorism then provides relational studies with 
new theoretical and empirical tools based in IR scholarship. 
 
The resulting relational narrative of securitization, identity, and British 
counterterrorism brings us to the third targeted audience, terrorism studies. The case of 
Britain from 1968 to 2011 links historical analysis to 21st century issues and brings a 
useful temporal frame to terrorism studies. Using a relational-securitization framework 
provides a new theoretical and methodological starting point, and compliments existing 
initiatives from critical terrorism studies in particular. Following George Lawson’s 
configurational approach, attention is paid to “how historically specific outcomes are the 
results of processes which are, in turn, drawn from the interaction between event and 
plural contexts”, acknowledging that “alternative readings are always available and 
always present”.74 Such a relational perspective is analytically inclusive of contingency, 
process, and substance, and adds a useful contribution to existing debates on security as 
both being and doing. In sum, a relational-securitization approach to terrorism studies 
underscores how the way threats and referents are identified is of causal consequence for 
collective meanings and material outcomes of counterterrorism.  
 
 
V. Causality and constitutiveness in discourse and in practice 
 
As mentioned earlier, a core starting assumption is that the way terrorism was 
securitized along particular constructions of identity, and the security practices that arose 
from these constructions, was not predetermined. In order to better explain the 
normalization of exceptional counterterrorism in Britain then, it is essential to trace the 
way relational configurations in discourse enabled certain intersubjective understandings 
and outcomes to arise over others. If identities had not been constructed in the way that 
they were across official British discourse, terrorism would not have been securitized in 
the way that it was: things today would have been different. Counterfactual logics such 
as this do not pinpoint alternative possibilities, and may be interpreted as a rather large 
                                                 
74
 George Lawson, Anatomies of Revolution (forthcoming), chapter 2, p. 9 
 39
 
jump in logic. However, when the historical context under investigation (the normalized 
plateau of exceptional counterterrorism reached by 2011), has become so embedded, 
even a generalized observation that “things could have been otherwise” is of analytical 
significance. Tracing discursive process is not solely a descriptive exercise, but a causal 
explanatory account of how things happened in the way that they did. Though in 
disagreement with Alexander Wendt’s 1998 distinction of constitution from causation, 
the thesis approach can be interpreted as what he would refer to as a set of “how 
possible” questions.75 How was it possible for identity labels such as “international 
terrorism” to become temporarily stabilized and become unquestioned resources for the 
securitization of terrorism? How was it possible for British counterterrorism to emerge, 
be legitimized, and become normalized in the way that it did? It is not that  
 
This thesis is not an account of deterministic structure, or a formalization of 
language “doing” in a type of grammatical vacuum. Nor is it an attempt to convince the 
reader of unobservable forces that teleologically connect discourse and practice in 
“some” way. The thesis builds largely upon a Copenhagen School (CS) approach to 
securitization but incorporates relational mechanisms as a means to further develop the 
theory, as well as discourse analysis as methodology. CS scholars have worked to 
interpret the “specific interplay between these threats and vulnerabilities, on the one 
hand, and the constitution of society and cultural identity as a referent object (that is 
threatened), on the other hand”,76 investigating the “mutually constitutive dynamic 
between identity and security”.77 
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The position of this thesis is then distinct both from a notion of securitization as a 
“strategic (pragmatic) practice” as well as interpretations of securitization as a 
“conventional procedure” of language and grammatical rules (Balzacq 2005: 172). At 
the same time, this thesis also works to move away from views of securitization that 
may be interpreted as “fixing the rhetorical structure of security”.78 Instead, 
securitization can be successful when discourses of threat/referent construction are 
accepted by an audience irrespective of conscious intention or motivation. This is not to 
say that some actors may not have a strategic or pragmatic motivation, but that 
individual intentionality is not necessary for securitization to unfold with consquence. 
Securitization as a process is relational and complex, and language does not “do” on its 
own, but relies upon back and forth negotiations and renegotiations of meaning to 
stabilise certain intersubjective understandings over others.  
 
The perspective taken in this thesis is thus distinct from Thierry Balzacq’s 
interpretation that the CS is premised on a philosophy of language based on a ““social 
magic” power” of discourse.79 Poststructural-inspired accounts by leading CS scholars 
such as Lene Hansen and Waever are not based on relativistic assumptions. Rather, they 
attentively investigate the structured (consequential) aspects of discourse while also 
questioning the inevitability of outcomes and possibility for change. This form of 
poststructuralism is explained by Waever as “structured poststructuralism”, whereby 
structuralism is a kind of science of the sign, and poststructuralism is a critique of the 
sign.80 As argued throughout Security by Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, a language of 
security matters, but so do the speakers’ positions, audience acceptance, and intervening 
contextual influences. However, it is not enough to say that intersubjective 
understanding contributes to security practice, or that identities are “relational”. These 
are all necessary assumptions for a relational inquiry, but they do not adequately clarify 
the status of causality for a particular case and set of outcomes. 
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The relational mechanism approach of this thesis advances securitization’s 
framework of existential threats, referent objects, and facilitating conditions. This 
relational inquiry of securitization, far from being based on an unobservable 
transcendental logic, is anchored by observed transactions of identity construction that 
link actors and textual sites in particular ways. It is not that there is nothing outside of 
language. Rather, that this “outside” can only come to make sense to affect 
understandings and action through discourse. Entities surely exist in the physical sense, 
but the way we understand this material existence depends upon labels of identification 
and the intersubjective meanings through which such labels are stabilized. This “monist” 
perspective of the “outside” world as intertwined with our practices of meaning making 
is frequently misunderstood, but has been helpfully clarified as follows: 
 
The charge of relativism is, however, misdirected on at least two counts, both of 
which amount to continued misunderstandings of the mind-world monist 
position. The first misunderstanding mistakes a set of logical claims for 
ontological claims and misreads monist authors as claiming that no world outside 
of our ways of referring to and talking about the world actually exists. However, 
the monist claim is not that no such external world exists, but that no sense can 
be made of the idea of such an external world either as existing or as putting 
objective limits on our production of knowledge—at least, no sense that would 
suffice to assuage dualist doubts.81  
  
 
Thus it is not that threat/referent identities in securitization are “fluid all the way down”. 
The way we identify ourselves and others along identity labels is inherently open to 
(re)interpretation, but this does not imply that there is no material ground whatsoever.  
 
Though the thesis does not explicitly draw on Max Weber, causality in this 
project is in many ways aligned with Patrick Jackson’s Weberian explanation of causal 
efficacy. He explains that Weber works to “direct our analytical attention to the social 
context out of which policy outcomes arise, rather than to the reductionist causal 
mechanisms characteristic of much contemporary social science”.82 In this way the use 
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of relational mechanisms is not based on a view of mechanisms as naturally existing 
forces. Rather, they are ideal-typical tools used to help map out recurring or shifting 
patterns: 
 
Causality in this conception involves the concatenation of causal mechanisms: 
the contingent coming-together of processes and patterns of social action in such 
a way as to generate outcomes (McAdam et al. 2001: 13). The explanation of 
outcomes thus naturally divides into two linked but analytically distinct stages: 
the analytical delineation of a set of causal mechanisms deemed likely to matter 
in particular cases, and the careful empirical tracing of that case or cases to 
illustrate the particular way in which these mechanisms came together.83 
 
 
In this way, the thesis is an example of analyticist inquiry based in “singular causal 
analysis”, explained as when “scientific researchers trace and map how particular 
configurations of ideal-typified factors come together to generate historically specific 
outcomes in particular cases”.84 In this way the thesis starts from an analytical view of 
counterterrorism in the UK from 2011 as one of normalized exception. Empirical 
analysis then works back to engage in an analyticist tracing and mapping to better 
understand the constitutive and causal role of identity, discourse, and securitization that 
contributed to this “historically specific outcome”.85 
 
Particular identity labels are not indicative of some objective essence, a point 
made by critical terrorism scholars such as Richard Jackson and relational sociologists 
such as Andrew Abbott. The securitization of terrorism instead depends upon 
configurations of discourse in order for actors to “stabilize the commonplace and 
produce the effect of an intrinsic essence”.86 The collective meanings established 
through socially constructed labels enable and limit spaces for agency. In this sense the 
thesis is in line with Benjamin R. Banta’s recent conclusion that “we can measure 
causation as directionality, as enablement or constraint on agents’ desires and 
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practices”.87 However, the thesis approach departs from Banta with respect to how we 
methodologically investigate such causality in practice. Through a relational account 
that is constructionist rather than critical realist, analysis identifies how structures of 
intersubjective understanding are formed through observable discourse and practice.  
 
Causality is “mechanistic rather than nomothetic”, and identifying causal 
linkages between discourses of identity, the securitization of terrorism, and outcomes of 
security practice is not based on law-like generalizations.88 The causal influence of 
discourse for outcomes is perhaps best visualized as explained below: 
  
A situation is produced as the situation that it is by the deployment of a particular 
configuration of rhetorical claims and commonplaces. The deployments in 
question shape the flow of events much like the shape of a riverbed shapes the 
flow of a river; shifts may occur over time, but the general relationship of 
significance is indisputable (Wittgenstein 1969: 93-97)…But precisely which 
commonplaces are implicated, and how their deployment and interaction 
contributed to the policy outcome in question, is a matter for empirical 
investigation. The perspective adopted here maintains only that some such 
commonplaces are implicated, and that their deployment is causally relevant.89  
 
 
The content and direction of British counterterrorism would have been decidedly 
different if the securitization of terrorism had developed along different sets of 
commonplaces and processes of identity construction than was observed. This thesis is a 
relational-securitization account that endeavors to help tease out some of the ways that 
discourse, identity, and security are causally interrelated with respect to one particular 
case study. 
 
 
VI. Introductory conclusions and thesis structure  
 
Discourses of identity have causal influence for intersubjective understandings 
and for material counterterrorism practice, and broader social and political meanings. 
                                                 
87
 Benjamin R. Banta, “Analysing Discourse as a Causal Mechanism,” European Journal of International 
Relations Online First (23 April 2012): 13-14 
88
 Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy, 32. 
89
 Ibid., 41-42. 
 44
 
Processes of identity construction propelling the securitization of terrorism are not 
isolated to official policy-making vacuums. Us/them boundary structures 
“dehumanising” the terrorist enemy influence the everydayness of security and 
insecurity, as discussed by Croft with respect to the War on Terror and the United 
States.90 For counterterrorism implementation, the mistaken killing of Jean Charles de 
Menezes by London police in 2005 is one acute example. A more latent example is the 
continued promotion of civic “vigilance” through an encouragement of societal 
surveillance, increasing the alienation of those already marginalized.91  
 
To interpret the killing of de Menezes as a one-off mistake, or alienation as a 
temporary consequence, would be to neglect the durability of discriminatory boundary 
structures that can influence knowledge and practice.92 Competing notions of inclusivity 
and exclusivity are exacerbated by security practices that draw heavily on boundary 
drawing related to religion, class, race, and gender.93  In the case of securitizing 
terrorism, state sovereignty, authority, identity, and power is both redefined and 
reasserted in particular ways. As the state is bolstered in position and purpose, domestic 
counterterrorism reinforces terrorist others as identifiable enemies in their own right, 
irrespective of whether or not they engage in violence. Such patterns of threat 
construction normalize exceptional counterterrorism as an unquestioned necessity, with 
discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism then positioned beyond the bounds of 
sustained critique.  
 
This thesis is organized along three parts. The first part sets the scene for the 
thesis as a whole, with chapter two introducing a brief historical backdrop of terrorism 
and discusses some trends of terrorism studies, and chapter three discussing the 
theoretical and methodological framework. Part two consists of the empirics, a relational 
discourse analysis that spans forty-three years divided along five chapters. Part three 
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then concludes the thesis by summarizing the case and presenting how this thesis 
narrative has aimed to bring added value to terrorism studies, securitization, and 
relationalism. 
 
  
Chapter 2 
Terrorism in context 
 
 
 
 
As argued in the previous chapter, terrorist threat labels attributed to possible 
sources of political violence do not exist independently from social and political 
practices of meaning making. Risks of violence from state and non-state actors or groups 
associated with terrorism may exist, but their categorization as “terrorist” instead of 
another label is open to interpretation.1 This chapter provides some historical context 
and temporal perspective. This is not to introduce new historical material and is thus 
somewhat of a descriptive departure from subsequent chapters. However, the following 
does provide temporal parameters that better situate the relational analysis in chapters 
four through eight. Discussion is organized along two parts. The first part presents 
terrorism as a historical constant. This demonstrates how terrorism, while always 
evolving, is in essence nothing new. In light of the chosen case study, a significant focus 
here is on British and Irish history. Following this part is an introduction to trends 
observed in studies of terrorism to better position the thesis focus on identity, discourse, 
and security amongst existing literature. 
 
 
I. Terrorism as a historical constant 
 
 A search for “history of terrorism” in the London School of Economics 
university library catalogue returned 789 hits, on Amazon returned 5,966 hits, and in 
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Google Books returned “about 1,980,000 results”, in just 0.23 seconds.2 The relatively 
recent growth of terrorism studies despite a long history of terrorizing political violence 
has not gone unnoticed.3 While, as observed by Walter Laqueur, “[t]o write a “world 
history” or provide a “general theory” of political terrorism is a hopeless undertaking”, 
this does not preclude a historical discussion of political violence to add some depth.4 A 
longer time horizon provides essential perspective on the socially constructed, materially 
consequential, and “historically embedded” nature of terrorist threat construction.5  
 
 
The terminology of terror and functional equivalents  
 
 The use of an explicit terminology of terrorism has become commonplace even 
as a specificity of definition remains elusive. As “terrorist” has come to represent the 
most illegitimate form of political violence, its usage in official discourse and practice 
can limit both academic research as well as effective practice by establishing 
prematurely narrowed conceptual parameters of understanding  Research on actors 
engaged in terrorism has pointed to how terrorists “are generally remarkable for their 
sheer ordinariness”,6 but the intersubjective understandings that reassert terrorists as 
particular others in their own right continue to depend upon a variety of particular 
myths, such as all terrorists as fanatical “madmen” or psychopaths.7 When contemporary 
terrorism is constructed along such irrational characteristics, it becomes simple to accept 
terrorism today as unlike “negotiable” terrorists of the past. Thus the view on terrorism 
as “new” is as much an issue of threat perception as it is of some objective novelty 
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linked to contemporary threats. As questioned by Croft and Moore, “is there a new and 
immediate threat—or is that which is new the nature of our own fears?”8 A consequence 
of accepting myths of terrorism is the silencing of historical dimensions related to 
terrorism and political violence from state and non-state actors well before 21st century 
events. “Terrorism” is a constant of history; it is the way we have chosen to identify and 
communicate this insecurity and violence that has changed over time. 
 
Examples of political violence, or prevented acts of political violence, may now 
be referred to in terms of terrorism, but at the time that they happened they were not. For 
example, a 2005 article today may state “in the Bush-and-Blair language of our own 
day, the foiling of the Gunpowder Plot [led by Guy Fawkes] was thus an outstandingly 
successful pre-emptive strike against what would now be described as the forces of 
organised, fanatical, religiously-motivated terrorism”, but in 1605 discussions, explicit 
terms of terrorism were not the norm.9 The initial reference to terrorism as an explicit 
threat identifier was during the late 1700s. State violence was identified as terrorism 
considering “the reign of terror in post-revolutionary France”10 from those “hell-hounds 
called terrorists”.11 Just over two hundred years later, terrorism came to be understood 
by many (if not most) as illegitimate non-state violence. This inconsistency enabled an 
open-endedness of terrorist threat construction to the point of conceptual and practical 
impracticality. To contextualize terrorism beyond 21st century assumptions, it is 
necessary to include terrorism’s “functional equivalents” as well as acts or actors 
explicitly identified as linked to “terrorism”. “Functional equivalents” refers to acts and 
actors referenced in studies on terrorism even if those references were not explicitly 
labeled “terrorist” during their respective historical moments. The goal in this section is 
not to claim that terrorism has not become more lethal or evolved over time. Rather, it is 
to reorient perspectives from a view of terrorism as new on its own terms, to a view of 
terrorism as a constant of political violence throughout history. Though not a “history 
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of” terrorism, the following section is compatible with a historical emphasis by 
presenting: 
 
the continuity of violence in human affairs, with the result that what may at first 
sight seem novel in modern terrorism appears to his eye merely as a long familiar 
beast which startled us for a moment only because the colour of its new spots 
was different.12 
 
 
There are a series of movements often cited in studies on the history of terrorism, 
including “the Sicarii from ancient times, the Assassins from the medieval period, the 
protagonists of the French Terror of 1793-4, and the Irish nationalists and Russian 
anarchists of the late nineteenth century”.13 The sicarri of the first century was an 
offshoot of the Zealots who fought against Roman rule in Palestine to try to be free from 
Roman control.14 They were one of the first known groups to utilize violence in a 
subversive form, revolting against the Roman Empire’s decision for a census as that 
would highlight the minority status of the Jewish population. “Echoes” of subversive 
activity related to philosophies of political violence have diffused across political and 
geographic borders for hundreds of years, albeit without an explicit terminology of 
terrorism as is in use today.15 In the Middle East during the 12th and 13th centuries, the 
Assassins stemming from the Ismaeli sect of Shia Islam became famous for their 
assassinations against the Crusaders.16 Both the Sicarii and the Assassins depended upon 
individual efforts and strategic targets, a strategy not dissimilar to those labeled terrorist 
today.17 Also similar to contemporary terrorism and political violence, these groups were 
“exceptional not because they were ‘terrorists’ but because they employed methods 
which were highly unorthodox for their day”.18 Thus, exceptional methods do not 
necessarily indicate a “new” terrorism, but represent a continuity of terror-causing 
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political violence going back through history.19 Terrorist methods will always be viewed 
as unorthodox and changing in scale and nature, albeit to different degrees relative to 
one’s historical frame of reference.  
 
The 19th century brought about technological shifts through evolutions in 
agricultural chemicals and the use of dynamite, influencing anarchists and Russian 
Revolutionaries. “Propaganda by the deed” was born during this period, and different 
groups continued to share similar philosophies with respect to the use of violence to 
communicate political messages. Targeted uses of violence such as assassinations link to 
tyrannicide and ancient Greek philosophy whereby individuals targeted political leaders 
considered tyrants to try and effect political change. But shifting technologies in more 
recent centuries, such as an evolving “mass media”, provided for a growing potential 
audience to these acts. As today, earlier movements maintained influence despite 
changing environments by looking “to different tactics”.20 Assassinations similar to 
contemporary targeted killings intensified. The 1878 Narodnaya Volya movement killed 
Tsar Alexander II in 1881,21 and the Social Revolutionary Party murdered Dmitrii 
Sipiagin in 1902.22 In some references, the Crna [Ruka] is even said to have sparked 
World War I by assassinating the Archduke Franz Ferdinand,23 though more in depth 
discussions of the social and historical context at the time point to a more complex 
situation, including not just the role of the Black Hand movement but also the Serbian 
government.24 These references are not to conflate “movements” with “terrorism”, as 
variations in how collective and individual uses of violence for political ends are 
identified in research and in practice underline important nuances across actors and 
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events.25 The referencing here is rather a simplified effort at underlining how a range of 
tactics similar to what may be considered terrorism have been in use well before 21st 
century counterterrorism that is constituted by a now normalized explicit articulation of 
“terrorist” others. 
 
As explained in detail by scholars such as Hogan, Walker, and Donohue 
mentioned in chapter one, the Northern Irish conflict and related state security practices 
that precipitated counterterrorism go back hundreds of years. In referencing the 1652 
Act of Settlement that awarded land to Protestants, Martha Crenshaw notes how “The 
genealogy of the IRA must be seen in the light of historical Irish antipathy toward 
British authority and toward the Protestant settler “ascendancy”, dating principally from 
the time of Cromwell’s conquest.”26 During the 1820s in Ireland there was a surge in 
agrarian uprisings that heightened tensions related to property and citizen rights around 
Irish-English relations. This historical point is especially noteworthy considering its 
reference in contemporary official discourse.27 The 1867 failed Fenian (IRB) bombing 
of London’s Clerkenwell jail to release Irish prisoners mistakenly killing civilians was 
an early example of how Irish-related terrorism was never limited to local territory.28  
 
Other connections going beyond local and domestic borders can be seen through 
the Clan de Gael’s and Skirmishers’s links to the United States and Ireland.29 One of the 
most frequently referenced acts of terrorism during the 19th century was the 1882 
assassination of Lord Frederick Cavendish and Mr. T.H. Burke in Phoenix Park, Dublin 
by the Invincibles. However, perhaps the most cited act connecting historical events and 
contemporary issues related to the Northern Irish conflict is the Easter Rising of 1916, 
when republicans challenged British rule through physical force rebellion. An 
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independent Ireland was declared in 1918, the Irish Republican Army was formed in 
1919, and the Anglo-Irish war took place from 1919-1921. The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 
1921 established the state of Ireland, but left the six counties of Northern Ireland under 
British rule. This dissatisfied both republicans determined to achieve a fully united 
Ireland, and unionists in the North who felt left behind. The republican movement 
subsequently divided between those based in Belfast dedicated to the use of force and 
those based in Dublin focused on nonviolence.30 Though the thesis empirics are focused 
on Britain, it is essential to not forget that the history of terrorist-related violence was 
not limited to the British and Irish Isles. The next section provides a descriptive 
overview of the broader context related to political violence and terrorism.  
  
 
The Sixties onwards 
  
 From the late 1960s, the 20th century order transitioned from World War, inter-
war, and isolationist patterns, to Cold War political and security relations. Actors 
challenged imperial occupiers in places such as India and Kenya. Groups drew 
inspiration from each other irrespective of political borders. In Latin America there was 
a rise in left wing guerrilla groups, but these movements were largely rural and 
disconnected from urban guerrilla activities. European groups include the Red Brigades, 
the Red Army Faction (RAF), the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), and the PIRA. Actors 
influenced each other through similar philosophies and strategies irrespective of political 
boundaries, geographic borders, or physical (prison) walls. Accounts have presented 
Northern Irish hunger striker Bobby Sands “immersing himself in the writings of Frantz 
Fanon, Che Guevera, George Jackson, and Camilo Torres, revolutionaries who called for 
the empowerment of the downtrodden, the wretched, the forgotten”.31  
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 During the latter half of the 20th century as the “international terrorism” 
commonplace gained prevalence, there were the beginning whispers of a “new” age of 
terrorism. Such newness is frequently explained as due to religious characteristics, 
despite religion playing a part in political violence for hundreds of years.32 Somewhat 
paradoxically, this generalized newness has been explained with reference to the 
specificity of events. The June 1967 Six Day war in Israel-Palestine, October 1967 death 
of Che Guevara, May 1968 student revolts in France, and 1968 clashes between police 
and demonstrators in Northern Ireland, have all been referenced as indicative of a late 
1960s temporal rupture with the past.33 Acts of violence were interpreted as indicative of 
a new international terrorism by discourse differentiating actors rather than methods, for 
example, “a contagion of mindless Palestinian brutality”.34 Discussions of a new age are 
not in and of themselves surprising, but dependence of this newness on inconsistent 
distinctions underscores terrorism as a label stemming from social practices. Terrorism 
is not and has never been a brute fact irrespective of intersubjective processes of 
meaning making.  
 
In Northern Ireland, the late 1960s marked a significant shift for terrorism and 
counterterrorism. Violent clashes following a civil rights march in 1968 
Londonderry/Derry were followed by the formation of the PIRA, the reintroduction of 
internment, the sending of the British Army to Ulster, and the suspension of the 
Northern Irish government (Stormont) by Westminster.35 Similar to other movements at 
the time outside the Irish and British Isles, the Provisionals represented the conflict as “a 
classical anti-colonial liberation struggle in which the enemy was British imperialism”.36 
The goal of radical republicans was to end British occupation of the North and to 
alleviate the “systematic discrimination against northern Catholics”.37 Issues of power, 
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injustice, and identity were foundational to the conflict. 38 As explained by Adrian 
Guelke, “nowhere were political strains over the question of national identity more 
apparent than in Northern Ireland with the onset of intercommunal violence in 1968 and 
1969”.39  
 
Special powers had been in use for hundreds of years, but in the early 1970s a 
new language was deployed that securitized terrorism and legitimized exceptional 
measures. Internment reactivated on 9 August 1971 created an “explosion of Catholic 
anger and resentment, resulting in a massive increase in support for the Provisional IRA 
in the ghettoes and a sharp jump in the level of violence”, and loyalist groups established 
the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF).40 The EPA 
(1973) and PTA (1974) marked a hardened security approach and a “disappearance of 
any equivocation in applying the term ‘terrorism’ to political violence taking place in 
Northern Ireland or emanating from the province”.41 A building global attention to 20th 
century terrorism established new links between domestic policing, national security, 
and international relations, but counterterrorism remained dominated by state level 
practices. These practices were anchored in new laws based on explicit discourses of 
“terrorism” that often depended upon a suspension of liberty and increase in insecurity 
to be implemented:42  
 
Starting in the early 1970s, national legal codes were substantially amended with 
respect to such matters as police custody, house searches, and so on. In Great 
Britain, for example, where freedoms had always been jealously defended, the 
law was adapted to the new realities of terrorism, especially Irish terrorism. The 
U.K. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1976 legalized 
extended police custody, the invasion and search of homes, the expulsion of 
suspects, and so forth.43  
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Security practices were not confined to Cold War politics or conventional threats, but 
were reconfigured to target nontraditional risks such as terrorism and criminality, with 
the boundaries between law enforcement and military responsibilities experiencing 
growing overlap. 
 
The securitization of terrorism repositioned intersubjective understandings of 
political violence, terrorist threat construction, and acceptable state force. These powers 
were increasingly aligned with explicit references to “international” dimensions, despite 
much terrorism and political violence having an international element throughout 
history. The growth in us/them boundary-drawing associated with the “international” 
commonplace was not predetermined, and is, from many perspectives, historically 
inconsistent. Earlier examples of cross- border communications, transactions, and 
information sharing among actors engaged in terrorist related violence go back many 
years. The temporal separation of past from present through the use of “international” 
was consequential for late 20th century collective understandings and material outcomes. 
Not only did discourse establish international as “new”, but those labeled “international 
terrorists” were dominated by non-western references of identification. In agreement 
with Aradau and Van Munster, “the international cannot be separated from the national 
in as far as domestic expressions of the enemy often rely upon international 
representations of modernity and progress that separate the West from the rest of the 
world—and vice versa”.44 Inside/outside assumptions of identity and belonging linked to 
terrorist threat labels laid the groundwork for exceptional counterterrorism well before 
21st century events. 
 
The following section discusses some trends in literature on terrorism and 
political violence to situate how a relational focus is an advantageous way to better 
understand and explain the emergence, legitimation, and normalization of British 
counterterrorism. 
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II. Studying research on terrorism 
 
 The field of terrorism studies is a relatively recent development that experienced 
significant growth from the 21st century on. It is also an extremely broad field, with one 
recent article categorizing “the top 150 books in the field” along seventeen issue-areas.45 
These ranged from “using the social, behavioral, and economic sciences to study 
terrorism”, to “journalistic case studies” and “terrorism on the internet”.46 Similar to 
security studies more broadly, terrorism studies can be organized along a spectrum from 
“orthodox” to “critical”. Orthodox studies frequently target policy, defense, and 
traditional security audiences. The dominant lens in this area is one that takes notions of 
identity and discourse as types of “givens” that do not require analytic unpacking. Such 
research is often based in rational choice reasoning, cost/benefit analyses, and practice-
oriented prescriptions. At the other end of the spectrum are critical studies on terrorism. 
This scholarship embraces a distinctively cautious analytic and conceptual scrutiny and 
demands that taken for granted aspects of terrorism studies and practice be 
problematized. Neither approach ignores the real possibility of insecurity or political 
violence. But they go about investigating such risks from distinct ontological and 
epistemological starting points. The assumptions basing this thesis may be interpreted as 
along a critical vein. But the resulting analysis speaks to both orthodox and critical 
scholarship. 
 
Existing literature in terrorism studies has provided highly instructive material 
with which to pursue further research. Richard English, Adrian Guelke, and Charles 
Townshend have all brought an invaluable historical lens to their respective analyses.47 
Critical scholarship on issues of language by Richard Jackson has brought important 
insight into the consequential interrelation of discourse and practice for 
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counterterrorism.48 Also investigating discourse and security is Croft, who has 
comprehensively researched how discourses around the War on Terror intersect with 
culture across levels of U.S. politics and society.49 Complimenting these works is 
scholarship by Didier Bigo, Anastassia Tsoukala, and Vivienne Jabri that challenge the 
illiberalism of liberal state security practices.50 Similar to these critical inclinations are 
work by Jef Huysmans, Alessandra Buonfino, Aradau, and Van Munster, who in 
different but not incompatible ways have all investigated the politics of exception as 
relates to counterterrorism.51 Providing additional legal depth to these approaches in the 
context of civil rights and liberties is work as that by Conor Gearty, Leonard Weinberg, 
and Walker.52 
 
Thesis research draws insight from these works and hopes to build upon such 
literature in two overarching ways. One way is through a new relational-securitization 
framework drawing on IR and sociological theories (securitization and relationalism). 
The second way is to discuss how discourse is causally consequential for ideational and 
material outcomes through an empirical illustration that bridges the artificial temporal 
divide separating pre- and post-11 September moments. In response to Jeroen Gunning’s 
convincing call for theoretical development in terrorism studies, this discussion 
underlines how the thesis fits within existing literature.53 This section is loosely 
organized along the definition of terrorism, solving the problem of terrorism, the 
“international”, and, terrorism, society, and insecurity.  
 
                                                 
48
 Jackson, Writing the War. 
49
 Croft, Culture, Crisis. 
50
 Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala, eds., Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: Illiberal practices of liberal 
regimes after 9/11 (London: Routledge, 2008); Vivienne Jabri, “War, Security and the Liberal State,” 
Security Dialogue 37, no. 1 (2006): 47-64. 
51
 Aradau and Van Munster, “Exceptionalism”; Jef Huysmans and Alessandra Buonfino, “Politics of 
Exception and Unease: Immigration, Asylum and Terrorism in Parliamentary Debates in the UK,” 
Political Studies 56, no. 4 (2008): 766-788. 
52
 Conor Gearty, “11 September 2001, Counter-terrorism, and the Human Rights Act,” Journal of Law 
and Society 32, no. 1 (2005): 18-33; Donohue, The Costs of Counterterrorism; Clive Walker, ‘‘Know 
thine enemy as thyself’: Discerning friend from foe under anti-terrorism laws,” Melbourne University Law 
Review 32 (2008): 275-301; Leonard Weinberg, ed. Democratic Responses to Terrorism (London: Taylor 
& Francis, 2008). 
53
 Jeroen Gunning, “A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies?” Government and Opposition 42, no. 3 (2007): 
365-367. 
 58
 
 
Definitional issues 
 
 From policy reports to academic analyses, the definitions debate maintains a 
dependable presence in terrorism studies. Different aspects of this debate resonate for 
different audiences, but a general attention to “defining terrorism” is fairly consistent.54 
This presence is not itself surprising, and social phenomena demand categorization to be 
communicated in practice and in theory. We search for definitions in the same way that 
we search for identities: to try to make sense of and provide order to complex relations. 
Definitions are interwoven with context, and the way that specific terms are positioned 
in the broader discourse at a particular time influences their common meanings. 
Practices of labeling come to make distinctions in the identification of overlapping 
processes, and the way that we categorize acts of violence more generally is a 
contentious conversation.55 With respect to terrorism in particular, while the definition 
of terrorism is in many ways ambiguous, an explicit terminology of terrorism evokes 
significant consequences for ideational and material outcomes that a terminology of 
sectarianism, for example, may not. The question of definition is here an empirical one, 
requiring a theoretical perspective that accounts for stability and change in particular 
contexts of terrorism and political violence.  
 
A relational approach to understanding how terrorism is securitized brings a 
useful framework to how this stabilization and change unfolds over time by viewing 
discourse as causally consequential. A direct engagement with “the definitions debate” 
is not pursued here. But the elusiveness of establishing any one definition of terrorism 
and related identities encourages the use of a relational-securitization approach. By 
tracing how explicit articulations unfold across discourse, the thesis narrative can better 
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explain how the causal influence of discourse contributed to the development of 
counterterrorism in particular ways for a specific case. 
 
 
Problem solving, attending to practice  
 
Problem solving arenas of research focus are frequently dominated by a 
particular set of concerns, which Lee Jarvis identifies as “efforts (i) to capture their 
object of knowledge – the problem of definition; (ii) to explain that object’s conditions 
of existence – the problem of causation; and (iii) to offer possible pathways for 
preventing or combating terrorism – the problem of response”.56 Such research 
frequently endeavors to “fix” terrorism without questioning the terms with which they 
have identified the perceived problem. Approaches often focus on “why” questions of 
individual versus group dynamics to try and answer questions like why certain people 
“walk away from terrorism”.57 This research is linked to behavioral sciences, working to 
identify individuals who are at risk of “becoming” terrorists. These approaches depend 
upon actor-based research frameworks. Conclusions such as “terrorists tend to think and 
act more as social solidarity maximizers” are then used to guide policy 
recommendations.58 Political efforts to figuratively and literally locate high-risk 
individuals are framed in such a way as to require such approaches, and can become 
aligned with misguided racial, religious, and ethnic assumptions.59  
 
Other research takes variable and actor-based approaches to a level close to 
formal modeling. For example, “a time-series, cross-national negative binomial analysis 
of 197 countries” to determine what states are “more likely to host terrorist groups”, or 
more likely to be targeted by transnational terrorists.60 Network analysis has added 
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another angle to actor based approaches. Research in this area has investigated 
organizational and transactional aspects of organized crime, intelligence operations, 
structural rearrangements, resource allocation, and information sharing.61 Problem 
solving approaches can hold potential, but the methodological restrictions of variable-
based analyses can lead to over-generalization. Accepting the language of terrorism as 
unproblematic is an obstacle to analysis as such a perspective unnecessarily limits 
politically acceptable options for security practice. This, in turn, can silence alternatives 
to militarized preemption or counter-radicalization, measures that counterproductively 
depend on identifying actors as terrorists even if they have not engaged in political 
violence. 
 
One development linked to problem solving research is in fact a growth in 
critical analyses of how counterterrorism can exacerbate insecurity. For example, by 
reviewing how “integration” and “counterradicalization” have become pervasive parts of 
contemporary practice despite areas of ineffectiveness.62 The issue of counterterrorism 
success is another area of problem solving research that can open up theoretical and 
empirical perspectives. Notions of winning justify exceptional practice even as what it 
means to win remains deceptively vague. By identifying this paradox, new approaches 
may be realized. For example, the sobering but perhaps more realistic goal of learning to 
live with terrorism.63 Studies that incorporate a relational perspective to investigate how 
terrorism is securitized would provide a broader and more dynamic account of how 
identity and practice interrelate to influence counterterrorism. “Disastrous” effects such 
as “one-sided curfew in Catholic Belfast in 1970” and “introduction of equally one-sided 
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and clumsy internment in 1971” underscore how threat identification is both an endemic 
and problematic part of preventive security practice.64 Counterterrorism is constituted by 
discourses of “who” is perceived to be a terrorist threat, with the use of preventive 
security practices then reinforcing these perceptions since those perceptions guide 
counterterrorism implementation. Similar policies continue to underpin 21st century 
research and practice through “a kind of political amnesia about the failures and lessons 
from other counter-terrorist campaigns”.65 Research to tackle how such outcomes arise 
and are maintained is more useful when critical sensibilities and a historical approach 
are explicit parts of analysis.  
 
Instructive analytical development around counterterrorism practice is seen in 
traditional studies on “how terrorism ends”66 and critical investigations of shifting 
temporalities of risk.67 Aradau and Van Munster explain “the emergence of a 
‘precautionary’ element [that] has given birth to new configurations of risk that require 
that the catastrophic prospects of the future be avoided at all costs”.68 They further 
discuss how policies “actively seek to prevent situations from becoming catastrophic at 
some indefinite point in the future”.69 This normalization of preemptive exceptionality 
encourages the logic of “not if, but when” terrorist attacks will occur.70 Identifications of 
terrorist suspects are “no longer the juridical decision for which careful consideration of 
evidence is necessary”, but an administrative decision “where the rule of zero-risk takes 
precedence”.71 This observation demands further inquiry into how such a situation arose 
in the way that it did to eventually dominate much counterterrorism discourse and 
practice.  
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Investigating the “politics of unease” and the “politics of exception” around 
contemporary security practices sheds light on the way normalized measures can 
become ordinary and exacerbate insecurity.72 Didier Bigo and Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet 
have explored unease, suspicion, exception, and radicalization in the case of Northern 
Ireland to argue how we must not decontextualize cases or ignore the failures of 
“success stories”.73 As such, an attention to specificity is essential and it would be 
misguided to establish generic “how-to guides” for security and conflict resolution. An 
acknowledgement of specificity in time and place, however, does not mean that we 
cannot build stronger understandings through a historical lens. More critical problem 
solving approaches to address “how we seem unable to escape feed-back loops of bad 
intelligence, bureaucratic thinking, and failed imagination” provide greater potential 
than perspectives turned away from history.74 It is possible to balance an attention to 
context with comparative evaluations that are done with a high level of analytical 
scrutiny. 
 
 
Positioning “the international”  
 
 Historical and problem solving work in terrorism studies are linked to the 
changing role of “the international” in research and in practice. Though a seemingly 
value-neutral or pre-existing term, the use of “international” as a threat identifier was not 
predetermined to be part of how terrorism was securitized. As referenced in the 
introduction chapter, scholars such as Paul Wilkinson distinguish international terrorism 
through political boundaries, or the assumed citizenship of actors. But in practice such 
distinctions are increasingly problematic. Terrorism and counterterrorism are “not easily 
classified into neatly differentiated domestic or international components”.75 In the 
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context of British counterterrorism, “Irish terrorism” is not considered “international 
terrorism” despite a history of international involvement. “International terrorism” is not 
considered “domestic terrorism” despite domestic actors planning “international” 
terrorist attacks. “Domestic terrorism” is not considered “Irish-related” or 
“international”, despite both Irish and international forms depending on domestic actors 
and territory. The burgeoning reference to “homegrown” or “lone wolf” threats provides 
another set of definitional problems. The implications of these overlaps have not yet 
been sufficiently analyzed, and this area of inquiry forms a significant part of the thesis 
analysis.  
 
The way that such labels have been differentiated along geographic assumptions 
of belonging is thus far under problematized. Each term has evolved along different 
degrees of danger and distance from the referent and other types of terrorist threats 
during securitization. The continued making and remaking of these threat identities in 
the securitization of terrorism is consequential for intersubjective understanding and 
counterterrorism practice. Exceptional measures were constituted and justified through 
particular sets of commonplaces. If these relational configurations had not been 
deployed, there would have been a different set of outcomes. British counterterrorism 
depended upon an externalization of the other to maintain extraordinary measures by 
distancing the referent from any notions of terrorist danger. The interweaving of 
structure and agency in this respect is both highly nuanced and highly consequential. 
Security and political officials had a consequential role in formulating what policies 
were possible. But they did so through a distinctive structure of threat/referent identity 
construction that delimited what us/them perceptions were the most influential in 
guiding understanding and action with respect to changing counterterrorism practice.76 
 
“International” is also indicative of how different perceptions of “levels” come 
into terrorism studies research. While an “era of global terrorist threats” demands “an 
unprecedented level of international cooperation between intelligence and police 
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agencies”, such cooperation is limited by a reassertion of inside/outside boundaries that 
bolster state authority.77 Despite globalization and economic interdependence that assert 
structures of international governance, for counterterrorism the state remains significant. 
The stickiness of national policies and identity helps legitimize exceptional domestic 
security practices. Self/other assumptions of belonging tied to the domestic/international 
divide. This can provoke consequences of insecurity through notions of 
inclusion/exclusion cross-cutting domestic and international social relations. References 
to “homegrown terrorism” and the blurring of foreign and domestic areas complicate 
notions of “belonging”.78 In terms of threat construction, perceptions of danger, and 
counterterrorism, the “international” commonplace hardens inside/outside divisions.  
 
Highlighting the persistence of national counterterrorism is not to negate 
international efforts at cooperation. Advances have been made through bilateral, 
regional, and international initiatives. At the international level, the United Nations has 
been drafting counterterrorism reports and strategies from the mid-1990s.79 Research on 
European counterterrorism by Cornelia Beyer presents how regional institutional 
developments encouraged multilateral responses to events such as 11 September.80 Even 
as broader strategies were formed, problems of resource coordination, the weakness (or 
absence) of enforcement mechanisms, persistence of national identity concerns, and 
attention to state sovereignty, continue to stall international cohesion.81 Inconsistencies 
and incompatibilities remain in how state governments “conceive of the use of violence, 
how publics perceive and interpret insecurity, and how threats are constructed 
politically”.82 As noted by Marieke de Goede, European counterterrorism is not so much 
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a supra-state balance for exceptional national policies, as it is a similar preemptive 
trajectory to existing state policies.83  
 
Debates on “new” terrorism are another way that “international” contributed to 
the hardening of borders separating within from without. Crenshaw approached the 
subject of “new terrorism” with caution over a decade ago by arguing that “research on 
terrorism has not yet fully considered the implications of recent claims that a “new” 
terrorism has developed”.84 More recent debates have given the topic greater critical 
attention, as seen in Alexander Spencer’s 2011 response to people “sick” of those 
critiquing the use of “new terrorism”.85 As the “new” terrorism terminology developed 
in discourse international terrorism was increasingly securitized along framings of Islam. 
These framings positioned international Islamic extremist terrorism as from specific 
actors such as AQAP and from exceptionally broad categories like “Jihadi” groups. As 
noted by Croft, the “securitization of Islam” involves both differential practices of 
othering and a generalization of Islam that negates specificities across and within 
groups. Actors associated with Islam are then distanced from the referent as foreign and 
dangerous outsiders, even if they are part of the self and unconnected to terrorist 
activity.  
 
Tony Blair approached notions of an international collective identity by referring 
to “a clash about civilization”.86 But, this expanded referent was matched by bolstered 
state counterterrorism and a reassertion of British identity. The civilized versus 
barbarian trope has an entrenched history, but its usage in the context of 
counterterrorism and discourse provided for a particular good versus evil framing that 
prioritized state authority. The international label became entrenched in securitizations 
of terrorism and asserted misguided inside/outside borders in official British discourse 
and practice. 
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Terrorism and society 
 
 An intersubjective understanding of international terrorism as external to the 
national referent was reinforced by framing terrorism “as being (partly) a problem of 
controlling both foreigners entering British territory and those already living in the 
United Kingdom”.87 By politicizing, and securitizing, issues such as immigration, failed 
states, and Islam, the “international terrorist” label evolved to represent a foreign threat 
that is culturally and physically distanced from the British self. This externalizing frame 
silenced historical dimensions of the international across earlier terrorism and political 
violence. For example the Fenian Brotherhood that was formed in the United States in 
1857 and had an arm in Ireland called the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB).88 Or the 
Clan na Gael, also known as the United Irishmen, that was “well established” in the 
United States from 1873.89 American actors and connected groups were essential 
support. As explained by Lindsay Clutterbuck, “The attacks took place in major cities in 
England and Scotland, not in Dublin or Belfast, whilst the bombers themselves came 
from the United States of America, the country that also provided them with explosives, 
detonators, and financial support.”90 Despite these international connections, due to the 
way that “international terrorists” have been constructed through the securitization of 
terrorism, past terrorist action is not “international” unless it is linked to “Islamic”. 
 
The “international” played a significant role in terrorism and political violence 
before “international terrorism” became a dominating threat label. One way this role can 
be seen is through a discussion of method. Strategic targeting such as attacking “the 
financial heart of London and carrying out the attacks by the use of massive ‘lorry 
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bombs’” is not dissimilar to methods used by later groups in other locations.91 The actual 
materials used were also indicative of the international dimension. Whether through 
Semtex transferred between the Czech Republic, Libya, and Northern Ireland, financial 
and moral support from NORAID in the US to republicans in Ulster, or the presence of 
Northern Irish actors alongside FARC members training in Columbia, Irish related 
terrorism could also be argued as a type of international terrorism.92 In light of such 
overlaps, how have structures from discourses of securitization stabilized particular 
labels to differentiate otherwise overlapping threat identities and influenced outcomes?  
 
 One way was through the assertion of religion. Despite the presence of religion 
in violent conflict for centuries, it was given a new priority in 21st century securitizations 
through framings of Islamic extremism.93 International Islamic terrorism as a type of 
boundary category, or particular “site of difference”,94 was presented as the most 
dangerous threat to Western society, despite the vast majority of associated attacks 
targeting non-western areas and populations. In addition, the perpetrators of 
international terrorism were frequently part of the domestic western self. But, older 
threats were explained as primarily secular with contemporary risks “linked to religious 
fanaticism”.95 While there are new aspects of religion in movements using political 
violence, of which changing interpretations of Islam is one, the presence or not of 
religion does not itself make terrorism today essentially new. The Irish and British case, 
for example, has a significant history of religious influence. This role of religion is 
bolstered through enduring myths, communal segregation, and the role of religious 
officials. Militant groups drew upon religious grievances to garner support, and helped 
cement the Irish cause with Catholicism for generations.96 Loyalist campaigns also 
incorporated religious motivation through Protestant influence in groups such as the 
Ulster Freedom Fighters and Ulster Volunteer Force. It is not only Northern Irish groups 
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that have had religious ideological influence, with Irgun in Israel and Ethniki Organosis 
Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA) in Cyprus two additional examples.97  
 
 The consequences for theory and for practice from these inconsistent and 
divisive patterns of threat construction demand research that rejects static perspectives of 
identity and discourse. By engaging in a processual relational approach to securitization, 
we can better account for how security practices based on stationary generalizations of 
identity emerged in the way that they did to have particular consequences for social 
relations and material practice.98 Studies on immigration and security provide extra 
insight into the effects of counterterrorism’s reliance on self/other constructions. A 
“rhetoric of exclusion and fear of foreigners” linking immigration and counterterrorism 
points to the broader consequences from interrelations of identity, security, and 
discourse.99 Studies investigating the War on Terror have also highlighted the social 
consequences of counterterrorism as relates to discourse and knowledge production. As 
explained by Richard Jackson, “Any large-scale project of political violence – such as 
war or counter-terrorism – requires a significant degree of political and social consensus, 
and consensus is not possible without language”.100 This brings us back to the way 
securitization theory provides an instructive framework with which to investigate the 
interrelation of identity, discourse, and security in the context of counterterrorism. The 
securitization of terrorism justifies practices that rest on consequences of insecurity for 
society. At the same time, it is society’s acceptance that helps legitimize the need for 
such measures in the first place. Exceptional counterterrorism thus not only has effects 
on society, but depends upon an acceptance by society of how threat/referent identities 
are positioned. 
 
Terrorists were embedded in mainstream understanding as “kooks, crazies, 
demented” actors before events such as 11 September 2001.101 Through intertextuality, 
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high politics are connected with everyday relations, and terrorists are reasserted as the 
“new barbarians”: enemy-others representing the ultimate savages threatening Western 
society.102 Terms such as “evil” have come to play a normalizing role for exceptional 
domestic and foreign security practices.103 Counterterrorism increases the alienation of 
marginalized groups within domestic societies by relying upon us/them divisions to 
identify possible risk. Even as exceptional measures were accepted as necessary, the 
implementation of these measures can pose a threat to liberal democracy by shifting the 
balance between security and liberty.104 Through discursive constructions of the terrorist 
as an essentialized enemy-other “out there”, counterterrorism and discourse on terrorism 
became a never-ending cycle where we are always “waiting for terrorism”.105 If there is 
a terrorist attack it means the threat still exists, and we must continue exceptional 
measures. If there is no terrorist attack it means these measures are working and thus 
also must be continued.  
 
 
III. Going forward with terrorism studies and history 
 
The normalization of a permanent state of exception in the name of preempting 
future catastrophe stems from a securitization of terrorism positioning terrorists as 
inherently indefinable yet politically unarguable. The need to interrogate how terrorism 
is stabilized through negotiated discourses of identity to normalize exceptional measures 
supports a relational-securitization approach to inquiry. This framework prioritizes 
processes of identity construction and self/other structures to explain how discourse is 
causally consequential for outcomes. Research has pointed to the complexity of identity 
by observing how individuals resist “identity hybridization[s]”, that “individuals born in 
Britain may carry British passports, but do not feel English (or Scottish or Welsh)”.106 In 
this context of competing identities, grievances linked to historic identity tensions can 
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“become ‘prisms’, interpretative mechanisms”.107 These identity prisms affect 
contemporary perceptions of threat and feelings of insecurity. Previous injustices are 
reproduced over generations. These become exacerbated by preventive counterterrorism 
practices based on exclusionary us/them boundary drawing.  
 
This thesis inquiry aims to complement existing work through a new empirical 
and conceptual narrative formed along a securitization logic that is applied with a 
relational mechanism based analysis. Through this approach, the thesis will better 
explain how British counterterrorism emerged, was legitimized, and became normalized 
from 1968 to 2011 along particular discourses of identity construction. The next chapter 
will discuss issues of identity and security, securitization, relationalism, and research 
design to lay out the theoretical framework before the empirical analysis begins. 
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Chapter 3 
Problematizing Identity:  A relational interrogation of securitization 
theory 
 
 
“The Caterpillar and Alice looked at each other for some time in silence: at last the Caterpillar 
took the hookah out of its mouth, and addressed her in a languid, sleepy voice. 
 “Who are you?” said the Caterpillar. 
 This was not an encouraging opening for a conversation. Alice replied, rather shyly, 
“I—I hardly know, Sir, just at present—at least I know who I was when I got up this morning, 
but I think I must have been changed several times since then.” 
 “What do you mean by that?” said the   Caterpillar, sternly. 
“Explain yourself!” 
 “I ca’n’t explain myself, I’m afraid, Sir,” said Alice, “because I’m not myself, you see.” 
 “I don’t see,” said the Caterpillar. 
 “I’m afraid I ca’n’t put it more clearly,” Alice replied, very politely, “for I ca’n’t 
understand it myself, to begin with; and being so many different sizes in a day is very 
confusing.” 
 “It isn’t,” said the Caterpillar. 
“Well, perhaps you haven’t found it so yet,” said Alice; “but when you have to turn into a 
chrysalis…”1  
 
 
 Alice has not been accused of being a terrorist by the Caterpillar or detained 
under Wonderland counterterrorism law. But this snapshot does provide one illustration 
of the tension surrounding the situatedness of “identity” between process and substance. 
As Alice struggles to claim one identity, the Caterpillar fails to understand anything but 
a simple singular response to whom one “is”. Responses to the questions “Who are 
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you?” or “Who are they?” are not finite, and can become durable or be renegotiated. The 
possibility for identity’s reconfiguration competes with the seized nature of self/other 
labels in discourse. How does a set of relations around identification come to be 
accepted as a bounded entity?2 How does the “making [of] an entity” and establishment 
of “thingness” influence the securitization of terrorism over time?3 As highlighted in 
chapter one, securitization is based on issues of threats and referents. But the way that 
these identities are constructed to temporarily stabilize intersubjective understandings to 
influence outcomes has not been sufficiently theorized. Waever explains securitization 
as “a particular way of handling a particular issue, processing a threat through the 
security format”.4 He continues by stating “the security quality does not belong to the 
threat but to its management”.5 These explanations point to securitization’s processual 
nature and open the door for a relational sociological approach in order to better 
understand the consequential interrelation of identity and security in practice.  
  
Despite moments of stability derived from labels of identity, processes of 
identification are always open to reinterpretation. This demands that we untangle the 
interrelation of the social and the material, not privilege one over the other. It is not 
controversial to endorse a theme of agents and structures as mutually constituted or open 
to change. But how that relationship is theoretically guided and empirically 
demonstrated is open to debate.6 Different theoretical positions embrace divergent 
assumptions of social relations, and certain logics are prioritized over others. Rational 
versus reflective debates,7 intertextual and postmodern perspectives,8 history and/in IR,9 
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constructivist approaches challenging realist and liberal tones,10 and typologies of how 
we “conduct” inquiry,11 have all provided for significant reflection in IR more generally. 
Sensibilities such as processual relationalism that challenge interest and identity as fixed 
variables open underexplored paths of inquiry. This approach views agents and 
structures as flexible and consequential, ebbing and flowing rather than representing 
fixed points. Through this approach, assumptions of objective atemporality or essence 
are subject to theoretical unpacking and empirical investigation.  
 
Knowledge construction around identity establishes boundaries of collective 
understanding that delineate perceptions of reasonable versus unreasonable action. But 
these boundaries do not determine structure, agency, or outcomes. Labels such as 
“terrorist” are not indicative of a natural terrorist essence but are representations of 
collective meaning. Intersubjective understandings of identity are constructed, 
deconstructed, and reconstructed through social and political practice. Securitization is 
one process by which such collective meaning making unfolds to influence outcomes. 
Interrogating threat/referent construction through empirical inquiry reveals the 
foundationless and causally consequential role of identity. This does imply that identity 
is hollow in meaning. Rather, it underscores how processes of identification are 
unavoidably connected to relations of power and interpretations of meaning. No 
framework can fully elucidate how tensions between process and substance are best 
navigated.  
 
The choice of approach is indelibly linked to wagers of the researcher. Theory is 
“always for some one and for some purpose”, albeit in varying ways considering 
differences in how researchers interpret “purpose”.12 Tracing identity construction is a 
                                                                                                                                                
George Lawson, “What is History in International Relations?” Millennium Journal of International 
Studies 37 (2008): 415-435; Friedrich Kratochwil, “History, Action and Identity: Revisiting the 'Second' 
Great Debate and Assessing its Importance for Social Theory,” European Journal of International 
Relations 12, no. 5 (2006): 5-29. 
10
 Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism”; Friedrich Kratochwil, “Constructing a New Orthodoxy? 
Wendt's `Social Theory of International Politics' and the Constructivist Challenge,” Millennium Journal of 
International Studies 29, no. 1 (2000): 73-101. 
11
 Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry. 
12
 Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond IR Theory,” Millennium Journal of 
International Studies 10, no. 2 (1981): 128. 
 74
 
type of critical investigation. As explained by Jackson with reference to Shotter, by 
identifying “rhetorical commonplaces” we can analyze how stability in language over 
time consists of historically developed “topological resources”.13 A genealogical 
mapping of identity, securitization, and counterterrorism is based on the assumption that 
the way things turned out for a particular case is not the way they were destined to be: 
things could have been different. Distinct sets of rhetorical signposts guide different 
processes of identification.14 In line with Shotter, the ontological focus is on “conditions 
of possibility”, enabling us to ask, “Could it be otherwise?”15 Definitional overlaps 
between “citizen” and “democratic” ensure no definitive meaning. Particular 
configurations of commonplaces lead to some intersubjective understandings and 
outcomes to arise in prominence over others.  
 
 
I. Positioning identity for the context of this thesis 
 
This thesis explains how the specific ways that terrorism was securitized along 
particular threat/referent configurations was of causal consequence for the way that 
British counterterrorism emerged, was legitimized, and became normalized. Even 
though relational mechanisms can be observable in the sense of tracing how explicit 
articulations of identity connect different sites or actors, relational mechanisms are not 
representative of “really existing natural forces”, like gravity. In this sense they are 
interpretive tools for discourse analysis as much as they are representations of a 
particular transaction. One example is the mechanism of yoking, defined as: 
 
when a social space is already filled with entities, when a division of a social 
space into entities is already established and institutionalized in some way…the 
only ways to radically change arrangements in a social space are to delegitimize 
old differences or to emphasize new ones. The former strategy yokes entities 
together, the latter divides them16 
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Mechanisms like yoking help the researcher make sense of the discourses under analysis 
by helping to identify how certain processes may come together in a distinctive way to 
influence the allocation of consequential boundary structures. Through yoking, we can 
see how issues and actors move from legitimate to illegitimate positions during 
securitization, such as the movement of communists and homosexuals during the 
McCarthy era, and Irish republicans and dissidents in the 21st century.17 Investigating 
shifts in boundary-marking and legitimacy allows us to better understand how identity is 
consequential for material outcomes. With identity “[w]e are not dealing with a false 
consciousness opposed to a true one—which would be waiting for us as a teleologically 
programmed destiny—but with the contingent construction of a consciousness tout 
court”, demanding inquiry that is contextually conscious and relationally-informed 
throughout analysis.18 
 
The way that identities were deployed across official British discourse has 
enabled a normalization of exceptional counterterrorism in a relatively short period of 
time. Extraordinary security measures were passed on the heels of political violence and 
during times of relative historic calm. The terrorist threat transitioned from a risk to 
peace and order when counterterrorism laws were introduced in the early 1970s, to a 
dangerous criminal as these measures were renewed through the eighties. By the late 
1990s terrorism was repositioned along “Irish”, “domestic”, and “international” threat 
labels. This presumed the existence of identifiable terrorist essences positioned along 
varying assumptions of danger and distance. Actions from particular groups, such as 
bombings by the PIRA and hijackings by the PLO, were referenced. But the successful 
construction of threat identities had to be established through processes of securitization 
before attacks took place. With counterterrorism essentially a preventive and preemptive 
security strategy, it was, and is, impossible for official discourse to rely upon material 
evidence of what threats “are” to securitize terrorism. In order for British 
counterterrorism to have emerged in the way that it did to eventually be normalized, 
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language had to transition from perceptions of possible risk to articulations of politically 
unarguable us/them oppositional identities.  
 
At first glance labels such as Irish, domestic, and international seem to align with 
objective boundaries of identification. However, such boundaries are in fact problematic 
because meaning was tied to assumptions of inclusion and exclusion, not clear-cut 
political or geographic boundaries of belonging as “domestic” and “international” would 
seem to imply. Despite evidence of the “international” in terrorism and political violence 
throughout history, contemporary terrorism was securitized as “newly” international. 
From the mid-1980s “international terrorism” was asserted as from foreign others. Over 
time, this foreignness became synonymous with an Islamic other in opposition to a 
British referent. At the same time, terrorism associated with Northern Ireland was 
increasingly aligned with a language of “dissident”. This enabled different approaches to 
“Irish” versus “international” threats even if their methods were similar, and insecurity 
from the former continued.19 Exploring such trends depends upon analyses of 
securitization that do not “freeze the dynamic of identification itself”.20 Processual 
relationalism is a useful way to untangle this causal dynamics of identity underlying 
securitization itself. This approach provides more comprehensive insight than a 
discourse analysis without the use of mechanisms. 
 
During the Troubles the meaning of terrorism was dominated by reference to 
almost day-to-day realities of insecurity and violence. On the other hand, the meaning of 
“international terrorism” is derived largely from processes of securitization that 
constructed a threatening entity-other before violence take place or international 
terrorists “appear”. As explained in critical terrorism studies scholarship:  
 
Terrorism is not a self-evident, exceptional category of political violence. Rather, 
it is a social construction – a linguistic term or label that is applied to certain acts 
through a range of specific political, legal and academic processes. This is not 
the same thing as saying terrorism is not real; there are real people causing real 
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harm and death to other real people. Instead, it is to say that the meaning of (and 
subsequent responses to) those real acts of violence is determined by a complex 
series of social and political practices that contribute to the labeling and 
categorization of events.21 
 
 
Interrogating threat labels is not to say one thing “is” a terrorist and one thing “isn’t”. 
Rather, it is to investigate the causal consequences of difference discourses on terrorism 
for intersubjective understanding, securitization, and outcomes.  
 
Identity labels and associated understandings influence what are considered 
legitimate laws and levels of state power. Destabilizing threat/referent constructions 
empirically helps reveal alternative readings of assumptions that have come to dominate 
many discourses and practices of counterterrorism. Structures of language and discourse 
do not determine agency, but acceptable action is constrained by rhetorical moves that 
frame issues in particular ways. This restraint does not remove accountability or 
responsibility, but refocuses attention on the causal interlinking of agency and structure 
at different moments over time. Durable structures of identity enable suspensions of 
liberty and can exacerbate social tension even if the collective aim is greater security. 
Analyzing how identities are stabilized to securitize terrorism in a particular way is 
essential to understanding how counterterrorism developed over time.  
 
In the context of Northern Ireland, borders around Catholic suspect communities 
during internment led to repeated miscarriages of justice. Extraordinary powers of law 
enforcement included internment and the “five techniques” of interrogation: hooding, 
sleep deprivation, restricted diet, leaning against a wall for a long time with just their 
fingertips, and disorientating ‘white noise’.22 Internment was eventually withdrawn in 
February 1972 and replaced with detention. In January 1978 the ECourtHR declared 
these techniques inhuman degrading treatment, but not torture. Internment resulted in a 
surge of recruitment for the Provisional Irish Republican Army and was implemented 
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despite officials being advised not to use such tactics.23 The link between 
counterterrorism, suspect communities, and alienation has been present since the earliest 
uses of security measures based on a language of terrorism.24 A relational inquiry into 
how terrorism is securitized helps us better understand how security practices continue 
to be legitimized and normalized despite repeated consequences that are 
counterproductive.  
 
The thesis is a type of textual genealogy, investigating how identity influenced 
the formation, constitution, legitimation, and normalization of exceptional 
counterterrorism through developing a relational-securitization approach. This responds 
to the observation that:  
 
There is no internal limitation in the Copenhagen agenda which would prevent 
an introduction of this question of the cultural specificity of the rhetorical 
structure. Delving deeper into the specific characteristics of the logic of security, 
e.g. by means of a genealogy of security practices or a comparative 
anthropology, would be a major contribution to security studies.25  
 
 
Securitization is thus an instructive conceptual guide for genealogical studies of identity, 
discourse, and security. The focus of speech acts and security “doing” complements 
critical studies on terrorism focused on the social construction of threat labels in areas of 
terrorism studies and practice. Publicly accessible official discourse including legal acts, 
parliamentary debates, official reports, official research papers, government websites, 
and official speeches, help illustrate how particular identities arise through securitization 
to influence counterterrorism outcomes in the case of Britain from 1968 to 2011. To 
advance securitization theory and understandings of how exceptional counterterrorism is 
normalized in practice, discourse analysis is engaged through a relational mechanism-
based unpacking of identity. This approaches labels such as “international terrorism” as 
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decipherable “only in terms of its ‘place’ in relation to the other concepts in its web”.26 
Through a mechanism –based approach, the thesis is an investigation of how identity 
and security are enmeshed in mutually constitutive, and causally consequential, dialogic 
relations.27  
 
Referent and threat are not accepted as finite physical veracities. Rather, they are 
identified through observed textual linkages that connect supporting characteristics 
through particular configurations. These configurations led to an acceptance of certain 
collective self/other meanings over others. Characteristics such as “Western” and 
“democratic” influence intersubjective understandings so that subsequent articulations, 
such as “British”, evoke a delimited notion of the self. The question is not whether some 
thing labeled “terrorism” is an objective threat, but how social processes that temporarily 
stabilize such a label build certain understandings of dangerous others and enable 
exceptional state power. By interrogating identity, the thesis speaks with literature in 
securitization, relationalism, and terrorism studies, examining:  
 
more thoroughly and systematically the discourses and representational practices 
of terrorism, and the ontological-discursive foundations – the ideological, 
conceptual, and institutional underpinnings – which make both Terrorism 
Studies, and the practices of terrorism and counterterrorism, possible in the first 
place28 
 
 
This chapter is organized into four parts that lay out the thesis theoretical 
framework. The first presents conceptual issues related to identity and security. The 
second discusses the benefit from using securitization theory in studies on discourse and 
practice. The third argues for a relational mechanism-based analysis to investigate 
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securitization through empirical application. The fourth builds upon the first three then 
by laying out the research design. 
 
 
II. Identity and Security – Material and Social 
 
The ultimate reason to study the concept of identity in IR is that “we” fight against and make 
peace with “others”…But for one reason or many – or, as we seem forced to relearn in every 
generation, for no reason at all – they come to be recognized as the “other”: the barbarian, 
infidel, heretic, savage, revolutionary, traitor; the racist, sexist, lunatic, alien cyborg. In turn, 
our collective identity – citizens, patriots, believers – becomes dependent upon these differences. 
These historic encounters of identity and difference have created fundamental physical, 
metaphysical and representational boundaries in and of IR.29  
 
 
Identity and boundaries are intimately tied to international relations in practice 
and in theory. The social construction of particular identities has significance for 
intersubjective understanding and material outcomes. Security practices are not isolated 
from broader social and political relations, and official discourses of identity contribute 
to collective meanings across public and private spheres. While identities are open to 
renegotiation, this does not mean they are devoid of substance. Boundaries 
distinguishing self/other identities establish walls of difference that enable illiberal 
practice by becoming “manifest in every instance of violence, every instance of control, 
every instance of practices targeted against a constructed other, the enemy within and 
without”.30 The growing normalization of extraordinary counterterrorism has been 
described as a “politics of exception” and “permanent state of emergency”.31 This 
alludes to analyses of government as in the “business of selling protection”,32 and is 
connected to research on the politics of fear in governmentalities of risk management.33 
Securitizing actors essentialize identity to justify exceptional measures, representing an:  
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exceptionalism inside liberalism, a logic of exclusion resting upon the 
construction of profiles that frame who is ‘abnormal’, and upon the imperative of 
freedom transformed into a normalization of social groups whose behaviours are 
monitored for their present and their future34 
 
 
How do particular constructions of identity and associated relations of power make this 
“logic of exclusion” a dominant guide for policy-making? How do routines change or 
stabilize over time, and what consequences does this have for counterterrorism 
outcomes? The notion of boundaries as flexible and durable echoes observations that 
what is needed is “a way of conceptualizing those moments of fixity and transformation 
in a foundationless world”.35 This thesis works to balance the fixity (substance) and 
transformation (process) of securitizing terrorism by teasing out the processual 
underpinnings of identity. Theory is a philosophically informed and practically useful 
tool for research practice and communication, but it is not a guide to universal truth. 
Theoretical approaches help us simplify, but not negate, the complexities of socio-
political relations:  
 
Theories are like mushrooms: they can be classified into three categories – 
‘edible’, ‘poisonous’ and ‘indifferent’. The criteria for good or sound theory are 
evident enough: it should be conceptually clear and rigorous, historically aware, 
able to yield substantive analysis and research agenda, and, where appropriate, 
able to engage with ethical issues.36  
 
 
Theories are thus not naturally pre-existing guides to knowledge claim-making, but 
different lens with which to approach particular empirical and philosophical inquiries. In 
agreement with the above, and in conjunction with the view that “[t]he role of theory is 
to structure analysis,” this chapter presents securitization and relationalism as two 
complementary approaches with which to empirically investigate the interlinking of 
identity and security.37 
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Identity as a concept “is most simply explained as “collective answers to the 
question “Who are you?” “Who are we?” and “Who are they?” offered by participants in 
such claim making”.38 As explained by Buzan, Waever, and Lemaitre, “At its most 
basic, [social] identity is what enables the word ‘we’ to be used.”39 By positioning 
identity as a response to a question, its contingent and relational character is brought to 
the forefront of analysis by considering: 
 
a substantial part of social reality consists of transactions among social units, that 
those transactions crystallize into ties, that they shape the social units involved, 
that they concatenate into variable structures. Identity will then become not an 
essential feature of an individual or a group but a characteristic and consequence 
of social interaction.40 
 
 
Identities as sources of knowledge are reasserted and reconstructed through continuous 
interaction. In the context of counterterrorism, national policies reinforce the state as a 
particular entity, while threats to national identity reinforce the need for these policies. It 
is co-constitutive cycle of identity and practice. Charles Tilly’s notion of a shared story 
usefully conceptualizes identity as “an experience” of shared transactions that 
continually renegotiate understanding.41 More specifically for IR, David Campbell’s 
work on the role of danger and identity in U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War,42 
Lene Hansen’s analysis of discourse and identity informing foreign and security policy 
during the Bosnian war,43 Patrick Jackson’s work on the creation of the West and post-
war German reconstruction,44 Iver Neumann’s work on the way constructions of eastern 
(in particular Russian and Turkish) others affect “Europeanness”,45 Richard Jackson’s 
research on language constructing an “Islamic other” informing the U.S. war on 
terrorism,46 Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney’s work on East/West othering and 
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entrenched constructions of difference normalize repression and oppression,47 and Stuart 
Croft’s investigation of the interrelation between securitized Islamic others (Radical and 
Orientalized) and Britishness,48 are some highly instructive analyses into how issues of 
identity and practice interrelate.49 The thesis is aims to build upon this existing literature 
on consequential self/other construction by incorporating a new theoretical framing and 
empirical illustration that brings relational aspects of identity and practice to the 
forefront of analysis.  
 
To help conceptualize boundary drawing, identity, and security, the experience 
of going through immigration at London Heathrow is a useful, if simple, example. By 
entering the “Non-EU/UK Citizen” line at immigration, I publicly confirm that I am 
officially “outside” EU and UK borders of belonging. In presenting my passport to the 
official, I reassert this inside/outside boundary marker by accepting their identity as the 
British Self, and myself as a foreign Other. If we saw each other again in the future, and 
I had since obtained British citizenship, the official would in all likelihood still 
categorize me as outside the bounds of Britishness. Transactions that assert particular 
identities at one time can inform how we order our relations in the future, regardless if 
changes in identity have occurred. Explained in detail through the work of Mark Salter, 
such bordering experiences shed light on some of the everyday interrelations of identity 
and security.50 
 
The “state” and state actors depend upon processes of boundary maintenance to 
maintain sovereignty and legitimize the use of force. Security policies are supported by 
both self/other perceptions of identity and evidence of material risk, with state purpose 
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reinforced through national security policy and discourse.51 Power relations along 
identity lines are central to the rules of engagement. As explained by Judith Butler, “to 
understand identity as a practice, and as a signifying practice, is to understand culturally 
intelligible subjects as the resulting effects of a rule-bound discourse”.52 In this vein 
“there need not be a “doer behind the deed”: the “doer” is constructed “in and through 
the deed” itself.53 From a similar perspective but in the context of the War on Terror, 
Richard Jackson links identity and practice by explaining how “the terms, assumptions, 
labels, categories and narratives used to describe and explain terrorism” have become 
“largely unquestioned”.54 The linking up of particular phrases forms influential 
narratives and inscribes particular knowledges.55 What methods can help us better 
clarify and communicate relational transactions to “reveal the temporal and contingent 
groundlessness of this “ground”” underlying identity?56  
 
Language does not have complete power over agency, postmodern approaches 
are not out of touch, and it is not that there is no ground. Rather, the argument is that the 
representations of that ground are encapsulated by identity labels that are in essence 
always open to change. This requires research to “understand how current forms of 
knowledge have been naturalized through time and discursive practice”.57 This is a 
“form of critical theorizing”, viewing: 
 
an understanding of language as constitutive or productive of meaning; an 
understanding of discourse as structures of signification that construct social 
realities, particularly in terms of defining subjects and establishing their 
relational positions within a system of signification; an understanding of 
discourse as being productive of subjects authorized to speak and act, legitimate 
forms of knowledge and political practices and importantly, common sense 
within particular social groups and historical settings; an understanding of 
discourse as necessarily exclusionary and silencing of other modes of 
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representation; and an understanding of discourse as historically and culturally 
contingent, intertextual, open-ended, requiring continuous articulation and re-
articulation and therefore, open to destabilization and counter-hegemonic 
struggle58 
 
 
In reflecting on the critical theorizing above, discourse is thus not just a descriptive 
component of socio-political relations, but a constitutive and consequential part of 
decision-making. Discourse is not deterministic, but the establishment of common 
practices and perceptions of legitimacy around who speaks and what is said can lead to 
embedded structures with significant impact on understanding and outcome. Certain 
rhetorical packages of identity enable, limit, and constitute counterterrorism to enable 
certain outcomes over others. In this way, discourse is of causal impact. Linguistic 
practices are not teleologically driven forces of nature, but they do establish temporarily 
stabilized structures. These structures in turn guide collective understanding and rule-
making. Language and discourse cannot be isolated from the historical contexts within 
which relational practices take place. Nor does language establish structures dissolving 
individual or collective capacities for agency.  
 
Discourses of identity exhibit intersubjective power by shaping the spaces within 
which agency is engaged. This is not due to independent properties of grammar. Rather, 
to how rhetorical structures form intersubjective understandings that establish certain 
rules that in turn limit conditions of possible agency. Processual-relational accounts 
acknowledge the role of interpretation for outcomes of legitimation struggles and 
endorse a view of causality that does not depend upon “unanswerable questions about 
actors’ true motives”.59 Causality is an indication of how certain practices can contribute 
to the constitution of evolving collective meaning and material outcomes in an observed 
way for a particular case: “causality” does not imply a universal law that can be applied 
across multiple cases. Through relational mechanisms, analyses of securitization hone in 
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on complex practices of social construction without ignoring the role of substance.60 
More specifically, securitization theory enables analysis to both investigate the 
processual side of identity construction and boundaries while incorporating how the very 
constitution of these us/them identifiers is of causal significance for subsequent material 
practice and collective meaning. 
 
 
III. Securitization as a gateway 
 
Securitization provides a view of security as being and doing, and is thus 
representative of a product and a process. Speech acts securitizing an issue enable action 
beyond normal politics “[i]f by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of 
an existential threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or 
rules he or she would otherwise be bound by”.61 Securitization theory supports empirical 
analyses into the social and material in that “security is neither objective (threats in 
themselves) nor subjective (a matter of perceptions), but intersubjective and political”.62 
CS approaches go beyond traditional “strategic studies” but do not ignore the 
importance of military developments or state level practice. It is explained that “the 
exact definition and criteria of securitization is constituted by the intersubjective 
establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial 
political effects”.63 More specifically, “to study securitization is to study discourse and 
political constellations: When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and 
semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of 
rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed?”64  
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However, it is not just the “when” that is important, but how particular labels 
gain an observable intersubjective salience over material outcomes. Securitization is 
based along an analytic apparatus including the referent object as what is in need of 
protection, existential threat as what is risking the referent’s survival, and three 
facilitating conditions that contribute to successful securitizations. These conditions are 
defined as: 
 
(1) The demand internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security,  
(2) The social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitizing 
actor—that is, the relationship between speaker and audience and thereby the 
likelihood of the audience accepting the claims made in a securitizing attempt, 
and  
(3) Features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitization.65 
 
 
They are here interpreted as related to, but distinct from, John L. Austin’s speech act 
theory based in grammatical issues known as “felicity conditions”. Speech acts are 
elaborated in one way as follows: 
 
In security discourse, an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme 
priority; thus, by labeling it as security, an agent claims a need for and a right to 
treat it by extraordinary means. For the analyst to grasp this act, the task is not to 
assess some objective threats that “really” endanger some object to be defended 
or secured; rather, it is to understand the processes of constructing a shared 
understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a 
threat. The process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech 
act. It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the 
utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words something is done (like 
betting, giving a promise, naming a ship).66 
 
 
Thus in the context of counterterrorism and securitization, for this relational analysis 
into the power of language and discourse for material and ideational outcomes it is not 
essential to first clarify what terrorism “is” or “who” terrorists may be. Explicit 
articulations of “terror” have distinctive influences over outcomes depending on how 
those articulations are positioned and how terms have evolved in collective meaning. 
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But the causal “something is done” is not from formal properties of language. Language 
by itself does not “do”, and there is more to the constitutive consequence of discourse 
than grammatical rules. The causal influence of discourse for securitization depends 
upon relationality, contingency, and context.67 Though the thesis does not systematically 
engage with Bourdieu,68 his discussion of Austin below is a useful interpretation:   
 
to gauge the magnitude of the error in Austin’s and all other strictly formalist 
analyses of symbolic systems, it suffices to show that the language of authority is 
only the limiting case of the legitimate language, whose authority does not 
reside, as the racism of social class would have it, in the set of prosodic and 
articulatory variations which define distinguished pronunciation, or in the 
complexity of the syntax or the richness of the vocabulary, in other words in the 
intrinsic properties of discourse itself, but rather in the social conditions of 
production and reproduction of the distribution between the classes of the 
knowledge and recognition of the legitimate language69 
 
 
This distinction on causality as outside the walls of strict grammatical structure helpfully 
reprioritizes the historical, social, and political conditions related to how language 
influences understanding and outcome. In this thesis words do not matter in and of 
themselves, but in terms of how they have come to represent certain perceptions of 
legitimate and illegitimate identities and actions. Facilitating conditions thus are not seen 
as determining outcomes in a type of deductive or sequential means of evaluating some 
set of relations and outcomes. But they do provide a way to focus research by helping to 
logically identify empirical sources and structure the methods of discourse analysis in a 
transparent way.  
 
With respect to identity, securitization research has carved out specific space for 
further research by noting “the character of the referent object makes a difference”.70 
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One way securitization has been developed around issues of identity is through ideal-
typical sectors of analysis.71 Disaggregated social and political relations are identified 
across distinguished sectors (and their referents) before reassembling components into a 
comprehensive analysis. Recent work on functional differentiation has usefully refined 
this sectoral approach without negating relational dynamics.72 For identity, the mutual 
constitution of different referents across sectors enables certain constructions of identity 
to achieve institutional durability over others. For example, a British “way of life” 
referent in the societal sector justifies legal measures in the political referent that are 
justified in the name of preserving this “way”. The formation and enactment of these 
laws reinforce the British state (political sector referent) through institutions that reassert 
authority and sovereignty. These institutions then cycle back to the societal sector 
referent by reasserting “democracy” and “the rule of law”. A societal “we” is interwoven 
with the political state. Societal and political sector boundaries are not necessarily 
“coterminous”, but their referents can still be mutually constituted and causally 
consequential for outcomes.73  
 
Most scholarship does not disagree with securitization but works to expand its 
potential in different ways. As stated by Stefano Guzzini, “securitization does a lot: it is 
a conceptual move, a framework of analysis, an empirical theory and a political theory 
of security. A lifetime job!”74 Similar to work on sectors, there has been a range of work 
to develop the theory further. For example, by expanding on “facilitating conditions”,75 
examining where securitization has failed,76 paying more attention to visuality,77 or 
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incorporating feminist scholarship.78 Bringing a relational-sociological methodology 
contributes to these efforts by developing securitization’s processual dynamics related to 
political sociology. Counterterrorism studies benefit from securitization through the 
theory’s attention to issues of social construction and materiality surrounding identity 
and security. At the same time, terrorism studies bring new empirical questions to 
securitization by investigating how “securitization reflects the complex constitution of 
social and political communities” in the context of counterterrorism.79 Though 
securitization theory is based on threats and referents, research on how these threats and 
referents become temporarily stabilized notions of identity is under-investigated. A view 
of discourse and materiality as “shaping each other in a dialectical, never-ceasing 
dynamic” underlines the relational aspect of securitization, and points to space for 
genealogical studies of identity and security practice.80  
 
Acknowledging the processual nature of identity underlying securitization 
connects to broader sociological concerns of “whether to conceive of the social world as 
consisting primarily in substances or in processes, in static “things” or in dynamic, 
unfolding relations”.81 However, there is no reason to have to decide “whether”/“or”. 
Pairing securitization with relational sociology encourages a beneficial focus on how 
substance and process work together. For empirical investigations of securitization, 
processual-relational accounts help us to more comprehensively interrogate the 
interrelation of boundaries, identity, and security.82 Articulations of referent and threat 
identities result from social and political practice, but entail material consequences. A 
relational methodology based along mechanisms of analysis brings research design 
specification and methodological clarity to securitization. Applying this approach to the 
historical development of British counterterrorism contributes a new narrative for 
broader IR concerns, terrorism studies, and relational scholarship. 
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IV. Enter relationalism 
 
Securitization’s attention to speech acts and intersubjective understanding 
encourages critical inquiries of the security-identity nexus. To best capture this 
interweaving demands empirical interrogations of threat/referent construction in 
practice. In line with Guzzini, this thesis aims to develop securitization not just as a 
conceptual move or theoretical framework, but also as an “empirical theory” connected 
to a “social ontology of discourses and practices”.83 The “post-structural realist” 
perspective of securitization encourages the use of a relational approach.84 Securitization 
is inherently relational, but work has not sufficiently engaged with relational scholarship 
in IR and sociology. Recent work has engaged more with aspects of securitization and 
methodology,85 but space remains for further explorations into securitization research 
design. The use of relational mechanisms and a processual approach of this thesis aims 
to provide one such exploration. 
 
Relationalism has been explained as treating “social interaction, social ties, 
communication, and conversation not merely as expressions of structure, rationality, 
consciousness, or culture but as active sites of creation and change”.86 This compliments 
critical terrorism studies research and poststructuralism more generally by approaching 
notions of identity with a certain analytic scrutiny. Particular identities arise from 
transactional negotiations within and amongst social relations, even if resulting patterns 
appear to confirm identities as “objective truths”. Individuals are not “neatly bounded” 
or “self-propelling” but are constantly “renegotiating who they are, adjusting the 
boundaries they occupy, modifying their actions in rapid response to other people’s 
reactions, selecting among and altering available scripts”: structures of identity and 
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actors’ agency are mutually reinforcing components of relational transactions that are 
never “arrested” in time.87 
 
 
Entities are “embedded in process and relation, so that there is no internal ‘core’ 
which was separate from social process”.88 Individuals are “inseparable from the 
transactional contexts within which they are embedded”.89 Relational research does not 
aim to find universal laws, but to understand how observed social and political practices 
lead to stabilities of identity and influence outcomes. Relational mechanisms target 
actor-level transactions without ignoring broader boundary shifts of identity, providing 
for a more comprehensive analysis.90 
 
A relational sensibility tailors research narratives that analyze and communicate 
how specific factors come together in a case with particular outcomes, with language 
and discourse playing a central role in establishing structures of meaning. At the same 
time, these understandings and structures are always open to (re)interpretation. 
Discourse is both structured (relatively fixed and consequential) and post-structural 
(relatively fluid and open to reconstruction).91 A relational perspective of securitization 
necessarily navigates both of these spectrums. By investigating the webs of relations 
underlying explicitly identified threat/referent identities, relational approaches identify 
repeated rhetorical practices over time. These patterns have been referred to in a variety 
of ways, one of which is as repertoires: 
 
[actors] do not simply invent an efficient new action or express whatever 
impulses they feel, but rework known routines in response to current 
circumstances…Performances within repertoires do not usually follow precise 
scripts to the letter; they resemble conversation in conforming to implicit 
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interaction rules, but engaging incessant improvisation on the part of all 
participants92 
 
 
Thus known routines and structures of identity have significance for subsequent action, 
but this significance does not strip an individual of their capacity to act as agents as 
“improvisation” and choice is never made obsolete. This tension between language as 
establishing durable structures and language as open to reinterpretation is of key 
significance for studies of securitization and how practices change or stay the same over 
time.  
 
While patterns may encourage a (mis)perception of certain identities as 
representing “universal truth”, they are in fact open to reconfiguration through changing 
contexts and interpretations. Relational narratives help explain how sets of 
commonplaces come to represent specific entities. For example, how the “stateness” of a 
state is produced through a particular web of relational processes.93 Process in this sense 
is “a causally or functionally linked set of occurrences or events which produce a 
‘change in the complexion of reality’”.94 A configuration is an aggregation of processes, 
to be “studied as systems of meaning, using hermeneutical or ‘interpretivist’ 
techniques”.95 For this thesis, the “techniques” are based in relational mechanisms of 
analysis. This connection between meaning-making, stabilized threat/referent forms, and 
counterterrorism practice harmonizes relational approaches with studies on 
securitization. 
 
 
V. Research design 
 
A relational-securitization framework is a genealogical discourse analysis tracing 
the way threat/referent identities are constructed across official British discourse. 
Specifically, how such processes influenced the emergence, legitimation, and 
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normalization of counterterrorism from 1968 to 2011. Genealogical indicates an 
attention to temporality, power and social construction. This complements genealogical 
analysis by viewing social actors as always “embedded in space and time”.96 Such a 
perspective asks how things today have evolved to become accepted in the particular 
way that they have. Building on research by Milliken and Hansen in areas of discourse 
analysis, a relational-securitization approach enables an attentive focus on one particular 
case without ignoring broader debates.97 By using relational mechanisms to harness and 
interpret how commonplaces come together in particular ways, we can better understand 
and explain the causally and co-constitutive relationship of identity and security.  
 
Each empirical chapter is organized into two sections. A first section provides 
historical context by outlining key events and policy developments. A second section 
then provides the detailed relational analysis of official discourse, counterterrorism, and 
identity. The overarching investigation of how terrorism is securitized, and assumptions 
of securitization theory, is what anchors the thesis. But relational mechanisms are what 
provide the dominant tools of analysis across each empirical chapter. This analysis is 
implemented along some general guidelines. One is to follow Jackson’s assessment that 
explaining outcomes involves “the analytical delineation of a set of causal mechanisms 
deemed likely to matter in particular cases, and the careful empirical tracing of that case 
or cases to illustrate the particular way in which these mechanisms came together”.98 
Another is to use securitization’s facilitating conditions as an aid to empirical source 
identification. Facilitating conditions are not binding but help to logically identify 
primary sources from the expansive selection of possible material. For this thesis they 
are interpreted as follows:  
 
Condition 1, “grammar of security” = the counterterrorism genre of texts (legal 
acts, parliamentary debates, reviews/reports, and other official discourse 
explicitly drawing on a language of “terror”);  
 
                                                 
96
 Emirbayer, “Manifesto,” 307. 
97
 Milliken, “The Study of Discourse”; Hansen, Security as Practice. 
98
 Jackson, Civlizing the Enemy, 43. 
 95
 
Condition 2, “authority of securitizing actor” = discourses written/spoken by 
official British political actors, audience and “reach” strengthened by a focus on 
publicly accessible discourse; 
 
Condition 3, “features of the threat to bolster or hinder securitization” = 
consistent and explicit attention to temporal contexts, contingency, history. 
 
 
Complimenting the above is Hansen’s advice that texts should be chosen if “they are 
characterized by the clear articulation of identities and policies; they are widely read and 
attended to; and they have the formal authority to define a political position”.99  For this 
thesis, these guidelines translate into discourses that are selected from searches for 
explicit “terrorism-related” language, are public official discourses whose audience is 
those making decisions on counterterrorism who must report these decisions to their 
constituents, and are elite-authored in the sense that they are official sources of 
knowledge that constitute identity. This final point refers to legal acts that put terms of 
terrorism on the books and in so doing simultaneously reassert British sovereignty and 
identity through the rule of law. The selection of texts relate to (a), legal acts with 
explicit articulations of “terror” in their policy substance; (b), searches in Hansard for 
terror, terrorist, and terrorism more generally as well as specific texts identified in 
background reading (i.e. “Prevention of Terrorism Act”) to include broader discourses 
on terrorism; and (c), supplementary discourses dependent upon terms of terror that 
influence intersubjective understanding and counterterrorism (i.e. official reports or 
speeches on the operation of a particular measure).  
 
An explanation of the mechanisms incorporated into the analysis as “interpretive 
devices” is essential to explain the research design and relational approach. From 
existing literature, four specific mechanisms stood out as holding particular potential for 
this thesis tracing threat/referent construction in the securitization of terrorism and 
development of counterterrorism. Their definitions and some examples are as follows: 
 
Framing 
 
                                                 
99
 Hansen, Security as Practice, 85. 
 96
 
“a collective process of interpretation, attribution, and social construction” going 
“well beyond how a movement’s goals are strategically formed to a much 
broader set of interpretive processes” that “result in attribution of new threats and 
opportunities by one or more parties”100 
 
Example: The way immigration is politicized along framings of a “Mexican wave 
of illegals” into the U.S. reasserts particular identity boundaries to support 
particular policy goals even as immigration from Mexico has decreased. 
  
 
Brokerage 
 
“the linking of two or more currently unconnected social sites by a unit that 
mediates their relations with each other and/or with yet another site …Brokerage 
creates new boundaries and connections among political actors”101 
 
Example: A U.S. Tea Party candidate and a green party candidate both frame 
Mexican immigration in their respective political discourse as “waves of 
illegals” to establish a new network tie. In this sense brokerage can take place in 
terms of a new tie that connects specific discursive sites as well as individual 
actors.102 
 
 
Yoking103 
 
“when a social space is already filled with entities, when a division of a social 
space into entities is already established and institutionalized in some way…the 
only ways to radically change arrangements in a social space are to delegitimize 
old differences or to emphasize new ones. The former strategy yokes entities 
together, the latter divides them”104 
 
Example: Through the election of a Mexican-American immigrant to political 
boundaries of “acceptable” immigrants sharing a boundary with the self while 
reasserting illegal immigrants as criminal aliens. 
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Rhetorical Coercion 
 
“While claimants may deploy arguments in the hope that they will eventually 
persuade, their more immediate task is, through skillful framing, to leave their 
opponents without access to the rhetorical materials needed to craft a socially 
sustainable rebuttal. Rhetorical coercion occurs when this strategy proves 
successful: when the claimant’s opponents have been talked into a corner, 
compelled to endorse a stance they would otherwise reject.”105 
 
Example: By combining framings of Mexican immigration as a threat to national 
security and to national identity, official U.S. discourse can rhetorically coerce 
actors into accepting illiberal policies toward border control even if the actors 
“believe in” or would prefer a different approach. 
 
 
These relational mechanisms aid the identification, analysis, and communication of 
how threat/referent forms are constructed through securitization to influence 
counterterrorism. They are ideal-types to structure and communicate discourse analysis 
in a particular way. Do embedded or historical rhetorical maneuvers provide stability 
during decision-making? Do discourses break from earlier configurations to reconstruct 
threat/referent entities in the face of shifting events and power structures? Is agency 
able to dissolve certain identities despite structural barriers, thereby opening alternative 
conditions of possible action? Or is agency restricted by durable structures of us/them 
understandings? Agents are not dissolved of their capacity to make a choice, however, 
structures of us/them identity that position a threat in contradistinction to a referent in 
need of protection do pose political and conceptual obstacles to how agency can be 
engaged. 
 
A brief illustration of each mechanism in the context of British counterterrorism 
helps further explain the utility of a relational approach to securitization. To begin, a 
simple instance of framing as observed across some official discourses is cited here: 
 
The aim of the UK Government’s counterterrorism strategy is to reduce the risk 
we face from international terrorism so that people can go about their lives freely 
and with confidence… 
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Keeping the UK and its people safe is the Government’s first priority.106  
 
 
This language frames the existential threat as from “international terrorism”, not 
“terrorism” generally. This externalizes the other in opposition to the “UK and its 
people,” not “British”. Framing holds a significant causal influence by establishing the 
intersubjective boundaries within which an audience interprets threat/referent entities. 
Different arrangements of different commonplaces have varied consequences for 
outcomes. These configurations contribute to the contextual situatedness of 
threat/referent construction during securitization. Brokerage helps us better understand 
the salience of particular framings by highlighting the connection of previously 
unconnected sites and/or actors through new linkages.  
 
A dominant perspective on “brokerage” as a relational mechanism in existing 
literature is that it entails a distinctive physical or human dimension. For example, as 
explained by Sherrill Stroschein, how a specific academic (actor) can be the broker 
between two opposition parties (actors) to establish a new political coalition. Though not 
in disagreement with this position depending on the context under inquiry, brokerage in 
this thesis departs from being a mechanism that encompasses a strictly physical 
dimension. Brokerage is an observed relational transaction, but this observation need not 
be associated solely with physical actors or humans as “the brokers”. Rather, two 
discursive sites can be “brokered” through a specific framing that is shared across space 
and time, with the framing itself becoming a type of intertextual broker. As divergent 
sites and actors are brokered through specific threat/referent framings, certain 
intersubjective understandings arise over others to influence how terrorism is securitized 
and how outcomes unfold.  
 
An example is how “murder” was used during the early years of the Troubles to 
broker agreement on the criminality of terrorist violence across party lines: 
 
1971, Reginald Maudling (Con): “The battle against murder and terrorism has to 
be pursued in the interests of all parties.”107 
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1972, Frederick Elwyn Jones (Lab): “That such men and women exist and that 
they have reaped and are reaping a grim harvest of murder and violence in 
Northern Ireland are basic facts which must be faced and dealt with.”108 
 
1972, Ian Paisley (DUP): “the escalation of murders of a most brutal and 
dastardly nature”109 
 
1974, Merlyn Rees (Lab, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland): “crimes of 
murder and extreme bestiality”110 
 
1974, Gerry Fitt (SDLP): “murderers who have been involved in the most 
heinous crimes…brutal, callous assassinations and murders”111 
 
 
In the case above, the criminalization of terrorism would not necessarily have developed 
as it did to enable a maintenance of exceptional counterterrorism law without similar 
framings of “murder” being brokered through the discourses of differentiated political 
elites.  
 
Yoking represents the reallocation of broader legitimate and illegitimate 
boundaries. This mechanism helps us identify how categories are formed through new 
sites of difference. For example, how the yoking of previous terrorist others in Northern 
Ireland to legitimate politics in the late 1990s established new boundaries of difference 
between former, current, and new types of terrorism. Yoking was also observed in 21st 
century reconstructions of identity by further differentiate Irish threats from international 
threats: 
 
Terrorism is not new to the UK. There is a continuing domestic threat from 
dissident Irish republican groups. But the most serious threat we face is from 
international terrorism…Al Qa’ida and similar groups are the main international 
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terrorist threat to the UK…motivated by a violent extremist ideology, which 
wrongly uses religion to justify violence.112 
 
 
By deploying framings of dissident Irish republicanism instead of “Irish terrorism”, 
boundaries of legitimate and illegitimate actors were allocated. This enabled a less 
hardline approach to Northern Ireland and increasingly exceptional approach to 
international terrorism even as Irish-related insecurities were on the rise. While multiple 
threat labels coexist and overlap, each terrorist “other” is established along different 
perceptions of risk. By yoking Irish related threats to “dissident” and reframing the 
international threat as “motivated by a violent extremist ideology”, former Irish terrorists 
were aligned with boundaries closer to the self. The new threat of “international” 
terrorism was externalized, positioned as more dangerous and further from the referent.  
 
 Rhetorical coercion is in many ways the most useful mechanism to help explain 
how exceptional British counterterrorism became normalized. This mechanism captures 
how political agency and sustainable political argumentation can be constrained “even 
when one’s opponents have not internalized the promoted values”.113 One example of 
rhetorical coercion is through the deployment of “real” as a commonplace during 2005 
debate:  
 
2005, Charles Clarke (Lab, Home Secretary): It is that vigilance against a real 
and substantial terrorist threat that is my responsibility to carry through, and I 
will.114   
 
2005, Hazel Blears (Lab, Home Office Minister): During the recent debates on 
the new legislation the majority of the House of Commons recognised the threat 
is real and serious and different in character. 115 
 
2005, Michael Howard (Con): We all agree that terrorism is a real and current 
threat, and that special powers are needed to deal with it.116  
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2005, Lord Carlile (LD): There is a real and present threat of continuing al-
Qaeda-connected terrorism within the United Kingdom.117 
 
 
Who can politically sustain a rebuttal to arguments for continuing exceptional 
counterterrorism law with so many accepting the threat as so “obviously real”? Without 
repeated usages of “real”, a vague and yet politically unarguable reference point, 
proposed measures would face greater scrutiny and would not necessarily have resulted 
in new legal powers. Rhetorical coercion helps analysis identify the way certain 
structures of identity and intersubjective understanding limit spaces for agency. While 
not explicitly referred to as “rhetorical coercion”, reference to a similar effect is 
observed by Donohue, albeit discussed in a different terminology: “Couched in terms of 
patriotism, failure to back the government becomes seen as support for terrorist entities 
– a dynamic notable in successive debates in the United Kingdom on the Prevention of 
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act.”118 Rhetorical coercion causally influences 
outcomes by delimiting, not determining, spaces of political action.  
 
These relational mechanisms help analysis map out how patterns in discourse 
and securitization influence intersubjective understanding and material outcomes. 
Framing highlights how a threat is rhetorically described and contextually positioned; 
brokerage represents how previously unconnected actors or sites become newly 
connected through similar framings; yoking redraws broader boundaries separating 
legitimate and illegitimate categories of actors; and rhetorical coercion captures the way 
particular configurations constrain and limit agency to make alternative measures 
politically unsustainable.  
 
Following this explanation of relational mechanisms for this thesis, it is helpful 
to present how analysis will be “done” to map out how processes of threat/referent 
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construction. This discourse analysis is an inductive rather than deductive or hypothesis 
testing approach, with the steps that help to structure analysis, loosely, as follows: 
 
1.) After establishing the temporal beginning and end for the case and chapters, 
build background knowledge of the case through secondary literature. Establish a 
chronological matrix of key events. 
 
2.) Identify official discourses (laws, policy strategies, reports, reviews, and 
debates) linked to counterterrorism during the period under analysis as 
determined by step 1. Further narrow this selection through the frequency of 
explicit articulations such as “terror”, “terrorist”, and “terrorism”. 
 
3.) Engage in an interpretive and historical analysis of the discourses. Prioritize 
substantive shifts in material power and discursive shifts in observed identity 
markers. Trace observed relational configurations of commonplaces around 
threat/referent construction. 
 
4.) Use steps 1-3 alongside searches of explicit articulations in Hansard119 to 
identify parliamentary debates related to counterterrorism law and broader 
discourses on terrorism for sources of legitimation struggle.  
 
5.) Re-read notes taken during steps 1 through 4, paying attention to how 
commonplaces are positioned across discourses considering mechanisms of 
framing, brokerage, yoking, and rhetorical coercion. Identify relational 
configurations and causal patterns. 
 
6.) Structure the analytic narrative in each chapter along two interrelated layers: 
(1) historical summary and positioning of events and counterterrorism, and (2), 
relational discussion of identity and securitization underlying shifts or 
stabilizations of threat/referent forms across discourse. 
 
  
These steps are an effort to present a more transparent methodological design. The 
above is not a rigid template, but enables back and forth movement between and out of 
step(s) during analysis. Each step involves the researcher prioritizing what material is 
used and how analysis is done. The way a researcher researches is a consequence of 
decision, not inevitability: “our very experience of the world is inescapably mediated by 
the conceptual and linguistic apparatus that we bring to bear when producing knowledge 
of the world”.120 A more detailed discussion of methodological decision-making would 
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add further clarification. But presenting these guidelines helps provide at minimum a 
more explicit ownership considering the role of the researcher and interpretation 
influencing the formation of an analytic narrative. 
 
This presentation of the relational-securitization research design is best followed 
by way of illustration: a simple exploration of “the stranger” from childhood experience. 
As outlined below, this example will help make clear the way that narrative process can 
establish particular threat identities and justify exceptional measures to influence 
conditions of possibility, agency and outcomes.  
 
 
VI. Concluding by way of the stranger 
 
As a child, the stranger was constructed as a specific threat posing a direct risk to 
my survival. My understanding and acceptance of this stranger identity depended upon 
rhetorical constructions deployed by people in authority that I trusted to know what they 
were talking about: Mom, dad, teacher, police. They all constructed the stranger as a risk 
to my security, each of them using similar language to frame the threat, brokered by 
shared “repertoires of stranger construction” that reasserted particular boundaries around 
this specific threatening other. Similar to the construction of the terrorist other, threat 
construction of the stranger had taken place before the threat would necessarily come 
into real physical “existence”. Processes of securitization simultaneously enabled and 
affirm preventive security practices. Whether or not a physical “stranger entity” ever 
presented her or himself to me was irrelevant for a successful securitization of the 
stranger and formation of exceptional measures. Due to patterns of identity construction 
brokering parents, police, and teachers into a strengthened relational network through 
similar framings of stranger threat construction, I accepted this other as “really existing”.  
 
My agency was constrained by structures establishing the stranger’s identity that 
directed me to abide by rules I would not tolerate if there had been no articulation of the 
stranger threat. For example, rules like only walking home from school a certain way, 
 104
 
only talking to certain people, justifying suspicion of others, and in general, limiting my 
independent actions to those delineated by authorities as necessary. The stranger was 
successfully securitized as an objective threat without imminent material evidence of 
risk. This securitization led to a change in how I walked home through collective 
meanings of identity that justified an extension of security measures beyond “normal” 
rules.  
 
The construction of the stranger illustrates how a mechanism-based approach can 
help elucidate the way identity and discourse build intersubjective understanding and 
influence outcomes. The role of perception is essential to justifying exceptional 
measures, and is of particular importance for the securitization of terrorism considering 
counterterrorism’s base in prevention and preemption. The use of relational mechanisms 
as method, relationalism as methodological sensibility, and securitization as theoretical 
logic, provide a useful way to engage in an analysis of official British discourse, 
identity, securitization, and counterterrorism. This relational-securitization framework 
enables a better understanding and explanation of how identity, discourse, and 
securitization contributed to the emergence, legitimation, and normalization of 
exceptional counterterrorism from 1968 to 2011. The next chapter starts the empirical 
narrative of this thesis, beginning in 1968, the start of the most recent Troubles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 4 
1968 – 1978 
Troubling times, temporary laws 
  
 
The conflict is about permanent identity-in-opposition, requiring every occasion to splice itself, 
like some feat of genetic engineering, into its tribal components, precluding a shared sense of 
grieving, the rhetoric of exclusion accommodating only a mutual sense of betrayal.1 
 
 
 
 This chapter begins the empirically grounded relational-securitization analysis of 
identity, official British discourse, and counterterrorism. Constructions and perceptions 
of identity going back decades were a core part of the more recent conflict in Northern 
Ireland that precipitated counterterrorism law and a building discourse of “terrorist” 
threat.2  Relational configurations of us/them identities in opposition were essential to 
the securitization of terrorism during the mid to late 20th century in official British 
discourse. These processes of securitization were, in turn, of causal significance for how 
counterterrorism emerged, was legitimized, and became normalized from 1968 to 2011. 
Historical issues of nationalism and competing notions of “Britishness” were highly 
significant for how terrorism was securitized during these years. In one account of 
identity and the Peace Process, “While 72% of the people of Northern Ireland preferred 
to remain part of the UK in 1992, only 30% of the British people saw the identity of 
Northern Ireland in the same light.”3  
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In one account going back to the early 20th century, “Englishmen” were 
explained as regarding the Irish to be “hostile natives”.4 Myths about the Irish as 
menacing others continue to inform divisions within Northern Ireland. An example is 
one account of a childhood story. It was told that since Ireland was neutral during WWII 
and did not have operating “blackouts”, by using electricity at night the Irish were 
purposefully “pointing” to Northern Ireland for German bombers.5 Notions of the Irish 
other played a role in British security practices going back well beyond late 20th century 
Troubles. But it was the formation of laws based on an explicit language of terrorism 
and the resulting construction of terrorist others that began processes of othering that 
enabled a normalization of 21st century counterterrorism practice. For this chapter from 
1968 to 1979, identity divisions within Northern Ireland as well as between Northern 
Ireland and the British “mainland” were central to discourses and practices of 
counterterrorism. Since it was the conflict out of Northern Ireland that sparked the 
introduction of special powers formed through an explicit language of “terrorism”, it is 
with the Northern Irish context that analysis begins.  
 
This temporal starting point may be seen by many readers as too recent to fully 
understand issues of security, identity, and Northern Ireland. In many ways they would 
be right, and indeed the history of British-Irish relations, conflict, and “special powers” 
goes back hundreds of years. As stated in his seminal study of Irish nationalism Richard 
English convincingly establishes that “it is clear that these late-nineteenth-century issues 
have cast a shadow into the twenty-first century”.6 In acknowledging this influential 
history well before 1968, starting analysis from the late sixties should not be seen as 
ignoring historical precedent. Rather, this more recent temporal beginning underscores 
the newness of counterterrorism and the focus of this thesis on exceptional security 
measures based in an explicit language of terrorism. The emergence of special powers 
formed by and through an explicit terminology of “terrorism” and “terrorist” began with 
the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 (EPA), and Prevention of 
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Terrorism (Temporary Orders) Act 1974 (PTA). To understand how permanent 21st 
century counterterrorism became normalized, discourse analysis must begin by 
investigating how these acts were introduced and justified through an evolving 
securitization of terrorism. The EPA was explained as: 
 
An Act to make provision with respect to the following matters in Northern 
Ireland, that is to say, proceedings for and the punishment of certain offences, the 
detention of terrorists, the preservation of the peace, the maintenance of order 
and the detection of crime and to proscribe and make other provision in 
connection with certain organisations there, and for connected purposes. [25th 
July 1973]7  
 
 
Out of a total 35 pages there are 21 matches for “terror”. The ability of a constable to 
“arrest without warrant any person whom he suspects of being a terrorist” directly 
constructed the threat as being a terrorist, not methods of violence.8 In the EPA, 
terrorism and terrorist are defined as follows: 
 
"terrorism" means the use of violence for political ends and includes any use of 
violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear;  
" terrorist" means a person who is or has been concerned in the commission or 
attempted commission of any act of terrorism or in directing, organising or 
training persons for the purpose of terrorism;9  
 
 
The PTA 1974 comprises 16 pages and 12 matches for “terror”. If including the act’s 
title, appearing on each page, there are 28 matches of “terror”.10 The PTA is explained 
as: 
 
An Act to proscribe organisations concerned in terrorism, and to give power to 
exclude certain persons from Great Britain or the United Kingdom in order to 
prevent acts of terrorism, and for connected purposes. [29th November 1974]11 
 
 
                                                 
7
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Similar to the EPA, a terminology of terrorism constituted the legal substance of this act 
through explicit articulations of “terror”. A distinct shift from the EPA to the PTA was 
the goal of preventing terrorism positioned in the PTA’s title. This set a significant new 
legal precedent for legitimate state power in the form of specific counterterrorism 
measures. 
 
Political violence and special state powers associated with Irish-British relations 
go back for many years. But it was the late 1960s and first years of the 1970s where a 
particular securitization of terrorism enabled the reconfiguration of us/them identities 
necessary to form and justify EPA and PTA measures. Relational configurations in 
official discourse stabilized certain intersubjective understandings of a terrorist other. 
These understandings securitized terrorism in a distinctive way to reconstruct what 
insecurity out of Northern Ireland became collectively accepted as “being”. As will be 
demonstrated through this chapter, the emergence of new counterterrorism laws 
constituted with a language of terrorism was possible because of how terrorism was 
securitized. The aim to prevent terrorist violence before it occurs, combined with the 
elusive definition of terrorism, required that the threat be convincingly established in 
discourse irrespective of actual events. This co-constitution of identity and practice 
began a causally interrelated cycle of securitizing discourse and material 
counterterrorism.  
 
This self-fulfilling cycle would provide a baseline for collective meaning around 
terrorism and legitimize specific counterterrorism outcomes for the next thirty-seven 
years. As argued in the earlier chapters, securitization literature has yet to sufficiently 
problematize the constitutive and causal aspects of how identity and discourse interrelate 
over time. By tracing the way that terrorism was securitized through relational 
configurations of identity, analysis can better explain British counterterrorism’s 
emergence, legitimation, and normalization. The next five chapters provide one 
empirical account of how the intersubjectivity necessary for terrorism to be securitized 
was established. In so doing, discussion endeavors to map out how particular 
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interrelations of identity, discourse, and practice delimited what actions were politically 
possible at different times, thereby influencing observed outcomes of counterterrorism.  
 
The securitization of terrorism during this period enabled a continued re-
authorization of temporary measures. Similar framings such as “brutal murders” linked 
previously unconnected actors and sites with particular discourses of securitization then 
acting as a kind of broker, strengthening certain collective meanings over others. 
Without these framings observed across different sites, terrorism would not have been 
securitized in the way that it was and the observed outcomes of how new 
counterterrorism laws emerged and were maintained would have been different. Yoking 
reallocated broader boundaries of identification by distinguishing terrorists from “other” 
illegitimate others. This yoking also differentiated terrorist actors from political 
movements and the British referent. Despite miscarriages of justice and a lack of 
consensus on counterterrorism effectiveness, certain configurations of threat/referent 
construction rhetorically coerced actors into limited positions of agency. Through the 
distinctive way that terrorism was securitized from 1968 to 1979, opposition to renewing 
new counterterrorism laws and exceptional security practice was politically 
unsustainable.  
 
 
I. Contextualizing 1968 
 
The early 20th century of Irish-British relations brought intensified activity 
related to self-determination and anti-colonial struggle. The foundations of these 
movements go back hundreds of years. But it is the Easter Rising of 1916 preceding the 
1918 election of Sinn Fein in Dublin that is often seen as the beginning of Irish-related 
political violence linked with the late 20th century Troubles. Following the Anglo-Irish 
War, the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty established the Republic of Ireland, but left the six 
Northern counties under British control. The republican movement divided between 
those pursuing non-violent political paths and those committed to armed struggle for a 
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fully united Ireland.12 The political and territorial situation in Ireland and the United 
Kingdom shifted along terms of national self-determination. At the same time, the 
international arena was also undergoing varied transformations. The Second World War 
and the beginning of the Cold War reconfigured international dynamics, with each 
historical moment introducing new security and political challenges. Inter- and intra-
state conflicts associated with decolonization forced dominant powers to reconsider their 
perceptions of legitimate and illegitimate violence. As explained by English, “Between 
Indian independence in 1947 and the handover in 1997 of Hong Kong to the Chinese, 
the British empire died. It was not only in the aftermath of the Second World War that it 
showed cracks. But it was in the wake of that conflict that the map began strikingly and 
emphatically to change colour, as Britain gradually lost its empire.”13 
 
A fear of nuclear annihilation cemented a bipolar international order, while new 
technologies and communications redesigned political and social relations. International 
interconnectedness grew even as local issues remained prominent. Cold War campaigns 
from Latin America to Afghanistan, increased degrees of economic interdependence, 
and political violence by Middle Eastern groups all influenced international relations and 
state practices. Terrorist organizations were not limited to political boundaries or 
hierarchical structures. Technology continued to develop, and attacks involved greater 
lethality. The Six-Day war of 1967 and the 1972 Munich Olympics attack were not just 
interpreted as politically motivated events related to the issue of Palestine. Rather, they 
enabled a generalization of “Middle Eastern” terrorism that helped build intersubjective 
understanding around perceptions of a “new international” terrorism years later.  
 
The Munich attacks contributed to the 1977 European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism, but the vast majority of counterterrorism remained at the state 
level.14 The use of airline hijackings and targeting of symbolic targets represented a shift 
in tactics. But such a shift on its own does not provide evidence of a “new age” of 
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terrorism. From 1960 to 1969 there were nine attacks against civilian aircraft, resulting 
in 286 deaths.15 From 1980-1989 there were 12 attacks, resulting in 1,144 deaths.16 
Although the overall numbers went up, the use of civilian aircraft as a method was not 
new to the late 20th century or post-September 11th era of “international terrorism”. 
State and non-state actors engaged in terrorism and political violence always search for 
bolder and more effective strategies, regardless of the historical period within which 
they are positioned. In light of these international developments, the “international” 
commonplace could have been deployed to construct an “international terrorist” in 
official British discourses around domestic counterterrorism during the early 1970s. 
International acts of violence such as those in Munich could have been referenced as a 
threat to democratic society and legitimized domestic counterterrorism. Instead, the 
focus was on counterterrorism laws as temporary measures to combat insecurity out of 
Ulster. 
 
In Britain and Ireland, there continued to be security issues linked with 
republicanism. Even though mid-20th century events such as a 1950s border campaign 
were largely unsuccessful, there was a latent presence of actors open to using violence 
for political ends. At the same time, the growing dissatisfaction related to social 
inequalities in areas such as housing and employment contributed to new social 
activism. Civil rights movements precipitated new organizations and action, such as the 
earlier mentioned NICRA formed in 1967. These movements challenged the physical 
and figurative walls that fostered unequal patterns of inclusion, access, and participation. 
In 1968 and with the support of the NICRA, the DHAC organized a 5 October 1968 
march in Londonderry/Derry. As news of this march spread, a Loyalist group – the 
Apprentice Boys – planned a parade for the same day. Anticipating conflict, the 
Northern Ireland Stormont government reacted by banning the march. However, the 
DHAC march went ahead and marchers were quickly met with force by the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC). Violent clashes with security officers and rioting ensued, with 
many citing this event as the start of the most recent Troubles. 
                                                 
15
 Ibid., 124. 
16
 Ibid.. 
 112
 
 
The government’s response was largely defensive and RUC actions were for the 
most part excused. In 1969 the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Terrence O’Neil, 
said:  
 
Enough is enough. We have heard sufficient for now about Civil rights, let us 
hear a little about civic responsibility. For it is a short step from the throwing of 
paving stones to the laying of tombstones and I for one can think of no cause in 
Ulster today which will be advanced by the death of a single Ulsterman.17 
  
 
Such responses were interpreted by many as neglecting injustices experienced by the 
minority Catholic community. Excessive force by the authorities exacerbated the 
situation, and helped fuel engagement with militancy. The late sixties are a period 
defined by cycles of violence connecting British security practice, insecurity, and 
paramilitarism. As new measures based in a language of terrorism emerged, a self-
sustaining cycle of discourses and practices of counterterrorism was launched. Patterns 
of threat identification were in a process of transition from historic notions of public 
order to a securitization of terrorism that stabilized particular notions of terrorist others.  
 
Alongside intensified state security practices was the heightening of 
contemporary grievances linked with historic injustice. The civil rights movement 
splintered. The Derry Citizens Action Committee (DCAC) took a moderate route, while 
the People’s Democracy out of Queen’s University took a more militant stance. The 
PIRA split from the Official IRA (OIRA) in 1969. The former reinvigorated “physical 
force” traditions linked with earlier movements.18 State force was also bolstered, with 
British troops arriving in August 1969 in the name of maintaining peace and order. 
Communities initially welcomed the forces, but this reception quickly went cold through 
growing mistrust and insecurity. The army would not officially leave until 2007, almost 
thirty-eight years later. This departure, however, did not mark an end to the insecurity, 
and violence continued to face Northern Irish communities. 
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Exceptional power and repressive security practice reached a peak on 9 August 
1971 with the reinstatement of internment. Indefinite detention was last used during the 
Irish Civil War under the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 
(SPA) 1922. This gave the Minister of Home Affairs for Northern Ireland the power “to 
take all such steps and issue all such orders as may be necessary for preserving the peace 
and maintaining order”. 19 In 1971, an overnight raid detained over 300 civilians, the 
vast majority being Catholic. Consequences from the practice of internment hardened 
boundaries along Republican/Nationalist and Loyalist/Unionist lines, and recharged the 
centuries-long conflict. Direct Rule was implemented in 1972 and aggravated notions of 
colonial rule that had been percolating for decades. As explained by Audrey Kurth 
Cronin, “terrorism is about justice—or, at least, someone’s perception of justice, 
whether its source is human or divine”, and the Irish conflict is no exception.20 Despite 
consequences such as alienation that worsened communal grievances, the EPA and PTA 
provided a baseline from which subsequent measures were formed and legitimized. 
Contemporary policies such as proscription and pre-charge detention are not a post-11 
September invention, but are based in measures going back much further in history.  
 
One of the most dramatic examples of violence between security forces and 
civilians during this period was the Bloody Sunday of 30 January 1972. Fourteen 
civilians were killed and many more wounded. Contrary to eye-witness accounts, 
authorities said they fired after being fired upon, with the Widgery Report excusing the 
actions.21 In 1971, Secretary of State for the Home Department, Reginald Maudling, 
said: 
 
The Compton Committee found no evidence of physical brutality by the British 
Army or the R.U.C., still less of torture or brainwashing. In the course of the 
arrest of 342 men on 9th August a small number of them suffered what the 
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Committee describe as a measure of ill-treatment or hardship. I think the House, 
on studying the report, will conclude that the operation, which was one of 
considerable difficulty and danger, was accomplished in a highly creditable 
manner…Very difficult issues are involved in judging what methods of 
interrogation are permissible in the protection of the lives of the civil population 
and the security forces against a ruthless and deliberate campaign of terror and 
murder.22 
 
 
Excessive force was furthering the wedge between communities. But articulations such 
as a “ruthless” enemy encouraged a distinctive securitization of terrorism that continued 
to justify exceptional practice regardless of the consequences. Domestic reports and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECourtHR) concluded that interrogation did not 
amount to torture. However, the use of “posture on the wall, hooding, noise, deprivation 
of sleep, [and] diet of bread and water” did constitute “physical ill-treatment”.23 Such 
measures were questioned by some in parliament. For example, Labour MP James 
Callaghan asking in 1971 “how far is a democratic assembly entitled to sanction the ill-
treatment of those committed to the custody of soldiers or police in order to save the 
lives of others”?24 But the following years brought a continuance of exceptional security 
practice and insecurity. In 1972 there was the burning of the British Embassy in Dublin, 
and 1974 there were the Birmingham and Guildford pub bombings.  
 
As explained special powers were not themselves new, but earlier measures did 
not rely on explicit discourses of “terrorist” threat. This terminology entailed specific 
consequences for material practice and intersubjective understanding. As state 
counterterrorism was formed, the boundaries between military and law enforcement 
were increasingly blurred. Institutional responsibilities merged in the name of fighting 
terrorist others, even as the definition of terrorism remained vague. When certain powers 
were deemed counterproductive, new powers different in name more than in kind took 
their place. When internment was removed, detention was instated. The replacement of 
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controversial powers with “new” measures that continued a similar security trajectory 
would indeed become a recurring theme.  
 
Terrorism was positioned as a broad category of reprehensible action that was 
also linked with particular types of actors. Initially framed as “rioters” and “hooligans” 
threatening public order, the securitization of terrorism would over time draw upon 
commonplaces such as “brutal murderers”. This criminalized terrorism and bolstered 
enhanced policing in the name of protecting “the public” referent:  
 
The aims of the I.R.A. are to intimidate the population by brutal terrorism and so 
to prevent any co-operation with the Government, the police and the courts of 
law; to inhibit normal political activity and constitutional progress; and to cause 
the public in Great Britain to become so sickened by the ceaseless bloodshed and 
destruction that the Army’s withdrawal will come to be seen as the lesser of two 
evils. No responsible Government can afford to yield to pressures of this kind.25  
 
 
In December of that same year, debate over detention was framed along a similar 
rhetorical path, with William van Straubenzee (Minister of State for NI, Con) stating: 
 
brutality and bloodshed…have sadly become only too prevalent in parts of 
Northern Ireland…for the safety and protection of the public it is our duty to see 
that terrorists are taken off the street, but we can do that only by providing 
alternative provisions26  
  
 
Though internment was ended, detention, search and seizure, and interrogation 
maintained exceptional state practice. Though introduced as temporary, exceptional 
counterterrorism measures were justified by a securitization of terrorism that positioned 
terrorists as entities distinct from “other” others.  
 
Political violence and public emergencies demand a security response. But the 
content of that response and how measures are legitimized is not predestined to take one 
particular form and direction over another. The continuance of exceptional 
counterterrorism measures in Britain, especially during times without violence, 
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demanded a convincing assertion of identity to legitimize state security practice. It is 
important to not ignore that those targeted by counterterrorism were also evaluating state 
legitimacy, albeit from different perspectives: 
 
The state had no legitimacy in the communities from which the IRA sprang. 
They saw themselves as victims of state violence, the army’s incursions as forms 
of assault, the security forces as the armed technicians of repression and 
injustice…In this void of legitimacy, the IRA was given a measure of moral as 
well as political acceptance, especially when it assumed its primary role as 
defender of the Catholic community. The more aggressive and offensive the 
presence of the security forces, the more likely was the community to give 
allegiance to the IRA.27  
 
 
Policies such as internment and pre-charge detention alienated communities. 
Miscarriages of justice such as the Birmingham Six, Guildford Four, and Maguire Seven 
only served to reinforce sentiments of insecurity. Officials understood that measures like 
internment were counterproductive and ensured “continuous enlistment in the IRA”.28 
But similar measures were maintained through a building focus on terrorism as types of 
others linked with specific communities on the margins of the British referent rather than 
a method of violence.  
 
Recent efforts to look back on the way this conflict was managed and determine 
“lessons learned” have provided helpful analyses in different contexts, for example 
contemporary counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.29 But research has yet to explore in 
detail what role the securitization of terrorism played in stabilizing certain identity 
assumptions in particular ways to influence outcomes. “Terrorist” is not a self-evident 
category existing outside practices of labeling. Thus for new measures to be formed 
through a language of terrorism, official discourse has to engage in securitizations that 
stabilize a terrorist other as threatening the survival of the referent. A search of 
Hansard’s online repository of parliamentary debates for “terrorist” from 1803 to 2005 
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resulted in 11 hits for the 19th century, 26,049 hits for the 20th century, and 7814 hits for 
the years 2000-2005. Though 19th century data may be a less representative sample, the 
difference in how many times “terrorist” appears as an explicit enemy identifier is still 
significant. Going by decade for the 20th century, the rate of change for the number of 
times that “terrorist” appears in Hansard debates is shown below: 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 – Number of times “terrorist” appears during Parliamentary debate during the 20th century30 
 
This simple chart illustrates the noticeable increase of observed references to “terrorist” 
even considering the possibility for a margin of error as relates to “actual” documented 
articulations. Terrorizing political violence has gone on as long as history, but a 
terminology explicit identifying “terrorist” others experienced a sharp increase as 
counterterrorism laws (EPA and PTA) were introduced and maintained. It is true that 
there was a growth in violence from the late 1960s onwards. But the existence of 
violence and insecurity does not determine what discourses are used to label or identify 
that violence and insecurity. A number of events throughout the 20th century could have 
warranted a discourse of “terrorist threat” that would have presented a completely 
different data set. However, the frequency of “terrorist” arose with the onset of 
counterterrorism security practice. Through discourses of securitization, “terrorism” 
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came to constitute and legitimize exceptional security practices in particular and 
consequential ways over time.  
 
 
II. Relational positionings, beginning counterterrorism, and disorder 
 
During the late 1960s, unrest was associated with hooligans, rioters, and 
disorder. By the early-mid 1970s, however, explicit terms of terror played a growing 
role in forming and justifying exceptional policies. The 1970s reference to “terrorists” as 
connected to Northern Ireland diverged from earlier official discourse that linked 
“terrorism” to overseas threats. Through a search of “terrorism” and “terrorist” in the 
National Archives database, during earlier 20th century debates, “terrorism” was 
dominated by associations with external threats. During one search of “terrorism” in 
Hansard, “terror” appeared to be most frequently associated with Ireland in the 19th 
century, but areas in Africa and Asia during the early and mid 20th century. Though this 
observation demands further empirical study, the initial assessment seems to present 
terms of “terror” as linked to insecurity from those already perceived as dangerous and 
foreign others. For example, how “If the conflicting territorial claims in the Gulf were to 
lead to local wars, or even only to terrorism and sabotage, it would become difficult to 
maintain the free flow of oil”.31 Or how “serious economic consequences” could lead 
“Africans in Rhodesia to turn to terrorism”.32  
 
Other discourse securitized terrorism by identifying terrorists in the context of 
withdrawal from “southern Arabia”, claiming “A terrorist was indistinguishable from an 
innocent bystander until he showed his colours by flinging a grenade or pistolling a 
victim”.33 Before the EPA or PTA but after 19th century conflicts with Irish groups, 
terrorism was frequently securitized in official British discourse by yoking “terrorists” to 
geographic areas south and east of Britain. These perceptions of physical and cultural 
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distance aligned with degrees of danger and otherness seem to align with empirical 
discussion in later chapters and the observed externalization of terrorist threat. Such 
historical patterns of securitizing types of terrorism along spatial boundary assumptions 
of belonging provided a kind of dormant collective meaning that would be reactivated 
during future securitizations that differentiated types of terrorist others. Securitizations 
could have reasserted terrorism as a method without spatial assumptions of belonging to 
minimize problematic patterns of alienation. But the securitization of terrorism 
continued to depend upon inside/outside boundary assumptions.  
 
Official discourse and temporary counterterrorism laws from 1973 through the 
1990s focused on the Irish threat. But the externalization of non-Irish related threats 
would eventually lead to significantly expanded counterterrorism by the end of the 20th 
century through the new label of “international terrorism”. From 1968 to 1978, the 
securitization of terrorism drew upon commonplaces of criminality, brutal murder, 
public order (community/hooligan gangs), gangsterism, ruthless, and murder. The way 
these commonplaces came together in particular configurations repositioned the threat 
from an issue of public order to one of non-negotiable terrorist enemy-others. Relational 
mechanisms of framing, brokerage, yoking, and rhetorical coercion point to the way 
configurations of identity built intersubjective understanding through relational 
connections to enable and limit what outcomes were possible for political actors. 
Counterterrorism laws and strategies, official reviews and reports, and parliamentary 
debate reinforced certain identity discourses over others through a causally 
consequential intertextuality of official discourse. The way that terrorism was securitized 
led to overall support for EPA and PTA renewals. Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland Merlyn Rees framed the referent as a “peaceful and orderly society”34 founded 
on a “rule of law”.35 In the words of Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson, survival was 
under threat from “lawless” terrorists who “brutally murdered” innocent civilians.36 
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Democratic institutions and society were being undermined by “terrorist 
organisations”.37   
 
Criminality 
 
 Framings of terrorism were increasingly based on notions of criminality. This 
lengthened the distance between legitimate politics and those associated with terrorism 
by silencing the political nature of the violence: “I do not, never have and never will 
regard murder, maiming, kneecapping, bank robbery and intimidation as politically 
motivated. They are criminal offences and those who engage in them are criminals”.38 
As explained by Hansen, “when studying the way in which identity is constituted in 
discourse it is important that we look at the intricate ways in which subjects are 
formed”.39 She goes on to point out that “Political discourse often does not operate in a 
way where “the threatening Other” is explicitly constituted as such. Rather such 
processes of Othering take place through more complex articulations of boundaries, 
distinctions and agency.”40 Tracing how rhetorical commonplaces of “criminal” are 
brokered across a range of political actors is one way to analyze how these “complex 
articulations of boundaries, distinctions and agency” unfold. By identifying the way 
terrorism was securitized through terms of criminality, we can see how terrorist actors 
were constructed as having no acceptable political cause: 
 
1975, Lord Donaldson (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (NIO)): It 
[Special Category Status] is impossible clearly and legally to define, and hence is 
arbitrary and open to wide abuse in its application. It is greatly resented by the 
ordinary criminals and many crimes committed for the most sordid self-interest 
are subsequently coated with the veneer of so-called political motivation, so that 
some gullible members of the public are induced to regard the criminals as “our 
boys”, when they are in reality nothing more than the perpetrators of callous 
crimes motivated only by greed or vanity.41 
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1975, Merlyn Rees (Secretary of State for NI, Lab): “senseless descent into 
criminality”42 
 
1979, Lord Elton (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (NIO), Con): But 
a line can and must be drawn between political and criminal acts. There can be 
no doubt that, by its admitted involvement in terrorism, INLA has crossed that 
line.43 
 
 
Counterterrorism law’s implementation depended upon a criminalization of terrorism to 
strip terrorists from political purpose irrespective of historical precedence or known 
grievances. Government explanations of emergency measures were based on a 
securitization of terrorism as unarguable criminality. The arrest, detention, and 
prosecution of “ruthless criminals” were the only ways to protect the referent.  
 
Brutal 
 
Repeated framings of the threat as a “ruthless” other engaged in “brutal murders” 
brokered different actors through specific similarities of discourse. This reinforced a 
particular criminality and rhetorically coerced actors into EPA and PTA support. The 
securitization of terrorism was transitioning to threat/referent constructions drawing 
upon characteristics of the actors rather than just acts of violence. It was not only that 
murder was part of the violence, but that this murder was of a brutal nature: 
 
1972, William van Straubenzee (Minister of State for NI, Con): Members in all 
parts of the House will have read of persons brutally murdered in front of their 
families, of young people, young women, being tarred and feathered, and of 
other sadistic practices; and they will recognize only too well the nature of the 
person one is dealing with and the risks incurred in giving evidence against the 
perpetrators of terrorism in Northern Ireland.44 
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1974, Gerard Fitt (SDLP): Only recently, one of its [UDA] members, a Mr. 
Baker, was convicted in a court in Northern Ireland of four brutal and callous 
murders.45 
 
1975, Airey Neave (Con): “emergency powers are still needed in Northern 
Ireland. It is horrifying to think that 1,400 people have been killed since 1969 in 
circumstances of great brutality”46 
 
1976, Harold Wilson (Prime Minister, Lab): Murder and violence there 
[Northern Ireland] reached a new peak in the first few days of this year. No 
fewer than 15 people were brutally murdered in the first week of January.47 
 
1976, Kevin McNamara (Lab): the specific problem of people who can come 
over the border, commit a brutal murder and then slip back over the border… 
all the forces of law and order—the armed forces, the constabulary, my right 
hon. Friend and all concerned—are determined to root out and punish terrorism48 
 
 
Through these framings, different actors and discursive sites were brokered to securitize 
terrorism in a way that dehumanized those associated with terrorist activities while 
connecting a range of political actors who were then rhetorically coerced into positions 
of support. It was politically impossible to “reasonably” argue against measures aimed at 
preventing “brutal” murder. 
 
It was not necessarily surprising to observe threat/referent framings based in 
terms of criminality. But unsurprising does not imply unproblematic or predetermined. 
These framings enabled a threat construction of terrorists as dangerous others in their 
own right rather than “others engaged in terrorizing methods”, a perception with 
significant consequences for future security practice. Alongside framings of brutal 
murder and ruthless criminality were framings of inside/outside boundary drawing on 
assumptions of geographic and territorial belonging. Phrases like “this side of the water” 
established a clear separation between Britain and the “other side of the water”:  
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1972, John Loveridge (Con): It might even be a precedent for this side of the 
waters if the spread of terror comes closer to this House, as it might well do49 
 
1972, Merlyn Rees (Sec State NI, Lab): We must face the facts of the situation 
and we must not close our eyes in a nice liberal fashion to the realities of the 
situation on the other side of the water.50 
 
 
Boundaries separating Ulster from “the mainland” were maintained, with the referent in 
need of protection not a fully inclusive political or cultural identity. In 1975, Labour 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Merlyn Rees stated, “Not only is Northern 
Ireland different politically from the rest of the United Kingdom; it is very different 
indeed in the nature of its violence.”51 The securitization of terrorism rested on 
hardening perceptions of natural belonging and difference rather than methods or acts of 
violence on their own terms. 
 
The British self was reasserted through institutional and political moves related 
to counterterrorism. Through the way that terrorism was securitized, it was as much a 
British political referent as a British societal referent that was in need of protection. This 
empirical observation lines up with Waever’s assessment of social and the political 
referents: 
 
Societal security is about those ideas and practices that identify individuals as 
members of a social group. This identity is distinct from, although often 
entangled with, the explicitly political organizations concerned with 
government.”52  
 
 
For British counterterrorism, legal measures were the only way to ensure the referent’s 
survival as both a political unit (legitimate sovereign and state power) and democratic 
society (based on “rule of law” norms). As argued by Antje Wiener, “socially 
constructed norms have a structuring aspect on political processes,” but “political 
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practices equally influence the construction of norms and institutions”.53 In this sense, 
the way counterterrorism law was formed and legitimized altered legal institutions while 
reinforcing democratic norms around a rule of law and social order. By looking at the 
securitization of terrorism, we can see how issues of identity played into mutually-
constitutive consequences of discourse and practice. 
 
 Earlier discourse around the SPA drew on similar notions of democratic order as 
a function of state and social identity. Discourses positioned exceptional measures as 
necessary because they enabled “certain authorities of the Government of Northern 
Ireland to take steps for preserving the peace and maintaining order in Northern 
Ireland”.54 Not just specific steps articulated in security practice, but “all such steps and 
issue all such orders as may be necessary” [emphasis added]:55  
 
2… (4) If any person does any act of such a nature as to be calculated to be 
prejudicial to the preservation of the peace or maintenance of order in Northern 
Ireland and not specifically provided for in the regulations, he shall be deemed to 
be guilty of an offence against the regulations.56  
 
 
A focus on law and order constituted the referent in need of protection and the 
counterterrorism practices formed to do the protecting. What changed with the EPA and 
PTA was a move beyond public order to explicit articulations that securitized terrorism 
in a way that stabilized “terrorists” as threatening others in their own right. The 
securitization of terrorism positioned the rule of law as a political and institutional 
source of legitimacy, and power. This bolstered counterterrorism based on new legal 
measures as the way to respond: 
 
1974, Nicholas Ridley (Con): Until that political solution is found this is a state 
where normal peacetime Queensberry rules as enunciated by some Labour 
Members are less important than the maintenance of law and order and the 
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protection to whatever extent is possible of innocent people from being maimed, 
murdered and blown up.57  
 
 
In the early securitization of terrorism, language around criminal terrorist activity 
justified exceptional powers through the official “determination to re-create a peaceful 
and orderly society”.58 There was some reference to consequences of security 
implementation as related to issues of identity. But extraordinary measures based on 
preventive practice continued.  
 
Security practice connected army operations and law enforcement, but remained 
focused on policing. Counterterrorism based in legal acts reinforced the connection 
between policing, the rule of law, and British self. This strengthened a perceived natural 
connection between the moral authority of a law-abiding British referent and the use of 
law-based security practice.59 The “increasing tendency of a minority to flout the law, 
undermine authority and create anarchy” securitized the terrorist other as in direct 
opposition to the referent as a moral, democratic, and rule of law-bound society.60 The 
inclusion of a moral/immoral dimension in the securitization of terrorism played a 
growing role in how exceptional practices were continued.  
 
Community and religion 
 
Framings of community and religion were a growing part of how terrorism was 
securitized with respect to both threat and referent identities. The Cameron Report 
explained: 
 
No doubt, religion is a deeply divisive force, but in addition there is the conflict 
of political loyalties which sometimes transcends the religious cleavage in the 
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population. There is division also in the segregation of race, real or imagined as 
it may be.61 
 
 
Framings of religion did not completely silence historical issues. Religion had played a 
part in the Irish conflict going back far into history. As discussed by English in his 
account of socialist republicanism from 1925 to 1937, “the claim to be fighting for 
Ireland was tied to the claim to be fighting for God”.62 Despite the awareness of 
divisions around religion, and race, the securitization of terrorism and implementation of 
counterterrorism exacerbated feelings of injustice. Social cleavages were presented as 
almost “inherent” to Northern Ireland. Militant republicanism was even framed as a kind 
of annoyance: It was “[A] more or less permanent irritant in the relationship between 
Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic”,63 with the civil rights movement described as 
“bound to attract opposition from many Protestant Unionists who saw or professed to 
see its success as a threat to their supremacy, indeed, to their survival as a 
community”.64 Discourse securitized terrorism along commonplaces of “left wing 
extremists”, “rioters”, and “hooligan elements” that required a hardline security 
response, not political engagement.65  
 
Particular communities were identified in a way that did not position them as 
completely outside of the referent. However, they were, like Muslim communities today, 
still established in a way that maintained a certain exclusion from full belonging. Thus 
the securitization of terrorism was from the start dependent on categories of identity 
associating terrorizing political violence with particular social groups:  
 
We particularly hope that in these new conditions more Roman Catholics will 
wish to join the ranks of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and will offer themselves 
for service in the new part-time forces, the setting up of which we also 
envisage.66  
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There should be a Police Authority for Northern Ireland, whose membership 
should reflect the proportions of different groups in the community.67 
 
Vigorous efforts should be made to increase the number of Roman Catholic 
entrants into the force.68 
 
Activities in the field of community and youth relations should be stepped up. 
 
 
Framings of community and religious affiliations provided intersubjective material for 
the political legitimation of exceptional state security practice going back many decades. 
Whether referencing the UK military’s 1950s hearts and minds campaign in “Malaya” or 
the current Prevent strategy, “winning over” certain communities has been a consistent 
focus of how exceptional security practices such as counterterrorism are formed and 
legitimized.69  
 
From 1968 to 1979, the situation in Northern Ireland was framed as two 
communities where “the normal conventions of majority rule will not work”.70 
Grievances associated with communal lines of division were exacerbated not just 
through the existence of exceptional powers, but how these measures were implemented. 
Instead of an attention to communities encouraging more political engagement, framings 
of the threat as criminal hooliganism joined notions of social groups to encourage a 
continued focus on counterterrorism: 
 
“hooligan gangs in Londonderry constituted a special threat to security”71 
 
“daily breaches of law and order in the face of the security forces”, officially 
legitimizing the specific task “to conduct a scoop-up operation of as many 
hooligans and rioters as possible”72  
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In the beginning, the threat was securitized from hooligans threatening order. Over time, 
the threat was constructed as a “ruthless” and vicious other. This expanded to include 
suspects even if they did not engage in political violence. In 1972, the Diplock Report 
was commissioned to evaluate internment and evaluate other options to:  
 
deal more effectively with terrorist organisations by bringing to book, otherwise 
than by internment by the Executive, individuals involved in terrorist activities, 
particularly those who plan and direct, but do not necessarily take part in, 
terrorist acts73 
 
 
This report hardened the threat’s association with “terrorist crime”, adding legitimacy to 
aggressive prosecutorial moves.74 Even though the utility of counterterrorism law is 
exceptionally difficult to measure or assess, legal conviction was from the beginning 
positioned as counterterrorism success. For example, when Labour Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland Merlyn Rees stated that “1292 terrorists have been charged with 
criminal offences”.75 There is no sure way to measure the efficacy of counterterrorism 
law, but the way that terrorism was securitized along criminal framings bolstered a legal 
approach. 
 
 Framings based on maintaining peace and order reminiscent of historical power 
relations continued. But the EPA also opened up a new focus, with the securitization of 
terrorism justifying counterterrorism laws through a new language that constituted the 
substance of the measures themselves. A legal language, such as “the detention of 
terrorists” [emphasis added], began a new era of discourse and practice based on an 
explicit terminology of terrorism and patterns of othering.76 The EPA reinforced this 
terminology, with search and seizure powers formed and justified “if that person is 
suspected of being a terrorist”, “concerned in terrorism or in promoting or encouraging it 
                                                 
73
 “Report of the Commission to consider legal procedures to deal with terrorist activities in Northern 
Ireland,” Chairman: Lord Diplock, December 1972, Cmnd. 5185, ch. 1, paragraph 1. 
74
 Ibid., ch. 1 paragraph 3. 
75
 Parl. Deb, H.C., 4 April 1974, 5th ser., vol. 871, col. 1469. 
76
 EPA, 1973, c.53, part 2 section 10. 
 129
 
[terrorism]”,77 or using information of “such a nature as is likely to be useful to 
terrorists”.78 Terms “terrorist” and “terrorism” were used without detailed explanation as 
to what those terms meant. 
 
Terrorism was constructed in as a distinct threat that simultaneously lacked a 
specific definition. This ambiguity was both a cause and effect of how terrorism was 
securitized. Counterterrorism was directly linked to the executive. State identity and 
purpose was strengthened through the formation of counterterrorism and when the 
Secretary of State implemented such powers in practice. In determining if it appeared 
that “a person is suspected of having been concerned in the commission or attempted 
commission of any act of terrorism or in the direction, organization or training of 
persons for the purpose of terrorism”, state actors engaged in a type of security practice 
that reasserted the legitimacy of these practices by reasserting certain perceptions of 
terrorist others and the discourse by which such perceptions were constituted.79 The 
public referent alongside the power of detention was represented as a particular peace 
and order: unarguable institutional norms.80 
 
 In 1974, the PTA resulted from and contributed to an particular development of 
how terrorism was securitized through the phrase “prevention of terrorism”. Led by 
Labour Home Secretary Roy Jenkins, this emergency legislation was passed following 
the Birmingham pub bombings of 1974 that killed 21 and injured 182. The PTA 
provided for widened proscription policies and exclusion orders. This enabled a stronger 
state control of individual movement and intensified border controls since “the hand of 
the police in examining both incoming and outgoing travelers should be strengthened in 
order to deal with the movement of terrorists in and out of Great Britain”.81  
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These practices reasserted explicit inside/outside demarcations of belonging that 
were in turn bolstered by the earlier referenced framings of geographic boundary 
assumptions: for example, “this side of the water” or “that side of the water”. The PTA 
allowed the Secretary of State to exercise powers “in such a way as appears to him 
expedient to prevent acts of terrorism”.82 A constable could arrest a person without 
warrant “whom he reasonably suspects to be…concerned in the commission, preparation 
or instigation of acts of terrorism”.83 This legitimized exceptional powers by and through 
the way terrorism was securitized along self/other labels associated with assumed 
physical boundaries of identification. Threat/referent construction increased perceptions 
of terrorist danger by linking the threat to those already encompassing a role as “the 
other” distinct from the core British referent.  
 
Gangster 
 
An interesting observation in this period building upon the earlier mentioned 
configurations of “criminality” were framings of a ruthless and lawless gangsterism. 
This attention to commonplaces of gangster securitized terrorism as stemming from 
others much more organized and dangerous than hooligan rioters or ordinary criminals. 
Lausten and Waever explain, “meaning is given in a web of signifiers which can be 
combined and recombined in a potentially unlimited number of ways”.84 The way such 
“signifiers” were brokered across party lines was vital to stabilizing meanings of 
terrorists as nonnegotiable criminals: 
 
1974, W. F. Deedes (Con): “They are engaged in mass murder, thuggery and 
gangsterism,” it is a “marriage of extremes and what at worst could become a 
gangsters’ federal Ireland”85  
 
1975, Merlyn Rees (Secretary of State NI, Lab): This is gangsterism. There is 
no other word for it. It can and will be dealt with by effective policing with the 
full support of the Army.86 
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1975, Gerry Fitt (SDLP): They are engaged in mass murder, thuggery and 
gangsterism. From that point of view, I do not regret seeing the end of political 
status.87 
 
1975, Merlyn Rees (Secretary of State NI, Lab): a council workman—a 
Protestant who volunteered to assist in the repair of bomb-damaged homes in the 
Catholic Lower Falls—was beaten to death by a Provisional IRA gang88 
 
1975, John Biggs-Davison (Con): “the success of the RUC in bringing political 
and sectarian gangsters and common thugs to book”89 
 
1975, Stanley Orme (Minister of State NIO, Lab): many of the people who 
commit atrocities are involved not in political activity but in sheer 
gangsterdom…almost impossible to attribute any motive to them for these 
deeds90 
 
 
With officials like MP Biggs Davison (Con) claiming there is “nothing that terrorists 
detest more than a coming together of the law-abiding”, criminal framings established 
the threat as in unquestionable opposition to British law and order.91 Political, historical, 
and social backdrops that may have motivated actors engaged in violence were silenced. 
As stated by Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Labour MP Rees, “The more 
policemen the better. The quicker we can get back to the normal processes of law—
although it cannot be done overnight—the better.”92  
 
1974, Merlyn Rees (Sec State NI, Lab): between 1st April 1973 and 1st April 
1974 the security forces searched over 4 million cars and removed from 
terrorists’ hands nearly 1.600 weapons and over 35 tons of explosives, 19 tons 
found before it was made into bombs and 16 tons found in made-up 
bombs…1292 terrorists have been charged with criminal offences, almost all of 
them of a very serious nature ranging from murder to armed robbery…we 
believe that in the long term it must be the community itself and normal police 
activities, not military operations alone, which will finally defeat the terrorist.93 
 
 
                                                 
87
 Ibid., col. 257. 
88
 Parl. Deb, H.C., 11 December 1975, 5th ser., vol. 902, col. 763. 
89
 Ibid., col. 810. 
90
 Parl. Deb, H.C., 4 November 1975, 5th ser., vol. 899, col. 289. 
91
 Ibid., col. 286. 
92
 Parl. Deb, H.C., 5 December 1974, 5th ser., vol. 882, col. 2102. 
93
 Parl. Deb, H.C., 4 April 1974, 5th ser., vol. 871, col. 1469. 
 132
 
Even though the definition of terrorism was ambiguous, the political acceptance of 
terrorist enemy-others was unequivocal. Threatening democratic peace was the ruthless 
terrorist, an enemy-other not to be underestimated in danger or to be dealt with through 
political negotiations. The powers housed by exceptional counterterrorism demanded 
that the UK derogate from the European Convention on Human Rights (EconvHR).  
 
Ruthless 
 
This departure from international institutional norms was made possible by a 
securitization of terrorism based in brutal and ruthless terrorist others contrary to 
democratic society. By allocating commonplaces of ruthless, threat construction 
bolstered intersubjective understandings of terrorism as connected with types of 
individuals rather than types of violent methods: 
 
1971, Reginald Maudling (Sec State Home Department, Con): The Government 
do not regard the findings of the Committee as in any way reflecting adversely 
on the responsibility and discipline with which the security forces in Northern 
Ireland are conducting their fight against a vicious and ruthless enemy.94 
 
1975, James Molyneaux (UUP): “For some time we have discussed murders and 
shootings in terms of tit for tat. I do not think we have ever clearly specified who 
is tit, and who is tat, and I suggest that tat is that element in the violence with 
which we ought to be concerned and which must first be eliminated, because that 
ruthless, guerrilla force which we know as the Provisional IRA is the root 
cause from which all the subsidiary and subordinate violence sprang.95 
 
1975, John Farr (Con): It has become apparent that these people live by the most 
bloody methods. They are completely ruthless, and six or seven years’ of 
platitudes in this House have got us nowhere.96 
 
 
In the words of Secretary of State for the Home Department Reginald Maudling (Con), 
the threat was from “a ruthless and deliberate campaign of terror and murder”.97 
Exceptional security practices were maintained because “[t]errorism, violence and 
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general lawlessness are still prevalent in Northern Ireland.”98 Political initiatives like the 
Sunningdale Agreement were unsuccessful, in this particular case due largely to the 
1974 Unionist Workers Strike. Direct rule was enforced alongside an intensified 
securitization of the threat and reassertion of counterterrorism practice.  
 
The Gardiner Report supported the continuance and expansion of security 
powers.99 The continued securitization of terrorism along morally reprehensible 
commonplaces, such as ruthless and brutal, helped alleviate concerns over excessive 
force in counterterrorism implementation:  
 
The British Government has acted legitimately, and consistently with the terms 
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, in restricting certain fundamental liberties in Northern 
Ireland. 100  
 
 
Debate around this report supported Gardiner’s recommendations, removing 
responsibility from the government by stating “If detention has to be used again, 
responsibility will lie clearly at the door of the terrorists.”101 By the mid-1970s, 
discourse had combined intensified securitizations of terrorism as nonnegotiable and the 
British referent as beyond the bounds of critique, even if security practice put 
international human rights norms in question. Statistically, the number of bombings and 
killings had gone down from 1,382 explosions in 1972, to 973 in 1973, and to 648 
during the first eleven months of 1974. But, unsurprisingly considering the security 
approach taken, political progress was “erratic”.102 The Gardiner Report framed 
terrorism as based in an organizational strategy whereby “arms, money and terrorist 
skills can cross frontiers”, with evolving technologies such as mass communications 
“facilitating and glamourizing violence”.103  
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A consequence of identity framings that brokered different discursive sites, 
thereby reinforcing certain intersubjective understandings over others, was the way that 
yoking reallocated broader boundaries of legitimate and illegitimate actors by 
redesigning threat/referent categories. Terrorism was yoked to boundaries of new and 
greater risks, with terrorism “today” explicitly differentiated from prior historical 
experience: 
 
The greater ease with which terrorism and subversion can now be organized, and 
the degree of fear it can generate in an otherwise peaceful society like Northern 
Ireland, make it unwise to compare the present emergency with similar troubles 
in Ulster in the inter-war years or in the 1950s.104 
 
 
This temporal silencing of the past is not a dissimilar pattern from 21st century moves 
that differentiated “new international terrorism” from “old” terrorism. From the mid-
1970s as counterterrorism laws were maintained, the threat was presented as impossible 
to compare with prior experience. As explained by Rees, “The year 1975 has faced us 
with a totally different set of security problems.”105 Terrorism put “ordered democratic 
government in jeopardy”, and demanded that “the Rule of Law must therefore be 
maintained in Northern Ireland not only for the sake of its people, but for the sake of all 
those in the United Kingdom and beyond who want freedom and peace instead of 
anarchy”.106 Threat/referent framings securitizing terrorism during the mid-seventies 
repositioned identity boundaries and were causally influential for the continuous 
renewals of counterterrorism legal measures. Focus remained on actors from within, but 
evolving securitizations of terrorism increased the perception of terrorist risk by 
expanding the referent beyond Britain:   
 
The presence of influential communities of Irish descent in many parts of the 
English-speaking world means that a number of Britain’s allies and 
Commonwealth partners have a keen interest in the stability of communal 
relations in Northern Ireland. Yet some of these same Irish communities have 
themselves helped to sustain violence there by their support for the paramilitary 
organisations.107  
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This reference to the international dimension of the Irish conflict is a significant 
historical reminder and counterpoint to later assumptions of “international terrorism” as 
a new in its own right. It also underscores how the securitization of terrorism was always 
built upon a practice of distancing based on certain communities distinguished from the 
referent as more likely to be terrorists. The nature of British counterterrorism law and 
the securitization of terrorism as a particular threat have always involved international 
and non-British actors from “outside”. Actors from the United States played a significant 
role in Irish-related terrorism since at least the 19th century. During the late 20th century, 
officials in the Republic of Ireland and the United States were essential for the peace 
process. International actors, locations, resources, and activities have been a part of 
Irish-related terrorism throughout history.  
 
Commonplaces of law and order stabilized intersubjective understandings that 
established the referent as an uncontroversial democratic self. This influenced what were 
considered to be reasonable legal responses to terrorism considering democratic 
institutions and the rule of law. In opposition to this democratic self was the terrorist 
criminal and “terrorist organizations [that] reject the democratic process”. Such framings 
bolstered exceptional measures through reference to the democratic institutions within 
which those very measures were housed. The official removal of special category status 
from those associated with terrorism in 1976 yoked the threat to brutal and ruthless 
others distinct from “more legitimate” ordinary criminals and political dissidents. This 
reconfigured broader understandings of identity, carved out what was politically 
possible, and influenced outcomes of counterterrorism law:  
 
They cannot bludgeon the British out of Ireland and, as the events of November 
1974 have proved, the extension of terrorism to Britain simply increases the 
resolution of the British. They can offer no gifts to the people of Northern Ireland 
by way of greater freedom, security, or prosperity which the people cannot now 
attain by legal and democratic means. Moreover, they command the support of 
only a small fraction of either the minority or the majority community in 
Northern Ireland. Because they are attempting to destroy Northern Ireland as a 
political society, terrorists who break the law – which in Northern Ireland gives 
greater protection to the accused than in most disturbed communities – are not 
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heroes but criminals; not the pioneers of political change but its direst 
enemies.108 
 
 
Building criminalization during the mid-1970s foreshadowed the approaches that were 
taken by Margaret Thatcher’s government after the 1979 election of a Conservative 
government. Suspending liberty in the name of security is not itself a new phenomenon. 
But the ways this suspension plays out in discourse and in practice, and the extent to 
which freedoms are suspended, is nuanced and historically specific. In 1975, Lord 
Gardiner explained “Detention can only be tolerated in a democratic society in the most 
extreme circumstances”.109 It was stated that a “person should be detained only if his 
freedom would seriously endanger the general security of the public”.110 Such 
statements reasserted the referent in need of protection while simultaneously justifying 
extraordinary measures.  
 
Murder 
 
From 1968 to 1979 the securitization of terrorism evolved from focusing on 
issues of peace and order to the construction of terrorists as illegitimate criminal others. 
Commonplaces of murder were one way that this transition was successful in how it 
focused on the most serious instances of violence rather than the overarching issues of 
communal division, historic grievance, and contemporary inequality. Through repeated 
framings of a ruthless and brutal criminal other engaged in murder a range of different 
political actors were brokered through similar securitizations of terrorism: 
 
1971, Reginald Maudling (Sec State Home Dept., Con): The battle against 
murder and terrorism has to be pursued in the interests of all parties.111 
 
1972, Frederick Elwn Jones (Lab): That such men and women exist and that they 
have reaped and are reaping a grim harvest of murder and violence in 
Northern Ireland are basic facts which must be faced and dealt with.112 
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1972, Ian Paisley (DUP): “the escalation of murders of a most brutal and 
dastardly nature”113 
 
1974, Merlyn Rees (Sec State NI, Lab): “crimes of murder and extreme 
bestiality”114 
 
1974, Francis Pym (Con): There is no logic about it except the expression of 
murderous hatred.115 
 
1974, Gerry Fitt (SLDP): “murderers who have been involved in the most 
heinous crimes…brutal, callous assassinations and murders”116 
 
 
Associated intersubjective understandings relating to these framings enabled a 
continuance of counterterrorism law despite miscarriages of justice, increased 
community division, and growing paramilitary support, all of which could have been 
interpreted as counterproductive consequences of existing measures. Brokerage 
reinforced the securitization of terrorism along specific framings and discursive patterns 
of meaning-making. This does not imply an absence of contention, for example over 
“who killed who”. But in the end such disagreements were overshadowed by a collective 
struggle against “terrorism” that led to the legitimation of otherwise unacceptably 
exceptional state powers. Through particular processes of securitization and relational 
configurations of identity, new security practices based on a language of terrorism 
emerged and were maintained. 
 
 
III. Concluding 1968 to 1978 
 
This period saw the beginning of the most recent Troubles and the formation of 
new laws as new sources of material state power that were constituted and legitimized 
by an explicit language of terrorism. Despite a justification of the EPA and PTA from 
1968 to 1978 as largely dependent on their position as temporary measures, these laws in 
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fact foreshadowed a future expansion and normalization of exceptional measures. 
Though internment was removed, similar powers of detention were instated. Interim 
Custody Orders and warrantless arrests continued alongside new counterterrorism laws 
and a building criminalization of terrorism as based in dangerous others distinct from the 
referent. Brokerage emboldened certain identity framings over others. Actors were then 
rhetorically coerced into positions of counterterrorism acceptance considering politically 
unarguable threat/referent configurations: 
 
1975, John Biggs-Davison (Con): Those who urge on Ministers courses of 
surrender to the IRA and scuttle from Northern Ireland fall broadly into ‘two 
categories—the subversive and the confused. The former, the subversive, betray 
deliberate and callous indifference. The latter, the confused, betray an unwitting 
indifference to the lives of our citizens, overwhelmingly peaceable and law 
abiding as they are, overwhelmingly and democratically committed to the Union 
and entitled to look to the Government of that Union for protection.117 
 
 
Not unlike 21st century discourse, the formation and maintenance of exceptional 
counterterrorism from 1968 to 1979 depended upon processes of securitization that 
positioned the threat as a non-negotiable other constantly evolving in danger. Terrorism 
was securitized through particular self/other perceptions of difference. More 
importantly, terrorism was established as terrorists and illegitimate people, not just 
terrorism and illegitimate methods.  
 
Phrases like “We are living in serious times in Northern Ireland. We now face 
the new threat of rockets, which are being used against British troops, and which 
originate behind the Iron Curtain” intensified the perceived danger from terrorist 
actors.118 Three years later, Rees explained, “Britain was “faced with crimes against 
society which cannot be justified on the grounds of any political cause”.119 Though 
counterterrorism laws were constructed by the rule of law, the very boundaries of those 
rules were reconfigured to accommodate expanding state power. Counterterrorism laws 
thus established a new benchmark for subsequent lawmaking and acceptable levels of 
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state force. Security practices, through their formation and legitimation, reasserted 
Britain as a political and societal referent. 
 
 Counterterrorism law was introduced as a temporary response to maintain order. 
How were such measures maintained during the following decade considering new 
political leadership, longevity of the conflict, and changing international security 
dynamics? Hunger strikes with significant public support demanded a return to special 
category status, and the attempted assassination of Prime Minister Thatcher put pressure 
on the government’s hardline approach. But these events did not spark a change in 
counterterrorism. Existing trajectories were continued and reasserted alongside 
Thatcher’s (in)famous phrase that “Crime is crime is crime”. Exceptional security 
practices based in counterterrorism laws remained the core strategy. How this 
continuance was maintained through a securitization of terrorism along particular 
relational configurations of threat/referent identities is the topic of the next chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 5 
1979 – 1989 
Criminalizing terrorism, maintaining emergency measures 
 
 
I turn to the renewal of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976. It cannot 
be said too often that the powers contained in this Act are exceptional. I have always accepted—
as, indeed, has the House since the Act’s first introduction after the tragic consequences of the 
bombings of 1974, culminating in Birmingham—that the Act represents a temporary 
infringement of civil liberties, but I believe equally firmly that it was, and remains, a necessary 
infringement. A clear responsibility is placed upon me and upon Parliament to ensure that the 
police have adequate powers to deal with a savage and dangerous minority who have no respect 
for the life or civil liberties of others.  
 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, Merlyn Rees (Lab), 19791 
 
 
In the United Kingdom the emergency measures shared a common initial perception:  they 
represented extraordinary moves designed to meet the needs of a passing emergency.  Over time, 
however, they became standard and unexceptional, a baseline from which further extraordinary 
powers could be introduced. 
 
Donohue, August 20002 
 
 
 
As remarked above by Labour Secretary of State for the Home Department 
Merlyn Rees in 1979 and counterterrorism law expert Laura Donohue in 2000, British 
counterterrorism laws have always been viewed as exceptional. The previous chapter 
analyzed how these exceptional measures emerged. This chapter examines how 
exceptional measures were maintained considering a shifting political environment and 
consistent impossibility of finding a secure definition of the threat. During the 1980s, the 
securitization of terrorism continued some trends from the previous decade 
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distinguishing terrorists from political dissidents and ordinary criminals in a domestic 
context focused on criminalization more generally. As explained by Guzzini, 
securitization is both a theoretical approach and an empirical process.3 This duality is 
central to each empirical chapter: securitization helps us conceptualize how the 
construction of intersubjective understandings around identity both ? organizing terrorist 
others as particular threats and in so doing delimit what outcomes are possible. Whether 
under Labour or Conservative governments, during moments following terrorist attack 
or periods of relative calm, exceptional counterterrorism was continued.  
 
In 1979 a Conservative government was put back in power. Blanket and dirty 
protests that began following the 1976 removal of special category status culminated in a 
significant hunger strike effort. Counterterrorism laws were consistently renewed 
throughout the eighties with the PTA replacing its five-year sunset clause with annual 
renewal in 1989. Though it was still a temporary law, this move foreshadowed the 
possibility of permanency. The securitization of terrorism drew upon commonplaces of 
criminality introduced earlier. But official discourse also began to rework how 
threat/referent identities were constructed. There was a newly observed reference to 
“international” terrorism. But “international” was not used in the legal definition of 
terrorism,4 nor was it clearly defined.5 Irish-related terrorism had an international 
element going back through history. But the explicit use of “international” as a threat 
label to continue securitizing terrorism was associated with “foreign others” from 
outside Britain.6 During the 1980s, the international commonplace remained less 
significant than framings associated with Northern Ireland. This inattention to 
international terrorism as a particular threat was noted by Frank Gregory and Paul 
Wilkinson, who explained:  
 
It is hardly surprising that this understandable preoccupation with terrorism 
related to Northern Ireland diverted the attention of Britain’s intelligence 
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agencies away from international terrorism. Until 7 July 2005 the only 
significant international terrorist attack on the UK homeland which MI5 and MI6 
and the police had to deal with was the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over 
Lockerbie in December 1988.7 
 
 
How was it that international acts of terrorism and political violence had been taking 
place throughout history, but the “international terrorist” label just recently arose as a 
threat identifier? The answer is not that a bounded entity called “international terrorism” 
just appeared, but that discourse started using the international terrorist label to organize 
certain intersubjective understandings of boundaries, danger, and belonging. This 
inclusion of a new international label during the securitization of terrorism began during 
the 1980s, but became influential during the late 1990s. By the 7 July 2005 attacks, 
violence could be perpetrated by domestic actors on domestic soil but be categorized as 
international terrorism. The externalization of some terrorist others was essential to the 
eventual normalization of exceptional measures. During the 1980s Northern Ireland 
continued to dominate discourse and policy. But the reference to an “international” other 
mid-way through this decade hinted at a future shift in threat perception.   
 
Labour introduced the PTA in 1974, but it was the Conservatives who 
maintained these powers by criminalizing terrorism through the 1980s.8 The domestic 
situation was increasingly tense. Events such as the defeated Miner’s Strike in 1985 
reinforced the Government’s hardline approach beyond strict security issues. 
Conventional forces geared toward the Soviet threat continued to influence security 
strategy, with some controversy over policies growing.9 The 1979 Iranian revolution 
altered geopolitics in the Middle East and weakened Britain’s strongest ally, the U.S. 
Though foreign intervention was not a dominating feature of 1980s British policy, the 
Falklands War of 1982, and (reluctant) support of the 1986 U.S. airstrike on Libya are 
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two examples of external engagements.10 This decade brought a thawing of Cold War 
politics. But unresolved complexities continued to influence local, regional, and 
international relations. The decade long Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had led to 
significant western support of Mujahadeen rebels, including Osama Bin Laden and 
future Al-Qaida (AQ) operatives. But when the Soviets left, so did the West. The 
immediate post-Cold War environment left a significant threat vacuum within which to 
redefine security policies and interests in more nontraditional terms.11 Nontraditional 
threats such as human security or terrorism were not “new” as much as they were newly 
acknowledged with greater attention. 
 
Leading up to this shift in overarching security dynamics, exceptional British 
counterterrorism continued to be renewed throughout the 1980s. The previous chapter 
explained how new counterterrorism emerged through an explicit discourse of terrorist 
threat departing from historical notions of public order. This chapter discusses how the 
securitization of terrorism through the 1980s bolstered processes of criminalization by 
building on earlier commonplaces while reasserting particular notions of threat/referent 
identity.  
 
 
I. An eighties turn 
 
 From 1979 to 1989, the “international terrorism” label was introduced as a means 
to identify non-Irish related insecurity, but the legitimation of counterterrorism law 
remained tied to issues linked with Northern Ireland. Internationally, the security and 
political environment was faced with shifts including the U.S. led War on Drugs, 
controversial foreign involvement in Latin America, Iranian hostage crisis, national-
separatist activity in Europe, 1984 Beirut bombings, and first Palestinian intifada. 
Threats to state sovereignty and democratic order were no longer dominated by fears 
                                                 
10
 Bluth, “The use of force,” 56. 
11
 Analyses of “1989” point to a vast amount of research, the most compelling being George Lawson, 
Chris Armbruster, and Michael Cox, eds., The Global 1989: Continuity and Change in World Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
 144
 
associated with communism and traditional military response, but range of possible 
risks. Despite some calls for greater cooperation considering the “nature of modern 
international terrorism”, initiatives such as the European Convention on the Suppression 
of Terrorism (ECST) were overshadowed by state level practice.12  
 
British actors did not openly refute international efforts. But material and 
symbolic powers connected to counterterrorism remained tied to national practice. 
Britain derogated from the EconvHR citing Article 15 and “times of emergency” to 
maintain the international legality of domestic counterterrorism. This move reasserted 
state sovereignty and international norms by reinforcing the former through engagement 
with international institutions. Patterns of identity construction focused on Northern 
Ireland securitized terrorism to maintain EPA and PTA legitimacy even when due 
process and civil liberties were suspended. Institutional moves such the Diplock Court 
system that did not use juries were another way that counterterrorism law was altering 
the institutional norms that guided British legal process. One debate even cited up to 
40% of Diplock Cases as non-terrorist related, alluding to consequences of exceptional 
counterterrorism power beyond strict issues of terrorism.13 Securitizing terrorism along 
terms of criminality maintained the distinction between terrorist criminals and ordinary 
criminals, legitimizing extraordinary counterterrorism as necessary: 
 
We must guard against extraordinary judicial processes being applied to those 
who are accused of committing crimes that have no terrorist or political motive. 
We should take care not to include what we used to call the ODC—the ordinary 
decent criminal.14 
 
 
Processes of criminalization and exceptional legal measures were not limited to the UK 
but were a growing international norm.15 At the same time, there was increased 
reference to international aspects of the Northern Irish conflict. But these international 
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links did not lead to a construction of all terrorism within one umbrella even though it 
was clear that the Troubles were not isolated to the northern six counties:16  
 
1979, Viscount Brookborough (UUP): It has been said time and time again that 
in this particular battle we are fighting for the minds of people. I was interested 
to see that the Irish Ambassador in Washington drew attention to this matter. His 
remarks were not very widely reported in the British Press but what he said was 
that immense damage would be done by the misrepresentation of the Bennett 
Report in America and that it would increase the flow of funds from America to 
the IRA…I think that the situation in America is extremely serious. We have 
very bad publicity there on these issues of H Block and interrogation.17 
 
 
Despite significant international components, the Irish threat was never identified as 
“international” in official discourse or practice. It could be assumed that the U.S. role as 
a major ally precluded more substantial inquiries into its relationship to violence in 
Northern Ireland, thus silencing the identification of Irish terrorism as international 
terrorism. However, even when international connections to non-allied states were 
referenced, such as Libya, the way terrorism was securitized still distinguished Irish-
related insecurity from other types of terrorism. From the beginning usage of the 
“international” commonplace in the securitization of terrorism, this label was allocated 
to foreigners external to Britain: outsiders. 
 
For the securitization of terrorism transitioning into the eighties, criminalization 
was more significant for outcomes of identity and practice than externalization. The 
1981 election of lead hunger striker Bobby Sands was a clear reminder of the social and 
political backdrop to terrorist violence. But terrorist others continued to be framed as 
immoral and illegal, not political. Terrorist suspects were yoked to dangerous others 
distinct from politics and ordinary crime. Terrorism was far beyond issues of public 
order from earlier years. In the words of Secretary of State for the Home Department 
Douglas Hurd (Lab), terrorism was “an exceptional crime, directed at the heart of 
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society”.18 However, most scheduled offenses in counterterrorism law were already 
present in existing legislation.19 Thus the maintenance of counterterrorism measures 
going beyond existing laws demanded a securitization of terrorism that established 
terrorists as threatening others in their own right.   
 
This stabilization of threat identity was made possible by particular relational 
configurations across discourse, for example by framing terrorist acts as “the most 
violent and revolting crimes”.20 Terrorists were essentialized as the ultimate illegitimate 
others, and represented “the degeneration of civilized beings to an all-time low in our 
democratic society”.21 With part of this referent democratic society constituted by “rule 
of law” norms, the formation and implementation of counterterrorism, security practice 
and threat/referent identities were mutually reinforcing. Efforts to repress violence 
through intensified security practice led to the detention of 279 persons under the PTA 
in the first quarter of 1979 alone, but did not lead to agreement on counterterrorism law 
effectiveness.22 Labour politicians claimed that “the draconian response to the use of 
armed violence in political issues has not succeeded”.23 Almost ten years later in 1988, 
Labour politicians alluded to counterterrorism as counterproductive, stating that “the Act 
[PTA] is draconian and creates terrorism”.24 A strong view was that counterterrorism, at 
least as it stood, was not working: 
 
1988, Seamus Mallon (SDLP): The second fundamental question is: can 
amending or bending the law lead to a solution? Let us look at the rake’s 
progress on that. We have had internment without trial, the Northern Ireland 
(Emergency Provisions) Act 1978, the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Act 1984, the Diplock courts, the brutal interrogation techniques 
verified by Lord Justice Bennett and supergrass trials. We have had all these 
                                                 
18
 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Bill, 6 December 1988, Parliamentary Debates, 
Commons, 6th ser., vol. 143, col. 208. 
19
 For example, Offences against the Person Act 1861 (c. 100), Explosive Substances Act 1883 (c.3), 
Aviation Security Act 1982 (aircraft) 1982 (c.36), Nuclear Material (Offences) Act 1983 (c.18). Later acts 
include the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (c.18), and Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990 (c.31). 
20
 David Howell (Con): Parl. Deb., H.C., 21 March 1979, 5th ser , vol. 964, col. 1526. 
21
 William Craig (UUP): Ibid., col. 1543. 
22
 “Statistics on the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Acts 1974 & 1976, letter from 
private secretary, home office, Chilcot,” 20 April 1979, PREM 16/2085. 
23
 Tom Litterick (Lab): Parl. Deb., H.C., 21 March 1979, 5th ser , vol. 964, col. 1602-1603. 
24
 Martin Flannery (Lab): Prevention of Terrorism, 16 February 1988, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 
6th ser., vol. 127, col. 942. 
 147
 
abuses of the law, but, 20 years on, none of them has ended terrorism. This 
legislation, whether permanent or temporary, will not end violence.25  
 
 
However, despite such views exceptional legal measures were renewed rather than 
reconfigured.  
 
At the same time that politicians expressed doubts over counterterrorism 
effectiveness in Northern Ireland, there were also doubts about the severity of 
“international terrorism”. Statistics associated with international terrorism as a specific 
threat led most to doubt “whether the level of international terrorism in Britain 
warranted any special powers”.26 As demonstrated in the below table taken from a 1987 
debate on “Terrorism”, the numbers associated with incidents of “international 
terrorism” were noticeably small compared with Irish-related acts of political violence: 
 
 1981 May—December 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 January—June 
1987 
Shooting incidents — 1 — 3 2 3 — 
Bombing incidents exploded 9 3 4 6 2 2 — 
Neutralised or failed to explode 1 2 1 4 4 — 5 
Arson attacks — — — — 1 — — 
Kidnappings 1 — — 1 — — — 
Hi jacking of aircraft — 1 — — — — — 
 
Figure 1.2 – “Incidents of international terrorism,” 1981-198727 
 
Thus, while the international commonplace was introduced, the focus remained largely 
on the Irish-related terrorism in the securitization of terrorism necessary to maintain 
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counterterrorism in practice. Securitization helped overcome doubts of legal 
ineffectiveness by bolstering the criminalization of terrorism more generally:  
 
Anyone who shows affinity towards communism, that’s common sense, the IRA 
the PLO and I would say anyone who’s decrying marriage, family life, trying to 
break that up, pushing drugs, homosexuality, indiscipline in schools, weak 
penalties for anti-social crimes . . . a whole gamut of things that could be pecking 
away at the foundations of our society and weakening it.28 
 
 
Threats were not situated in traditional security terms but included ideological and 
subjectively determined risks. Terrorism did not just threaten law and order through 
violence, but the morality of the referent through drugs and homosexuality. The referent 
was not just a political state, but a societal we that was based on certain values. The 
shifting securitization of terrorism from terms of public order in the early 1970s, to 
processes of criminalization identifying terrorist others through the 1980s, entailed 
particular consequences for identity and practice. Insecurity was reframed from one of 
literal survival considering physical violence or disorder, to one of moral or ideational 
survival. As explained by Buzan et al., a part of whether or not an issue is securitized 
depends on the answer to the question: 
 
Does a referent object hold general legitimacy as something that should survive, 
which entails that actors can make referent to it, point to something as a threat, 
and thereby get others to follow or at least tolerate actions not otherwise 
legitimate?29  
 
 
For the British self in the case of counterterrorism, this “should survive” is supported by 
security practices formed through a “rule of law”. This enabled and legitimized 
exceptional counterterrorism while also reaffirming the referent as a morally legitimate 
entity based in uncontroversial democratic norms.  
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Issues of identity and belonging were further exacerbated as authorities were 
susceptible to “political pressure in regard to whom they should arrest”.30 Similar to 
earlier years, by securing law and order, citizens would be able to go about their 
business and daily lives without fear.31 The securitization of terrorism as a threat to 
society was bolstered by a “criminalization of dissent” directed at those unrelated to 
terrorist activity.32 A consequent interrelation of security practice, alienated 
communities, and insecurity was apparent to lawmakers, but did not redirect 
securitization discourse or counterterrorism practice:  
 
1987, Lord Mishcon (Lab): I can do no better than quote from the report on the 
operation in 1986 of this Act by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, of 
his scrutiny. I quote from page 36, paragraph 7.2: The PTA is extremely 
unpopular with the Irish community in Great Britain, and, as with all the 
emergency legislation, in Northern Ireland too. I heard from one staunch 
Republican who denies the right of Westminster to legislate for the Province at 
all. Others denounce terrorism whether domestic or international but say that the 
legislation has cast a blight over the Irish population in Great Britain and is 
counterproductive in Northern Ireland, because, among other things, it alienates 
the population and discourages the public from any attempt to help in rooting out 
terrorism. It creates martyrs and tends to cause misplaced sympathy for people 
who on any rational view have committed terrible crimes. It is not for me to 
advise whether it would be possible to abolish all emergency legislation in 
Northern Ireland, and rely on the ordinary criminal law; but it is a suggestion 
seriously made to me. The EPA has just been renewed in January 1987 with all 
party support.33 
 
 
Counterproductive effects of insecurity were acknowledged but counterterrorism still 
received “all party support”. This support was given even though measures increased the 
alienation of communities and failed to prevent some of the most fatal attacks of this 
period. This included the 1982 bombing of a disco in Ballykelly, killing over a dozen 
and injuring fifty, the 1984 Conservative Conference bombing in Brighton that used 
over 100 pounds of explosives and required significant planning, and the 1987 
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Enniskillen bombing that killed eleven. In 1988, the Lockerbie bombing was a reminder 
of how international relations and security were interconnected and not separated by 
political borders.  
 
Despite the overarching maintenance of counterterrorism measures during this 
period, there were areas of increased scrutiny. One 1979 cabinet paper referencing the 
Shackleton Report stated that proscription had not made “more than a marginal 
contribution to the defeat of terrorism”.34 During debate, opposition concerns were 
voiced:  
 
1979, Joan Maynard (Lab): The Prevention of Terrorism Act has not prevented 
terrorism and it has not even been effective in detecting it. Its real effect and 
purpose have been to deter legitimate political activity and discussion on Ireland 
and the British role there.35  
 
1986, Gerald Kauffman (Lab): In terms of preventing terrorism, this Act is a 
failure. Terrorism continues horrifically. The presence of the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act on the statute book, most unhappily, prevented neither the atrocity 
at Harrods nor the abomination at Brighton.36 
 
 
Political efforts were not completely absent. The Anglo-Irish Agreement passed in 1985 
strengthened commitments to an eventual political settlement. It also reaffirmed that 
Northern Ireland’s political status would only be determined by majority rule.37 
However, counterterrorism law remained the dominant trajectory despite continued 
issues of effectiveness. Government statistics published in 1986 going back to 1974 cite 
that 92% of those detained had not been subject to any charge, and that only 3% of those 
charged were with counterterrorism offenses.38 A third of those charges were due to 
failed cooperation during port examinations, and in the end only 2% of those charged 
were found guilty.39 By way of comparison, a drop in serious crime conviction rates to 
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less than 10% in the year 2006 was viewed by Attorney General Lord Goldsmith as “out 
of control”.40 The low rate of conviction for terrorist offenses and growing “concern 
about the impact of this Act [PTA] on community relations” during the 1980s thus could 
have prompted reassessments of counterterrorism.41 However, any reassessment was 
foreclosed by a securitization that stabilized the knowledge of terrorists as so dangerous 
and nonnegotiable that consequences from counterterrorism were “less bad” than 
possible attack. 
 
Security and insecurity were linked by counterterrorism laws that suspended due 
process, and implementation procedures that established suspect communities. Despite 
miscarriages of justice, such as the Birmingham Six, or the decision in Brogan v. the UK 
that officials violated Article 5(1)42 of the European Convention on Human Rights, EPA 
and PTA measures continued to be renewed.43 As early as 1983, criminalization targeted 
“problem groups such as gays, nuclear disarmament campaigners, welfare recipients, 
nationalists, blacks and the Irish”:44 
 
Blacks in Britain share the same animosity towards the police and the lack of 
confidence in the rule of law as Catholics in Northern Ireland. The British police 
are seen as partisan and racist to wide sections of the black and Asian 
communities.45  
 
 
These broader trends of exclusion were exacerbated by the way counterterrorism was 
implemented. The 1979 Bennett Report indeed affirmed Amnesty International’s 
observation that British authorities mistreated suspected terrorists during interrogation, 
stating “in some of the cases investigated by Amnesty International there was prima 
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facie evidence that ill-treatment had taken place”.46 Medical evidence revealed that 
injuries “were not self-inflicted and were sustained in police custody”.47 This could have 
prompted a reassessment of counterterrorism practice, but subsequent government 
reviews such as the Jellicoe Report reaffirmed existing measures.48 The maintenance of 
EPA and PTA laws marked a creeping normalization of extraordinary measures. They 
also marked a building acceptance of the illiberal consequences that stemmed from 
counterterrorism practice that relied upon us/them boundary making processes for 
preventive action. The justification of such insecurity can be interpreted as an effect of 
the “politics of exception” and “politics of unease” that surrounded how terrorism was 
securitized.49 The referent was legitimate, the terrorist was not. Each identity’s position 
was stabilized in discourse and practice through a relational reassertion of both.  
 
As explained earlier, events and materiality are far from unimportant. But it takes 
more than acts of violence to sustain exceptional powers over time. Processes of 
threat/referent construction through securitization are essential to legitimize exceptional 
practice in the absence of attack, and presence of counterproductive consequence. 
Counterterrorism laws drawing upon the Special Powers Act were initially framed in 
terms of public order, but transitioned to construct terrorists as entity-others in their own 
irrespective of actual violence. Due to the securitization of terrorism demanding 
preventive action, terrorist suspects were as dangerous as those engaged in violence. 
 
 
II. Configurations, counterterrorism, and the Thatcher administration 
 
Through the 1980s, counterterrorism was maintained through relational 
configurations of identity dominated by commonplaces of “campaign”, “community”, 
“civilization/democratic society”, and “war against terrorism”. Terrorism was reinforced 
as a threat in its own right distinct from ordinary crime and political dissidence. 
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Contributing to this shift was a new attention to the “international” as a means to 
securitize terrorism along inside/outside assumptions of identification. The way 
“international terrorism” was positioned in official British discourse ignored the 
international aspect of Irish-related terrorism and the international element of terrorism 
going back in history. This established a misplaced perception of “international 
terrorism” as a self-evident other that would become increasingly problematic. The 
illegality and immorality of terrorist activity reinforced the legitimacy of British security 
practice.  
 
Campaign 
 
The danger of terrorism was asserted above all other threats to British security. 
The use of “campaign”, though not new, was particularly prevalent in the securitization 
of terrorism during this period. Through framings of “campaign” that brokered different 
sites, discourse intensified the risk of terrorism as an organized wave of criminality. 
Whether or not elites viewed current measures as working, notions of campaign 
bolstered the perceived scale of Irish-related terrorism: 
 
1979, William Craig (UUP): Recently reports in the newspapers—whether or not 
they are to be believed—suggest that another campaign is envisaged in Great 
Britain. I find it a sad reflection on Parliament and Government that, after all the 
years of violence, we have to admit that our citizens are still at risk.50 
 
1979, Gerry Fitt (SDLP): I have never supported the terrorist campaign being 
waged by the IRA. However, those in charge of security in Northern Ireland 
should not allow themselves to lower their standards and engage in practices 
which have already been condemned by the European Court of Human Rights 
and Compton.51  
 
1987, Cecil Walker (UUP): They have endured such campaigns of terror for the 
past 15 years, 15 years of inefficient colonial rule. During that time, they have 
suffered about 2,500 deaths and another 29,000 injured in the process. If such 
diabolical acts were carried out in any other part of the United Kingdom, the 
population would rise against the Government. However, over in Northern 
Ireland there is a belief that we are now considered to be second-class citizens.52 
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1988, Douglas Hurd (Sec of State Home Department, Con): The past 20 years 
have seen in the United Kingdom a terrorist campaign unparalleled in the 
western world, aimed ostensibly at the goal of a united Marxist Ireland. This 
campaign has caused the death of almost 3,000 men, women and children, more 
than three quarters of them Irish men and women. It has also been responsible for 
the deaths of more than 400 soldiers. This year alone 91 people have been killed 
in Northern Ireland.53 
 
 
“Campaign” framed terrorism as an “enemy of society” connected to notions of war, 
army, and soldier that were a part of constructing the Irish republican threat throughout 
history. This bolstered terrorism as a network of illegitimate violence, not lone criminals 
or isolated cells. Though commonplaces of campaign could have linked to the political 
grievances underlying terrorist violence, they were instead linked to framings of 
criminality: 
 
The main threat to civil liberty comes from the criminal, the wrongdoer and the 
terrorist. Anyone who cares for liberty must therefore seek to defeat the criminal, 
the law-breaker and the terrorist….54  
 
 
By securitizing terrorism as an especially serious other, the “only” politically legitimate 
response was to maintain hardline security measures based in the law. Brokered notions 
of criminality softened political disagreement even if measures did not seem to be 
especially effective. This rhetorically coerced the majority of actors into supporting a 
continuance of existing measures. Political negotiations, though taking place privately, 
were not a part of official public discourse, and the “existential” nature of terrorism 
established through processes of securitization was maintained.  
 
Community 
 
In addition to “campaign” was a growing reference to “community”. Through 
these framings, certain groups were positioned as sharing an identity boundary with both 
terrorists and the referent. The focus on communities foreshadowed later securitization 
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discourse and practice, providing another example of exclusionary boundary formation 
as central to how counterterrorism was formed and implemented. Those associated with 
certain communities were presented as victims and risks. Both of these perceptions had 
the effect of further marginalizing those already positioned on the borders of the 
referent. Rhetorical packages such as “two communities”, “minority community”, “trust 
from the community”, winning “hearts and minds” in the community, and “recruiting 
security service officers” from “the community”, reinforced unequal and problematic 
relations between authorities and social groups. These power dynamics were reminiscent 
of earlier colonial history as well as contemporary tension with the “Muslim 
community”.55 These framings established consequential perceptions of “the other” by 
brokering an increased number of actors and textual sites through particular 
securitizations of terrorism, even if the speaker’s intention was not a full endorsement of 
existing measures: 
 
1979, Bennett Report: Effective policing of a community can only be achieved 
with the consent and support of the overwhelming majority of that community.56 
 
1979, Martin Flannery (Lab): Injustices flow from the essential nature of the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act as sure as rain comes from a rain cloud. It 
exacerbates and inflames the already difficult situation with which we are trying 
to grapple. It is applied basically to one section of the community—the minority 
in Northern Ireland.57 
 
1985, Lord Hylton (Crossbench): My Lords, in previous years, in common with 
other noble Lords, I have expressed concern about the impact of this Act on 
community relations.58 
 
1985, Douglas Hurd (Sec State NI, Con): This policy can provide the 
community with the service they need only if the security forces can be sure of 
the support of all those within the community who obey the law…We must 
continue to look for ways of winning the confidence and securing the support of 
the whole community…It is up to the whole law-abiding community and its 
political leaders to show that they hold to the basic principles that underlie our 
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system of law and order and that they are prepared to support and sustain those 
who duty is to protect us all.59  
 
1985, Lord Prys-Davies (Lab): A law that is perceived by a large sector of the 
community to be unfair may help to fuel discontent, lawlessness and violence. 
There is a feeling that the EPA may be counter-productive.60 
 
1987, Eldon Griffiths (Con): When such a surveillance is being conducted, the 
police must be sensitive to the situation in the local community.61 
 
1988, Jim Marshall (Lab): We are driven to the conclusion that security policy 
alone will not defeat terrorism. If we are to defeat it, both communities in the 
North must feel secure in the knowledge that the practice of rule of law will be 
objective and even-handed…62 
 
1990, Colville Report: There is universal agreement that the struggle to eradicate 
terrorism in Northern Ireland must be conducted with the widest possible support 
from the community…The Central Community Relations Unit and the 
Northern Ireland Community Relations Council are engaged in cross-
community contact and co-operation, mutual understanding and respect, as well 
as equal opportunities and equity of treatment, and a respect for the cultural roots 
of both communities, including the use of Gaelic.”63  
 
 
Framings of community provided a discursive gateway to broker divergent political 
parties through seemingly uncontroversial assumptions of threat and vulnerability. The 
securitization of terrorism increasingly depended upon such patterns of boundary 
differentiation. Linking terrorist suspects to particular communities institutionalized 
suspicion and justified increased surveillance: 
 
1979, James Kilfedder (UUP): An example of antagonism has already been 
given in tonight’s debate of the policeman at Gatwick who looks upon all 
travellers to Northern Ireland as terrorists or suspected terrorists. That is the 
message that television programmes and press comments give to people in 
Britain. The message is that the people of Northern Ireland are second-class 
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citizens who are not worth the moral support that we believe the United 
Kingdom should give them.64 
 
 
Even as concerns were raised, the construction of terrorist suspects along reprehensible 
terms such as “brutal murderers” and “ruthless criminals” outweighed arguments such as 
above. Through the way terrorism was securitized and threat/referent identities were 
stabilized, actors were rhetorically coerced into continuing more of the same. Through 
framings of community, official discourses of securitization reinforced and legitimized 
divisive boundaries of inclusion and exclusion.  
 
Civilization and democracy 
 
Exacerbating situations of alienation from commonplaces of community were 
references to “civilization” and “democracy”. These framings reasserted us/them 
differences based on perceptions of good versus bad. As explained by Croft, terms of 
civilization are a means to raise the stakes of the struggle.65 As such, these 
configurations escalated earlier discourses of criminality and bolstered the threat as not 
only due to violent action, but politically unarguable framings of actors’ moral 
disposition.  
 
1979, John Biggs-Davison (Con): In view of both British and Spanish reports 
that members of the Provisional IRA have operated with terrorists of the Basque 
separatist organisation ETA…are the Government satisfied with the co-operation 
between European and other western countries against the common enemy of 
Western civilisation?66  
 
1979, William Craig (UUP): we have been unable to cope successfully and 
adequately with the problem of terrorism. We are talking of a matter of life and 
death. We are discussing horrible mutilation. These are no ordinary crimes. They 
represent the degeneration of civilised beings to an all-time low in our 
democratic society67  
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By the mid-1980s, temporary counterterrorism laws had been in practice for over a 
decade. Terrorism was no longer an effect of rioting hooligans, but was securitized to 
represent nonnegotiable immorality and criminality. It is here that the role of 
securitization in effecting outcomes becomes particularly salient. The justification of 
maintained exceptionality is possible irrespective of material evidence.  
 
The audience must accept the terrorist other as “real” before an actor engages in 
terrorist violence. This fits in line with securitization theory and speech acts more 
generally,68 as well as the question “What, though, if the ‘objective’ nature of a threat 
was only the last stage of a process that is much more social in its character?”69 It is not 
that the objective aspects of insecurity are insignificant. However, the impossibility of 
objectively defining “terrorism” and the policy objective of prevention demand that 
terrorism be successfully securitized even if the environment is devoid of objective 
reference points such as an attack. The 1980s continuance of exceptional measures 
would not necessarily have taken place, or taken place in the way that it did, if terrorism 
had not been formed through discourses of “civilization” and “democracy”. 
Counterfactual arguments are not always the most convincing. Nonetheless, they are a 
helpful reminder for an analysis “from” the present that alternatives were possible. 
 
“International”? 
 
The expansion of the referent beyond Britain to “civilization” was met by the use 
of an “international” commonplace. Though infrequent, when the international label was 
deployed it was positioned as an indication of foreigners from outside. International was 
an externalizing commonplace that marked those who were using British territory to 
plan attacks outside Britain, against non-British actors, related to non-British disputes. 
Though it was not all of a sudden in the mid-1980s that such acts may have been taking 
place, this new threat construction did contribute to a shift in outcomes: For example, by 
bolstering securitization to help justify the PTA’s 1989 renewal, fifteen years after its 
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first appearance and without a five-year sunset clause. Through assumptions of 
foreignness, new physical and cultural distances not only separated terrorist others from 
the referent, but types of terrorists from each other. “International” did not help provide 
a clear means of threat identification. However, this commonplace did establish what 
Hansen has referred to as “degrees of othering” by establishing different degrees of 
identity and difference.70 This spatial trend was not predetermined, and the presumed 
essence separating international from Irish demanded social and political practices of 
labeling to be established as such. Over time by the end of the following decade, such 
processes of securitization would lay the foundation for an unexpected shift to 
permanent counterterrorism. 
 
The “international terrorist” as a foreigner was supported through intertextual 
linkages to immigration. For example, by connecting counterterrorism with deportation 
powers housed in the Immigration Act 1971.71 However, despite these moves, during the 
1980s the international threat identity remained marginal relative to Irish-related 
terrorism.72 While contemporary discourse connects international terrorism with events 
from the 1980s, such as the Salmon Rushdie affair and tensions in Bradford, this 
association was not apparent during actual 1980s discourse. International terrorism was 
a threat in its own right, differentiating non-Irish from Irish related terrorism. The 
international component of Irish groups could have encouraged a transition in 
securitization to one terrorist threat label: 
 
1987, Tom King (Sec of State for Northern Ireland, Con): It [the IRA] may 
possibly have support from President Gaddafi; it may have associations with 
other groups around the world; but it does not enjoy the support of any decent, 
civilised country in the world.73  
 
1988, Kenneth Hind (Con): “Many terrorists, and especially those in the IRA, are 
trained in Northern Ireland and some of them have experience of camps in Syria 
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and the Lebanon. They are trained by the PLO or by other Palestinian 
organisations”74  
 
1988, Ian Stewart (Lab): “the terrorists have received substantial supplies of 
arms and explosives from Libya and elsewhere”75  
 
 
However, rather than merge all terrorism into a category defined by methods of 
violence, official discourse securitized terrorism as types of others based on geographic 
boundary assumptions. Interestingly, despite some references to international terrorism, 
many seemed unconvinced that this international other was threatening enough to 
demanded counterterrorism, and the risk was said to be inflated.76 Reports were also 
cited as in fact failing to acknowledge the successful police operations against “foreign” 
terrorists that did not use counterterrorism.77  
 
Attention to some opinions of international terrorism during this period as 
minimal is not to ignore threats from outside the UK. But it does provide important 
perspective in light of how much attention the term “international terrorism” received in 
later years. Even as Irish and international labels constructed separate types of others in 
securitization, an overlap of definition continued. For example, how in 1988 Ken 
Maginnis (UUP) referred to Father Ryan from Northern Ireland as “a man who has 
acquired a reputation as an international terrorist”.78 The overlap was not interpreted 
as a contradiction because international was positioned as a type of foreign other based 
on particular geographic assumptions of belonging and difference. More specifically 
when it came to the “international”, this terrorist other was constructed as “non-British”, 
“non-domestic”, and frequently, non-western identities: 
 
1986, Lord Molloy (Lab): Is there not some justification that animates these 
[international] loathsome terrorists who slay innocent people on aircraft or at 
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airports; primarily, the occupation of their homeland, whether by the Russians in 
Afghanistan, others in the Middle East or CIA agents in South America?79 
 
1988, James Molyneaux (UUP): My second point is brief. As the order is based 
on a Bill that extends mainly to Great Britain, which originated only in Great 
Britain and which now refers to international terrorism and not solely to Irish 
terrorism, I wonder whether someone in authority could tell us whether the 
Libyan or Iranian Government have had the same facility for consultation as 
the Irish Government.80 
 
1988, Douglas Hurd (Secretary of State Home Department, Con): There is still a 
threat of terrorism hanging over the citizens of this country, including Northern 
Ireland. That arises not just out of the affairs of Northern Ireland but, as the right 
hon. Gentleman said, from the middle east and the sub-continent… As the 
right hon. Gentleman said, the original Act [PTA] did not cover international 
terrorism at all, but the world has changed for the worse since then. During 1987, 
there were six murders in Great Britain, which the police attributed to 
international terrorism. Those who died were three members of an Indian 
religious group at a service, two opponents of the Khomeini regime, and a 
Palestinian journalist.81 
 
1988, Kenneth Hind (Con): We are dealing not only with international terrorism, 
or only with domestic terrorism, but with a mixture: the IRA, the Libyans, the 
Iranians—all kinds of terrorists who come to this country bearing its people 
no good will. Those are the people whom we must exclude, and this Bill will 
exclude them.82  
 
 
The international commonplace broadened securitization to include threats coming in to 
the UK from beyond Ireland. This would set an important intersubjective precedent for 
later perceptions of international terrorism. But for the 1980s, these new others were 
outshadowed by what Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (Con) referred to as the “evil of 
terrorism” out of Northern Ireland.83  
 
Violent acts from actors connected to Northern Ireland, such as the 1984 
Conservative Party conference bombing, were more times than not strategic uses of 
violence for political ends. Terrorism was not an existential fanaticism based on a 
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ruthless brutality, but an instrumental use of violence for political ends. When 
considered alongside terrorism as a constant of history, terrorism is a method of violence 
irrespective of geographic identity markers not an entity-other in its own right. However, 
the securitization of terrorism reinforced processes of threat identification based on 
spatial assumptions of belonging, not the way actors engaged in violence: 
 
Many of these terrorists are trained by the Red Brigades and Baader-Meinhof 
and middle eastern [sic] terrorist groups and they come to Ulster to do their 
worst. We must prevent them from doing their worst on the mainland.84  
 
 
The Irish have always been distanced from the core British self, but Irish security threats 
were “closer” to the British referent than “other” others, such as international terrorism 
connected to the Middle East. The Irish threat was yoked closer to the British referent 
than dangerous foreigners from areas south or east of the British Isles. As mentioned 
earlier, the international label contributed to the replacement of the PTA’s five-year 
sunset clause with annual renewal considering the reduction of Irish-related violence at 
the time of the Act’s renewal:  
 
1988, Earl Ferrers (The Minister of State Home Office, Con): It is a fact that 
more than three years have now elapsed since the last outrage was committed by 
Northern Irish terrorists on the mainland. That is a tribute to the vigilance of the 
police. But the sombre threat remains undiminished. It comes from any and all 
parts of the world…However, in recognition of the exceptional nature of the 
powers, we propose that the new legislation should be renewed and reviewed 
annually so that it will be the subject of regular scrutiny. It will require a 
deliberate decision by Parliament each year to retain it. It will remain possible to 
discontinue any part of it at any time.85 
 
 
It was over fifteen years since the EPA and PTA were introduced as temporary 
measures. Though non-Irish terrorism and political violence had been in “existence” 
well before the late 1980s, it was only during this period that the securitization of 
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terrorism explicitly referenced possible insecurity from without in discourse on security 
practice within.  
 
While this shift in securitization to include possible insecurity beyond the UK is 
important, the influence of the “international” commonplace during this particular period 
should not be overstated. Even during the debate referenced above that directly 
referenced the possible insecurity from non-Irish groups, in the discourse, “Irish” 
outnumbered “international” 5 to 1.86 Arguments referencing the previous five years 
cited only six deaths from international terrorism, compared to 83 from “internal” 
activity.87 Political actors were unconvinced by the actual risk posed by international 
terrorism, and focused more heavily on continuing insecurity out of Northern Ireland: 
 
1988, Roy Hattersley (Lab): The Act [PTA] must be judged by its effects on 
terrorism in Northern Ireland and our success in combating it. The Home 
Secretary now wants to broaden its scope and tries to defend that action by 
saying that we live in an age of international terrorism. But everybody knows 
that this measure was introduced to deal explicitly with the Northern Ireland 
situation as an immediate and temporary expedient and necessity. Without the 
tragedy of Northern Ireland—indeed, without the specific tragedy of the 
Birmingham pub bombings—the Act would never have been passed.88 
 
 
In the late 1980s, despite a reference to international terrorism, officials were not fully 
convinced that this particular threat was a big enough risk to justify the maintenance of 
domestic legal exceptionalism.  
 
Thus the securitization of terrorism remained dominated by Irish-related threats 
while reconstructing the relational configurations of threat/referent construction. One 
way discourse was reconfigured was through commonplaces of “war”. This reference to 
“war” blurred the boundaries between law enforcement and defense and changed the 
rules of what were acceptable levels of state force. Terrorism was securitized as more 
threatening than disorder or brutality in earlier years, and framings of war legitimized 
continuing practices based on prevention. While contemporary research around “war” 
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and counterterrorism often focuses on the post-September 11th era, in the case of Britain 
“war” contributed to the securitization of terrorism over a decade earlier.  
 
War against terrorism 
 
 
1979, Cyril Townsend (Con) “asked the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland if 
he will make a statement on the war against terrorism in Northern Ireland”89 
 
1979, Harold McCusker (UUP): “despite some of the favourable trends that have 
been seen in the war against terrorists, seven young uniformed soldiers were 
killed in South Armagh last year”90 
 
1987, Eldon Griffiths (Con): The third task that the RUC is asked to undertake is 
unlike that of any other British police force—to fight Europe’s most difficult 
and prolonged counter-insurgency war. It is not in the Basque region of Spain 
or in Greece that the casualties of terrorism are at their highest; it is in the United 
Kingdom.91 
 
1987, James Kilfedder (UUP): It is not the duty of the police, which is a civil 
organisation, to engage in war with the IRA…the Army, not the police, should 
be used in such areas.92 
 
 
Rather than an example of a 21st shift, “war” represents a continuity around how 
terrorism is securitized and exceptional measures were legitimized. Framings of war 
escalated perceptions of terrorist danger beyond the notion of “campaign”, though the 
consequence of both was an expansion of perceived scale. Terrorism was not just a 
brutal criminality but a much “bigger” source violence and insecurity. From 1979 to 
1989, “criminal” and “war” commonplaces reinforced the illegitimacy of terrorist 
suspects and legitimacy of exceptional state force. These discourses and the 
intersubjective understandings upon which they relied were causally consequential for 
the consistent maintenance of exceptional measures. The politically unarguable nature of 
these framings limited the conditions of possibility for alternative security responses. 
Terrorism continued to be securitized as an illegitimate other whose essence as such was 
increasingly unquestioned.  
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Reasonable 
 
Actors were rhetorically coerced into an acceptance of counterterrorism not just 
because of the terrorist danger but because of the British self that was based on 
politically unarguable democratic values. The term “reasonable” came to play a legal 
and legitimating role in how measures were constituted and the referent was constructed. 
This cemented the referent as a distinctive self whose legitimacy was formed by and 
through the rule of law itself. In the first instance, “reasonable” is recognizable as a legal 
term of technical use for British lawmaking.93 However, underlying this usage are 
influential assumptions of moral superiority beyond technicalities of law. “Reasonable” 
positions those who are part of the official referent as those who can exert subjective 
judgment in order to implement exceptional counterterrorism. Measures such as 
extended detention were guided by whether or not the “examining officer…has 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the person examined is or has been concerned in 
the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism”.94  
 
The decision of whom was a possible terrorist or what was suspicious depended 
upon an authority’s interpretation of risk. Considering the demands of preemptive 
counterterrorism, material evidence is frequently unavailable. Actors depend upon 
intersubjective understandings of the other formed through processes of securitization in 
implementing security practice. Determining reasonable suspicion is indelibly linked to 
interpretation and judgment by actors who are part of the referent, with this 
determination linked with preexisting repertoires along terms of “community”, 
“campaign”, and “war”. “Reasonable” is thus part of counterterrorism law’s substance as 
well as the legitimation process justifying such substance in the first place: the referent 
and counterterrorism practice were mutually reinforcing. 
 
“constable may enter and search any premises or other place where that person is 
or where the constable has reasonable grounds for suspecting him to be”95  
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“wears any item of dress…wears, carries or displays any article…to arouse 
reasonable apprehension that he is a member or supporter of a proscribed 
organization, is guilty of an offence”96  
 
“a constable may arrest without warrant a person whom he has reasonable 
grounds for suspecting to be…concerned in the commission, preparation or 
instigation of acts of terrorism”97 
 
 
To view “reason” or “reasonable” as solely a technical component of law making or an 
objective mechanism of implementation, would be an analytic and historical misreading. 
There are broader implications at play through terms of reason because through terms of 
reasonable, state officials are bestowed with a type of unquestioned legitimacy.98  
 
Counterterrorism law implementation depended upon individual judgment by 
state actors and a convincing construction of the terrorist enemy. The British referent 
was reasserted as the ultimate source of legitimacy and terrorist suspects were 
delegitimized. This mutual constitution of self and other brings back broader issues 
within security studies more generally. Buzan and Hansen explain how CS scholarship, 
like Realism and Poststructuralism, is confronted by questions including “Does the state 
rely upon enemies to maintain identity/control over its population?”99 In the case of 
maintained counterterrorism law in Britain through the 20th century discussed here, a 
securitization lens enables at least a preliminary and context-specific response that 
would be in the affirmative. CS scholarship cannot not take on the assumption of 
self/other identities as essential to the way a state functions (or, survives) both as a 
political and as a societal referent. Whether or not “others” are explicitly labeled as 
“enemies” is an empirical question, but the role of the state does depend upon an 
establishment of singularity and purpose based on terms of difference. In this sense, the 
way terrorism was securitized to maintain counterterrorism law during 1980s Britain 
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depended upon particular configurations of identity for legitimation. The referent was 
yoked to boundaries of reason, and the threat to boundaries unreason. 
 
Framings of “criminal”, “campaign”, “community”, “international”, “war”, and 
“reason” were strengthened in how their position in discourse brokered previously 
unconnected actors and textual sites, thereby delegitimizing terrorist others while 
bolstering the legitimacy of the British referent. Exceptional counterterrorism was 
maintained, with a normalization of exceptional EPA and PTA powers lurking on the 
horizon. Public order issues associated with hooligan activity from the early 1970s had 
transitioned to nonnegotiable criminality distinct from ordinary criminals and political 
dissidents. The new reference to an “international” commonplace depended upon a 
disregard of the international element connected to Irish terrorism, beginning a process 
of securitization based on spatial assumptions of belonging. The referent’s moral 
capacity and civilization bolstered the threat to limit politically possible response aside 
from the maintenance of existing counterterrorism. The 1980s began the causally 
significant trend of securitizing terrorism along geographic perceptions of inclusion and 
exclusion that would become hardened over time. 
 
 
III. Summarizing 1979 – 1989 
 
Despite the 1990 Colville Report concluding that exceptional counterterrorism 
was in many ways counterproductive, British counterterrorism renewals through the next 
decade would reassert existing measures. Though the introduction of an international 
label did not play as significant a role during the 1980s as it would in the late 1990s, the 
beginning securitization of terrorism(s) along perceptions of geographic and cultural 
distance foreshadowed future practices of labeling that hold significant consequence for 
outcomes. The longer counterterrorism laws were maintained, the more the 
securitization of terrorism asserted degrees of externalization separating types of 
terrorist others from the referent in need of protection. International terrorism was 
associated with foreign, non-western threats, while Irish-related terrorism encompassed 
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a different degree of danger from “across the water”. Both threat constructions relied 
upon an establishment of suspect communities that shared a boundary with the referent 
but were not fully included.  
 
Processes of securitization based on degrees of otherness and danger outweighed 
concerns over insecurity or ineffectiveness linked to EPA and PTA measures. 
International terrorism was from the beginning a foreign threat with no connection to 
western civilization or the British referent, distinguished from domestic and Irish 
terrorism:  
 
After reading the summary of Lord Shackleton’s report on the operation of the 
Acts, the Prime Minister has commented that although these issues are naturally 
viewed in terms of the terrorist threat in and from Ireland, we should not exclude 
the Iraqis, and Arabs in general, from our minds in considering the 
recommendations in Lord Shackleton’s report.100  
 
 
The international threat label, while seemingly value-neutral, was in fact always linked 
to intersubjective assumptions of foreignness, non-belonging, and non-Britishness. 
International and Irish terrorists were both positioned as external to the British referent, 
albeit along different degrees of distance and foreignness.  
 
The term “international terrorism” was introduced alongside a new connection 
between counterterrorism and immigration: 
 
1985, David Waddington (Con): The enforcement of the provisions of the 
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 is principally for the 
police. As part of their training Immigration Officers (and customs officers 
employed as immigration officers under the Immigration Act 1971) are made 
aware of their powers of examination under the 1984 Act have instructions to 
bring to the attention of the police any matter which might involve international 
terrorism.101 
 
1987, Clare Short (Lab): Will the right hon. Gentleman confirm that the 
extension of the Prevention of Terrorism Act to include international terrorism 
is new? Secondly, will he explain exactly on what grounds those people were 
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detained, so that we may judge whether they could have been detained under 
other powers in the criminal law or in immigration legislation? My belief is 
that the Government have extended the Act to international terrorism to justify 
legislation that does not stand up in its own right.102 
 
1987, Minister of State Home Office (Earl of Caithness, Con): It has been 
suggested by those who believe the Prevention of Terrorism Act is unnecessary 
in the fight against terrorism that the Immigration Act 1971 provides sufficient 
powers for the authorities to proceed against international terrorists.103 
 
 
From its nascent references in official British discourse, international terrorism was 
linked with concerns over “a greater flow of international terrorists into Britain” 
[emphasis added].104 While all terrorism was positioned as in need of exceptional 
counterterrorism, international terrorism was also placed as requiring powers of 
deportation. “International terrorism” and fighting a “war” against terrorism broadened 
the scope of terrorist threat even as the majority of securitization discourse focused on 
Northern Irish related instability. Despite the inconsistency of separating terrorist others 
along geographic boundary patterns, the stage was set for a long-term securitization of 
terrorism based on spatial assumptions of belonging.  
 
Would exceptional counterterrorism continue during the 1990s as the peace 
process got under way, international terrorist acts remained minimal, and political 
leadership changed? As will be discussed in the next chapter, Labour began the 1990s 
with the direct conviction that counterterrorism law was not working.105 Yet by 1998, it 
would be Labour that would introduce the first permanent act of counterterrorism built 
upon EPA and PTA strategies. This act was formed on the heels of the Good Friday 
Agreement, and during an era of relative calm with respect to violence. The way 
terrorism was securitized and threat/referent identities were stabilized along particular 
configurations thus continued to be essential to counterterrorism outcomes. It is how 
such relational configurations unfolded to stabilize us/them perceptions of danger and 
                                                 
102
 Prevention of Terrorism, 10 February 1987, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 110, col. 
265. 
103
 Parl. Deb, H.L., 19 February 1987, 5th ser., vol. 484, col. 1236. 
104
 Andrew Hunter (Con): Parl. Deb, H.C., 6 December 1988, 6th ser., vol. 143, col. 248. 
105
 Colville Report, 1990, Cm. 1115, ch. 1, 1.3. 
 170
 
continue securitizing terrorism despite a substantially altered social environment and 
political leadership that is the focus of the next chapter leading to 21st century permanent 
counterterrorism law.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 6 
 
1990 to 1999 
A change in legal course, from temporary status to permanent feature 
 
 
 
As the House will be aware, the Government propose the introduction of permanent counter-
terrorist legislation, which we hope will do away with the need for the annual renewal of 
temporary provisions. 
 
That approach recognizes the sad but incontrovertible reality that even a lasting peace in 
Northern Ireland—something that we all pray and hope will be firmly established soon—would 
not of itself remove the need for counter-terrorist legislation. Terrorism, and the threat of 
terrorism from a range of fronts, is likely to continue to exist for the foreseeable future. 
 (Jack Straw, Secretary of State for the Home Department, 16 March 1999)1 
 
 
The anti-terrorism laws have led to some of the worst human rights abuses in this country over 
the past 25 years, contributed to miscarriages of justice and have led to the unnecessary 
detention of thousands of innocent people, most of them Irish. Only a tiny percentage of those 
detained have ever been charged and almost without exception they could have been detained 
under ordinary criminal laws…  
(Wadham 14 December 19992) 
 
 
 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, despite controversy over counterterrorism 
law effectiveness, exceptional measures continued to be renewed throughout the 1980s. 
There was a building distinction in official discourse between Irish and international 
terrorism even as the general definition of terrorism remained vague. Counterterrorism 
laws in the early 1970s emerged along framings of public order reminiscent to special 
powers used in Ireland going back to at least the early 20th century. But through the 
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seventies and eighties, terrorism was securitized along framings of criminality leading 
not just to the securitization of “terrorism”, but the construction of “terrorists” as others 
in their own right. Individuals could be labeled terrorist suspects even in the absence of 
violence. By the late 1990s, this identification of terrorist others in official discourse 
reinforced a securitization of terrorism that established types of others rather than types 
of terrorizing violence. These discourses bolstered Labour’s proposal to replace 
temporary legislation with the Terrorism Bill, a UK-wide, permanent act. The referent 
was not just domestic order, as seen immediately following the Troubles, but democratic 
civilization. This shift in discourse broadening the referent and reinforcing different 
terrorist threat labels activated a beginning normalization of exceptional 
counterterrorism.3  
 
This chapter analyzes how terrorism came to be securitized as a general risk of 
violence and as specific others through practices labeling Irish, domestic, and 
international terrorist threats.4 Intersubjective understandings linked to us/them identities 
constructed during the securitization of terrorism were essential to lawmakers’ 
acceptance that “international terrorism” was so threatening as to justify permanent 
counterterrorism. The securitization of terrorism was especially important considering 
the relative historic calm of terrorist violence at the time and aims of prevention: 
perceptions of possible future risk were more important than verifying known danger. 
The securitization of terrorism along Irish, domestic, and international labels reinforced 
particular collective meanings based on degrees of distance, difference, and danger. 
Prior threats were yoked to legitimate politics, for example Gerry Adams and Sinn Fein 
to John Hume and the SDLP. This emphasized “new” boundaries of illegitimacy around 
international terrorism. Though the peace process was under way, insecurity in Northern 
Ireland remained. The Omagh 1998 attack was the single most deadly bombing of the 
troubles, killing 29 and injuring over 200. At the same time, the international threat did 
not necessarily pose such an imminent danger as to require making measures permanent 
that had in earlier years brought significant counterproductive consequences.  
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It may seem that, quite simple, counterterrorism hardens when threats harden, 
and policies weaken when threats weaken. However, this perspective would ignore 
issues of consequence for the empirical case that are drawn out by a relational-
securitization framework. First, the threat of Irish terrorism, increasingly referred to as 
“dissident republicanism”, was not necessarily diminishing at the time that the peace 
process began. The full cessation of violence by the PIRA was not declared until 2005, 
and republican splinter groups in fact joined forces under one operational umbrella 
during the summer of 2012. Secondly, it was unclear what “international terrorism” 
actually was. A number of specific groups were mentioned, such as the PLO or AQ. But 
the threat was also positioned as a generalized danger stemming from the broader 
Middle East. In addition, the number of deaths from international terrorists was far less 
than the close to 3,000 killed by Irish related acts.  
 
The argument is not that a threat did not exist from groups such as AQ, or that 
the formation of security measures against nontraditional uses of terrorist violence was a 
surprise. However, the way that these measures formed along particular labels of 
identification was not predetermined. These labels and the intersubjective 
understandings upon which they were stabilized in turn caused certain outcomes to be 
made possible over others. These outcomes led to specific consequences including 
repeated patterns of alienation and insecurity, the establishment of new legal precedents 
for a higher threshold of legitimate state power, and a beginning normalization of 
preemptive security practice. Thus the perspective is not that rising and falling threats 
corresponded with rising and falling levels of counterterrorism exception. Rather, that 
rising and falling levels of counterterrorism corresponded with patterns of identity 
construction that were based on particular sets of intersubjective understandings. These 
understandings were of significant consequence for what outcomes of security and 
insecurity were deemed to be politically acceptable. 
 
This construction of particular identity labels was not determined by the nature 
of objective security threats but a result of negotiated and renegotiated political and 
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social practice. These practices had consequences for intersubjective understanding 
around self/other identity perceptions, and material security outcomes such as 
counterterrorism law. 
 
 
I. Situating the nineties 
 
The last two chapters explained how counterterrorism emerged and was 
maintained during the 1970s and 1980s. When introduced in 1973 and 1974, 
counterterrorism laws were accepted as emergency responses to establish peace and 
order that were “unprecedented in peacetime in Great Britain”.5 As stated by Roy 
Jenkins, these measures were necessary to “enable preventive action to be taken against 
people who appear to the Secretary of State to be involved with terrorism (i.e. concerned 
in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism) but against whom it is 
not possible to bring charges under the present law”.6 The justification of these new laws 
rested in “the defeat of terrorism and the extension of normal policing”.7 The view was 
that these measures would not be indefinite. Though internment was only used for a few 
years during the Troubles, exceptional measures and the consequences on state-
community relations were long lasting. Interim Custody Orders and extended detention 
continued to target and alienate suspect communities. This was legitimized by 
securitizing terrorist others as more threatening than ordinary criminals. Terrorism was 
“an exceptionally serious threat to society…not merely more serious than other forms of 
violent crime, but different in kind.”8  
 
Over time the construction of terrorism expanded and was positioned as 
uncivilized fanatics that threatened a way of life in addition to the right to life as such: 
“Something about terrorism makes its threat inflate, genie-like, way beyond its actual 
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physical scale…”9 Securitization is a never-ending process of renegotiated meanings and 
demands regular reassertions of identity. This constant (re)securitization of terrorism 
was necessary to justify the maintenance of counterterrorism in the face of opposition 
concerns during the early to mid nineties: 
 
1991, Roy Hattersley (Lab): The Act creates the illusion of a campaign against 
terrorism…Today, the Home Secretary read a tragic and terrible list of the death 
and destruction caused in this country in the past year. That can be interpreted in 
two fashions: as the need for the prevention of terrorism Act to continue in its 
present form, or as evidence of the Act’s failure and the need to reconsider the 
whole issue.10 
 
 
This continued ambiguity of effectiveness required that official discourse elevate 
terrorist risk to overcome opposition and continue policies. To successfully securitize 
terrorism and legitimize a continuance of exceptional law, the threat had to be formed 
along politically unarguable threat/referent constructions irrespective of material 
evidence. Whether or not there “really” was an international other at the doors of Britain 
was, to a point, irrelevant for whether or not the securitization of terrorism was 
successful.  
 
As explained by Buzan et al., “Our approach [to securitization] has the basic 
merit of conceptualizing security as a labeling for which actors can be held responsible 
rather than an objective feature of threats.”11 This nuanced view is a key part of how 
securitization theory complements critical terrorism studies and genealogical 
investigations of counterterrorism. It is not that the objective is unimportant, but that for 
causally consequential interrelations of discourse, identity, and practice, the material on 
its own is not sufficient in affecting outcomes. Leading up to the nineties, the 
criminalization of terrorism differentiated terrorists from ordinary criminals and political 
dissidents. The removal of special category status connected protests from prison with 
the street and bolstered support for the republican cause. The Thatcher government 
remained committed to “tough” uses of power despite events such as the 1979 
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assassination of Conservative MP Airey Neave, 1984 Brighton bombing at the 
Conservative Party conference, and increased scrutiny of state security practices. 
Opposition to continuing counterterrorism was not entirely absent, with Labour MP Roy 
Hattersley arguing that “the record of the past 13 years shows that the Tory Government 
have been no more successful in their battle against terrorism than in their fight against 
crime”.12 But exceptional laws continued to be renewed. 
 
Counterterrorism discourse reconstructed the terrorist threat while the peace 
process reconfigured other identities and interests.13 These processes bolstered a yoking 
of former Irish-related terrorists to legitimate politics and asserted new actors as 
terrorists. While U.S. support of the IRA came up in earlier discourse around 
counterterrorism, in the 1990s the U.S. was a broker of peace, not part of the problem. 
Over time, transnational components of Irish-related terrorism were given far less 
scrutiny than issues around “international terrorism”. The role of U.S. actors in Irish 
political violence was well known. But the U.S. as a key British ally may very well have 
helped silence this role over time.14  
 
During the 1990s, reforms in Eastern Europe were referenced as successes over 
terror, and tensions in Iraq were referenced as risks of terror.15 The terrorist suspect was 
increasingly constructed as external, non-western others. Following the bombing of the 
New York World Trade Centers in 1993 and the attacks on US embassies in East Africa 
in 1998, AQ took on a new resonance. But the threat was still low on most radar screens. 
The 1995 sarin gas attack by Aum Shinrikyo on the Tokyo subway highlighted the 
possibility of CBRN weapons-use by non-state groups. But terrorizing political violence 
was not “new”, and such acts represented a continuity of political violence and shifting 
scale that had gone on before and after 1989.16. What did change was the sense of 
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uncertainty that the Cold War “balance of terror” had avoided.17 In the context of British 
counterterrorism, the decade following the end of the Cold War marked two decades 
since counterterrorism law was introduced. The peace process was underway and there 
had been no significant international terrorist attacks against Britain. But exceptional 
counterterrorism was on the verge of being made permanent.  
 
In 1998, the year of the Omagh attack, parliament passed the Criminal Justice 
(Terrorism Conspiracy) Act. This expanded state power by restricting right to innocence 
until proven guilty in two ways. A police officer’s opinion on membership of a 
proscribed organization (rather than material evidence of membership), and a suspect’s 
silence during questioning (previously a protected right), could now be used as evidence 
of guilt.18 Neither of these on their own would enable a conviction, but this shift in 
burden of proof and due process was significant. At the same time, the UK passed the 
1998 Human Rights Act (implemented in 2000), strengthening a commitment to civil 
liberties and international human rights. However, there was a simultaneous derogation 
from the EcourtHR: 
 
There have been in the United Kingdom in recent years campaigns of organised 
terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland which have manifested 
themselves in activities which have included repeated murder, attempted murder, 
maiming, intimidation and violent civil disturbance and in bombing and fire 
raising which have resulted in death, injury and widespread destruction of 
property. As a result, a public emergency within the meaning of Article 15(1) of 
the Convention exists in the United Kingdom. 
… 
To the extent that the exercise of these powers [counterterrorism measures] may 
be inconsistent with the obligations imposed by the Convention the Government 
has availed itself of the right of derogation conferred by Article 15(1) of the 
Convention and will continue to do so until further notice. 19 
 
 
This legal reinforcement of a continued emergency situation was necessary to justify the 
maintenance of exceptional practice despite a building peace process. Reconfigured 
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identities were important to continue counterterrorism practice and to sustain policies of 
negotiation in Northern Ireland.20 The 1993 Downing Street Declaration recognized “the 
birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as 
Irish or British, or both, as they may so choose”, while security practices broadened 
threat construction beyond Irish-related terror.21 Executive decision continued to trump 
judicial authority in counterterrorism law, for example as related to EPA “Detention 
orders”: 
 
8.—(l) After receiving a report made by an Adviser under paragraph 7(1), the 
Secretary of State shall consider the case of the person to whom it relates and, if 
he is satisfied—  
(a) that the person has been concerned in the commission or attempted 
commission of any act of terrorism, or in directing, ? organizing or training 
persons for the purpose of terrorism, and  
(b) that the detention of that person is necessary for the protection of the public, 
the Secretary of State may make a detention order for the detention of that 
person. (emphasis added)22 
 
 
The conditions legitimizing executive power were similar to earlier laws. Terms of 
“reasonableness” reinforced state authority in discerning if a suspect is “concerned in the 
commission or attempted commission of any act of terrorism, or in directing, organizing 
or training persons for the purpose of terrorism”.23 As discussed in the previous chapter, 
“reasonable” was not particular to the 1990s but a consistent legal and rhetorical means 
of reasserting state authority. The addition of “reasonable” was intended as a check on 
excessive power, but to “reasonably” believe was still more open-ended than to 
“absolutely” believe, a point that was brought up by the European Commission.24  
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 Counterterrorism through the 1990s expanded law enforcement powers as well 
as the executive, for example through a stop and search clause in the PTA (Additional 
Powers) 1996:25  
 
1 Power to stop and search pedestrians 
(f) In the 1989 Act insert, after section 13A— 
“13B Power to stop and search pedestrians 
(1) Where it appears to a police officer of the rank mentioned in subsection 
(1)(a), (b) or (as the case may be) (c) of section 13A above that it is 
expedient to do so in order to prevent acts of terrorism to which that 
section applies, he may give an authorization that the powers to stop and 
search persons conferred by this section shall be exercisable at any place 
within his area or a locality in his area which is specified in the 
authorization. 
(2) This section confers on any constable in uniform power to stop any 
pedestrian and search him, or anything carried by him, for articles of a 
kind which could be used for a purpose connected with the commission, 
preparation or instigation of such acts of terrorism.”26 
 
 
There were some efforts to moderate existing powers, in part connected to international 
law. This was noticeable with the Human Rights Act 1998 mentioned earlier, as well as 
through initiatives such as the Geneva Convention (Amendments) Act of 1995 including 
protection for individuals from “acts of terrorism”.27 Elements of due process relevant to 
domestic counterterrorism were reinforced, such as Article 75’s “Fundamental 
guarantees”: 
 
(d) anyone charged with an offence is presumed innocent until proved guilty 
according to law;  
(e) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to be tried in his 
presence;  
(f) no one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt; (36)28 
 
 
This final clause is especially important for counterterrorism. The 1979 Amnesty 
International Report had cited that 94% of cases before Diplock Courts resulted in 
conviction, and that 70-90% of those convictions were based on admissions of guilt 
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during interrogation: “Only in a minority of cases is other evidence – forensic evidence, 
intelligence evidence, or testimony of witnesses – produced in court to secure a 
conviction”.29 The consequence of this report combined with the 1979 Bennett Report 
was significant, and 1990s human rights initiatives started legal protections for terrorism 
suspects. However, to be enacted, these protections in fact reinforced a securitization of 
terrorism based on the threat as from terrorist others rather than terrorist methods.  
 
The Northern Ireland Arms (Decommissioning) Act 1997 and the Northern 
Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 were significant institutional moves. As prisoners were 
released former terrorists were incorporated into political negotiations, yoking 
previously illegitimate others to legitimate actors. Discursive space opened up to 
redefine who “terrorists” were. Despite work on human rights and political efforts, 
however, the state of counterterrorism through the 1990s was one of maintained 
exception. This continuance transformed into a permanency of counterterrorism law 
through a securitization of terrorism across particular “forms” (labels) as observed in the 
“Legislation Against Terrorism – A consultation paper”.30  
 
By the 1990s, a terrorist terminology newly prevalent from early 1970s discourse 
was routinized. The intensification of words connected with terror in parliamentary 
debate grew alongside broadening state powers. The below screenshot of how many 
times “terrorism” appeared in parliamentary debate records during the 20th century 
shows this increased usage in the blue bars above each decade:31 
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Figure 1.3 – Search of “terrorism”, UK Parliamentary debates 1900-2000 
 
 
We see in this screenshot the top five speakers using terms of terrorism, the total number 
of hits for terrorism, and the “most relevant” record for the 20th century. There were 
21,415 results for terrorism in the 20th century compared to 3265 hits in the 19th century, 
and 9457 hits for the years 2000 to 2005 alone.32 During the 1990s alone, “terrorism” 
appeared 6300 times, and “terrorist” 6218 times.33 
 
While these results are a helpful frame of reference, it is not merely the number 
of times a word appears that influences intersubjectivity, securitization, and outcomes. 
However, the presence of terrorism-specific language and growing reference to terrorists 
as specific entity-others. If discourse had not constructed “terrorists” but focused on 
methods of violence, the intersubjective understandings around terrorism and 
counterterrorism outcomes would have been different. The construction of “terrorism” 
as a morally reprehensible other enabled certain discourses to arise that changed what 
was considered legitimate security practice. An increase in explicit articulations around 
terrorism restricted possibilities of response. The intersubjective power residing in 
discourses of terrorism marginalized dissenters as being “soft” on terrorism. The 
unquestioned immorality of terrorists reinforced the trump card morality of state actors 
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and limited spaces for agency during lawmaking. While it was not new for terrorism to 
be understood as unethical, this immorality grew in influence through 1990s 
securitization. The threat was no longer just brutal, but evil; the referent not just Britain, 
but civilization and democratic society. 
 
The broader 1990s context did not necessarily point to a continuance of 
emergency counterterrorism or their transition to permanence. Though it was Labour 
who introduced the PTA in 1974 and the TA 2000, it was also Labour who had largely 
voted against PTA and EPA renewals:34  
 
1.3 There is a direct challenge, in the representations made to me, to a 
continuation of the EPA. The Labour Party puts it thus:-  
 
"The Labour Party continues to believe that emergency legislation cannot resolve 
the problems which exist in Northern Ireland. Furthermore, the grievances to 
which the operation of emergency powers give rise are in themselves one of the 
causes of the continuing violence. They also lend credence to the claims of the 
paramilitaries by giving them a status they would not otherwise have. We believe 
that the basic task of government in Northern Ireland is to ensure that the 
Province is administered on the basis of the rule of law. It is an extremely 
dangerous fallacy to believe that the absence of political stability justifies 
deviations from the rule of law. On the contrary, precisely because the political 
institutions lack legitimacy, the negative effects of deviations from the rule of 
law are magnified."35  
 
 
Exceptional powers are not easily relinquished once obtained, but power did not have to 
be maintained through counterterrorism. Instead, government could have emboldened 
political power by fulfilling earlier promises of returning to normalcy alongside the 
peace process, reinforced existing criminal laws, or focused on being a global leader in 
balancing security and human rights. These political directions would not have removed 
power or ignored insecurity. But they would have reallocated where power came from 
by recalibrating security practice. The inconsistency of Labour’s position was not 
unnoticed, with Conservative MP James Gray asking “Will the Home Secretary take this 
opportunity to feel the slightest twinge of embarrassment at the fact that, from 1983 to 
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1995, the Labour party consistently opposed renewal of the prevention of terrorism 
Act?”36 He continued by asking Labour officials if they would “apologise to the nation 
for getting it wrong for 12 years?”37  
 
Combined with this unpredictable political climate, historical events at the time 
did not necessarily present a picture of imminent emergency threatening the life of the 
nation. The Downing Street Declaration, paramilitary ceasefires (inconsistent but 
significant), and Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement, all provided for public talks aimed at 
peace. Though Omagh was a tragedy, reactions to the attack made it clear that the vast 
majority were committed to nonviolence. The British Government reaffirmed in the 
Declaration that “they have no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern 
Ireland”.38 With respect to non-Irish threats, while officials referenced 80 “international 
terrorist incidents” in Britain over the past 20 years,39 such numbers were minimal when 
compared to the 71 deaths caused by Irish-related terror in 1990 alone.40 The de-
escalation of rhetoric around Irish related terrorism considering political initiatives was 
not itself puzzling. But the expansion of exceptional counterterrorism laws that were 
formed in response to this threat in light of such de-escalation was. It is this disjuncture 
that opens up space to more adequately conceptualize the way securitization built upon 
discourses around new threat labels. Instead of categorizing all terrorists under an 
umbrella of “terrorism”, securitization distinguished types of others. It was through these 
threat/referent constructions that a path to 21st century normalization of exceptional 
counterterrorism was enabled. 
 
As in the prior decade, most international attacks referenced in official discourse 
were not directly against Britain. The 1994 car bomb outside the Israeli embassy and 
Balfour House in London, the 1998 Johannesburg restaurant bombing, the 1997 Luxor 
attack, and the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa were indeed linked with 
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British interests. But they could have been interpreted as one-off strategic incidents, not 
as events demanding exceptional domestic laws that permanently reconfigured the 
British rule of law itself. While the 1998 East African bombings were officially 
referenced as an early example of “international” terrorism, according to the American 
Federal Bureau of Investigation these attacks were also linked to British citizens.41 Irish 
actors carrying out attacks in the Netherlands and Germany were referred to as “Irish”, 
not “international”. What made the examples in Africa demand a different 
securitization? Even though the non-Irish threats were presented as not necessarily 
against Britain, international terrorism justified exceptional measures:  
 
1995, Michael Howard (Con): with the growth of Islamic radicalism, we need to 
remain vigilant against the possibility that Britain will be used as a base for 
plotting acts of violence overseas and raising money for terrorist purposes42 
 
1998, Jack Straw (Secretary of State for the Home Department, Lab): We have to 
send the clearest message to international terrorist groups that we in the United 
Kingdom will not allow this country to be used as a base for plotting and 
supporting terrorist operations abroad.43  
 
 
International terrorism, as in earlier discourse, was understood as foreign and external. 
This reinforced the degrees of distance and difference separating the referent in need of 
protection from each identified type of terrorism. This identification of terrorist risk 
along patterns of inclusion/exclusion and labels based on geographic perceptions of 
belonging was problematic from the start. As seen with the 7 July 2005 London 
bombings, international terrorism was committed by domestic actors from within as 
much as foreign others from without.44  
 
The 1990s could have refocused efforts on existing criminal law and 
international cooperation, but initiatives such as the Euro Directive were interpreted as 
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having “no effect on our right and determination to combat the evils of terrorism”.45 As 
argued by Townshend, international cooperation is “always limited by the absence of 
consensus on the justifications for political violence”.46 Expanding powers of search and 
seizure, shifting burdens of evidentiary proof, and broadened jurisdictions outside 
Britain against non-British interests, pointed to a significant expansion of state 
counterterrorism. When a measure was repealed, it was either replaced by a new 
measure or accompanied by reminders of other powers. For example, though exclusion 
orders were removed, the Secretary of State followed this removal by stating “Of course 
our ability, under the Immigration Act 1971, to deport, or deny entry to, suspected 
international terrorists will remain unchanged”.47 This reasserted international terrorism 
as non-British and from outside the UK and bolstered the legitimacy of exceptional state 
power.  
 
It is not just that a shift to permanent counterterrorism law took place, but how 
this move occurred. With political developments holding, it was not predetermined for 
counterterrorism to continue: 
 
1997, Jack Straw (Sec State Home Dept, Lab): In Northern Ireland, there has of 
course been a very welcome change for the better. The IRA and a number of 
loyalist groups have declared ceasefires. Currently those are holding. Substantive 
talks between the parties have begun. There is real cause for optimism that a 
lasting peace may be achieved in Northern Ireland.48 
 
 
The threat from splinter groups and an incomplete decommissioning of arms remained, 
but progress was being made. “International terrorism” was not clearly defined and 
“international terrorist” incidents were far fewer in number than Irish terrorism ever was. 
Arguments referencing changes in technology as evidence of growing terrorist danger 
are not incorrect, but they should be interpreted relative to the context within which 
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these changes occur.49 The risk of CBRN demanded attention, but the possible use these 
weapons was not itself a new danger, whether by state or non-state actors. In addition, 
experts continue to disagree about the risk such weapons pose.50 These factors 
underscore the causally consequential role of how terrorism was securitized in that 
certain patterns of identity construction enabled some outcomes over others. 
 
The following relational analysis explains this role of securitization by tracing 
how observed patterns of threat/referent construction through the 1990s led to the 
permanent TA 2000.  
 
 
II. Late 20th century relationalities and types of terrorist others 
 
Terrorism as a specific threat must be securitized in a way that is at once 
ambiguous and incontestable. To legitimize exceptional practice, the threat had to be 
established as real in a physical sense before it was actually witnessed, reminding us of 
the stranger example from chapter three. While events may provide initial support for 
certain practices, the maintenance and normalization of these measures required 
legitimation beyond acts of violence. Officials had to successfully securitize terrorism in 
a way that positioned exceptional practice as the “only” political option. Though “[t]he 
revulsion of feeling in the country and in Parliament” following the 1974 Birmingham 
pub bombings helped the speed at which the PTA was passed, the renewal of this act for 
more than two decades depended upon an evolving securitization of terrorism as an 
exceptional threat in its own right.51 
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The securitization of terrorism depended upon social and political practices 
constructing understandings of terrorists as particular others to overcome questions of 
effectiveness:  
 
1993, Kevin McNamara (Lab): The original emergency legislation was passed 20 
years ago, yet according to a recent European Community report the murder rate 
in Northern Ireland is about five times the European average. Only the Calabria 
region in southern Italy, stronghold of the Mafia, ranks higher.52 
 
 
Debates compared the danger of Northern Ireland with other places of insecurity. But 
attempts to provide statistical assessments along international versus Irish-related 
categories were confusing: 
 
1993, Peter Robinson (DUP): The death statistics for Northern Ireland show that 
3,053 people have been murdered as a result of terrorist campaigns…Outside the 
3,053 people who have been killed in Northern Ireland, 100 have been killed in 
the Republic of Ireland, 118 have been killed in Great Britain, and 18 have been 
killed in other parts of Europe directly as a result of the terrorist campaigns from 
Northern Ireland…the fact is that, if the Northern Ireland community of some 1.5 
million people is considered in ratio to the population of Great Britain, one 
would be envisaging the murder of some 125,000 people on the mainland. One 
would be talking about more than 1.25 million people on the mainland having 
been maimed and mutilated as a result of violence.53 
 
 
Irish terrorism was international, but not considered “international” in how it was 
identified. Despite counterterrorism laws having been in force for almost two decades, 
they did not stop the violence. Conservative MP Ian Gow was assassinated in 1990, a 
PIRA bomb in Bishopsgate in 1993 killed two and resulted in over £350 million in 
damages, a 1996 Canary Wharf bombing killed 2, injured 39, and caused about £85 
million damage, and a Manchester city centre bombing injured over 200. The single 
most fatal incident was the earlier mentioned 1998 attack in Omagh, the same year as 
the GFA. 
 
Failure  
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 Views on whether or not to continue counterterrorism as it stood varied. A range 
of parties including Lab, SDLP, and Con MPS were brokered through references to the 
ineffectiveness of exceptional measures: 
 
1990, Ken Livingstone (Lab): Of those people who were actually detained under 
the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974, only one in 100 was successfully 
prosecuted.54  
 
1990, Seamus Mallon (SDLP): One cannot defeat terrorism by the use of 
more stringent law.55  
 
1990, Roy Hattersley (Lab): At no time did he [Home Secretary] relate the 
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act to the battle against 
terrorism. At no time did he tell us how the Act was helping in that campaign.56  
 
1993, Edward Heath (Con): I must ask myself this question: at a time when other 
countries in Europe—to limit ourselves to that particular geographical area—
have been able to deal with the problem, why have we failed…One has to be 
cleverer in intelligence, cleverer in action and cleverer politically. Again, to be 
perfectly blunt, we have failed in all three.57  
 
 
Others highlighted not just ineffectiveness, but counterproductiveness. This included 
Labour officials whose party would in fact champion the TA 2000 years later: 
 
1991, Barry Sheerman (Lab): We shall vote against the prevention of terrorism 
Act not merely because it does not work and because it undermines the quality of 
justice in this country—justice which we have always been proud of—but 
because it feeds terrorism and gives terrorists ammunition with which to win 
support at home and abroad—support which we must cut off.58  
 
1992, Martin Flannery (Lab): There was no bluffing about what happened to the 
Guildford Four, the Birmingham Six, the Maguires and others. Not only does the 
Act not prevent terrorism; it does terrible things to people and thus encourages 
terrorism.59  
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1993, Lord Monkswell (Lab): It is worth remembering the draconian provisions 
of the Act…The fundamental reason why I stand here year after year arguing 
against the provisions of the Act is because I feel that in fact it contributes to 
terrorism.60  
 
1999, Lembit Öpik (LD): We have to be scrupulously clear and careful not to 
undermine the very values that we are attempting to uphold with legislation. In 
that sense, replacing terrorism with injustice is not an equitable trade.61  
 
 
Despite such statements around how existing measures had failed, EPA and PTA laws 
were renewed and the Terrorism Act 2000 continued a similar trajectory.  
 
Alienation 
 
With peace talks under way at the time, to continue exceptional counterterrorism 
targeting Irish-related risks could have been viewed as a political risk of sending the 
wrong signal. In particular considering the repeated consequences of alienation that 
negatively affected community relations: 
 
1990, Roy Hattersley (Lab): reason why the Government reject the idea of 
internment is that it would alienate many men and women in Northern 
Ireland…the Government are prepared to risk that alienation…it makes their 
policy a liability in the real political battle against terrorism.62 
 
1993, Kevin McNamara (Lab): one in 10 Irish males living in Britain have been 
detained under or affected by the prevention of terrorism [sic] Act. This 
harassment only adds to the sense of alienation felt by the Irish community in 
Britain…80 per cent of the Irish in Britain doubted that they would receive a 
fair trial for a terrorist-related offence.63  
 
1994, Seamus Mallon (SDLP): In 1993, 1,641 people were detained, and 379 
people were charged. That means that 1,262 people were not charged and were 
released in the terms of the law of this country that they were innocent until 
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proven guilty…They have the stigma of detention on them when they return 
home, and we know what that can mean in Northern Ireland terms.64  
 
1996, Dennis Canavan (Lab, SP): the prevention of terrorism [sic] Act has 
succeeded in alienating many innocent people, their families and their 
communities. It has caused hostility between communities and the police, 
particularly among young people, who are often arrested and detained—their 
only crime being their Irish accent, Irish name or Irish family connections.65 
 
1996, Lord Monkswell (Lab): I believe that the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
effectively discriminates against Irish people and acts as a recruiting sergeant 
for violent Irish nationalists, and that is the reason why I take a principled stand 
against it.66  
 
1998, Elfin Llwyd (PC): The great danger is that the very intention of the Bill, to 
defeat terrorism, will be completely subverted, and that it will fan the flames 
and create martyrs once again.67 
 
 
Despite an acknowledgement of insecurity stemming from exceptional practices that 
targeted minority communities, counterterrorism’s trajectory was more of the same, not 
a reconfiguration of approach. This outcome of being willing to risk the alienation of 
some groups depended upon a securitization of the threat in such a way that was 
politically unarguable. As explained by Sherrill Stroschein, “minority groups may find 
themselves consistently on the losing side”.68 Though the context of this research was in 
democracy and majority rule, a similar outcome arises in contexts of the liberty-security 
balance around exceptional counterterrorism. Being on the losing side was a consistent 
consequence for Irish and Muslim minority groups.69 The particular way that threat 
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construction unfolded targeting certain groups of individuals rather than methods of 
violence led to a normalization of counterterrorism. It also led to a normalization of the 
insecurities that resulted from such measures in practice. 
 
Creating types, blurred boundaries 
 
The division of terrorism across threat forms of Irish, international, and domestic 
encouraged a misguided perception that it was possible to objectively categorize terrorist 
risk along geographic boundary assumptions of belonging. Rather than being value-
neutral means of identification, the allocation of these labels depended upon negotiated 
configurations of us/them construction. Even if actors used similar methods (strategic 
bombing) or had similar philosophies of self-legitimation (anti-colonial liberation), 
processes of securitization distinguished degrees of physical and cultural distance 
between terrorist threat labels (Irish, domestic, international) and the referent in need of 
protection. Inclusive/exclusive borders of positioning and belonging became the base of 
securitization. These assumptions overshadowed historical inconsistency and 
definitional overlap. Croft is right in stating that, “Over time, discourses decay under the 
weight of internal contradictions and external alternative narratives.”70 But for the 
securitization of terrorism and externalizing discourses of threat construction, that time 
had yet to come.  
 
Whether in references to arms shipments linking Libya, the Czech Republic and 
Northern Ireland,71 South Africa-Northern Ireland connections,72 American financial and 
moral support of Northern Irish terror groups,73 or two Australians killed in the 
Netherlands by Northern Irish actors because they were driving a car with British license 
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plates,74 Irish-related threats could have been securitized as “international”, but were 
not: 
 
1990, Lord Harris of Greenwich (LD): It is deplorable that after attacks on 
innocent citizens in this country a fund-raising organisation remains in 
existence in the United States and is generously supported by many American 
citizens. Is the Leader of the House aware of our strong approval of the words of 
the United States ambassador in describing as contemptible the acts of the Mayor 
of New York who has seen fit to name a street in New York after a convicted 
IRA terrorist?75 
 
1990, John Butcher (Con): When he gives them [Dutch counterparts] our thanks 
for helping to preserve the lives of British service men abroad, will he also offer 
his full support to the necessity for proper co-ordination, functional and 
organisational, in attacking terrorism in mainland Europe, whether it comes 
from Northern Ireland or elsewhere?76 
 
1990, Stuart Randall (Lab): It is important to recognise that the problems of 
terrorism, particularly the IRA, extend to other member states, rather than 
being associated only with the United Kingdom.77  
 
 
As seen above, not classifying Irish-related terrorism as international could have been 
viewed as contradictory. But instead, through particular patterns of externalization, Irish 
and international threats were distanced from each other in discourse and practice. 
 
Not unlike contemporary policies such as those housed at Guantanamo Prison, 
the lineage of British counterterrorism was always based on an acceptance (if even 
reluctant) of the exception. Such exceptionality was documented in the Bennett Report 
and underlined the 1970s Amnesty International Report on mistreatment during 
interrogation:  
 
Physical methods alleged included: beatings, attempted strangulation, pressure to 
sensitive points of the body, bending of limbs, prolonged standing or squatting in 
awkward positions, prolonged physical exercises, and burning with cigarettes. 
Mental pressures alleged included: prolonged oppressive questioning by teams, 
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threats of death and imprisonment, and threats to the family of the suspect, 
stripping, and verbal abuse and humiliation.78 
 
 
Though the ECourtHR concluded that these practices did not amount to torture, they did 
represent cruel and degrading treatment. This exceptionality was not unaddressed by 
officials. Detailed attention was paid to the language around security action in such an 
unrestrained environment. For example, as seen in one official document discussing 
Amnesty International’s work in Northern Ireland:79 
 
 
Figure 1.4 – UK cabinet paper on what “Line to take” for security forces 
 
Terrorism was from the beginning emphasized as violent sophistication (careful as 
opposed to reckless, targeted as opposed to indiscriminate), distinguished from ordinary 
criminal behavior. It was not a threat based in particular methods but in particular actors, 
“the terrorists”. This securitized terrorism as not just as an act of violence or source of 
public disorder, but a specific enemy other. The perceived danger, illegitimacy, and 
immorality of the terrorist led to the justified use of interrogation tactics needing a 
glossary as below to be described:80 
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Figure 1.5 –Terms of Reference, Amnesty International Investigation into the Interrogation of Terrorist 
Suspects in Northern Ireland 
 
This snapshot demonstrates the extent to which counterterrorism departed beyond the 
bounds of normal law. To continue such measures, the securitization of terrorism 
continued to assert terrorist suspects as entity-others in their own right.  
 
Thugs and gangsters 
 
Drawing upon earlier discourses, processes of securitization were built on 
framing the terrorist actor as a thuggish gangsterism and callous brutality: 
 
1990, John Cope (Minister of State Northern Ireland Office, Con): The ordinary 
law may be sufficient on its own to deal with individual criminals or small gangs 
of the sort with which we are familiar on this side of the water, but it does not 
provide the police and Army with the full statutory armament that they need if 
their work in protecting the whole community from the menace of terrorist 
gangsters81  
 
1991, Kenneth Baker (Secretary of State for the Home Department, Con): 
Members of those organisations [IRA and INLA] are criminals, murderers and 
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thugs who callously use violence in all its forms—death, brutality and 
destruction.82 
 
1993, David Alton (LD): We know that many of them are involved in thuggery 
and gangsterism of the worst sort —not unlike that of the Mafia.83  
 
1997, Baroness Blatch (Minister of State Home Office, Con): Within our midst, a 
callous, murderous minority remains determined to use violence to achieve its 
ends.84  
 
1998, Lord Cope (Con): The whole difficulty of the talks is that unless the 
terrorists and their godfathers accept whatever agreement can be reached, 
peace will not result.85  
 
 
In addition to this amplification of criminal framings from earlier years, the non-Irish 
international terrorist was increasingly constructed as non-western. This linked to 
identity tropes separating the terrorist within from the terrorist without, normalizing 
exceptional measures along east/west assumptions well before any post September 11th 
discourse.  
 
Evil 
 
In the 1990s, commonplaces such as evil were essential to stabilizing certain 
threat/referent identity understandings in the securitization of terrorism. Terrorism did 
not represent disorder but threatened a democratic way of life. Such framings 
rhetorically coerced actors into counterterrorism acceptance. Whether members of 
parliament were for or against a measure, they were increasingly brokered in terms of 
how threat and referent were constructed. This maintained a particular securitization of 
terrorism that, in turn, enabled a creeping normalization of exceptional practice. 
 
1990, James Kilfedder (UUP): There can be no trimmers in the fight between 
good and evil.86  
                                                 
82
 Parl. Deb, H.C., 4 March 1991, 6th ser., vol. 187, col. 22. 
83
 Parl. Deb, H.C., 8 June 1993, 6th ser., vol. 226, col. 191. 
84
 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 (Continuance) Order 1997, 10 March 1997, 
Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 579, col. 10. 
85
 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Bill, 12 January 1998, Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 5th 
ser., vol. 584, col. 905. 
 196
 
 
1991, Lord Belstead (Con): It makes a serious attempt to ensure that the police, 
armed forces and the courts have at their disposal the means to protect society in 
Northern Ireland from the evils of terrorism.87  
 
1992, Eddie McGrady (SDLP): I want to illustrate the evil, illogicality and 
fallacy of the position and policies of those trying to indoctrinate communities.88 
 
1993, Kevin McNamara (Lab): the Labour party does not want simply to hold up 
the prevention of terrorism Act as some kind of talisman to ward off evil 
terrorists89  
 
1996, David Wilshire (Con): The third thing we must do when we decide where 
we go from here is to stop pandering to these evil people. The time really has 
come to call a halt to our dealings with Sinn Fein-IRA.90  
 
1998, Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD): It is the indiscriminate nature of terrorism 
which points up the evil.91  
 
1998, Jack Straw (Lab): Our commitment to the rule of law is one of the crucial 
differences between the principles of democracy and the evil dogma of the 
terrorists.92  
 
1998, John Major (Con): our determination to get at the evil people whom all of 
us want to see safely behind bars93 
 
 
Framings of a democratic and civilized referent brokered across different actors and 
discourses were positioned in opposition to the immoral and evil terrorist, reinforcing 
particular identity binaries and boundaries. Discourses put significant emphasis on the 
rule of law and reinforced the referent as law-abiding citizens. 
 
Democratic society 
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 By positioning the referent as democratic society, discourse raised the stakes of 
the fight against terrorism. These configurations built upon earlier framings as discussed 
in the previous chapter, but combined with the threat as an evil other provided for more 
intensified practices of threat/referent construction: 
 
1990, David Waddington (Sec State Home Dept, Con): Whether it strikes at 
military or civilian targets, barracks or private homes, it is attacking democracy 
itself...94  
 
1992, Michael Mates (Con): Terrorist organisations are criminal conspiracies, 
representing perhaps the most dangerous threat to the fabric of any 
democratic society.95  
 
1994, David Winnick (Lab): the terrorists—the enemies of democracy and of 
Britain96  
 
1997, Jack Straw (Lab): terrorist crime is seen as an attack on society as a 
whole, and our democratic institutions. It is akin to an act of war. Those are 
powerful words, but they accurately define the nature of terrorism and the 
threat that it poses to our society.97  
 
 
Commonplaces of democracy reasserted a political referent (“democratic institutions”) 
and a societal referent (“civilized society”) in need of protection.  
 
Civilized 
 
Threat construction also relied on unarguable oppositional terms such as 
“civilized”. This established a set of rules that limited alternative lawmaking practice 
and led to accusations of those that challenged counterterrorism as themselves “uncivil”: 
 
1990, Peter Brooke (Secretary of State NI, Con): For terrorism, by its very 
nature, represents a relapse into barbarism and savagery that unites the entire 
civilised world in determined and unquenchable opposition.98 
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1991, Lord Belstead (Con): The actions of the terrorist have no place in a 
civilised society.99  
 
1992, Alex Carlile (LD): I share the right hon. Gentleman's aspiration to achieve 
convictions in terrorist cases where guilt can be established by proper and 
civilised standards.100  
 
1992, Ivor Stanbrook (Con): It is appalling that the Labour party has made no 
sensible, civilised contribution to the argument.101 
 
1995, Mo Mowlam (Lab): In a civilised society, Governments cannot ignore the 
rule of law; otherwise, by their very actions, they destroy what they are trying to 
protect and defend.102  
 
1996, Andrew Hunter (Con): There is no place in a civilised society for Sinn 
Fein-IRA, let alone in negotiations seeking to create in Northern Ireland new 
relations based exclusively on non-violence and democracy.103  
 
 
These framings heightened the ideological stakes of not maintaining exceptional 
measures. This reasserted terrorists as the uncivil counterpart to western civility, 
reinforcing perceptions of east/west belonging. 
 
East/West 
 
Accompanying patterns in discourse asserted divisive east-west perceptions of 
difference exacerbated inclusive/exclusive boundaries by implying a particular savagery 
of outsiders coming “in” to the west. 
 
1990, Keith Speed (Con): The security of our nation and, indeed, of the west 
demands substantial resources to safeguard it…It is important to consider the 
threat out of areas, notably in the middle east.104 
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1990, Stuart Bell (Lab): Yasser Arafat during the last few days has said that in 
the event of a war the PLO would unleash upon the west a terrorist campaign 
the likes of which we had never seen before105  
 
1999, Terrorism Bill: The risk that terrorists (in the widest sense of the word) 
might follow the example of the Aum Shinrikyo and deploy chemical, biological 
and nuclear materials presents a serious challenge to western governments.106  
 
1999, Ken Maginnis (UUP): For the next 20 or 30 years, terrorism will mean the 
nuclear device that is loaded on to a ship and sailed up the Thames and into 
London docks, or into Boston, or the nuclear device that is placed in the back of 
a container lorry and driven from eastern Europe to this country, or somewhere 
else.107  
 
 
These framings were observed from a range of speakers and in acting as a type of 
discursive broker enabled a hardening of perceptions of “Eastern others” as linked with 
distinct geographic regions connected with historically embedded practices of othering 
in Europe more broadly.108 
 
Middle Eastern, Arab, Islamic  
 
Even as Irish related violence was a more realistic threat to everyday insecurity 
in Britain, discourse securitizing terrorism was frequently dependent upon 
commonplaces of a Middle Eastern or Islamic threat as the most uncivilized terrorist 
other. 
 
1996, Ivan Lawrence (Con): Terrorism is being used at the moment to undermine 
the peace in the middle east, with the most horrific acts of violence in Jerusalem 
and in Tel Aviv and other parts of Israel. We have to play our part in helping to 
defeat international terrorism.109  
 
1998, Tony Benn (Lab): It does not help to launch a cold war against Islam, or to 
whip people up into believing that there is only one way to deal with violence, 
which is more and more violence.110  
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1999, John Taylor (UUP): What is the potential for extreme Islamist terrorism 
within the United Kingdom? There are links with the United Kingdom in the 
case in Yemen. Is there a growing threat within our own territory?111 
 
1999, Jack Straw (Lab): The problem is middle eastern terrorism based on 
territorial challenges and on tribalism, which seeks to justify itself by reference 
to Islam…I make that point at some length because it is a real issue of sensitivity 
for the British Muslim community, which is entirely lawful.112  
 
 
Even if referenced acts of violence in the Middle East were local events with domestic 
actors, in official British discourse such acts and actors were still positioned as 
“international terrorism”. As stated by Alan Krueger, “88 percent of the time, terrorist 
attacks occur in the perpetrators’ country of origin. This finding implies that most 
international terrorism is in fact local”.113 By the late 1990s, intersubjective 
understandings associated with certain identity characteristics and threat labels were 
increasingly problematic. Instances of alienation for Muslim communities were 
compared to the experiences of Irish communities.114 The association of “evil 
international terrorist” with “Eastern” other increased insecurity in ways that were not 
dissimilar to Northern Ireland.  
 
War 
 
Though 1990s securitizations drawing on the international terrorist threat were 
increasingly prominent, issues in Northern Ireland were not ignored. The securitization 
of terrorism also drew upon earlier framings by continuing to reference the situation as 
one of “war”, linking to 1980s discourse while also foreshadowing post-September 11th 
securitizations: 
 
1990, Nicholas Bennett (Con): We have responsibilities not only in Europe but 
across the world. In addition, our other big responsibility is fighting a war 
against terrorism in Northern Ireland.115 
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1990, Peter Robinson (DUP): Our security forces are left to operate against a 
wartime situation under peacetime conditions.116  
 
1992, Barry Sheerman (Lab/Co-op): Getting round a table to discuss a more 
effective way to stop death, misery and bloodshed seems a good starting point in 
the war against terrorism.117  
 
1996, Roy Mason (Lord Mason of Barnsley, Lab): We are now back in a 
terrorist-war situation.118  
 
 
The reference to war, commonplaces of civilized versus evil, and reassertion of types of 
terrorism, bolstered the rhetoric to a height where extraordinary counterterrorism entered 
a path of normalized exception. Actors who may have voiced opposition during the first 
two decades of temporary counterterrorism laws were brokered through threat/referent 
framings to securitize terrorism in such a way that made exceptional counterterrorism 
the “only” choice. The perception of terrorism was not just a physical threat to disorder 
but an immoral threat to western society.  
 
Tough versus soft 
 
Framings of war rhetorically coerced actors into a space without sustainable 
rebuttal. Those that did oppose were faced with the charge of being “soft on terrorism”: 
 
1991, Seamus Mallon (SDLP): I am critical of the legislation, and shall vote 
against it for the reasons that I have consistently given and will continue to give. 
That does not mean that I have any sympathy for terrorism or that I am in any 
way soft on terrorism.119 
 
1993, Roy Hattersley (Lab): It [voting against PTA renewal] is not because we 
are soft on terrorism but because we are rational about it.120 
 
1994, Tony Blair (Lab): we should engage in discussions without rancour, or 
accusing each other of being soft on terrorism121  
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1995, Andrew Robathan (Con): The message that he and the Labour party are 
sending today by voting against the prevention of terrorism Act, I regret to say, is 
that the Labour party is soft on terrorism and soft on the causes of 
terrorism.122  
 
 
Tough-versus-soft discourse in a national security context is not surprising. However, a 
critical analysis of this framing reveals the extent to which such discourse exponentially 
limited spaces for action over time. By the 1990s it was close to impossible to politically 
challenge policies proposed along the securitization of terrorism.  
 
Terrorism as disease 
 
Framings and new metaphors of danger intensified how terrorism was 
securitized. For example, through new metaphors of public health: 
 
1992, Giles Shaw (Con): Terrorism has become an international cancer…123  
 
1992, Menzies Campbell (LD): Why do I believe that the powers are justified 
and that the order should be renewed? It can only be because the cancer of 
terrorism still stands at the heart of life in Northern Ireland. It can only be 
because I believe that the powers provide a means of containing that cancer.124  
 
1993, David Alton (LD): We must build on the things that we hold in common as 
Europeans. That is how to combat this terrorist plague and to get our 
relationships right. Unless we do that, we shall come back here year after year 
into infinity to renew orders of this kind.125 
 
1996, Jack Straw (Lab): Terrorism is a modern plague.126  
 
1997, David Rendel (LD): It [counterterrorism law] is a powerful antibiotic to 
the bacteria of terrorism, but it must be administered only as long as is 
necessary.127 
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The securitization of terrorism as a type of modern and new disease presented an image 
of the threat as a lethal mass spreading throughout the democratic civilized world. Such 
a framing went beyond notions of “campaign” and demanded exceptional 
counterterrorism to “stop the cancer”. These metaphors increased the perceived scale of 
terrorism and reasserted terrorism as an entity that embodied a danger that had to be 
eradicated at all costs.  
 
Discourse reinforced terrorism as specific enemy-others who would become 
terrorists if western counterterrorism did not stop this modern-day monster. Though Irish 
and international were the dominant threat labels, a third type of terrorism, “domestic 
terrorism”, was also asserted during this period. This threat was defined as “terrorism by 
indigenous groups prepared to engage in serious violence to further their cause”, with 
“indigenous” excluding “Irish” and “international” actors from having any link to 
“domestic”.128 The Irish threat underwent a type of discursive reconstruction. On the one 
hand, actors recently described as callous and brutal murderers were yoked to legitimate 
politics through the peace process. At the same time, the securitization of terrorism 
could not completely disregard continuing insecurity in Northern Ireland. Irish-related 
terrorism was referenced as “dissident” in addition to “terrorism”. Irish-related 
insecurity remained a concern, but was over time positioned as less dangerous than other 
types of terrorism in official discourse: 
  
1998, Following the Belfast Agreement and its endorsement by the people of 
Northern Ireland, the Government hopes and expects that the threat of Irish 
terrorism will diminish to the point where no additional special powers are 
necessary to combat it.129 
  
…the Government believes that there exists now a clear and present terrorist 
threat to the UK from a number of fronts and that a terrorist threat is likely to 
continue to exist for the foreseeable future even when a lasting peace in Northern 
Ireland is achieved.130 
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Through the 1990s, terrorism was newly securitized as a threat facing the entire civilized 
world, even as security practice remained a state-level affair that reinforced national 
sovereignty and identity. Notions of Britishness remained important, but official 
discourse also focused on a referent constructed through broader characteristics such as 
democracy and civilization.131 Terrorism was securitized as a risk beyond a risk, and no 
“sane” person could deny exceptional counterterrorism because such denial would result 
in inevitable catastrophe:132  
 
1990, Geoffrey Tordoff (LD): No one in his right mind would stand in the way 
of legislation which was properly designed to reduce the fear of terrorism, 
whether in the air, on land or on the sea.133  
 
1991, Roy Hattersley (Lab): the Government and the Opposition are united in 
their determination to destroy terrorism, and to defeat it in this country. No 
sensible person doubts that.134  
 
1991, David Waddington (Con): Quite frankly, it would be madness to drop the 
Act at this time.135 
 
 
Terrorism was defined as “the use of violence for political ends” including “any use of 
violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear”.136 A 
terrorist was defined as “a person who is or has been concerned in the commission or 
attempted commission of any act of terrorism or in directing, organizing or training 
persons for the purpose of terrorism”.137 The substance of actual counterterrorism 
practice contributed to the expanded securitization of terrorism.  
 
Through the TA2000, the definition of terrorism was broadened to include 
ideological or religious motivations. The referent as “civilization” then necessitated state 
powers to protect a referent beyond the UK and not just including actors but property: 
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1. - (1) In this Act "terrorism" means the use or threat, for the purpose of 
advancing a political, religious or ideological cause, of action which-  
(a) involves serious violence against any person or property,  
(b) endangers the life of any person, or  
(c) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section 
of the public.  
(2) In subsection (1)-  
(a) "action" includes action outside the United Kingdom,  
(b) a reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, 
or to property, wherever situated, and  
(c) a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a country 
other than the United Kingdom.  
(3) In this Act a reference to action taken for the purposes of terrorism includes a 
reference to action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation.138 
 
 
These shifts were consequential for intersubjective understandings of terrorism and for 
what were perceived as acceptable material security practices. The general risk of terror 
was intensified and “terrorist” characteristics such as religion were made explicit despite 
a possibility for implementation along these lines to exacerbate existing tension and 
insecurity. But religion and ideology have played a role in political violence throughout 
history, and to position them as “new” was historically inconsistent.  
 
Such processes of securitization represented a causally consequential 
interrelation of discourse and practice that established certain us/them understandings 
over others. Knowing why Labour leaders initiated the transition to permanent 
counterterrorism does not help us understand how that proposal was accepted and 
constituted particular outcomes. This relational analysis helped identify how certain 
threat/referent positionings made it politically difficult to propose alternative policies. 
Through the securitization of terrorism, identity framings were situated in terms of 
exceptional future risk and geographic boundaries of identification. This contributed to a 
perception of terrorism as a seemingly natural and pre-existing other outside of social 
and political practices of labeling. Goals to “destroy terrorism”, as phrased by Secretary 
of State for the Home Department Jack Straw (Lab), were then not viewed as 
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impossible, but necessary.139 The international threat label hardened inside/outside 
boundaries of assumed physical and cultural distance. International terrorists were in no 
way connected to the British self, but were outsiders using the UK “to plan terrorist acts 
abroad”.140 The historic longevity of terrorizing political violence was silenced by 
statements asserting that terrorism was “not now a temporary phenomenon anywhere in 
the world” [emphasis added], and by presenting non-Irish as a new threat.141 
 
 While internment was viewed as a mistake, measures legitimized in the name of 
international terrorism continued similar strategies. Though “international” was 
presented as a value-neutral commonplace, the unquestioned notion of international as 
“non-western”, foreign, and from outside Britain was problematic. Building notions of 
civic vigilance underpinning counterterrorism encouraged “us” to always be on the look 
out for “them”. This reinforced an identification of terrorist risk along racial, ethnic, and 
religious boundaries of inclusion and exclusion formed through securitizations and 
othering going back many years. By associating terrorism with Irish, domestic, and 
international labels, threat identification was based on a conflation of perceptions linking 
degrees of distance with degrees of danger. The further a terrorist other was positioned 
from the self, the easier it was to justify a suspension of “their” liberties in the name of 
“ours”. While Irish-related threats have always been viewed as external to the British 
“mainland”, they were closer to the referent than international non-western foreigners. 
An interpretation of this movement over time can be seen across the following two 
images:142 
 
                                                 
139
 Parl. Deb, H.C., 4 March 1991, 6th ser., vol. 187, col. 30. 
140
 ‘The Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Bill’, 2 September 1998, Research Paper 98/87, 
section 3B.  
141
 Parl. Deb, H.C., 30 Oct 1997, col.1029.  
142
 The effort to provide some kind of visual representation of the dynamics of securitization is thought to 
have been influenced by earlier training in geography and spatial representation as well as the scholarship 
and teaching of Patrick T. Jackson. 
 207
 
 
Figure 1.6 – Views of an isolated enemy and territory, early-mid 1970s – mid-1980s 
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Figure 1.7 – Negotiated geography and externalized others from the mid-1980s 
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Figure 1.8 – Civilization under threat from international terrorism, late 20th century onwards143 
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As international terrorism was constructed as an externalized other beyond 
British or Irish Isles, the danger level was heightened, and exceptional measures began 
to be normalized. As simplified in the above visualization, the international was 
constructed largely as a vast space east and south of the British Isles. Identity 
oppositions corresponded to historically embedded civilized-barbarian polarizations. In 
1990s discourse the Irish-related sphere of risk was in more manageable than, and 
distinct from, the international. The domestic threat was coterminous with contours of 
the British referent, this “indigenous” threat constructed as from presumably less evil 
groups, such as animal rights activists. Despite the risk posed by domestic actors such as 
right wing extremists, domestic terrorism was almost constructed as an afterthought. It 
was a possible source of insecurity, but less threatening than Irish dissidents and far less 
dangerous than international terrorists.  
 
By the turn of the century, the construction of terrorist others along differentiated 
physical and symbolic distances redirected how terrorism was securitized to enable the 
shift to permanent counterterrorism law. Yoking former Irish-related terrorist others to 
legitimate actors enabled public negotiations with those who were recently constructed 
as brutal terrorist gangsters. The danger of Irish related terrorism was as a reduced 
category of intensity, even as violence in Northern Ireland continued. At the same time, 
international terrorism was aligned with a non-western others and drew upon 
associations from discourse years earlier, such as “Arab terrorism”.144 Self/other 
boundaries can become durable structures of maintained inequality and division.145 
Embedded historical lineages around “orientalized others” provided a source of 
“knowledge” for years to come.146 Threat identification and policy formation were based 
along assumptions of terrorist entity-others as those who “by their nature, do not obey 
the law”[emphasis added].147 Indeterminate borders around forms of terrorism were 
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reified as value-neutral means with which to bound possible future risk and 
identification of who was and who was not “a terrorist”.148  
 
 
III. A new century? 
 
 The 1990s shift in domestic political leadership, desecuritization of some 
Northern Irish threats during the peace process, and minimal incidents of international 
terrorism influencing Britain, did not necessarily point to making exceptional 
counterterrorism law permanent. Terrorism could have been securitized as based in 
method instead of assumptions of geography, religion, or ideology. There could have 
been a renewed focus on existing criminal law while targeting specific others such as Al 
Qaeda. In short, the way it turned out with a normalization of previously temporary 
measures was not a predetermined outcome, or the way things had to be. Rather, such 
outcomes were caused by a particular set of discourses and relational connections that 
enabled certain intersubjective understandings to arise over others, securitizing terrorism 
in a way that entailed particular consequences.  
 
Irish related terrorism has consistently had an international dimension and 
international terrorism is not “new”. The identification of terrorism across labels of Irish, 
international, and domestic rested in social and political practices, not objective identity 
essence. By the turn of the century, these identifications became an unquestioned means 
to securitize terrorism as a threat, constituting and legitimizing exceptional security 
practice. As will be seen in the following chapter, the 11 September 2001 and 7 July 
2005 attacks were not so much a turning point for British counterterrorism as much as 
they provided support for an expansion of existing discourse and practice. Discourse 
securitizing terrorism during the 1990s along inside/outside processes of identity and set 
the stage for a beginning normalization of permanent exceptional counterterrorism 
through the 21st century. 
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Chapter 7 
 
2000-2006 
 
Amplifying 21st century exception 
 
 
 
Liberty’s general conclusion is that the UK already has some of the most draconian 
anti-terrorism measures anywhere in the Western World and further measures are likely 
to violate fundamental principles, be counter-productive in the long term and at the 
same time are unlikely to be effective.  
(Sally Broadbridge 2001)1 
 
We are supposed to be acting against terrorism and reassuring young people, whether 
they are Muslim or Catholic, about the fairness of British society and the things that we 
stand for, but the notion of internment without trial runs clean contrary to the idea of an 
effective war against terrorism. 
(Diane Abbott 2001)2 
 
If, however, the Government insist [sic] on rushing these measures through, I fear that 
they may do the opposite of what they want. They will create a sense of injustice among 
many British citizens, and do what I warned when we first discussed this: for every 
known terrorist that the Home Secretary confines, he may create 10 unknown terrorists, 
free to do harm to our people and to our nation. That would be more than a mistake; it 
would be a tragedy.  
(David Davis 2005)3 
 
 
 
 
The end of the 1990s left us with Labour’s initiative combining the PTA and the 
EPA into a permanent UK-wide act.4 On 20 July 2000, the Terrorism Bill became the 
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Terrorism Act 2000.5 This set the tone for a range of subsequent laws through 2006, 
including the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (2001), Prevention of Terrorism 
Act (2005), and Terrorism Act (2006).6 On a material level each act emboldened state 
security power, with CONTEST 2006 documenting that “annual spending on counter-
terrorism, intelligence, and resilience will reach £2bn, which is double what it was prior 
to 9/11with the annual budget for”.7 On a symbolic level, the continued creation of laws 
based on an explicit language of “terrorism” reinforced terrorist others as dangerous 
others in their own right. This may not seem surprising if viewed only with a post-11 
September 2001 lens. But with a wider historical perspective that acknowledges 
terrorism as a historical constant and the possible ineffectiveness of existing measures, 
such outcomes give reason for pause.  
 
Events such as 11 September 2001 or 7 July 2005 are referenced to justify 
normalized exception, with the suspension of civil liberties and human rights accepted as 
necessary sacrifices. The immediate shock of a terrorist attack can help governments 
pass new laws quicker than normal. However, the maintenance of exceptional 
counterterrorism depends upon a regular reassertion of threat/referent identities in order 
to securitize an issue during times without violence. The broad definition of terrorism 
enables a constant rearticulation of who “are” terrorists, alluding to a possible state of 
indefinite counterterrorism exception. It is impossible to fully succeed over terrorism 
since there will always be another terrorist other to fill the place of those who were 
defeated. How terrorism has been securitized to differentiate threat identities depends 
upon different sets of intersubjective understanding delineating degrees of otherness. 
The assertion of an international terrorist other enabled a distinctive shift separating 
perceptions of terrorist danger from Northern Ireland, the UK mainland, and outside 
Britain. Even though some terrorists from within could be categorized as international, 
discourses and practices of counterterrorism from 2000 reinforced the view that the most 
dangerous terrorist others were from beyond Britain. The events of 11 September 2001 
then provided key historical reference points with which earlier perceptions of us/them 
                                                 
5
 TA, 2000, c.11. 
6
 ACTS, 2001, c. 24; PTA, 2005, c.2; TA, 2006, c.11.  
7
 CONTEST, 2006. 
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identity were further embedded through a consequential and largely unquestioned 
acceptance of what “terrorist” meant. 
 
From 2000 to 2006 violence continued in Belfast and in London. The assumption 
of international terrorists as Muslim outsiders contributed to the alienation of Muslim 
communities in British society and miscarriages of justice. Three British men, dubbed 
“the Tipton Three”, were released from Guantanamo in 2004 after being detained there 
for over two years.8 Jean Charles de Menezes was fatally shot at the Stockwell Tube 
station in London 2005 after police mistakenly identified him as a terrorist. Not unlike 
earlier incidents during the Troubles, preemptive counterterrorism was implemented 
along presumed boundaries of the other. As explained by Croft, securitization discourse 
around terrorism and Islam has reinforced perceptions of “Orientalized” and “Radical” 
others.9 Increased insecurity for marginalized Muslim groups was similar to how 20th 
century security practice increased insecurity for Irish groups. It was not long ago that 
counterterrorism led to the wrongful imprisonment of the Birmingham Six and the 
Guildford Four.10 Corruption, collusion, and excessive force in counterterrorism was 
documented by official reports such as the Stevens Enquiry and Cory Report.11 
 
However, the focus on preventing future risk at any cost maintained exceptional 
measures despite counterproductive consequences from their implementation, or 
questions like “Does the Minister recall that on 15 October, over a month after the 
terrible attack on New York, the Home Secretary said that there was no immediate threat 
to this country's security?”12 Relational configurations of identity developed in prior 
decades distinguished Irish, international, and domestic others. Despite international 
some cooperation, the securitization of terrorism in official British discourse reasserted 
                                                 
8
 The lead actors from The Road to Guantanamo (2006), a film based on the Tipton Three, were 
themselves detained under terrorism legislation at Luton Airport after the Berlin Film Festival. 
9
 Croft, Securitizing Islam, 245. 
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 “Life of Crime Part 3: Examining injustice in the UK”, BBC News [cited 11 November 2011]; available 
from http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/uk/2001/life_of_crime/miscarriages.stm. 
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 For access to these and other reports see Martin Melaugh, “Key Issue - Collusion between Security 
Forces and Paramilitaries”, CAIN Ulster Services, available from 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/collusion/index.html. 
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 Norman Baker (LD): Human Rights, 19 November 2001, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, vol. 375, 
col. 146 (Part No. 54, bound volume). 
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national identity and practice. European coordination was “weakened by significant 
differences in perceptions of the national threat”.13 From 2000 to 2006 the securitization 
of terrorism did not ignore Irish related violence, but the focus was on the “foreign” 
threat of international terrorism. Though the 7/7 attacks underlined how the international 
as also domestic, intersubjective understandings of international terrorism as Muslim 
outsiders had become embedded in collective meaning. A two-track approach to 
counterterrorism based on distinguishing Irish from international reinforced particular 
practices of labeling and a counterterrorism trajectory of normalized exception.  
 
 
I. Contextualizing 2000-2006 
 
During these years, international terrorism was the dominant label that propelled 
the securitization of terrorism and expansion of counterterrorism. Intersubjective 
understandings had moved from a focus on Northern Ireland to the “new” international 
threat. Republican leaders publicly denounced 11 September 2001, despite the IRA 
being labeled by some as “part of that international terrorist network”, in large part 
considering the various transnational ties of the IRA within and beyond the UK.14 This 
event reasserted perceptions of the “international terrorist’s” existence. But, as discussed 
earlier, it was before 11 September that a specific label of international terrorism began 
to help maintain extraordinary measures. This is not to say that there was no risk of 
violence during the early 21st century. But, it is to highlight that the way official 
discourse securitized terrorism as international terrorism had specific consequences for 
material outcomes (a normalization and expansion of exceptional domestic laws) and 
intersubjective understandings (an externalization and alienation of others based on 
degrees of distance and danger). 
 
                                                 
13
 Stuart Croft, “Introduction”, Government and Opposition 42, no. 3 (2007): 269 (with reference to Jörg 
Monar). 
14
 This statement was, however, taken with a grain of salt (“IRA statement branded ‘cynical’”, 20 
September 2001, BBC News [cited 10 September 2011]; available from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/1553850.stm).  
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This securitization along types of terrorists enabled a two-track approach to 
counterterrorism even as insecurity in Northern Ireland continued, and the risk of 
international terrorism was relatively minimal. From 1998 to 2005, the Memorial 
Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism recorded 26,455 terrorist-related fatalities.15 But 
only 6,447, or 24%, were from international terrorism (including the over 3000 from 
9/11).16 Irish-related terrorism was presented as less dangerous than international 
terrorists, despite the IMC reporting a “worsening picture” in Ulster, the suspension of 
devolved government in 2002, and a significant drop in optimism around the peace 
process.17 This “worsening” was differentiated from other types of terrorism by referring 
to Northern Irish related insecurity as paramilitarism and dissidence. In this way, reports 
could acknowledge the violence without delegitimizing the peace process. Splinter 
groups were positioned as less serious than international terrorism that demanded a 
national security response to protect western civilization.18  
 
Threat differentiation was also strengthened through resource reallocation. Total 
spending for local, regional, and London Metropolitan police forces went from 63£ 
million in 2006-2007, to 110£ million in 2007-2008, an increase of almost double in one 
year.19 Troop levels in Northern Ireland were reduced from 18,200 in 1992 to 13,000 in 
2003, the Castlereagh, Strand Road and Gough Holding Centres were closed, and 102 
cross-border roads were re-opened.20 For international terrorism, by contrast, new 
policies at Belmarsh prison enabled detainees to be held in solitary confinement every 
day for up to 22 hours.21 Jurisdiction was extended to include if a terrorist offense was 
committed outside the UK by a UK national or resident, or if the offence was committed 
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 Victor Asal and R. Karl Rethemeyer, “The Nature of the Beast: Organizational Structures and the 
Lethality of Terrorist Attacks”, The Journal of Politics 70 (2008): 447 (cited in Sanchez-Cuenca and de la 
Calle, “Domestic Terrorism”, 32).  
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 Ibid.  
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 Adrian Guelke, “Whither the peace process in Northern Ireland?” ISP/NSC Briefing Paper 05/01 
(Chatham House, July 2005). 
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 Horgan, Walking Away, 23. 
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 Terrorism, 10 March 2006, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, vol. 443, col. 1781W (written answers). 
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 “Responding to a Changing Security Situation, The Government’s Approach,” Updated October 2003, 
Northern Ireland Office (NIO) [cited 20 May 2012]; available from 
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by a non-UK national or resident to a UK national or resident.22 From 2000 to 2006, the 
securitization of international terrorism enabled a beginning normalizing of exceptional 
practice even as clear definitions of terrorism and success remained elusive. 
 
In one official statement in 2004, “international terrorist” was mentioned four 
times as Home Secretary Charles Clarke referenced the attacks of 11 September 2001 
and later incidents in Spain (Madrid train bombings 2004), Saudi Arabia (al-Khobar 
shooting as well as the U.S. consulate attack in Jeddah), Indonesia (Australian embassy), 
and Egypt (an Israeli-owned hotel). These attacks were presented as evidence that 
international terrorism presented “a public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation”.23 However, concerns over consequences of policies related to international 
terrorism were voiced years earlier. Just three days after 11 September 2001 during a 
debate titled “International Terrorism”, Labour MP Tom Dalyell said: 
 
In 1998, with the former Taoiseach Albert Reynolds, I went to Baghdad. We 
were invited one evening to the house of Tariq Aziz, who said rather movingly, 
"You may think that Saddam and I are extremists. We are as nothing to what will 
follow if these sanctions and this bombing continue…” I have one concrete 
suggestion, which may be very unpalatable: I ask the Foreign Secretary to look 
again at the whole Iraq policy…I simply ask the Foreign Secretary this: for God's 
sake, look at 10 years of bombing of Iraq and sanctions.24 
 
 
This call to consider longer term British (and western) policy in the Middle East in light 
of 21st century counterterrorism highlighted the awareness of the complex interrelation 
of identity, securitization, and material outcomes. Regardless of how one judged 
another’s feeling of injustice, conflicting inside/outside perceptions of belonging played 
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 International Terrorism, 12 December 2001, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, vol. 376, col. 868 (part 
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a significant role in political violence. This was especially apparent with respect to 
counterterrorism and Islam: 
 
For UK Muslims who become involved in terrorist activity, this identification is 
with Palestinian victims of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, victims in Iraq or the 
conflict in Kashmir. In Khan’s video testimony, he placed responsibility for his 
behaviour on the US and UK for the: ‘bombing, gassing, imprisonment and 
torture of my people in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. Though Khan came 
from Yorkshire, in northern England, he identified with the suffering of Muslims 
worldwide.25 
 
 
The interrelation of foreign policy and domestic insecurity reinforced negative 
consequences from using domestic and international as labels as threat identities. 
Connections linking domestic citizens to multiple “homelands” made the attempt at 
stabilizing single identity labels, and boundaries, inherently problematic.26 Possible 
insecurity related to multiple self-identifications, exceptional security practice, and 
notions of historic grievance, can be observed in an AQ video from Ayman Al Zawahiri. 
This video, with a background collage “featuring the attacks on New York, Madrid, and 
London, as well as jihad in Iraq, Palestine, and Chechnya”, referred to the London 
attacks as “a slap to Blair, the arrogant crusader”.27 Despite these linkages between 
foreign policy, history, international relations, and insecurity, such references did not 
significantly alter counterterrorism substance or direction. By 5 December 2001 efforts 
had expanded to Afghanistan in the “war against international terrorism”, the invasion of 
Iraq was sixteen months away, and a beginning normalization of exceptional 
counterterrorism faced Britain domestically.28 
 
  Foreign interventions intensified a militarized approach to counterterrorism, and 
domestic counterterrorism was further normalized through the new CONTEST strategy, 
“The UK Strategy for Countering International Terrorism”. Drafted in 2003, and made 
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26
 On varieties of nationalism as relate to various “homelands” see Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed.   
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public in 2006, CONTEST would become the cornerstone of UK counterterrorism. New 
government offices institutionalized counterterrorism, for example the Joint 
Counterterrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) established in 2003 and the National 
Extremism Tactical Coordination Unit (NETCU) in 2004. The former’s objective was to 
assess “intelligence relating to international terrorism”29 and the latter’s objective was to 
combat “domestic terrorism”.30 UK state powers were expanded through the ATCS 
2001. This act again required that Britain derogate from the EConvHR. Britain was “the 
only European state to do so (Spain, despite the March 11, 2004, Madrid bombings that 
left 191 dead and 1824 injured, did not derogate; neither did Germany, even after it 
became clear that active al Qaeda cells had been operating within the state).”31  
 
  This derogation from the EConvHR by the UK and reassertion of state 
sovereignty over international norms and institutions was not unnoticed. In 2002, the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stated “In their fight against terrorism, 
Council of Europe members should not provide for any derogations to the European 
Convention on Human Rights.”32 Human rights concerns over the ATCS 2001’s section 
4 powers around “suspected international terrorists” eventually necessitated a change in 
the law. A December 2004 Law Lords decision concluded that section 4 was 
incompatible with the EConvHR as well as the UK Human Rights Act:33 
 
b) in the light of the evidence so far presented to Parliament, the Committee 
continues to doubt whether the powers under Part 4 are strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation to deal with a public emergency threatening the life of 
the nation, and so continues to doubt whether the derogation from ECHR Article 
5 is justified (paragraphs 33 to 34);  
c) even if the courts were ultimately to decide that the derogation from Article 5 
is justified, the Committee would still consider an indefinite derogation from the 
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 “Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre,” Security Service MI5 [cited 2 September 2012]; available from 
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important right to liberty under Article 5 to be deeply undesirable (paragraph 
34);  
d) the Committee remains of the view that there is a significant risk that the 
powers under Part 4 violate the right to be free of discrimination under ECHR 
Article 14 because they have a particular impact on only one part of the resident 
community of the United Kingdom (namely those who are not nationals of the 
United Kingdom) on the ground of nationality (paragraph 35);34 
 
 
The exceptionality of these measures was presented in a context of the threat as foreign 
and highly dangerous. As explained by Home Secretary Charles Clarke, “It is true that 
the part 4 powers apply only to foreign nationals”, but this was necessary because of 
“the very real threat that we faced from international terrorism in the immediate 
aftermath of the terrible events of 9/11” considering the “small number of foreign 
nationals resident here who posed a particular danger to us”.35 The international terrorist 
was a foreigner from outside Britain, a danger to “us”.  
 
Though the section 4 decision was linked to human rights, the PTA 2005 
replaced this measure with some of the most exceptional powers to date, “control 
orders”. A control order was an order “against an individual that imposes obligations on 
him for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of 
terrorism.”36 Control orders were positioned as alleviating incompatibility between the 
ATCS 2001 section 4 powers and human rights by including both UK and non-UK 
citizens. A person could be detained for up to four days before a control order was 
made.37 Counterterrorism substance was thus not significantly reassessed, and 
counterproductive consequences from implementation continued. A renewal of 
derogating control orders could be made “on as many occasions as the court thinks fit” 
as long as “the court considers that the obligations to be imposed by the renewed order 
are necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting involvement by that 
person in terrorism-related activity”.38 As stated by Walker:  
                                                 
34
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Whilst rounding up alien suspects had popular appeal in 2001, the factual threat 
of terrorism was not confined to foreign bogeymen….In short, continued support 
for foreigner detention without trial ignores the inconvenient truths which persist 
today as they did in December 2004 when the House of Lords took its fateful 
decision.39 
 
 
Despite the securitization of terrorism enabling an expansion of exceptional measures, 
the contradictions of identifying types of terrorist others with labels such as “Irish”, 
“international”, or “domestic” was clear. 
 
On 7 July 2005, less than four months after the PTA2005 was passed, four 
bombers targeted the London transport system and killed 56, injuring over 700. After 
over three decades of some of the most exceptional counterterrorism in the world, these 
attacks were not prevented. Due to the nature of intelligence and the preemptive nature 
of counterterrorism it is hard to conclusively identify when attacks are clearly prevented 
from happening. Authorities halted a copycat attempt weeks later, but the 7 July 2005 
attack left substantial damage. The identity of the attackers as British but the labeling of 
the attack as international terrorism contradicted discourse and practice that depended 
upon separating internal and external others. International terrorism proved to be as 
much British as foreign and as much from inside as from outside.  
 
After 7 July 2005, there was a renewed focus on risk management through 
prosecution. Though counterterrorism law enabled the control of a suspected terrorist’s 
movement, offenses were often already established in existing criminal law, as discussed 
in chapter five. The TA 2006 introduced new offenses that explicitly targeted 
“terrorists”, such as the encouragement and glorification of terrorism, dissemination of 
terrorist publications, attendance at a terrorist training camp, and withholding of 
information that may be of use in a terrorist investigation.40 The “encouragement of 
terrorism” was defined as:  
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a statement that is likely to be understood by some or all of the members of the 
public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other 
inducement to them to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of 
terrorism or Convention offences41 
 
 
A person commits an offence not just if they intentionally encouraged the public but if 
they were “reckless” as to whether the public would be “encouraged or otherwise 
induced by the statement to commit, prepare or instigate such acts or offences”.42 
Offenses are frequently vague in definition, and without clear guidelines for assessment. 
For example, an offense identified as “the act of terrorism to which an intention relates 
is a particular act of terrorism, an act of terrorism of a particular description or an act of 
terrorism generally”.43 “Glorification” is referred to in similarly expansive terms, 
meaning “any form of praise or celebration” including “sounds or images or both”.44  
 
The TA2006 framed terrorism as an ambiguous threat and as specific illegal acts. 
The Terrorism Bill 2006’s initial proposal of 90-day detention was unsuccessful. But the 
continuance of 28-day detention45 represented how exceptional counterterrorism was 
already normalized. Opposition was not silent, as seen below. But the years 2000 to 
2006 did not rebalance security practice in favor of liberty: 
 
2000, Jeremy Corbyn (Lab): Draconian legislation is proposed… It is a 
permanent, not a temporary provision…I fear that, if the Bill is enacted in its 
present form, we will return to the miscarriages of justice of yesteryear, which 
we hoped to have left behind us, with the changes in attitude and legislation 
following the release of the Birmingham Six, the Guildford Four and others. We 
may want to deal with the problems of people who place bombs that kill innocent 
people, but this is not the way to do it. We are being urged to convict the 
innocent along with the guilty. That prejudices the entire judicial process.46 
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Dissenting voices curtailed counterterrorism expansion at particular moments, as with 90 
day pre-charge detention. But this curtailment resulted in a maintained normalization of 
“draconian” measures introduced years earlier.  
 
  CONTEST is based on four strands, Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare. The 
2006 version encompassed less than forty pages, but established a foundation for 
subsequent counterterrorism. The guiding aim was to “reduce the risk from international 
terrorism, so that people can go about their daily lives freely and with confidence”.47 
International terrorism was positioned alongside a discourse of “Islamist terrorists”. 
Reference to Northern Ireland was noticeably infrequent, in particular considering 
insecurity that continued. While the ATCS2001 and the TA2006 were passed in light of 
specific events, the TA2000 and PTA2005 were passed in relative isolation from major 
attacks against Britain. Though 11 September 2001 is often considered “the” event that 
sparked preemptive counterterrorism, such measures are rooted in securitization 
discourse before “international terrorism” became represented by the Twin Towers, 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, or Mohammad Sidique Khan.  
 
 
II. Maintaining permanency through the “international” 
 
 Particular processes of threat/referent construction securitized terrorism in a way 
that enabled the institutionalized of counterterrorism from 2000 to 2006. This 
institutionalization is what enabled a particular normalization of exceptional measures to 
gain traction. Particular configurations of commonplaces influenced the parameters of 
decision-making. As discussed earlier, it is not that language determines outcomes. But 
intersubjective understandings formed through discursive practice delimit spaces for 
agency, and thus have a causal effect on what outcomes are possible. The construction 
of international terrorism as a new threat was reinforced by the physical incarnation of 
“international terrorists” after 9/11. This encouraged a historical amnesia that separated 
past violence from current perceptions of terrorist risk. Repeated consequences of 
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insecurity were outweighed in the name of preventing future terrorist catastrophe. 
Language expanded the danger of international terrorism while broadening the referent 
to encompass timeless democratic values: 
 
There will be many different analyses of the history but my own view is that the 
1945-89 Cold War was succeeded by the period to 9/11 in 2001 when democracy 
became better entrenched and now after 2001 all that democratic progress is 
under attack from AQ [Al Qaida] and their allies.48 
 
 
To frame security policy in terms of core values is not a novel 21st century shift.49 But 
the way these framings evolved alongside a discourse of inside/outside boundaries, 
terrorism, and identity helped to normalize exceptional counterterrorism. 
  
An increased presence of terms explicitly connected to “terror” reinforced 21st 
century associations of international terrorist as from outside. Framing Irish-related 
terrorism along “non-terrorist” language such as “dissident” legitimized differences in 
security approach whether the threat was Northern Irish or international.50 Two ways of 
visualizing an observed frequency of “terror” in language are presented below.  
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Figure 1.9 – Searching for “terrorism” in UK parliamentary debates, 2000-200551 
 
This is a screenshot from a search of “terrorism” in Hansard’s online database 
from 2000 to 2006. This resulted in over 9,000 hits compared to 6,300 during the 
1990s.52 Terrorism was spoken on average 4.3 times per day (if parliament met 365 days 
a year) from 2000 to 2006, compared to being spoken on average 1.7 times per day 
(again if parliament met 365 days a year) from 1990 to 1999. While numbers do not tell 
the whole story of how discourse is causally consequential for outcomes, a more than 
doubling of terror’s presence in parliamentary debate is significant. The top five 
speakers associated with “terrorism” are listed below the years, and include the Home 
and Foreign Secretaries and the Prime Minister. Over six years there are 9,457 hits for 
terrorism, averaging about 1,576 hits per year. To put this in perspective, a similar 
search of Hansard for the entire 20th century resulted in 34,127 hits. This averaged just 
                                                 
51
 http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/search/terrorism?decade=2000s (Search performed 18 April 2011). 
52
 http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/search/terrorism?decade=1990s (Search performed 18 April 2011). 
 224
 
over 341 hits per year.53 Even considering differences in sample representation and size 
over time depending on access, source collection, and database compilation, this 
difference is notable. These numbers indicate “terror” was spoken an average of four 
times per day in the 21st century, and less than once per day during the 20th century, 
despite terrorizing events throughout the 1900s.  
 
From another perspective, the below represents how many times “terror” occurs 
per page of five major counterterrorism laws during this period, a legal-linguistic rate of 
terror: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.0 – The “linguistic rate of terror” per page of key counterterrorism laws, 2000-2006 
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While it is important to remark how many acts have “terrorism” in their title, it is also 
important to note how many times “terror” appears per page of each act to measure 
intensity. In other words, how many times one is faced with a term of terror in reading 
each of these acts.  
 
Equally important to the number of times “terror” appears in discourse is how 
identities associated with terrorism were relationally positioned. How particular 
configurations of commonplaces framing threat/referent identities was configured 
affected conditions of possible action. Different intersubjective understandings establish 
different rules. From 2000 to 2006 we see an increased frequency of terror in discourse 
and a divergence in approaches depending on whether the threat was Irish or 
international. Violence in Northern Ireland continued to terrorize communities, with one 
reference from 1999 citing over 3,600 killed and over 40,000 injured.54 But from 2000 to 
2006 official discourse reconstructed this insecurity to include non-terroristic framings 
of threat construction. References to “terror” were not silenced,55 but commonplaces 
such as dissident and paramilitary increased: 
 
2005, Baroness Amos (Lord President of the Council, Lab): It is inconceivable, 
in my view, that members of Sinn Fein could again hold ministerial office while 
the issue of paramilitary activity and criminality on the part of the Provisional 
IRA remained unresolved.56  
 
 
Despite the reassertion of Irish terrorism and international terrorism as essentially 
different, the ambiguity surrounding this differentiation was difficult to ignore: 
  
2001, Lord Selsdon (Con): In discussions, Libyans asked me why it was wrong 
for them to fund the IRA when the United States provided 75 per cent of the 
IRA's financial resources through NORAID.57  
  
2001, Jeffrey M. Donaldson (DUP): With regret, we also note that Irish terrorism 
is not covered in the definition of international terrorism. That is difficult to 
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57
 International Terrorism, 14 September 2001, Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 627, col. 70. 
 226
 
understand, as the definition of an international terrorist group is that it is 
"subject to the control or influence of persons outside the United Kingdom"…Is 
it not also the case that the Real IRA and indeed the Provisional IRA have 
been engaged in international terrorism?58  
  
2001, Lembit Öpik (LD): Why have the Government failed to understand the 
contradiction between the judgments they make about Northern Ireland, which 
can lead to informed and consensual solutions, such as this Bill, and the 
unjoined-up approach that they take to international terrorism as a whole?59 
 
2005, Lembit Öpik (LD): It is unacceptable to suggest that Northern Ireland 
terrorism is in some way understandable, manageable and sane, whereas 
international terrorism is in some way motiveless and insane.60 
 
 
Despite these challenges the securitization of terrorism continued to be based on a 
separation of Irish and international forms. De-escalating security practices in Northern 
Ireland was a priority. Associating continuing insecurity as paramilitary, dissident, or 
criminal as much as, if not more than, terrorism supported this redirection: 
  
2005, Paul Murphy (Sec of State for Northern Ireland): The issue that is holding 
up political progress in Northern Ireland is criminal activity on the part of 
paramilitary organisations—in this case, particularly the Provisional IRA.61  
  
2005, Ian Pearson (Lab): We want to see not only decommissioning, but an end 
to paramilitary and criminal activities on the part of the Provisional IRA.62
  
 
2005, Peter Hain (Lab): As I have said, I am confident that we are seeing an end 
to paramilitarism, and it is extremely unlikely that control orders will prove to 
be necessary in a normalised environment in Northern Ireland.63 
 
 
These framings reinforced assumptions of geographic division between types of threats 
and the core referent that were observed in earlier discourse. While it was in the 20th 
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century that we saw the separation of Irish, domestic, and international labels, it was 
through the 21st century that these markers became durable. Identity labels were 
presented as objective, with a consequent hardening of threat boundaries alienating 
communities.  
 
During this period, the internet came to play a growing role in the securitization 
of terrorism and resulting collective meaning around who are terrorist threats. MI5 
website headings such as “How the threat has developed,” “Domestic extremism,” 
“Other groups,” “Autonomous Islamist extremists,” “Al Qaida’s history,” “Al Qaida’s 
ideology,” “Pakistan-based Sunni extremist groups,” and “The nature of the 
[international terrorist] threat”, provided additional public official securitizations. This 
last page, “the nature of the threat” [emphasis added], stated that a “number of British 
nationals and foreign citizens resident in the UK are known to be linked to or 
sympathetic with Al Qaida”. The below image of “terrorists” was the only example or 
picture of terrorist others, no other images of “domestic” or “Irish” terrorists could be 
found on the website at the time:64 
 
 
Figure 2.1 – MI5 website, 2011, “The Nature of the Threat” 
                                                 
64
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This contributed to the focus, even if unintentional, on the perception of international 
terrorists as identifiable by racial and ethnic boundaries. 
 
 Despite some apprehension about expanding counterterrorism law, that “before 
we legislate further we should consider whether those [TA2000 and RIPA2001] are not 
enough”, between 2000 and 2006 the government passed three new laws putting terms 
of “terror” on permanent footing: the ATCS 2001, PTA 2005, and TA 2006.65 Other acts 
increasing state security power included the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
(RIPA) 2000, Criminal Justice Act 2003, and Terrorism Act (Northern Ireland) 2006. 
RIPA put warrants on a basis of individuals rather than addresses (similar to the U.S. 
PATRIOT Act’s roving wiretaps).66 Terrorism maintained a privileged position in 
security practice:  
 
the broader information made public tells us little about the powers specifically 
related to terrorism and national security – an exception permitted by Article 8(2) 
of the ECHR. The ICC, for instances, does not disclose the number of warrants 
issued by either the Foreign Secretary or the Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland67  
 
 
In Northern Ireland efforts were under way to put security practice on a normal footing. 
Former “terrorists” continued to be yoked with legitimate politics, and insecurity from 
splinter groups was framed as paramilitarism and dissident activity. In the Seventh 
Report of the Independent Monitoring Commission for Northern Ireland, for example, 
there were 8 hits for “terrorist” compared to 12 for “dissident” and 97 for 
“paramilitary”.68 While security policy in Northern Ireland was downgraded despite 
continuing insecurity, counterterrorism targeting international terrorists was moving in 
the opposite direction. While the TA 2000 was formed with more deliberation time than 
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earlier acts, its sixteen schedules and 131 sections set the stage for a normalization of 
exceptional counterterrorism:69  
 
1.—(1) In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where—  
  (a) the action falls within subsection (2),  
  (b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to 
intimidate the public or a section of the public, and  
  (c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, 
religious or ideological cause.  
 (2) Action falls within this subsection if it—  
  (a) involves serious violence against a person,  
  (b) involves serious damage to property,  
  (c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the 
action,  
  (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section 
of the public, or  
  (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an 
electronic system.  
 (3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the 
use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is 
satisfied. 
 (4) In this section—  
  (a) “action” includes action outside the United Kingdom,  
 (b) a reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, 
or to property, wherever situated,  
  (c) a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a country 
other than the United Kingdom, and  
  (d) “the government” means the government of the United Kingdom, of a 
Part of the United Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom. 
(TA2000 c.11 section 1) 
 
 
This definition newly included religious and ideological causes, and offenses expanded 
to include action against property and electronic systems in addition to action against 
persons. The referent was also broadened to incorporate publics, persons, property, and 
jurisdictions beyond UK borders.  
 
 The TA2000 extended detention and expanded stop and search powers, the 
public’s most frequent encounter with counterterrorism law.70 As in earlier discourse 
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and practice, “reasonable” was a key implementation guide and source of referent 
legitimacy. The field of possible suspects was broadened, and a constable could detain a 
person “for such time as is reasonably required to permit the search to be carried out at 
or near the place where the person or vehicle is stopped”.71 “Examining officers” could 
question a person “for the purpose of determining whether they appear to be a 
'terrorist'.”72 For this act a person commits an offence if “he possesses an article in 
circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that his possession is for a 
purpose connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of 
terrorism”,73 or “collects or makes a record of information of a kind likely to be useful to 
a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism”.74 Broad barometers of 
“reasonable” and “likely” guided threat assessment and counterterrorism 
implementation. Walker observed five patterns around section 44 stop and search 
powers from 2000 to 2006, “a sustained increase in the use of this power, a low rate of 
consequent terrorist arrests, a higher rate of non-terrorist arrests, a disproportionate 
impact on Asian ethnic minorities and an uneven geographical delivery”.75 
Intersubjective understandings of identity based on a particular securitization of 
terrorism allocating boundary structures in particular ways influenced security and 
insecurity. 
 
 The ATCS 2001 provided new powers of financial asset freezing and the 
indefinite detention of foreigners suspected of terrorism under the heading “Suspected 
International Terrorism”. Despite just “two and a quarter hours to destroy a principle 
[habeas corpus] that has underpinned British law for 500 years”,76 the house voted 334 
to 213 in favor of the ATCS2001. While suspensions of habeas corpus are not 
themselves new, in the context of preventive counterterrorism that was fast being 
normalized such suspensions held different consequences. The ATCS 2001’s language 
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of immigration, asylum, race, and religion reinforced assumptions of identity boundaries 
around international terrorism through exclusionary inside/outside divisions:77 
 
Where an appeal has failed [to the Special Immigration Appeals Court, or SIAC], 
my intention is to streamline the process for removal. Those who have no right 
to stay must leave the country immediately. [Interruption.] 
 
We currently have 1,900 detention places, which we will have increased to 2,800 
by the spring of next year. I intend that we should expand the capacity by a 
further 40 per cent. [sic] to 4,000 places. Those will become secure removal 
centres. [Interruption.] Asylum seekers will no longer be held in mainstream 
prison places; I can confirm that from January next year that practice will cease. 
[Interruption.] (24-25, citing HC Deb 29 October 2001 Col 628-9)78 
 
 
The link between “Immigration and Asylum” and “suspected international terrorists” 
hardened us/them distinctions securitizing terrorism in earlier discourse. The need to 
derogate from the EConvHR considering the ATCS powers was given just a few hours 
debate: 
 
PART 4 (ATCS 2001) 
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM 
Suspected international terrorists 
21 Suspected international terrorist: certification 
(1) The Secretary of State may issue a certificate under this section in respect of 
a person if the Secretary of State reasonably – 
(a) believes that the person’s presence in the United Kingdom is a risk to 
national security, and 
(b) suspects that the person is a terrorist. 
(2) In subsection (1)(b) “terrorist” means a person who— 
(a) is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of 
acts of international terrorism, 
(b) is a member of or belongs to an international terrorist group, or 
(c) has links with an international terrorist group.79 
 
 
 The legal association of “suspected international terrorists” with “immigration and 
asylum” connected international terrorism and foreign others. The international terrorist 
                                                 
77
 One study reported that 85% of European elites saw immigration as a greater problem than in the past, 
with a rise in xenophobic and nationalist political groups (Gallya Lahav, Immigration and Politics in the 
New Europe, Reinventing Borders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 143, 179, 189).  
78
 “The Anti-Terrorism,” 2001, Research Paper HC 01/96. 
79
 ATCS, 2001, c. 24, part 4. 
 232
 
label was unquestioned as being representative of outsiders who could be legitimately 
“removed”:  
 
 Part 4 allows the detention of those the Secretary of State has certified as threats 
to national security and who are suspected of being international terrorists 
where their removal is not a realistic option within a reasonable period of time, 
excludes substantive consideration of asylum claims by suspected terrorists 
where the Secretary of State certifies that their removal would be conducive to 
the public good, and allows for ten years’ retention of fingerprints taken in 
asylum and certain immigration cases.80 
 
 
 This reinforced repertoires of inside/outside identity constructions from earlier discourse 
that externalized international terrorism by distancing international others from the 
referent. It was in many ways a “return of the past”, reminiscent of 20th century 
exclusion orders that enabled authorities to identify others within mainland Britain and 
send them back where they were “from”.81 The charge to be suspected of international 
terrorism was broad, stating only that an actor must “be concerned in the commission, 
preparation or instigation of acts of international terrorism...is a member of or belongs to 
an international terrorist group...[or] has links with an international terrorist group”.82 
This widened the net of possible international terrorists by establishing conditions of 
guilt whether or not violent action was taken.  
 
The securitization of terrorism through this period along forms of terrorism was 
successful in part due to the greater frequency of “terror” in discourse. This was not 
because of the intrinsic properties of language, but the way that this frequency played 
out along relational configurations of identity. Framings increased intensity, drama and 
danger, brokering a range of political actors and textual locations. There was agreement 
that exceptional measures were necessary to protect the democratic, Western, and 
civilized referent from an evil, international, Islamist, barbaric, and ruthless terrorist 
other: 
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2001, Tony Blair (Lab, PM): We must also make common cause with decent, 
law-abiding peoples in the Islamic world in combating the threat of terrorism, of 
which they, too, are the victims…It was a barbaric act, and action must be 
taken...83 
 
2005, Louise Ellman (Lab/Co-op): Does the Home Secretary accept that, in 
contrast to the society that he has just described, the terrorism that threatens this 
country is based on the fascist-type ideology of hatred and an obsessive wish to 
destroy the west and modernity?84  
 
 
The presence of “civilized” built on earlier discourse and stabilized a moral superiority 
of the referent. It also enabled an increasingly aggressive preemption that included 
foreign military intervention. “Civilisational” commonplaces were particularly 
significant following 11 September 2001. This reinvigorated relational configurations 
from 1990s discourse and reasserted the international terrorist-entity-other: 
 
Tony Blair (Prime Minister, Lab): By their acts, these terrorists and those behind 
them have made themselves the enemies of the entire civilised world.85 
 
Jack Straw (Foreign Secretary, Lab): The attacks were not just on the United 
States; they were on humanity, on civilisation and on us all.86 
 
Michael Ancram (Con): It was an attack not just on America but on the whole 
free world—the whole civilised world.87 
 
 
These “civilizational” framings brokered different political actors in a common 
construction of the referent in direct opposition to the international terrorist other. 
Notions of incivility, fanaticism, and barbarism intensified 20th century framings beyond 
ruthless criminals and brutal murderers. The scale of 9/11 was interpreted as proof that 
AQ terrorism was impossible to “understand” and represented a far more reprehensible 
enemy than “callous” republican or loyalist murderers from Belfast.  
 
Fanaticism 
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The securitization of terrorism as senseless and evil fanatics reasserted 
intersubjective understandings of international terrorists as insane and nonnegotiable. 
This narrowed spaces for agency, and actors were rhetorically coerced into an 
acceptance of exceptional counterterrorism as the only “sane” way to combat 
international terrorism. Rhetorical coercion does not imply a complete stripping of all 
agency, but the spaces within which agents could act considering the political context 
were significantly limited by certain structures of identity: 
 
2001, Lord Selkirk (Con): After all, the contrast between the fanatics who 
perpetrated these crimes against humanity and the representatives of the 
democratic nation they attacked could not be more substantial.88  
 
2005, Gordon Banks (Lab): What about the human rights of people in this 
country not to be victims of terrorism—not to be maimed by suicide bombers, or 
killed by religious fanatics who want to destroy our very way of life?89 
 
2005, Baroness Ramsay (Lab): We are facing fanatics aiming to kill and maim 
as many people as possible and to sacrifice themselves in the process.90  
 
2001, Michael Ancram (Con): I offer the full support of Her Majesty's 
Opposition to the Government in their chosen path as a leader in the international 
community and a staunch ally to our American friends in the fight against this 
terrorist evil…91 
 
2001, Jack Straw (Foreign Secretary, Lab): We have shown that the determined 
will of the international community can defeat the evil that seeks to destroy us 
and that destroyed the lives of so many people on 11 September. We have shown 
that action to enforce universal values is a powerful force for good.92  
 
2005, Lord Kalms (Con): Terrorism is pure evil. It is unadulterated evil. It is evil 
from every angle and perspective.93 
 
2005, Mark Hendrick (Labour/Co-op): Again we face an evil ideology from 
abroad, a perverse extremist form of Islam…94 
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Commonplaces of “evil” and “fanatic” were politically unarguable tags of illegitimacy 
and immorality allocated to terrorist others. These constructions securitized terrorism in 
a particular way that limited outcomes with respect to knowledge “of” terrorism and 
responses to the threat.  
 
Immigration 
 
Discourses linking immigration to international terrorism furthered assumptions 
of this particular threat as from outside Britain and from non-British actors. The 
reformed Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Bill added a requirement “of good 
character” to all applicants for British citizenship.95 This move was explicitly linked to 
the 2005 “Counterterrorism Progress Report” explicitly connected immigration to 
(counter)terrorism.96 Commonplaces of immigration and asylum were increasingly 
prominent: 
 
2001, James Butterfill (Con): We need to regain control over the immigration 
process if we are to protect ourselves from international terrorism.97 
 
2001, Lord Howell (Con): It seems also—this is more controversial—that young 
terrorists or young fundamentalists determined even to commit suicide in their 
mad cause are still coming too easily into this country. I am afraid that we shall 
yet again have to revisit the issue of the asylum entrants.98  
 
2005, A. J. Beith (LD): That power [executive decision basing criminal offense 
and incarceration] has been imported from immigration legislation, which was 
the original basis of the decisions on the Belmarsh detainees99  
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Along with commonplaces of “immigrant” were framings similar to 1990s discourse that 
highlighted “non-western” characteristics. Even when suspects were British citizens, 
effort was made to clarify the “origins” of such individuals. This reinforced their 
position as not wholly included with the core referent identity, but on the margins: 
 
In November 2000, police discovered 70 kg (154 lb) of home-made explosives in 
a suburban "bomb factory" in Birmingham. Although the intended target was 
unclear, it is likely that the explosives were meant to be used to carry out terrorist 
attacks in the UK. Moinul Abedin, a British citizen of Bangladeshi origins, was 
later sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment for his role in the plot.100 
 
 
Abedin, while a “British citizen”, was explicitly positioned as “of Bangladeshi origins”. 
This implied that even if the internal/external identity divider was imprecise, at their 
“essence”, international terrorists are outside traditional notions of the self. This external 
othering around perceived native/foreign boundaries was apparent in earlier discourse, 
but was intensified in the post-11 September 2001 environment.  
 
Islam 
One way that these borders were reinforced was through framings around 
“Islam” and “Muslim”: 
 
2000, Baroness Cox (cross-bench): a rapidly growing Islamist movement which 
constitutes the gravest threat to global security in the world today…On 12th 
November in London, a meeting addressed by Sheikh Omar Bakhri Mohammed 
called for a jihad against Russia and raised money to support fighters in 
Chechnya... Elsewhere in England, the Afghan war veteran, Abu Hamza, an 
imam in north London, was shown teaching recruits terror tactics such as 
methods of bringing down aircraft flying into Heathrow airport…each recruit 
was told to devise similar terrorist activities, for this is a war, a jihad, in which 
blood will be shed here in Britain.101 
 
2001, John Butterfill (Con): “common cause between Islam and all the western 
world”102 
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2005, Lord Pearson (UKIP): The Bill is largely a laudable attempt to arm 
ourselves as best we can against the new evil of Islamist terrorism.103  
 
 
Positioning actors such as Abu Hamza and Sheikh Omar Bakhri alongside framings of 
“Islam” generalized historical relations and actors without allowing for contingency or 
context. It is not that these actors or associated groups were innocuous. But, the way that 
international terrorism was constructed conflated Islam with terrorism and enabled a 
response that ignored consequences of insecurity. Bakhri indeed responded to the 
question “why the ‘radical Jihadis’ achieved such prominence” by stating: 
 
I believe the new laws of terrorism, in Europe, were a big mistake. I am now far 
away from them, but I honestly believe this is the biggest mistake committed by 
Western powers. Before the London bombings, before the Madrid bombings, and 
to a certain extent before September 11, I think the strictness of the rules started 
to [contribute to] the uprising.104 
 
 
Regardless if one agrees with the grievances underlying those engaged in terrorism and 
political violence, issues of historical oppression, Western foreign policy, us/them 
boundary assumptions, counterterrorism practice, and feelings of injustice hold 
significant influence for identity and security. However, the long history of problematic 
East/West division and complexity of identity-security relations was not taken seriously: 
 
2001, Lord Selsdon (Con): In many of those countries, the British, who were 
once a friend and partner, were for a long time treated as an enemy. I shall give a 
couple of the stupid sort of jokes that were heard. "Why does the sun never set 
on the British Empire?" "Because the Arabs do not trust the British after dark." 
"What is wrong with the Middle East?" "Hashish, baksheesh, malish (meaning, 
'tomorrow') and the British; and the worst is the British because they invented the 
rest." We were somehow regarded as a corrupt, foreign, colonial power that had 
exploited the resources of a country and brought it no benefit.105  
 
 
When discourse did link perceptions of injustice to historical imperialism and 
colonialism, it was not given consideration as a legitimate grievance or factor of 
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insecurity. Distinctions among risks were brushed aside, often asserting a simplistic 
“two-world” view separating Islam and the West.  
 
Similar to earlier discourse targeting Irish groups, 21st century discourse 
provided a dual set of images around communities linked to suspected terrorists. On the 
one hand, the threat of terrorism was linked to a particular community and religion. On 
the other hand, some actors within this group were constructed as “law-abiding 
Muslims”, establishing a kind of communal vulnerability. Neither construction 
positioned members of this community as equal to the core referent, whether or not they 
were engaged in violence. Everyday aspects of this paradoxical (non)belonging can be 
interpreted as an example of what Der Derian has called “a mimetic war of images”:  
 
A mimetic war is a battle of imitation and representation, in which the 
relationship of who we are and who they are is played out along a wide spectrum 
of familiarity and friendliness, indifference and tolerance, estrangement and 
hostility. It can result in appreciation or denigration, accommodation or 
separation, assimilation or extermination. It draws physical boundaries between 
peoples as well as metaphysical boundaries between life and the most radical 
other of life, death. It separates human from god. It builds the fences that make 
good neighbors; it builds the wall that confines a whole people. And it sanctions 
just about every kind of violence.106 
 
 
Within this are implicit yet significant aspects of emotion and affect that come into play 
through processes of identity and boundary construction. Us/them “bordering” practices 
around “Islamist extremism” and “decent, law-abiding Muslims” reinforced 
inside/outside assumptions of difference in a way that was both “tolerant” and “hostile”. 
The construction of “suspect communities” versus “good” communities from discourse 
securitizing terrorism, both marginalized from the referent. This represented how 
“knowledge of the other [is] inflected by the equation of difference and inferiority” and 
can lead to “the physical destruction, enslavement, or cruel exploitation of the other”.107 
Identity distinctions such as “law-abiding” are a type of othering practice with the 
potential to increase social tension and insecurity: 
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2001, Tony Blair (PM, Lab): We do not yet know the exact origin of this evil. 
But if, as appears likely, it is so-called Islamic fundamentalists, we know that 
they do not speak or act for the vast majority of decent law-abiding Muslims 
throughout the world. 
… 
those who truly follow the religion of Islam are decent, peaceful and law-
abiding people. Like us, they have often been victims of terrorism and, like us, 
they want it stamped out.108 
 
2001, John Hume (SDLP): majority of decent, law-abiding Muslims throughout 
the world109 
 
 
The focus on Islam and explicit discussions of “decent, law-abiding Muslims”, instead of 
just “decent, law-abiding people” or “decent, law-abiding societies”[emphasis added], 
bolstered Muslim/non-Muslim categories of difference. Embedded practices of othering 
maintained exceptional counterterrorism even if the perceived boundaries of separation 
were blurred: 
 
2001, Khalid Mahmood (Lab): Above all, I am British—and, in fact, a Brummie, 
having been brought up in Birmingham and having lived there…It was not long 
ago that people in the north of the country were trying to divide the community 
on the basis of skin colour and religion. Those very people will now have another 
opportunity to carry out such activities. It has already started in Birmingham. I 
was at a radio station yesterday morning when I learned that such people were 
ringing up mosques and other institutions leaving abusive messages and putting 
excrement through doors. I spoke to a member of the Sikh council. He is not a 
Muslim but ignorant people do not recognise the difference. They lump 
everybody together.110 
 
2005, Lord Ahmed: Your Lordships will be aware that many of the people 
stopped, searched and arrested under the current anti-terrorist legislation are 
mostly from the Muslim community. Since 9/11 more than 1,000 have been 
arrested under the anti-terrorism laws. Seventeen were found guilty and among 
those six were Irish, two were Sikhs, five Muslims and the remainder unknown. 
Yet the common perception is that these are all Muslims who want to destroy 
our democracy and our way of life. In the mean time, my community has been 
isolated, Islamophobia has increased, and there is a popular belief that allegations 
about Muslims must be true.111 
                                                 
108
 Parl. Deb, H.C., 14 September 2001, 6th ser., vol. 372, col. 606, 612. 
109
 Ibid., col. 613. 
110
 Ibid., col. 648-649. 
111
 Prevention of Terrorism, 22 Feb 2005, Parliamentary Debates, Lords, vol. 670, col. 199 (part no. 45). 
 240
 
 
 
Us/them boundary construction along assumptions of race and religion increased 
insecurity for those associated with suspect communities, further linking Islam with 
international terrorism: 
 
2005, Robin Cook (Lab): I worry gravely that the powers, in particular the power 
of house arrest, could be counterproductive in the fight against terrorism…Let us 
be frank. We all know that the control orders are most likely to be applied 
against citizens of Britain who are British Muslims.112  
 
  
Despite the Joint Committee on Human Rights noting “mounting evidence that the 
powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 are being used disproportionately against 
members of the Muslim community in the United Kingdom,” alternative 
counterterrorism approaches were not engaged.113 By the early 21st century these 
self/other dichotomies were entrenched sources of intersubjective knowledge supporting 
a particular securitization of terrorism and normalization of exceptional 
counterterrorism. Despite the 7 July 2005 attack underlining the international terrorist as 
from within, internal/external discourses were durable seeds of alienation justified by an 
official securitization of terrorism that had been unfolding for decades. The effect of 
counterterrorism on broader social relations and identity, and the contradictions of a 
two-track approach to Irish versus international threats, was noticed by the public:114 
 
When other nations fight for their rights you call them LOYALIST and 
FREEDOM FIGHTERS but when a Muslim fights for his/her rights you label 
them a TERRORIST...how can you justify this?  
Imteyaz Azmi, London 
 
These Islamic terrorists, and they are Islamic terrorists despite Tony Blair's 
insistence to the contrary, have one objective: To bring the US in particular, and 
the West in general, to its knees… 
If these people wish to live in our country, then they should adopt the principle 
of 'doing in Rome as the Romans do'.  
                                                 
112
 Prevention of Terrorism Bill, 28 Feb 2005, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, vol. 431, col. 714 (part 
no. 44). 
113
 Terrorism Bill, 20 December 2005, Parliamentary Debates, Lords, vol. 676, col. 1635 (part no. 82). 
114
 “Your comments on Britain on the Brink [forum],” 1 October 2001, BBC News [cited 11 May 2009]; 
available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/1573310.stm. 
 241
 
Richard, Cardiff 
 
It's ironic to see Blair helping to organise the hunt for Bin Laden in the 
mountains of Afghanistan. It's a pity he hasn't shown the same enthusiasm in 
hunting down the murderers of the people in Omagh. But then again he might 
have offended Gerry bin Adams and that would never do.  
Alan, Banbridge  
 
I am proud to live in this country and am grateful to the people who died in the 
wars to give us freedom. Do not let our country go down the drain even further! 
We need laws now to stop the fanatics.  
Stan Francis, Birmingham 
 
 
Inside/outside assumptions stemming directly from the securitization of terrorism 
influenced broader perceptions of who belongs, who terrorist others are, and who is 
dangerous. Magnifying the international terrorist as an evil, alien other enabled official 
discourse to justify an expansion of exceptional counterterrorism. This expansion caused 
extraordinary security practices to begin a trajectory of normalized exception.  
 
Democracy, way of life 
 
Combined with shifts in threat identity were alterations in referent construction. 
Discourse had moved away from 1970s and 1980s notions of law and order by 
establishing the referent as western democracy and a British way of life built upon 1990s 
discourse: 
 
2005, Charles Clarke (Home Secretary, Lab): Democracy and the need to protect 
our democracy is at the heart of the Bill.115 
 
2001, Baroness Symons (Minister of Trade, Lab): This enemy has no respect for 
our way of life, nor for our values.116 
 
2005, David Davis (Con): Global terrorism is an attack on those very things—
our way of life, our beliefs, our liberties, and our lives.117 
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2005, Charles Clarke (Home Secretary, Lab): We face foes who seek to destroy 
our way of life and everything we stand for.118  
 
 
As explained by Richard Johnson, the phrase “way of life” takes on a distinctive 
significance in the context of counterterrorism. It is positioned as “a potential victim that 
reveals itself as a source of strength”.119 Distinguishing international from other 
terrorisms alongside this uncontroversial referent was essential to downgrading security 
in Northern Ireland while bolstering counterterrorism more broadly. As the threat was 
amplified as an immoral foreign other opposing a democratic way of life, actors were 
brokered and consequently rhetorically coerced into positions of exceptional policy 
acquiescence. Who in a position of political authority could argue against security 
measures if they were necessary to protect liberal democracy when “No one can doubt 
the threat that we face from international terrorism”?120  
 
Through rhetorical coercion, the audience’s conditions of possibility were 
limited by particular identity framings and the meanings that they came to represent. 
Regardless of belief or motivation, it was politically impossible to take a position one 
could interpret as disregarding the referent’s well being, the number one priority of 
government.121 Even when actors acknowledged a proposed measure as draconian, in the 
end they voiced support: 
 
2001, Graham Allen (Lab): The House should not mince its words. The 
Executive are in effect suspending habeas corpus and ending trial by jury, a right 
that can be traced back more than 700 years to the Magna Carta. We are bringing 
in indefinite internment and introducing to the English mainland something that 
we never did even at the height of the IRA offensive. As with internment, the 
normal burden of proof will be reversed: people will be treated as guilty unless 
they can prove their innocence. Those who are detained will not be able to see 
the evidence gathered against them, and will therefore not be able to challenge its 
accuracy…None the less, the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister say 
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that they believe the measure is necessary to combat terrorism, and I will 
trust their judgment.122 
 
 
A similar phrasing of support came from Labour MP Kevin McNamara who first 
claimed that “the Bill does not meet the requirements of the European convention on 
human rights”, but followed this by stating “I regret that the Bill is necessary, but I will 
not divide the House on it.”123 Rhetorical coercion does not dissolve agency – this would 
wrongly imply a removal of accountability and responsibility from lawmakers. Even in 
the rhetorical political stakes following 11 September, “The ‘war on terror’ was [still] a 
deliberate political choice taken by western political leaders, and they could have 
fashioned other responses.”124 But the spaces for politically possible agency were 
limited by specific patterns of threat/referent construction. An example similar to the 
above is seen during debate preceding the TA2000.  
 
Real 
 
One commonplace that contributed to rhetorical coercion and counterterrorism 
outcomes from 2000 to 2006 was “real”. “Real” was a rhetorical trump card that 
outweighed dissent. Even without detailed explanation, the threat was constructed as 
undeniably “real”: 
 
2001, David Blunkett (Home Secretary, Lab) “real dangers that exist”125 
 
2005, Hazel Blears (Home Office Minister, Lab): During the recent debates on 
the new legislation the majority of the House of Commons recognised the threat 
is real and serious and different in character.126 
 
2005, Michael Howard (Con): We all agree that terrorism is a real and current 
threat, and that special powers are needed to deal with it.127  
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2005, Lord Carlile (Lab): There is a real and present threat of continuing al-
Qaeda-connected terrorism within the United Kingdom.128  
 
 
We can see the effects of rhetorical coercion when lawmakers have to publicly answer 
the rare opposition stance. In a speech regarding disagreement over policy in 
Afghanistan, Browne claimed that those who disagreed did so “not because they 
question whether the mission is important, or indeed legitimate, but because they think it 
is impossible”.129 Those in favor of counterterrorism here framed dissent not as 
fundamental disagreement over policy legitimacy or substance, but as a lack of faith that 
such measures would be successful. A consequence of such language was the 
simultaneous reassertion of existing counterterrorism and silencing of alternative views.  
 
The durable position of identity framings deployed by various actors and the 
intersubjective understandings that they engendered were of causal consequence for 
intersubjective understanding and material counterterrorism practice. In Britain from 
2000 to 2006 we saw an expansion and normalization of exceptional counterterrorism 
despite an incoherence of the threat identity labels that were used to securitize terrorism. 
Though violence continued in Northern Ireland, in official discourse this was framed as 
“paramilitary” and “dissident”. Terms of terrorism were privileged in discourse around 
the international threat from outside Britain. At the same time, acts of violence such as 
7/7 connected the international terrorist label with domestic actors. In official discourse, 
inside/outside boundaries of identity that underpinned the continued securitization of 
terrorism along different forms were increasingly blurred and reasserted as essentially 
different categories of the other.  
 
 
III. From 2006 onwards 
 
The real risk is that, if we detain and then release one suspected terrorist without 
charge, we radicalise 100 further people—the terrorists of the future. The Bill is 
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dangerous in that respect. The proposal is simply wrong: it will damage liberties, rights 
and a system of justice fundamental to the British way of life.  
2005, David Davis130 
 
 
On his last day in parliament in 2005, itself perhaps how he could breach the 
rhetorically coercive discourse, Brian Sedgemore (Lab) said: 
 
As this will almost certainly be my last speech in Parliament, I shall try hard not 
to upset anyone. However, our debate here tonight is a grim reminder of how the 
Prime Minister and the Home Secretary are betraying some of Labour's most 
cherished beliefs. Not content with tossing aside the ideas and ideals that inspire 
and inform ideology, they seem to be giving up on values too. Liberty, without 
which democracy has no meaning, and the rule of law, without which state 
power cannot be contained, look to Parliament for their protection, but this 
Parliament, sad to say, is failing the nation badly. It is not just the Government 
but Back-Bench Members [sic] who are to blame. It seems that in situations such 
as this, politics become incompatible with conscience, principle, decency and 
self-respect. Regrettably, in such situations, the desire for power and position 
predominates.131  
 
 
This discourse used framings similar to those in favor of expanded measures (“rule of 
law”, “democracy”), and pointed to the consequential power of brokerage by referencing 
Government and Back-Bench Members. From 2000 to 2006, the securitization of 
terrorism reinforced internal/external boundaries of identity from earlier discourse. The 
referent was British, but also global. It was a value-based democratic identity building 
upon 1970s discourse of a British public represented by peace, law and order. 
International labels differentiated types of terrorism and material response from 
insecurity in Northern Ireland. These processes of identity (re)construction constituted 
and justified the transition to permanent legislation with the TA2000, and expanded 
measures through the ATCS2001, PTA2005, and TA2006. 
  
Framings from 2006 “to win the battle of hearts and minds” underscored 
terrorism not just as a threat to life, but as a threat to British values: 
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2005, Lord Judd (Lab): As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, has 
reminded us, we are dealing with a very sinister and dangerous threat. To be able 
to deal with that effectively, the battle for hearts and minds is crucial.132 
 
2005, John Denham (Lab): It is in our policing, our intelligence, the development 
of community support, and crucially, in winning the hearts and minds of 
people at home and abroad. The key battle is for hearts and minds.133 
 
2005, Lord McNally (LD): there is a need to win hearts and minds. We have to 
ensure that all our fellow citizens, from every community, see the war against 
terror as their war too. As the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, said, the lesson from 
Northern Ireland and other areas of conflict is that laws or methods that do not 
win hearts and minds inflame problems134 
 
 
Through framing counterterrorism along value-based arguments of winning “hearts and 
minds”, early 21st century discourse rhetorically coerced actors into positions whereby it 
would be politically difficult to disagree. By 2006, counterterrorism was no longer just a 
temporary measure, but a normalized part of domestic security practice. Actors 
espousing different views on counterterrorism were using similar discourses in 
securitizing the threat, with a spectrum of political positions contributing to an 
overarching construction of identity.     
 
The next chapter from 2007 to 2011 is a period of changing political leadership, 
reduced international terrorism, continuing Irish related insecurity, and maintained 
counterterrorism. By 2011, counterterrorism practice had reached a plateau of exception. 
With extraordinary counterterrorism permanent and embedded in everyday practice and 
the terrorist other an unquestioned entity existing in “its” own right, discourses that 
securitized terrorism and extraordinary counterterrorism measures were a self-sustaining  
cycle of identity and practice.
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Chapter 8 
 
2007-2011 
 
A plateau of exceptionality 
 
 
 
 
Regimes…differ momentously in which kinds of organization, identity, and collective 
interaction they prescribe, tolerate, and forbid. But all of them create procedures for 
public screening of acceptability in these regards; those procedures crystallize as laws, 
registers, surveillance, police practice, subsidies, organizations of public space, and 
repressive politics.  
(McAdam et. al 2001)1 
 
The risk level is at “severe”. We face threats from a whole range of people. When I was 
Prisons Minister, I visited some of our prisons and I saw some of the terrorists who had 
been prosecuted, and they really are scary people. Next year, a large number of them 
will be released on license, and they will be back in society, so the threat is always 
there. 
(Gerry Sutcliffe (Lab), 23 June 2011) 2  
 
The best place for a terrorist is a prison cell; I think we all agree on that.  
(James Brokenshire (Con), 30 June 2011)3 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter discusses how particular relational configurations of identity 
securitizing terrorism sustained a normalization of exceptional counterterrorism from 
2007 to 2011. Measures continued despite no major attacks and the weakening of AQ. 
Known failed attempts were thwarted by actor ineptitude as much as, if not more than, 
counterterrorism. New reviews and the 2010 shift to a Liberal Democrat-Conservative 
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coalition government held initial promise of a redirection of counterterrorism approach.4 
The 2007 discovery of unexploded car bombs in London and the 2007 Glasgow airport 
attack were instances of insecurity. But they also represented the unreliability of 
counterterrorism to stop attacks. Reviews begun in 2009 were positioned as a 
reevaluation of the liberty-security balance, and some powers were removed. A snapshot 
of the Government’s objectives in the review stated in 2011 are as follows: 
 
 
Figure 2.2 – “Key Elements” of the 2011 UK Government Counterterrorism Review5 
 
But in the end as will be seen through this chapter, the overarching trajectory of 
counterterrorism as extraordinary state power was maintained: counterterrorism was on 
a plateau of normalized exception.  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, 21st century official discourse and practice 
introduced new commonplaces. But they also reinforced existing patterns of identity 
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construction from earlier discourse. The securitization of terrorism continued to draw on 
domestic, Irish, and international identity assumptions. Historically rooted us/them 
understandings linked to framings of good/evil, civilized/barbarian, and East/West 
remained influential. As demonstrated in chapter six, it was not that “international” or 
“Irish” labels were absent prior to the 1990s. Rather, that the way these terms became 
temporarily stabilized through particular configurations in discourse influenced 
outcomes of intersubjective understanding and material practice. The 21st century shift 
to permanent counterterrorism law set the foundation for a normalization of exceptional 
counterterrorism through new laws, offices, and strategies.  
 
From 2007 to 2011, the securitization of terrorism continued along identity labels 
based on geographic assumptions of identification. Processes of identity construction 
securitizing terrorism were interlinked through websites (OSCT and MI5), national 
strategies (NSS, CONTEST), laws (CT2008 and TPIM2011), parliamentary debates, and 
reviews. This chapter discusses how a mutual constitution of securitizing discourse, 
identity construction, and counterterrorism enabled a plateau of normalized exception 
with no end in sight. 
 
 
I. Positioning the recent past 
 
From 2007 to 2011, counterterrorism became institutionally entrenched through 
the Office of Security and Counterterrorism (est. 2007), National Security Strategy 
(2008,6 2009),7 Counterterrorism Act 2008,8 CONTEST (2009, 2011), and Terrorism 
Prevention and Investigation Measures Act (2011).9 The latest version of CONTEST 
covered “all forms of terrorism”, acknowledging “there is very often no clear distinction 
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between international and what is sometimes called ‘home grown’ terrorism”.10 
However, “home-grown” was mentioned only one other time out of 125 pages.11 
Compared to 980 instances of “terror” this was somewhat surprising. CONTEST 2011 
references “lone-wolves”, but just twice, one of which referred to the title of a book.12 
Though notions such as “home grown” have played a role in establishing conventional 
wisdom around the terrorist threat, this term was conspicuously absent from official 
discourse on counterterrorism law and policy.13 In the 2009 version of CONTEST (176 
pages), “terror” appears 230 times but “homegrown” only once. This minimal reference 
reasserted perceptions of international terrorism as external, and non-British: 
 
Terrorist incidents in this country usually have an overseas connection: the term 
‘home-grown’ terrorism, though often used, can be misleading. Planning for 
attacks in the UK takes place overseas as well as at home.14  
 
 
In CONTEST 2009 “international” appears 189 times, “Irish” 6 times, “domestic” 34 
times, and “terror” 1,060 times. In the NSS 2008 (64 pages), terror appears 104 times, 
but homegrown not once. This infrequency does not contest the influence of these 
phrases more broadly. But it does underscore a stubborn durability of threat framings 
begun in earlier years. There was a new attention to internal sources of insecurity. 
However, a securitization of terrorism drawing upon geographic boundary assumptions 
associated with differentiated degrees of danger and otherness continued. 
 
Interestingly, the most recent CONTEST from 2011 removed “international” 
from its title. But upon greater investigation, the content of this version maintains the 
use of earlier threat labels, for example as seen through its section “The Strategic 
Context”. There was a more explicit acknowledgment of continuing insecurity in 
Northern Ireland, but there was also a continued use of international to categorize almost 
all non-domestic and non-Irish related threats. 
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Figure 2.3 – “Arrests on suspicion of terrorism in the UK,” 2009-201015 
 
Though Irish-related terrorism was distinguished from other threats in Britain, 
“international” remained a catchall phrase. This threat identifier grouped all varieties of 
AQ inspired terrorism (domestic and “international”) together, even as the AQ network 
itself has become significantly less centralized. Similar to Croft’s analysis of how Islam 
is securitized, discourse around the normalization of exceptional counterterrorism 
positioned all Islamic-related security issues under one general umbrella.16  
 
A 2010 report on the TA2000 framed terrorism in a way that continued 
intersubjective understandings established in earlier discourse through practices of 
labeling international, Irish, and domestic threats. The report explained “Prosecutions 
currently are focused on three strands of terrorism offences – (i) extremism claimed to 
have its foundations in Islam [international], (ii) Northern Ireland based dissidents 
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[Irish], and (iii) right-wing violent extremism [domestic].”17 From 2007 to 2011, the 
securitization of terrorism continued to align different threats with issues of race and 
religion. A decade after the TA 2000 was passed and thirty-seven years after the first 
counterterrorism laws were introduced, the issue of suspect communities made its way 
into an official review:18 
 
Most Muslims had direct experience of being stopped and searched, had close 
friends or family who had been stopped and searched or had witnessed stops in 
their local area…The impact of counter-terrorism law and policies are 
experienced and felt more acutely and directly amongst Muslims than non-
Muslims. Non-Muslims were less likely to have direct or indirect experiences of 
any measures and were generally more supportive of the measures that were 
being taken as necessary.19 
 
 
Research around the issue of Muslim suspect communities provided insight into how 
policies such as counter-radicalization were linked to issues of insecurity rather than 
security: 
 
The exaggeration of the ‘Muslim threat’ and an increasing sense of scrutiny and 
surveillance were viewed as contributing towards a growing sense of isolation 
for many within Muslim communities. This was also seen as exacerbating 
existing internal community fragmentation (given the diversity of cultures and 
countries of origin within and amongst Muslim communities). The Prevent 
strand of the Contest II strategy, directed at the ‘prevention of radicalisation’, 
was seen as producing particular problems in this regard.20 
 
 
Though the alienation of Muslim suspect communities stemming from counterterrorism 
was apparent in academic and policy reports, these reviews did not result in a significant 
reevaluation of counterterrorism trajectory. In addition, none of these reports discussed 
the possible link between suspect communities and how “international terrorism” as a 
threat label was based on inside/outside assumptions of belonging irrespective of 
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whether or not actors engaged in violence. In 2007, an independent report by Human 
Rights Watch in 2007 stated: 
 
Counterterrorism measures that violate human rights undermine the UK’s moral 
legitimacy at home and abroad, damaging its ability to win the battle of ideas that 
is central to long-term success in countering terrorism. They erode public trust in 
law enforcement and security services, and alienate communities whose 
cooperation is critical in the fight against terrorism.21  
 
 
The above is reminiscent of experiences during the Troubles, and repeated consequences 
of alienation. It also demonstrates the continued mutual constitution of Britain as a 
political and societal referent. However, there was no problematization of how the way 
terrorism was securitized enabled a stabilization of certain us/them understandings to 
arise over others. It is by unpacking securitization that this thesis narrative brings added 
value to existing debates. By identifying how relational configurations of identity came 
together in particular ways at particular times, we can see how discourse is causally 
consequential for outcomes. As discussed in earlier chapters, securitization theory 
provides an important starting point for investigating the interrelation of discourse, 
identity, and practice. But in order to better explain the causal impact of language for 
outcomes, analysis has to disentangle the relational configurations that enable certain 
identities to arise over others. Collective understandings linked to these threat/referent 
identities enabled and limited different possibilities of response. Due to distinctive 
patterns of identity externalization in the securitization of terrorism across British 
discourse, exceptional measures were eventually normalized. 
 
In one debate around the TPIM it was stated “We know that there have been 
miscarriages of justice, as the hon. Gentleman has mentioned, but these are never 
mentioned in any reviews.”22 Thus even as actors are aware of consequences from 
counterterrorism that go back in some shape or form for decades, the outcome was a 
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maintenance of existing approach. The intersubjective understanding of international 
terrorism as synonymous with Islam, unparalleled in danger, and opposing a civilized 
way of life was embedded in official discourse. Terrorism was not an issue of “public 
order” or serious criminality, as during 1970s and early 1980s. It was a threat to western 
democracy and civilized British values, whose “common purpose is to condemn 
Western society and its value systems”.23 
 
Forming counterterrorism through the “the rule of law” and “democratic 
procedure” led to material outcomes of counterterrorism law, and in the process 
reasserted a British democratic self. This strengthened the self-fulfilling interrelation of 
discourse, identity, and practice over time. Statements like “the British are strong and 
free people, and their laws should reflect this” simultaneously legitimized exceptional 
counterterrorism law and the British referent.24 Focusing on the rule of law also ensured 
that if powers were removed, they could be legitimately replaced with similar measures 
through subsequent practices of lawmaking. The removal of powers was not a de-
escalation of exception as much as it was a recalibration of what that exception entailed. 
Just as the 2004 Law Lords decision against the indefinite detention of “suspected 
international terrorists” spawned new control orders, the 2010 removal of control orders 
spawned new, and similarly exceptional, TPIMs.25 The Equality and Human Rights 
Commission (TPIM 03) and Liberty (TPIM 04) gave the following assessments of the 
proposed TPIM regime: 
 
TPIM 03 (EHRC) 
 
“-…we consider that as a whole the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation 
Measures (TPIMs) regime lacks sufficient safeguards to adequately protect the 
right to liberty and the right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the European 
Convention on Human Rights... (5) 
- The Commission believes, as a matter of principle, restrictions on individual 
liberty should occur on the basis of what someone has done, not what they are 
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suspected of doing and that those suspected of terrorist offences should be 
prosecuted…the Bill departs from this principle... (5-6) 
-…the Commission is concerned that overall the proposed TPIMs regime may 
still fail to comply with Convention rights, in particular the right to liberty and 
security (Article 5), the right to a fair trial (Article 6), the right to respect for 
private and family life (Article 8), freedom of expression (Article 10) and 
prohibition of discrimination (Article 14).”26 
 
 
TPIM 4 (Liberty) 
 
“the TPIM regime essentially mirrors the control order system in all of its most 
offensive elements including:  
- abrogation of the constitutional safeguards which protect the right to a fair trial, 
in particular the process will continue to be executive led, with judicial 
interventions remaining weak and shrouded with secrecy;  
- creation of an impediment to prosecution of those genuinely involved in 
terrorist activity who are tipped off and then prevented from doing the very 
things which would allow evidence to be gathered;  
- imposition of punitive and potentially unending restrictions on individuals in 
the absence of criminal due process;  
- furtherance of a system which is as unsafe as it is unfair ruining the lives of the 
innocent and allowing potentially dangerous people to evade prosecution; and  
- retention of a system which creates huge costs liabilities at a time of financial 
strife”27 
 
 
Despite these views and an environment without major terrorist attack, the TPIM 2011 
received royal assent 14 December 2011. Over the past almost forty years, different 
speakers and textual sites were brokered through repeated framings that asserted 
politically unarguable threat/referent identities rhetorically coerced actors into accepting 
exceptional counterterrorism as the “only” option: 
 
2011, Bob Stewart (Con): I very much support most of what the right hon. Lady 
is saying. None of us in this House wants control orders or TPIMs, but we do not 
have a choice. … The people concerned are very dangerous—or apparently very 
dangerous: we cannot prove it, but we do not want to take the risk—and I am 
afraid that we have to put up with this lack of liberty.28 
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This focus on preventing future risk, even if very dangerous is “apparently very 
dangerous”, encouraged the logic of “not if, but when” terrorist catastrophe will occur.29 
This limited spaces for agency and silenced alternatives that could be interpreted as 
ignoring perceptions of inevitable doom.  
 
As mentioned, the years 2007 to 2011 mark a relative calm with respect to major 
terrorist events targeting Britain. This is not to negate the Glasgow airport attack of 
2007, violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, drone attacks in Yemen and Pakistan, insecurity 
in Northern Ireland including “40 attacks on national security targets in 2010”,30 or 
failed attacks such as those by Nicky Reilly and Umah Farouk Abdulmutallab. But it is 
to highlight how even if violence was seen to be decreasing, exceptional measures 
continued along a preemptive path begun in the late 1960s. Terrorist violence outside 
Britain continued, but actors such as those in Iraq were frequently identified as “suicide 
bombers” rather than “terrorists”. The 2008 Mumbai attack was a stark reminder of the 
planning that can go in to non-state violence. But the June 2010 killing of AQ leaders 
Sheikh Sa'id al-Masri31 and May 2011 killing of Osama Bin Laden significantly 
weakened AQ. A 2009 Manchester arrest of multiple individuals demonstrated ongoing 
domestic operations, but a conclusive means of identifying threats or more clear 
definition of “terrorism” remained elusive.  
 
New counterterrorism reviews from 2009 led to the removal of TA 2000 stop and 
search without reasonable suspicion, PTA 2005 control orders, and reduction of pre-
charge detention to 14 days.32 Though this influenced counterterrorism implementation, 
with 9,645 stops in 2010/2011 compared to 102,504 the year before,33 it was not a major 
reduction of exceptionality. TPIMs replaced control orders with similar powers, and pre-
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charge detention at 14 days was still significant. The overall trajectory of 
counterterrorism was unchanged. Patterns of threat construction continued to demarcate 
AQ and “like-minded” groups under the international terrorist label:  
 
The current threat level to the UK from international terrorism is severe. 
The most significant international terrorism threat to the UK remains 
violent extremism associated with and influenced by Al Qa'ida. 
 
First, Prevent will remain an integral part of the government’s counter-terrorism 
strategy, CONTEST.  
 
Second, Prevent will address all forms of terrorism, including the extreme right 
wing. However, it is clear that Prevent work must be targeted against those forms 
of terrorism that pose the greatest risk to our national security. Currently, the 
greatest threat comes from Al Qa’ida, its affiliates and like-minded groups.34 
 
 
In the end, counterterrorism reviews reasserted CONTEST and counterterrorism 
approach. The years 2007 to 2011 reveal the extent to which securitizing discourse along 
particular identity assumptions had become embedded in collective knowledge and in 
practice.  
 
These processes stabilized exceptional practice along a seemingly inoffensive 
plateau of exceptionality, even as discourse from 2011 touched upon “all forms of 
terrorism”.35 After over two decades of aligning international with “external” foreigners 
associated with assumed racial and religious characteristics, perceptions of the most 
dangerous other had taken on a consequential durability. From 2007 to 2011, the 
international commonplace continued to dominate: the “revised Prevent strategy will 
continue to address the most significant security risk that we face: the risk from 
international terrorism”.36 The international other remained the most dangerous threat. It 
was a violent Islamic extremism too barbaric for negotiation and too dangerous for 
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ordinary criminal laws. Official discourse referenced other types of terrorism but the 
international label maintained a certain prominence.37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 – Geographic perceptions of belonging and relational configurations of meaning 
 
This visual representation of securitizing terrorism from 2007 to 2011 aims to 
capture the way labels of identification had evolved, or stayed the same, in terms of 
intersubjective understanding. The blurred boundary between domestic and other threat 
labels was increasingly acknowledged, as demonstrated by the porous referent border 
and two-way arrow movement above. But commonplaces remained tied to earlier 
boundary assumptions linked with Irish, domestic, and international labels. Thus while 
official discourse began to reorient priorities to “all forms” of terrorism, it still relied on 
“forms” in the plural rather than “terrorism” in the singular. Intersubjective 
understandings of terrorist threat established through securitizations of terrorism that 
relied upon geographic and cultural borders of difference remained. 
 
The risk from Northern Ireland continued to be constructed as “Northern Irish-
related terrorism”, “dissident republicanism”, and “paramilitary activity”. Despite 
                                                 
37
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growing insecurity in Northern Ireland during this period, Irish-related threats were 
seemingly less dangerous than international terrorists: 
 
My observations in relation to TA2000 in 2009 and throughout the past eight 
years have confirmed the shift of emphasis towards international terrorism, 
as the process of normalisation in Northern Ireland has become more 
evident. However, 2009 and early 2010 have demonstrated that there is a 
paramount need for continuous vigilance in Northern Ireland, despite the 
progress of recent years. The number of terrorism incidents in Northern 
Ireland has increased, as has the evidence of the existence of determined and 
dangerous groups of dissident republicans with the ability to manufacture 
and deploy lethal explosive devices.38 
 
 
Despite the acknowledgement of Irish-related insecurity, British troops left in 2007 after 
a thirty-eight year presence, and Diplock Courts were removed through the Justice and 
Security (Northern Ireland) Act.39 This contributed to the reduction of exceptional 
measures in Northern Ireland, but powers targeting other types of terrorism were 
maintained. The construction of international terrorism as violent extremism revalidated 
existing measures even as efforts such as 42-day detention were defeated in 2008. When 
compared to other detention policies at the time (one day in Canada, two days in South 
Africa and New Zealand, seven days in Ireland), halting 42-day detention by continuing 
28-day detention reinforced exceptionality.  
 
At the same time, counter-radicalization continued to target suspect communities 
and bring consequences of insecurity.40 Muslim suspect communities did not just 
include those suspected of terrorism, but “extremist” opinions on foreign and security 
policy.41 The risk of terrorism as threatening a British way of life and democratic 
civilization continued to securitize terrorism as a terrorist entity-other someone 
embodies, not as a method of political violence. As explained in Prevent, this “strategy, 
launched in 2007 seeks to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism both 
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in the UK and overseas.”42 [emphasis added]. This reinforced the future-oriented and 
actor-based approach, even as preemptive policies that exacerbated racial, religious, and 
ethnic categorizations led to situations of insecurity.43  
 
Broader policy moves (OSCT, NSS, CONTEST) and new laws (CT2008, 
TPIM2011) were mutually reinforcing. By 2011 exceptional counterterrorism had been 
in use for over four decades. Counterterrorism outcomes did not depend upon terrorist 
attacks to be justified, with a 3.5 billion £ spending plan for counterterrorism by 2011.44 
Though there were parliamentary calls to limit state power since “TPIMs are an 
extraordinary departure from ordinary principles of criminal due process [bold in 
original]”, TPIMs were passed and counterterrorism continued along a trajectory formed 
years earlier.45 To understand how we have arrived at this plateau of normalized 
exception, we must interrogate how relational configurations of identity came to 
securitize terrorism in particular ways. Threat/referent identities stabilized by collective 
meanings established through social and political practice delimited what kinds of 
response were politically possible, causing certain outcomes to arise over others.  
 
 
II. Normalizing discourse and practice 
 
As established by securitization theorists, intersubjective understanding is 
essential to any successful securitization. In doing an analysis of securitization as both a 
conceptual tool to investigate the power of discourse and an empirical process shaping 
material outcomes, it is essential to keep in mind that “the exact definition and criteria 
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of securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential 
threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects”.46 This 
“intersubjective establishment” is formed in large part through framings “of interpretive 
processes” in language.47 Thus language does not “do” or “cause” in a predictable way, 
but by tracing the way that observable relational configurations connect different actors 
and sites we can better understand how some discourses link to some outcomes. 
However, as demonstrated through the previous four chapters, the unfolding of certain 
relational configurations at different times and in different positions has a causal impact 
on outcomes. This last empirical chapter explains how commonplaces such as freedom, 
rule of law, community, way of life, ruthless, hearts and minds, and Britishness 
hardened perceptions of the other through politically unarguable framings of the self, 
and led to a normalization of exceptional counterterrorism. 
 
From 2007 to 2011, fundamental British freedoms were positioned in direct 
opposition to the international threat. A renewed focus on Britishness reinforced the 
domestic referent. In the words of Home Secretary Jacqui Smith (Lab), “there is no 
greater individual liberty than the liberty of individuals not to be blown up on British 
streets or in British skies”.48 Despite a threat positioned as global in nature, similar to 
earlier years, the referent was strengthened as a distinctive domestic self that was 
intertwined with the British state. New institutions such as the OSCT, strategies such as 
the NSS, and policy aims as stated by Prime Minister Gordon Brown (Lab) that “The 
first priority of any Government is to ensure the security and safety of the nation”, 
asserted a British political and societal referent.49  
 
The fight against international terrorism was housed within the Home Office, 
whose agenda was to “cut crime, provide effective policing, secure our borders and 
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protect personal identity”.50 Though this referent was bolstered through national 
repertoires of identity, commonplaces of democracy and civilization from earlier 
discourse still played a role: 
 
This is the first time the Government has published a single, overarching strategy 
bringing together the objectives and plans of all departments, agencies and forces 
involved in protecting our national security. It is a significant step, and the latest 
in a series of reforms bringing greater focus and integration to our approach.51 
 
 
Strategies linked to relational configurations combining “confidence” and 
“fundamental freedoms” reminiscent of 1970s discourse justified counterterrorism “so 
that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence”.52 Government 
legitimacy was enhanced through commitments that “Providing security for the nation 
and for its citizens remains the most important responsibility of government”.53 This 
intertextually linked CONTEST, the OSCT, and the NSS by connecting national security 
with domestic counterterrorism. Statements by Home Secretary Smith “to keep our 
citizens safe and secure, and to protect the freedoms we all enjoy” depended upon 
framings of national identity and freedom, not maintaining peace and order.54 Without 
these particular relational configurations, counterterrorism outcomes would not have 
unfolded as they did.  
 
Freedom 
 
Identity assumptions were strengthened in the way that similar framings 
brokered actors with different policy opinions. Thus both the general securitization of 
terrorism and particular us/them discourses were reinforced despite being deployed for 
seemingly different ends. The commonplace of freedom provides one example of this 
brokerage:  
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2008, David Davis (Con): The Government can and should do much more to 
protect this country from the terrorist threat that we face, before resorting to 
draconian measures that sacrifice our fundamental freedoms.55  
 
2008, Dominic Grieve (Con): “battle will be won by sticking to our principles of 
a liberal, free, pluralist democracy”56  
 
2008, Andrew Dismore (Lab): Each erosion of the normal process is, in itself, a 
result for the terrorist, who would undermine our freedoms and way of life.57 
 
 
Notions of freedom were politically unarguable and essentially undefinable, yet able to 
be used by different actors for different purposes.  
 
Rule of law 
 
Similar to framings of freedom was the historically embedded notion of “rule of 
law” observed in discourse from the very start of empirical analysis and 
counterterrorism law’s emergence. From 2007 to 2011, the rule of law continued to play 
a role in reasserting the legitimacy of the referent as well as counterterrorism practice’s 
foundation as a preventive, legal approach: 
 
2008, Jacqui Smith (Home Sec, Lab): “Terrorism has changed, is changing, and 
will continue to change. We have no option other than to respond if we are to 
remain constant and true in our defence of British liberties and British 
security…We rely on the law and we need to be sure that the law evolves as the 
threat changes in a way consistent with our rights and freedoms.”58  
 
2009, CONTEST: “response to terrorism based on the rule of law”59 
 
2010 Theresa May (Home Sec, Con): “The first is that our response to terrorism 
across the police, the agencies and across all government Departments must be 
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based on the rule of law – and not only on the rule of law but on the rule of the 
right law.”60 
 
 
Such framings asserted the British referent through a “belief in the rule of law” 
supporting “a rules-based approach” to international affairs.61 Illiberal expansions of that 
very rule of law paradoxically accommodated accommodate the legitimation of 
exceptional counterterrorism. Policy went beyond focusing on specific offenses such as 
“attending a place used for terrorist training” to include non-terrorist-related charges.62 
These initiatives were largely a response to the durable perception of the most dangerous 
terrorists as foreign others:  
 
It is “not always possible to prosecute people…terrorist-related activity: for this 
reason the Government has developed a range of alternative non-prosecution 
actions to protect the public…include control orders…exclusion of foreign 
nationals from entering the UK…revocation of citizenship…deportation”63 
 
 
The government could remove actors from their temporary and partial inclusion with the 
referent (“revocation of citizenship”) by identifying views that “fall short of supporting 
violence and are within the law, but which reject and undermine our shared values and 
jeopardize community cohesion”.64 What had been hinted at in earlier discourse and 
practice was now explicitly laid out: to be identified or convicted as a “terrorist”, you do 
not have to necessarily engage in political violence.  
 
Community 
 
There was an intensification of government control and power to determine who 
was and who was not a part of the British referent irrespective of violence. 
Counterterrorism discourse and practice continued to simultaneously shape and defend 
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the British referent’s cultural (societal referent) and institutional (political referent) 
identity. Patterns of inclusion and exclusion remained poignant parts of how terrorism 
was securitized as the national referent was strengthened. As explained in one Chatham 
House Briefing Paper, Muslim groups tended to “feel excluded during discussions of 
‘British’ and ‘English’ people”.65 These trends were asserted through framings of 
community: 
 
2008, Lord West (Parliamentary Under-Sec of State, Home Office, Lab): “new 
funding to support communities and organisations who are taking on and 
disrupting those who promote violent extremism”66 
 
2011, CONTEST: “Communities who do not (or in some cases feel they cannot) 
participate in civic society are more likely to be vulnerable to radicalization; a 
stronger sense of belonging and citizenship makes communities more resilient to 
terrorist ideology.”67 
 
2011, Kris Hopkins (Con): I want to concentrate on the impact of terrorism and 
anti-terrorism law on the relationship between the Muslim community and the 
non-Muslim community and between the Muslim community and the 
state…There must be a question about what incited young British Muslim men to 
blow themselves up in British streets.68 
 
 
Commonplaces of “community” harking back to the Troubles continued to play part in 
counterterrorism formation and justification despite consequences of “community” to 
increase the insecurity of those already on the margins of full political or social 
inclusion. Framings of community were dependably ambiguous. Overlapping notions of 
victim and threat were a continuing trend, while articulations of communities reinforced 
the marginalization of particular groups. 
 
Way of life, core values 
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Aligned with notions of community were framings of a “way of life”. This 
connected prior discourse of civilization and western democracy with a distinctive 
Britishness. Security practice aimed to “safeguard the nation, its citizens, our prosperity 
and our way of life”[emphasis added]:69  
 
2008, Jacqui Smith (Lab): International terrorism presents one of the greatest 
threats to the UK. In this country we will always respond to terrorism through the 
rule of law and the criminal justice system. We task our police, our prosecutors 
and our courts with bringing to justice those who threaten British lives and our 
way of life through terrorism.70 
 
2008, “It [international terrorism] now represents an attack on our values and our 
way of life of a completely different order to the terrorist threats we have faced 
in the past.”71 
 
 
Terrorism, in particular international terrorism, was a threat to “values on which our 
society depends” such as “human rights, the rule of law, justice, freedom, tolerance, and 
opportunity for all”.72  
 
2007, Jacqui Smith (Home Secretary, Lab): terrorism is a serious threat to us all. 
We must ensure our resources, capability and legislation support our common 
endeavour to defend the shared values of this country from terror73  
 
2007, NSS: “Our approach to national security is clearly grounded in a set 
of core values [bold in original]… human rights, the rule of law, legitimate and 
accountable government, justice, freedom, tolerance, and opportunity for all. 
Those values define who we are and what we do. They form the basis of our 
security, as well as our well-being and our prosperity.”74 
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2008, Jacqui Smith (Home Secretary, Lab): The long-term challenge – the one 
you are addressing today – is preserving both our security and the values on 
which our society depends by preventing terrorism in the UK.75 
 
2008, Lord Sheikh (Con): “Terrorism has to be fought…extolling the values and 
virtues that bind us together as a society”76  
 
 
Discourses on British values constituted domestic practices such as the NSS 2008 and 
CONTEST 2011 and thus were causally implicated in counterterrorism outcomes. The 
enactment of these practices reasserted the very referent these policies were designed to 
protect: 
 
2009, CONTEST: “is based on principles that reflect our core values…and the 
broader security principles set out in the National Security Strategy.”77  
 
2011, Gerry Sutcliffe (Lab): There is a need to look at the context of some of the 
fundamental liberties that we uphold and believe to be important in our society—
what defines us as a country, and what defines our values [in support of the 
TPIM2011].78 
 
 
Not wholly distinct from intersubjective understandings around “values” were 
notions of “reasonable” similar to earlier years. Through the CT 2008, the court could 
order forfeiture of property not only for clear “purposes of terrorism” but if the court had 
“reasonable cause to suspect would or might be used for those purposes” [emphasis 
added].79 Repeated framings of “reasonably believe” reinforced the role of 
counterterrorism legal powers and the authority of British officials, in particular non-
judicial officials, to identify terrorist risk.80 For example, how “A constable may use 
reasonable force, if necessary, for the purpose of exercising a power conferred on the 
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constable by virtue of this Schedule”.81 Some shifts in types of reasonableness did 
indicate an increased scrutiny – “that the Secretary of State must now reasonably 
believe, rather than reasonably suspect, that an individual is or has been involved in 
terrorism-related activity”82 – but new TPIM 2011 powers remained dependent upon 
expansive barometers beyond normal legal processes and implementation.  
 
As acknowledged earlier, though “reasonable” has a legal-technical role for 
lawmaking, it also conveys a broader meaning of state officials as inherently sensible 
and in an unquestionable position to adjudicate exceptional practice. The vagaries basing 
counterterrorism law continued through new formulations. For example, the new phrase 
“terrorist connection”. This was explained as existing “if the offence – (a) is, or takes 
place in the course of, an act of terrorism, or (b) is committed for the purposes of 
terrorism”.83 Through such legal shifts, the spaces of interpretation for security officials 
enabled by commonplaces of reasonable were significant for state power.84  
 
Consequential legal terminology was accompanied by the now cemented notion 
of international terrorists as entity-others in their own right. This threat was positioned 
as “wholly different in type, as well as extent, from the threat we faced twenty years 
ago…a wholly new form of terrorism – so different in motivation, complexity and reach, 
in fact, that it might as well have a different name”.85 The analytic take away is not just 
noticing the association of “international” as “different”, but how this difference was 
established in discourse along particular us/them framings to influence outcomes.  
 
Ruthless, different in scale and nature 
 
Similar to earlier discourse before the 21st century, framings of evil and barbaric 
were associated with terms of ruthlessness, violent extremism, Islam, and activity in the 
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broader Middle East.86 “Ruthless” was observed in the 1970s and 1980s around 
temporary laws, but its position alongside non-western characteristics framed as 
essentially different kinds of danger normalized permanent 21st century practice. 
 
2008, Jacqui Smith (Home Secretary, Lab): The threat we face from terrorism 
today…is more ruthless…It is international, drawing upon loosely affiliated 
networks across the globe…a new and sustained level of activity by those who 
wish to kill and maim and to undermine the values that we all share in this 
country.87 
 
2008, Lord West (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State Home Office, Lab): 
The terrorists are more ruthless than those we have faced in the past…88 
 
 
To differentiate from past terrorists that were also considered brutal and ruthless, 
international terrorism was also different in “scale and nature”. But as explained earlier, 
terrorism and political violence have always been different in scale and nature relative to 
the historical context within which they are situated. Though by 2011 CONTEST hints 
at a repositioning of scale with “scale and nature” appearing only once, it is too early to 
evaluate if this is a hiccup in securitization discourse or a more significant redirection. 
Overall, from 2007 to 2011, discourse on issues of scale, nature, and future catastrophe 
still provided an influential groundwork that maintained counterterrorism exceptionality.  
 
2007, Lord Carlile (LD): We agree that enhanced sentencing for terrorist and 
terrorist-related offences might be appropriate given the potential and real 
nature and scale of terrorist attacks.89 
 
2008, Jacqui Smith (Lab): As you know, the terrorist threat is very different from 
any we have faced in the past. It is less predictable and more international in 
nature, and it is of an unprecedented scale.90 
 
2009, CONTEST: “different in scale and nature”91 
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2011, Hazel Blears (Home Secretary, Con): However, it does something to us, as 
human beings, when we see the scale and nature of the problem and how 
dangerous these people are. We then see how far we are prepared to move 
away from a pure principle of liberty so that we do our very best to protect 
normal, ordinary people in the country as they go about their everyday lives.92 
 
 
Framings of scale and nature magnified the danger of international terrorism even when 
there were no major acts of international terrorism, and it was Irish-related violence that 
was on the rise. Despite headlines such as “Northern Ireland bomb attempt 'threatened 
mass murder'” through a 500lb (227kg) van bomb, issues of scale and nature were 
almost always associated with the international label.93 Escalating violence in Northern 
Ireland could have encouraged a new discourse removing international, Irish, and 
domestic labels altogether. But a plurality of labels dependent upon intersubjective 
understandings separating degrees of distance between types of terrorism and the 
referent persisted. 94  
 
Violent extremism 
 
The 1990s yoking of former Irish-related terrorist to legitimate politics, 
reconstruction of Irish-related threats as “dissident republicans engaged in terror” rather 
than just “terrorists”, and framings of international terrorism as violent (Islamic) 
extremism furthered the normalization of counterterrorism through the 21st century.  
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2008, NSS: “United Kingdom faces a serious and sustained threat from violent 
extremists, claiming to act in the name of Islam”95 
 
2008, Jacqui Smith (Home Sec, Lab): “We have redoubled our efforts to prevent 
violent extremism from taking hold, because our long-term challenge is to stop 
people becoming, or supporting, terrorists in the first place. With new funding 
to support communities and organisations tackling those who promote violent 
extremism, we will take on the ideologues and disrupt their efforts to radicalise 
individuals at risk in our society.”96 
 
2008, Jacqui Smith (Home Sec, Lab): “And I will set out the solutions we’ve 
developed – and are continuing to develop – within our legal and democratic 
framework to protect our citizens and to prevent violent extremism from 
taking hold in our communities.”97 
 
2009, CONTEST: “stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting violent 
extremism”98 
 
 
By 2011, “violent extremism” was less noticeable in discourse, though “extremism” and 
“radicalization” remained prevalent.99 The intersubjective understandings formed by 
linking violent extremism, international terrorism, and Islam in the securitization of 
terrorism established durable boundaries of what, or who, the threat was. Despite this 
differentiation of Irish and international terrorist others, the negative consequences for 
those aligned with such labels irrespective of violent action demonstrated more 
similarity than difference: 
 
A shared history of ‘colonial policy and colonial exploitation’ was noted by a 
number of participants and here too language and the denial of historical 
perspective was seen to be important in ‘framing issues and limiting the 
possibility of alternative readings’ of both past and present. The Contest 2 
strategy was also seen by some as trying to reframe who and what Muslims are 
through the language and definitions of ‘extremism’. This again was closely 
associated with the feeling that identification with Muslim people or causes 
internationally, most obviously in terms of Palestine, was being presented as 
evidence of ‘extremism’.”100 
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The NSS referenced 1990s terrorism in the “Middle East, north and east Africa, south 
Asia, east Asia, mainland Europe, and the United States”, but situated Irish-related 
threats as less threatening others. “Dissident Irish republican activists” were positioned 
alongside “animal rights extremists” and differentiated from the violent extremism of 
international terrorism associated with Islam.101 
 
The narrative used to explain the history of terrorism in official discourse did not 
expand upon experience in Northern Ireland but focused on the Middle East. For 
example, militant Palestinian groups or organizations in Egypt that had “an explicitly 
religious agenda and claimed to justify violence on religious grounds”.102 “Sites of 
difference” based on spatial assumptions of belonging continued to distinguish types of 
terrorism, and enabled different types of response.103 The foreign, non-British, and more 
times than not, non-Western, assumption of international terrorist others distanced 
anyone associated with perceptions of who were likely terrorists from the referent. 
Framings of violent extremism differentiated old from “new” terrorism by positioning 
international terrorism “outside” Britain, connected to geographies to the south and 
east.104  
 
As observed by Aradau and Van Munster, even though “the colonial/racial 
constitution of the international/internal would appear to be disputable for the 
governance of terrorism,” through counterterrorism legal practice “these elements get re-
inscribed upon the technologies of governance”.105 This thesis provides a partial account 
of how that reinscription unfolded in one case through a relational-securitization 
analysis. Evolving legal practices, security policies, and official discourse differentiated 
types of terrorist others along such inside/outside racial and colonial lines. This extended 
the distance between new threats and the referent, and new threats and previous threats. 
While acknowledging that “over 3,500 people died in the UK itself as a result of Irish-
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related terrorism”, the “history of international terrorism” in CONTEST 2009 is 
explained as how “a new form of terrorism emerged overseas in the late seventies and 
early eighties, initially with little connection to the UK, when terrorist organisations in 
Egypt tried to overthrow the Egyptian Government and establish what they regarded as 
an Islamic state”.106 Policy pinpointed the “first modern international terrorist incident” 
as occurring in 1968 when “a faction of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) 
hijacked an Israeli commercial flight from Rome”.107 Additional references were then 
made to Egypt, Algeria, Afghanistan, and Libya, with international or “modern” 
terrorism reinforced as “non-British”. While on the surface this may seem 
unproblematic, this externalization of terrorism and unquestioned assumptions of 
extremism and othering around “Islam” increased alienation and insecurity.   
 
Though religion has played a part in terrorism and political violence throughout 
history, 21st century references to religion contributed to misguided perceptions of 
terrorism today as different from terrorism in the past.108 As noted by Martha Crenshaw:  
 
It is reasonable to propose that just as one would not hold Christianity 
accountable for the terrorism of the IRA, Protestant paramilitaries, or American 
right extremists and anti-abortionists, one should not blame Islam for Shi’ite 
inspired terrorism in the contemporary Middle East. The legends of the Assassins 
of medieval Islam and the history of Shi’ism as a source of revolt against 
dominant political elites notwithstanding, religion acquired its modern relevance 
under specific political conditions.109  
 
 
Thus religion can easily be accepted as a constant of history and political violence, not a 
novel 21st century feature. Instead, however, official discourse increased a focus on 
religion, specifically as relates to Islam. In CONTEST 2009 alone, a document of 176 
pages, “Islam” appeared 120 times.110 Rather than working to identify motivations of 
extremism for more effective strategies, it was assumed that violent extremists aiming 
“to undermine our democratic society” have “no negotiable agenda, unlike our 
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experience of Welsh nationalists and even the IRA”.111 Even if Irish-related terrorism 
was also a threat to democratic society, the two-track approach to Irish versus 
international terrorism maintained these threats as different in name, kind, belonging, 
and rationality.  
 
As discussed earlier, different actors were joined through similar framings of 
identity that acted as kinds of discursive brokers, even if these actors supported different 
policy views. On the one hand this was a new display of agency. But, on the other hand, 
the way this agency was structured pointed to how certain intersubjective understandings 
of identity had become hardened through years of securitization. Though certain powers 
were questioned, the way terrorism was securitized along fears of people “becoming” 
terrorists was almost unequivocally accepted. Statements that increased detention would 
“drive young Muslim men into the arms of extremists” were outweighed by a discourse 
of danger around extremism and Islam.112 The securitization of terrorism remained 
dependent upon problematic, and consequential, us/them patterns of inclusion and 
exclusion that in the end maintained existing exceptionality.  
 
For and against 
 
Actors that articulated different positions on what direction counterterrorism 
should take in fact used similar framings to make their respective arguments. Similar 
patterns of securitization brokered divergent actors and sites even if when the presumed 
intention of such framings was political opposition rather than alignment. This added to 
the incoherence and contradiction of counterterrorism. Some argued for alternative 
practices because people posing “a risk to the state” had increased to 2,000.113 Others 
used the same statistic to argue why exceptional measures must be maintained.114 
Whether for or against particular measures, a values-based argument necessitating the 
role of identity had taken hold:  
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In favor of extended detention: 
 
2008, Keith Vaz (Lab) “The common cause among all parties, regardless of 
their views on the extension of the period of detention, is the acknowledgement 
that terrorists want to destroy our way of life, our liberty and our 
democracy.”115  
 
2008, Jacqui Smith (Lab): “Terrorism is an assault on our civil liberties, on 
our democracy and on our values. Our response to terrorism must continue to 
be based on those values and liberties, ardently pursued through our democratic 
framework, primarily through our criminal justice system.”116  
 
 
Opposition to extended detention: 
 
2008, Baroness Kennedy (Lab): “the best answer to terrorism is a louder 
assertion of the values that are embedded in our system and of which we should 
be proud”117  
 
2008, Baroness Neville-Jones (Con): “united society based on shared liberal 
values and the mutual trust of a free, responsible citizenry”118  
 
 
Different positions were brokered through similar threat/referent framings of politically 
unarguable values. The consequence was not a different approach but more of the same. 
The securitization of terrorism had reached a type of consensus over what terrorism 
“was” despite the still elusive definition of terrorism and continuing consequences of 
insecurity from alienating practice. The TPIM 2011, the continuance of 14-day pre-
charge detention, the maintenance of expanded offenses such as “the glorification of 
terrorism”, and the reinforced intertextual linkages between domestic policies (OSCT, 
CONTEST) national security (NSS), and everyday practices normalized extraordinary 
counterterrorism. The way that terrorism was securitized was of causal significance for 
these observed outcomes by hardening politically unarguable threat/referent identities. 
 
Hearts and minds 
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A similar example of “brokerage-in-disagreement”, whereby two actors with 
different views depend upon the same discourses of identity, comes from the phrase 
“hearts and minds” that was referenced to conclude the previous chapter and link into 
the current discussion. Those for and against extending detention based their arguments 
on the “need to win hearts and minds”, because “the most decisive conflicts are on the 
home front and in the hearts and minds of our fellow citizens”.119 Relational 
configurations like “hearts and minds” reasserted the referent as a particular Britishness 
that was connected to, but distinct from, earlier commonplaces of civilization and 
Western democracy. Growing references to historic and traditional notions of the British 
nation brokered actors regardless of their view on specific measures. This hardened the 
boundaries around an essential British self differentiated from a range of “others”: 
 
2008, Robert Marshall-Andrews (Lab): In the past six months, we have heard a 
great deal about Britishness…Civil liberties are not an attribute of being British. 
They are the defining characteristic of our nation. They are what we are.120 
 
2008, Frank Dobson (Lab): In recent times, a lot of attention has been paid to 
what it means to be British. Well, one thing it means is that we do not allow the 
police or politicians to lock people up for a long time without charge. That is not 
some trendy, fashionable bit of political correctness; it was laid down in Magna 
Carta in 1215 AD, and it has been followed in the English-speaking, common-
law democracies ever since.121 
 
2008, David Davis (Con): For almost 800 years, we have built on the right of 
habeas corpus, founded in that ancient document [Magna Carta]: the 
fundamental freedom from arbitrary detention by the state. The liberty of the 
person is in our blood, part of our history, part of our way of life; Conservatives, 
Labour, Liberal Democrats, Democratic Unionists—all parties. Liberty is the 
common strand that binds us together, and we have shed blood to protect it, 
both abroad and at home.122 
 
2008, Lord Dear (Crossbench): It has been a fundamental right of the UK citizen 
not to be detained arbitrarily without charge… traced all the way back to Magna 
Carta in the 13th century, of course, and probably arguably to the earlier great 
reforms of Henry II at the end of the 12th century…it is a principle that runs in 
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parallel to habeas corpus, that we introduced to the civilised world, and that we 
have defended as a fundamental right for centuries.123  
 
2011, Lord Morgan (Lab): How ironic that we are commemorating Magna 
Carta by trampling on the fundamental freedoms of free-born British 
citizens.124  
 
 
Different from earlier discourse where the referent transitioned from public order to 
democratic civilization, from 2007 to 2011 we see a stabilized British self rooted in 
ancient tradition. Core values were connected across actors and policy texts: 
“CONTEST is based on principles that reflect our core values, the lessons we and others 
have drawn from experiences of terrorism to date, and the broader security principles set 
out in the National Security Strategy”.125 The Magna Carta was a salient commonplace 
brokering particular framings of British identity in need of protection from terrorism and 
counterterrorism. Even as international terrorism was linked to British actors, temporally 
situated framings going back hundreds of years reasserted cultural and physical 
differences between possible terrorists and the referent. 
 
Another framing shared by political actors espousing different arguments was 
that extending detention would “do the terrorists’ job for them”. Though some deployed 
this framing to oppose new powers, the structure of this opposition was similar to those 
in favor of the measures. Such framings reinforced all terrorists and suspected terrorists 
as of a nonnegotiable nature in unarguable opposition to British values: 
 
2008, John Baron (Con): “to detain someone on the basis of suspicion alone is a 
fundamental breach of liberty…we risk doing the terrorists’ job for them”126  
 
2008, Baroness Neville-Jones (Con): Terrorists want to undermine our freedoms 
and way of life by provoking the state into putting in place repressive measures. 
We therefore risk, in effect, doing their job for them.127  
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2008, Baroness Mallalieu (Lab): Terrorists seek to destroy our freedom, so why 
are we being asked to do the job for them?128  
 
2008, David Davis (Con): “we will not sacrifice our fundamental 
freedoms…That would do the terrorists’ job for them. This country does not 
buckle, bend or bow to terror. It is not in our history, it is not in our character and 
it is certainly not written in what the Prime Minister calls the “next chapter of 
British liberty” 129 
 
  
Temporally situated borders of identification continued to influence 
securitization even as they exacerbated boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. Official 
discourse established Muslim communities as both victims of counterterrorism and as 
risks of violent extremism. Even when actors were viewed as “allies in the struggle 
against ‘extremists’”, they were also “under suspicion as they may be harbouring or 
supporting ‘extremists’”.130 Britain’s history of multiculturalism had played a role in UK 
domestic and foreign policy since the mid-20th century to preserve cultural difference.131 
But in the context of international terrorism, difference was a sign of suspicion. 
Statements like “I have a large Muslim population in my constituency and I have come 
to be very fond of those fine people” did not position the Muslim community as guilty. 
But “they” were still positioned on the borders of being a full part of the traditional 
British referent.132 The phrase “law-abiding Muslims” was seen in earlier 21st century 
discourse. But by 2007 attention to the threat as from a single Muslim community made 
up of a “law-abiding majority” and a “criminal minority” was an unquestioned means to 
implement exceptional practice.133 As explained by Gutkowski, the boundaries between 
“community development” and “security objectives” were increasingly blurred.134  
 
Alienation 
 
                                                 
128
 Ibid., col. 704. 
129
 Parl. Deb, H.C., 1 April 2008, vol. 474, col. 672 (part no. 76). 
130
 Hickman et. al, “Suspect Communities”, 3. 
131
 Brighton, “British Muslims”. 
132
 Steve Baker (Con): Parl. Deb, H.C., 7 June 2011, vol. 529, col. 119 (part no. 164). 
133
 Smith, “Countering Terrorism in a Democracy,” 3 June 2008.  
134
 Stacey Gutkowski, “Secularism and the Politics of Risk: Britain's Prevent Agenda, 2005-2009,” 
International Relations 25, no. 3 (2009): 358. 
 279
 
Opposition to 42-day detention referenced alienation in Northern Ireland. But 
framings of identity securitizing terrorism remained tied to boundaries distancing British 
Muslims and British non-Muslims. 
 
2008, Patrick Mercer (Con): “[contemporary terrorist groups] will use it 
[detention] in exactly the same way as the IRA did—to suggest that this is a 
racist or anti-religious Act directed purely and simply at the Muslim 
community. In the same way, the IRA suggested that internment was directed 
purely at Roman Catholics”135  
 
2008, Mark Durkan (SDLP): “The fact remains that counter-terrorism legislation 
alienated lawful people; law-abiding and decent communities were made to feel 
like suspect communities and were fundamentally alienated.”136  
 
 
Actors across party lines referenced alienation as a way to oppose extended detention, 
but in so doing hardened community divisions. This added to perceptions of distance 
separating types of others, with both Irish and Muslim groups separated from the British 
referent, albeit in different degrees at different times.  
 
Through explicit references to British history and identity, framings around 
ancient freedom and tradition did limit some expansions of state power through an 
increased significance as similar patterns brokered different actors and sites. But the way 
that terrorism was securitized enabled the overall maintenance of existing measures, 
leading to a plateau of normalized exception.  
 
 
III. Looking back from 2011 
 
By 2011 there had been some shifts in discourse and practice, such as the 
removal of international from CONTEST 2011’s title and reduction of pre-charge 
detention to 14 days. But the overarching substance of exceptional counterterrorism 
begun years earlier remained largely intact. The referent was not incompatible with 
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earlier commonplaces of Western democracy or civilization. But new historic 
references, like the Magna Carta, reasserted a traditional Britishness that made certain 
inside/outside assumptions of belonging durable features of collective meaning. 
Counterterrorism laws were intertextually linked to national security policies to 
reinforced state identity, purpose, and power. Commonplaces associated with an external 
Islamic other distanced the threat from this national referent, even as domestic and 
international labels of identification were increasingly indistinguishable.  
 
There was a continuance of policies based on preemptive identifications of risk 
that depended upon boundary assumptions formed and stabilized through particular 
processes of securitization. British values constituted the referent in need of protection 
and the policies aimed at doing the protecting. International violent extremism was 
positioned as fundamentally different from dissident terrorist threats in Northern Ireland, 
despite Irish-related insecurity during these years increasing. Exceptional 
counterterrorism and constructions of Britishness were mutually constituted through 
particular patterns of threat/referent construction. This propelled a securitization of 
terrorism based on perceived degrees of otherness, distance, and danger, enabling the 
normalization of exceptional counterterrorism. 
 
While opposition to 42-day detention represented a curtailment of proposed 
power, the CT 2008’s passage itself continued the existing counterterrorism trajectory. A 
logic of “not if, but when”137 terrorism would occur continued to legitimize preemptive 
counterterrorism. The pervasiveness of intersubjective understandings bolstering 
threat/referent constructions in the securitization of terrorism have in this thesis been 
investigated through an analysis of official discourse. But consequences of such us/them 
boundary drawing and threat identification around knowledge of “the other” extended 
beyond these official sites. The below snapshot of comments following an article on 
control orders provide one example:138  
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Svistz, 2 January 2011 3:53AM  
 
“Control orders are an authoritarian measure, but what's the alternative? Do 
nothing and wait until known Jihadi ideologues kill someone? No thanks, 
couldn't really give a toss about the freedoms of someone who wants to deny 
many others of their most essential freedom, to live.  
 
The eight terror suspects with the orders are fucking odious characters; they 
aren't your average Mohammad taken off the street for simply criticising the 
government. I'd be all for removing their controls orders though; I'd be for 
booting them out of the country.”  
 
Zhubajie, 2 January 2011 4:43AM  
 
"The eight terror suspects with the orders are fucking odious characters;"  
If being odious is all it takes, then why are so many politicians walking around 
free?  
 
"they aren't your average Mohammad taken off the street for simply criticising 
the government"  
 
I'm not so sure of that.” 
 
 
This exchange by no means represents a totality of views, not least considering highly 
influential discourse and practice around human rights and civil liberties. But it does 
highlight significant consequences of securitization related to perceptions of the other 
that even if there have not been serious acts of international terrorism in Britain for six 
years. Efforts were made to acknowledge the alienation of Muslim communities. But 
historically rooted inside/outside boundary structures and the collective meanings upon 
which they were based had taken on a consequential durability. 
 
From 2007 to 2011, the securitization of terrorism led to an overall maintenance 
of exceptional measures despite no major attacks, significant reviews, and parliamentary 
defeat of certain proposals. Counterterrorism did not become normalized through of a 
barrage of violent attacks or the presentation of irrefutable material evidence during 
lawmaking. Rather, exceptional security practices were entrenched because of how the 
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securitization of terrorism constructed politically unarguable threat/referent identity 
understandings. Without the observed relational configurations underlying how 
terrorism was securitized, counterterrorism would not have emerged in the way that it 
did to enable exceptional measures for “the foreseeable future”: 
 
2011, Theresa May (Home Secretary, Con): As the Coalition Programme for 
Government makes clear, national security is the primary duty of Government. 
We will not put that security at risk. The review has taken place in the context of 
a threat from terrorism which, as the Prime Minister has said, is as serious as we 
have faced at any time and will not diminish in the foreseeable future.139 
 
 
Despite “a widespread perception, apparently transcending political ideologies and 
different political parties, that the boundary between freedom and security may have 
started to shift in the wrong direction”, the TPIM2011 was passed and broader strategies 
such as CONTEST were reasserted.140 Constructions of differentiated entity-others 
associated with spatial assumptions of belonging continued even as counterterrorism 
newly addressed “all forms” of terrorism. Distinguished from the extremist and radical 
other was a British referent, reasserted through framings of ancient British tradition, 
freedom, and values. Similar identity framings acted as a broker between different sites 
and actors irrespective of views on specific measures or party position.  
 
By 2011, institutionalized counterterrorism practice and the everydayness of 
counterterrorism discourse had become entrenched in a co-constitutive cycle of material 
and intersubjective consequence: extraordinary counterterrorism had settled onto an 
atemporal plateau of exceptionality. 
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Chapter 9 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
The way that particular relational configurations of threat and referent 
construction unfolded across official British discourse securitizing terrorism from 1968 
to 2011 enabled a distinctive set of outcomes. A causally consequential interrelation of 
discourse and practice led to exceptional counterterrorism’s emergence, justification, 
and normalization. It is not that structures of identity determined how actors spoke or 
decided to act with respect to counterterrorism lawmaking or legitimation. Structural 
effects from securitization do not remove agency. However, the dominant 
understandings that emerged from particular threat/referent configurations were limiting 
and enabling in terms of what spaces for agency were “politically possible”.1 The way 
that exceptional security practices were maintained and legitimized would not have been 
possible if official discourses had not securitized terrorism in the way that they did. The 
securitization of terrorism along “Irish”, “domestic”, and “international” threat labels 
based on assumptions of geographic belonging was not inevitable. Nor was it predictable 
that temporary measures introduced in the early 1970s would lead to a 21st century 
normalization of counterterrorism based on a range of new domestic legal measures. 
 
A distinctive combination of official discourse, historic events, and material 
policy in the case of Britain from 1968 to 2011 enabled certain outcomes of 
intersubjective understanding and security practice to arise over others. As explained by 
Jackson, “the configuration of the boundaries of acceptable action, produced and 
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reproduced in the course of ongoing political struggle over policy outcomes, are central 
to the explanation of those outcomes”.2 Through the way that terrorism was securitized, 
specific identity labels were brokered along politically unarguable framings. The 
collective meanings resulting from such configurations constrained the conditions of 
possibility for counterterrorism practice. 
 
Special security powers have existed for decades, and terrorist political violence 
has been around as long as history. However, it was during the early 1970s that an 
explicit language of “terrorism” came to constitute and justify specific security measures 
in Britain. Counterterrorism laws were initially positioned as an emergency and 
temporary response to violence in Northern Ireland. Just over forty years later, even as 
the definition of terrorism remained contested and what it would mean to be successful 
over terrorism was uncertain, exceptional counterterrorism became a normalized fixture 
of contemporary security practice. By 2011, logic underlying state counterterrorism has 
become a self-sustaining cycle of securitization discourse and preventive policy. The 
1974 Birmingham pub bombings and 2001 attacks in New York and Washington 
provided support for a more rapid introduction of extraordinary state powers. But it was 
the salience of politically unarguable discourses on identity that enabled the 
entrenchment of such powers over time even in the absence of violence. Us/them 
structures of understanding delimit spaces for agency. As explained in chapter one, 
language does not cause outcomes in a linear or generalized sense. However, particular 
patterns of discourse are causally consequential in that they alter what discourses and 
actions are “politically possible”.3   
 
This chapter first briefly reviews the status of causal claims made through this 
thesis and the overarching value added. A summary of the case study is then presented, 
followed by a more detailed discussion of how the thesis builds upon existing literature 
in terrorism studies, securitization, and  relationalism. 
 
                                                 
2
 Ibid., 25. 
3
 Ibid., 132. 
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I. Reviewing relational-securitization claim-making 
 
This thesis is not an evaluation of what threats are “real” or an analysis of which 
policies are “right”. Rather, the relational-securitization research framework helped 
illustrate how specific patterns of identity construction were constitutive and 
consequential for a distinct set of material outcomes. As explained in chapter one, 
language on its own does not do in some kind of ““social magic” power”, part of 
Balzacq’s recent discussion of CS securitization theory with respect to methodological 
approach.4 CS securitization theory is not limited to views of grammar and linguistic 
structure as sufficient to affect outcomes, but nor is it an account by which “anything 
goes”. Such assumptions would misrepresent scholars such as Waever and Hansen who 
draw upon poststructural approaches to discourse while investigating material aspects of 
security practice. The thesis contributes to CS literature by developing the theory along a 
specific relational sociological sensibility. “Explanation” and “understanding” are not 
mutually exclusive, and a relational-securitization approach helps us better understand 
outcomes by better explaining the way discourse and materiality interrelate over time. A 
notion of relational causality is helpfully explained by Jackson with reference to 
McAdam et al. as involving “the concatenation of causal mechanisms: the contingent 
coming-together of processes and patterns of social action in such a way as to generate 
outcomes”.5 The thesis narrative evolved along such an approach through a two-part 
strategy involving “the analytical delineation of a set of causal mechanisms deemed 
likely to matter in particular cases, and the careful empirical tracing of that case or cases 
to illustrate the particular way in which these mechanisms came together”.6 
  
This interpretation of discourse as having a causal capacity to influence 
outcomes draws upon poststructural inclinations in critical terrorism studies, 
securitization, and relationalism. In this way the thesis aims to build upon poststructural 
conceptual clarifications and empirical engagements from Buzan et al., Jackson (P), 
                                                 
4
 Balzacq, “A theory of securitization,” in Securitization Theory, 1. 
5
 McAdam et al., Dynamics of Contention, 13 (as cited in Jackson Civilizing the Enemy, 43). 
6
 Jackson Civilizing the Enemy, 43. 
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Jackson (R), and Waever and Hansen.7 In one helpful description and ontological 
clarification, poststructuralism is defined as “a form of structural analysis, albeit not 
identical to those essentialist forms of structuralism that place their analytical bets on 
“objectively” existing parameters constraining social action”.8 A similar perspective is 
advanced through Waever’s 2002 discussion on foreign policy, Nordic identity and 
European integration. He explains what he refers to as “structured poststructuralism”: 
structuralism representing a type of science of the sign, and poststructuralism 
representing a critique of the sign.9  
 
In this sense, poststructural accounts are not relativist interpretations. Rather they 
are grounded studies investigating how observed social processes shape intersubjective 
meaning and material outcomes. “Science of the sign” is interpreted here as a 
genealogical tracing of discourse, while “critique of the sign” is viewed as an analytic 
exercise that underlines how the way things are is not the way they were predetermined 
to be. The thesis narrative traced how existential threats and referent objects were 
articulated across official British discourse and practice over time (the science of 
discursive signs). In so doing, the way exceptional counterterrorism emerged, was 
justified, and became normalized was analytically and historically problematized 
(critique of the sign).  
 
In consideration of the above position viewing discourse as having a causal 
influence on outcomes, the thesis aimed to contribute to existing debates in 
securitization, relationalism, and terrorism studies in the following ways: 
 
(1) Securitization: Instead of taking threat and referent identities as given, 
investigating how these labels become stabilized in discourse to securitize an 
issue in a particular way; further a view of security as being and doing by 
analyzing securitization as formed by relational practices of identity construction 
(being), and leading to particular outcomes (doing); investigate how agency is 
                                                 
7
 Buzan et al., Security; Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy; Jackson, Writing the War; Waever and Hansen, 
ed., European integration and national identity. 
8
 Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy, 15, footnote 6. 
9
 Waever, “Identity, communities and foreign policy”, in European integration and national identity, 44, 
note 15. 
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enabled and/or limited by structures that position certain understandings of 
us/them identity over others; 
 
(2) Relationalism: Incorporating relational mechanisms of framing, brokerage, 
and yoking from relational sociology to advance the explanatory potential of 
securitization theory; investigating an empirical case study on identity, 
securitization, and counterterrorism to interrogate how threat/referent forms and 
discursive structures are constitutive, consequential, and causal; 
 
(3) Terrorism studies: Building on critical terrorism studies by questioning 
assumptions of terrorist threat labels through a genealogical analysis of British 
counterterrorism from 1968 to 2011; using a new framework based in 
securitization and relationalism to analyze the processual and substantive aspects 
of how counterterrorism can emerge, be legitimized, and become normalized. 
 
 
Through a “singular causal analysis” that “trace[s] and map[s] how particular 
configurations of ideal-typified factors come together to generate historically specific 
outcomes in particular cases”, the thesis contributes to IR by examining how identities 
became temporarily stabilized and causally influence material outcomes in a specific 
case.10 British counterterrorism and understandings of terrorism were not just influenced 
by acts of violence, but were intertwined with historically rooted structures of identity, 
discourse, and practice. Concerns related to situations of insecurity encouraged a thesis 
focus on identity and counterterrorism. But the immediate task was to analytically 
unpack how the securitization of terrorism contributed to a normalization of exceptional 
security practice. The project is an empirical narrative interpretation of how 
counterterrorism measures came to be formed and legitimized in the way that they were, 
not how things should have been. However, in exposing that the way things turned out 
was not the way it had to be, analysis does, if implicitly, encourage a critical 
reassessment of counterterrorism practice.  
 
If the 1990s peace process had not spurred the yoking of former terrorists to 
legitimate politics, would official discourse have constructed three forms of terrorism, 
distinguishing Irish, domestic, and international threat labels? If permanent 
counterterrorism law had not been formed along a securitization that externalized an 
                                                 
10
 Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry, 114. 
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“international” other, would exceptional measures such as 28-day pre-charge detention 
or control orders have been legitimized? There was a growing consensus during the 20th 
century that a consolidation of counterterrorism was perhaps needed. However, the 
permanent state of exception reached by 2011 was only possible due to particular ways 
that terrorist threats were securitized to explicitly distance us from them by asserting 
inside/outside boundaries of identification. Identifying the international threat as foreign 
outsiders from areas  “south” and “east” of Britain was based on an external othering 
that led to different outcomes than would have been the case if the threat was 
constructed to include internal others.  
 
The transition to permanent counterterrorism would have been significantly more 
difficult if the threat did not explicitly exclude members of the core referent when 
permanent laws were first passed. The international threat label was from the beginning 
established as non-British, and non-western. This hardened intersubjective 
understandings of danger salient enough to justify exceptional measures even if there 
was no terrorist violence. Events such as 11 September 2001 reinforced preexisting 
perceptions of international terrorists as external to the British referent and special state 
powers, not new perceptions of the other. The normalization of counterterrorism rests on 
historically developed securitizations of terrorism that distinguish types of terrorists 
along inside/outside boundaries of danger and difference.  
 
The causal linkage between knowledge construction, identity, and security is of 
particular influence for counterterrorism where the secretive and preventive nature of 
counterterrorism demands that lawmaking draw upon polemic rather than evidence. 
Political discourse must convincingly establish the “real” existence of terrorism to an 
audience whether or not an act of violence takes place. When identities become 
temporarily stabilized they help translate perception of possible risk into an acceptance 
of guaranteed threat. Interestingly, though “threats” and “referents” are a foundational 
part of securitization theory, research has not yet satisfyingly unpacked the “arrestation” 
of some threat and referent labels over others.11 How identities become stabilized as 
                                                 
11
 Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy, 31. 
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“things” or “entities” has been a topic for relational scholars such as Emirbayer and 
Abbott, but has yet to be engaged with IR studies of securitization. Specific identities do 
not arise from unquestionable essences “out there”, but are products of contingent 
relational processes that harden certain boundaries and collective meanings over others.   
 
While there are real risks of political violence linked with some groups and 
individuals associated as terrorist, patterns of labeling are not indicative of 
unproblematic veracity, a point made convincingly by critical terrorism studies 
scholarship.12 Though structures of identity can exert significant influence over what 
spaces for agency are more politically possible than others, actors still have a choice to 
make in determining which acts and actors warrant labels of terrorism, and which do 
not. This choice is highly consequential considering the significant difference between 
calling someone a “terrorist” versus calling them a “criminal” or a “dissident”.13 
Inconsistently used commonplaces such as “Western” and “civilized” come to be 
accepted as essential characteristics of the democratic referent. “Barbaric”, “ruthless”, 
“evil”, and “fanatic” come to represent an unquestioned terrorist nature. Whether in the 
continued dependence on suspect communities, increased 21st century Islamaphobia, or 
persistent “terrorist taboo”, patterns of identity construction and the policies that these 
practices legitimize can lead to insecurity rather than security.14  
 
Identity labels establish unequal boundaries separating us from them, inside from 
outside, and good from bad. An awareness of consequences stemming from us/them 
practices of identification is not new. Work by Inayatullah and Blaney, Lapid et al., 
Neumann, and Tilly have all provided important discussion around boundaries and 
associated relational dynamics.15 A relational-securitization framework focused on shifts 
in exceptional counterterrorism builds on these analyses of identity through a new 
empirical focus and research framework. A securitization framework drawing on 
                                                 
12
 Jackson et al., Critical Terrorism Studies; Jackson et al., Terrorism. 
13
 The Breivik trial is one recent example (Jonathan Freedland, “Anders Breivik is a terrorist, so we should 
treat him like one,” 20 April 2012, The Guardian [cited 20 April 2012]; available from 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/apr/20/breivik-terrorist-like-al-qaida. 
14
 Hickman et al., “Suspect Communities”; McGovern et. al., “Countering Terror”. 
15
 Inayatullah and Blaney, International Relations; Lapid et al., ed., Identity, Borders, Orders; Neumann, 
Uses of the Other; Tilly, Durable Inequality. 
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poststructural and relational approaches to inquiry brings the causal consequences of 
discursive structures to the forefront of analysis without viewing language as 
deterministic, removing responsibility from actors, ignoring substance, or negating 
future change. Even as relations can form seemingly consistent repertoires of 
understanding or concatenations of structure, to use the language of Tilly, such 
durability is not atemporal objectivity. Identities are social and political constructions, 
materially powerful, but constructions nonetheless.  
 
 
II. Case summary 
 
As explained in detail by legal scholars such as Walker and Donohue, special 
powers in Britain are not themselves a new phenomenon, and instead go back hundreds 
of years in the context of Ireland. However, emergency measures framed and legitimized 
through an explicit language of terrorism in the early 1970s was a departure from 
existing security practices. Counterterrorism laws were enacted to provide order and 
maintain peace in response to a specific context of violence surrounding the most recent 
Troubles. Initially, their temporary nature was itself a source of political legitimation. 
But by the year 2000, this temporal position reversed to be based on a future time 
horizon of permanent prevention, providing for an atemporality of exceptional 
counterterrorism.  
 
Through the 1970s, temporary laws were renewed through discourses that 
provided a brokerage of specific framings to connect previously divergent actors and 
sites, transitioning from “hooligan gangs” to constructions of terrorists as “completely 
ruthless”. Terrorism was increasingly criminalized into the 1980s, which stripped any 
political purpose from those connected to terrorism. Terrorist actors were established as 
distinct from both ordinary criminals and political dissidents. Terrorism was not 
presented as a method of violence, but was securitized as particular enemy-others, 
“terrorists”. Despite growing domestic protest, the election of hunger striker Bobby 
Sands, and increased international attention, hardline counterterrorist measures 
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continued to be renewed through the 1980s. It was close to impossible for political 
divergence from counterterrorism practice when these measures were based on 
discourses of eradicating “brutal murderers” and protecting “democratic society”. Actors 
involved in the policymaking process were rhetorically coerced into policy acquiescence 
as politically viable alternatives became increasingly limited. From the mid-1980s, an 
“international” commonplace became a noticeable threat identifier in official discourse. 
Reference to Northern Ireland remained dominant, but the new “international” reference 
was deployed with greater frequency.  
 
The late 20th century was a period of significant shifts in identity and practice, 
with the broader security environment itself transitioning from Cold War struggles to an 
array of “new” threats.  In the context of British counterterrorism, official discourse 
newly securitized terrorism along “Irish”, “domestic”, and “international” threat labels, 
with international terrorism framed as a new and dangerous foreign other. At the same 
time, the peace process helped yoke former terrorists in Northern Ireland to legitimate 
politics even as insecurity in Ulster remained. As these new threat constructions 
unfolded, the referent transitioned to include commonplaces of civilization and 
democracy. The self was a British societal and political referent, embodying the 
undeniably “good” counterpart to terrorism’s “evil” nature. The 1985 Anglo-Irish 
Agreement, 1993 Downing Street Declaration, and 1998 Good Friday Agreement 
pointed to a growth in political efforts in the Northern Irish conflict. These political 
overtures did not, however, point to a departure from existing counterterrorism. The new 
Labour government elected in 1997 did not refocus attention to criminal law, but 
collapsed PTA and EPA measures into a single UK-wide permanent act, the TA 2000. 
Elites are indeed hesitant to relinquish powers once achieved. But, the way that powers 
were continued through a consolidation of emergency measures into one permanent law 
at the turn of the century was not inevitable. This outcome resulted from an 
externalization of the “new” international threat in contradistinction to seemingly less 
dangerous domestic and Irish actors. The securitization of terrorism redirected the 
trajectory of counterterrorism outcomes from temporary response to permanent necessity 
by establishing new us/them intersubjective understanding.  
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Dissent was frequently out-maneuvered by processes of identity construction that 
rhetorically coerced actors into tight political corners. Similar threat/referent framings 
brokered different political positions, as seen through discourses of foreignness: the 
perceived danger level of international terrorism initially positioned as coming from 
outside was increased even as acts of violence compared to other security risks were 
minimal. The externalization of the other positioned exceptional and illiberal powers as 
targeting “them”, not “us”. Official discourses securitizing terrorism differentiated 
degrees and distances of terrorist others along socially constructed labels of 
identification. By 2000, the stage was set for a 21st century normalization of exceptional 
counterterrorism as identity labels along geographic assumptions of difference became 
increasingly durable. 
 
The attack of 11 September 2001 was viewed as proof of the “international 
terrorist” that had been constructed through earlier securitizations. Characteristics of the 
attackers reinforced generalized assumptions of terrorists related to race (not white), 
religion (Muslim), and nationality (Middle Eastern). These were not new perceptions but 
processes of othering that had been a part of how terrorism was securitized and 
counterterrorism was legitimized years earlier. A perception of international terrorists as 
foreign Muslim others as “the” international terrorists helped launch new legal measures 
(e.g. ATCS 2001), broader counterterrorism strategies (e.g. CONTEST), and a continued 
focus on the threat as from outside Britain. But by 2004 human rights concerns directly 
questioned the legality of British counterterrorism. This resulted in the removal of the 
ATSC 2001’s detention of “suspected international terrorists”. In 2010, control orders in 
the PTA 2005 were allowed to lapse following similar concerns. However, despite 
having some kind of institutional response to issues of proportionality, both powers were 
quickly replaced by new measures that were different in name more than in kind (control 
orders in 2005 and TPIMs in 2011). Such moves indicated a recurring cyclical theme 
whereby exceptional measures were maintained even as reviews or recommendations 
pointed to a need for reassessment. Through 21st century discourse and practice, 
counterterrorism reached a plateau of normalization. 
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The maintenance of exceptional counterterrorism depended upon a securitization 
of terrorism along distinctive threat labels. This allocation of identity borders was often 
historically inconsistent, for example considering the role of international actors in 
terrorist violence affecting Britain going back decades. In addition, inside/outside 
boundary assumptions contributed to the continued alienation of marginalized groups 
along racial and religious lines, observed with respect to both Irish and Muslim suspect 
communities. Despite these results of insecurity, the securitization of terrorism remained 
tied to intersubjective understandings based on ideological, cultural, and geographic 
boundaries. Borders around labels of threat identification became durable knowledge 
structures separating us (insiders) from them (outsiders) even as these borders were 
increasingly blurred. Violence from Irish-related groups increased. But insecurity in 
Northern Ireland was positioned along framings of dissident activity and paramilitarism 
as much, if not more so, than “terrorism”. Terrorism as a threat identifier was 
increasingly positioned as synonymous with “Islamic extremism”. The risk of violence 
from non-Muslim groups, such as far right extremists, remained on the margins of 
official discourse. As demonstrated by Croft, counterterrorism practice became heavily 
reliant upon both a generalized category of “Islam” and reasserted perception of what it 
means to be British.16  
 
The most recent CONTEST referenced “all forms of terrorism” (emphasis 
added). But exclusionary patterns of identity construction along degrees and distances of 
othering connected with Irish, international, and domestic labels were by then 
entrenched in collective meaning. Despite a lack of major international attacks against 
Britain from 2007 to 2011, extraordinary counterterrorism was institutionally embedded 
through policy strategies, bureaucratic offices, and legal acts. This included two new 
CONTEST strategies (2009, 2011), the first ever NSS (2007, 2008), formation of the 
OSCT (2007), CB (2008), and TPIM (2011). From 2011 official discourse seemed to be 
charting a new securitization of terrorism that did not rely upon the “international” 
commonplace. But the durability of intersubjective understandings formed through years 
                                                 
16
 Croft, Securitizing Islam. 
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of securitization discourse had by then enabled a self-sustaining cycle of 
inclusive/exclusive identity assumptions, and exceptional counterterrorism practice. 
 
Following this summary of the empirical case, it is useful to reference images 
from earlier chapters to provide an interpretive visualization of securitization and British 
counterterrorism. This can help us better capture how boundaries and threat/referent 
perceptions shifted over time: 
 
Figure 2.5 
An interpretive visualization of identity, securitization, and British counterterrorism over time 
 
 
 
 
Views of an isolated enemy and territory, early-mid 1970s – mid-1980s 
 
 
 
International
Domestic
Irish
 
Negotiated geography and externalized others from the mid-1980s 
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 Irish  Threat
Western Civilized Referent
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Civilization under threat from international terrorism, late 20th century onwards17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Geographic perceptions of belonging and relational configurations of meaning 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 “Civilization” as a commonplace was not new to this period, but its position in opposition to the 
“international terrorist” marked a new trajectory alongside pending permanent counterterrorism law. 
Referent:  way of life, fundamental freedoms, rule                               
          of law, democracy, British, good
International terrorism: 
dangerous, violent, extremist, external, foreign, Muslim, ruthless, bad
Irish and Northern-Irish related terrorism: dissident republicanism, 
paramilitarism, manageable, criminal
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Though simplified, this series of images is one way to try and clarify the spatial 
underpinnings of securitization in the context of the official British discourses and 
security practices that were analyzed through this thesis. Observed categories of 
threat/referent identification temporarily stabilized particular assumptions of distance 
and danger, contributing to the constitution and legitimation of identity and practice over 
time. 
 
Constructing the externalized threat of international terrorism as a fanatical evil 
in opposition to democratic civilization and a British way of life delimited what security 
options were politically possible. The way that terrorism was securitized established a 
type of unending exception with no clear path to resolution that was different from other 
“long wars” such as the Cold War.18 Over the past four decades, official British 
discourse and counterterrorism practice led to a distinctive temporal perspective 
whereby “political leaders constantly remind us we are in this [fight] for the long haul, 
but it’s a long haul beyond their horizons”.19 The temporal outlook basing 
                                                 
18
 Buzan, “Will the ‘global war on terrorism’ be the new Cold War?” 
19
 Campbell, “Time is Broken”, paragraph 11. 
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counterterrorism shifted from one of temporary response to one of forever preventing 
future catastrophe. The vagueness of defining terrorism provided for an indefinite 
possibility of threatening terrorist others, and exceptional counterterrorism settled onto a 
plateau of exception with no redirection in sight. 
 
 
III. Studies on terrorism 
 
Terrorism and counterterrorism are often studied through a misguided 21st 
century lens. However, as demonstrated through this thesis, elements associated with 
recent policies such as a “war against terrorism” were in place before 21st century 
events. International political violence, and exceptional state powers, have “existed” 
long before the explicit articulation of an “international terrorist” threat in discourse. 
This is not to negate the specificity of this particular case, and the thesis narrative has 
endeavored to place a premium on the role of context and contingency throughout 
analysis. However, it is to point out that our studies on terrorism and counterterrorism 
should not artificially close the door to past experience. Not unlike Bigo and Guittet’s 
2011 discussion, the thesis does not present the “Irish case” as a gold standard of 
conflict resolution.20 But this relational-securitization narrative does respond to experts 
such as English, Gearty, Guelke, and Townshend who all advocate that terrorism studies 
pay greater attention to history.21  
 
With a longer historical perspective, analysis was able to highlight how 21st 
century events were not responsible for the association of international terrorism as a 
non-western Islamic other. Rather, these events reinforced existing us/them 
intersubjective understandings, and trajectories of exceptional security practice. 
“International” terrorists such as the 7 July 2005 attackers were also “domestic” actors. 
Implementing security measures along inside/outside perceptions of belonging was 
increasingly both counterproductive and institutionally entrenched. From fatal mistakes 
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 Bigo and Guittet, “Northern Ireland as metaphor”. 
21
 English, How to Respond; English, Armed Struggle; English, Irish Freedom; Gearty, Civil Liberties; 
Guelke, Age of Terrorism; Townshend, Terrorism. 
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such as the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes to wider reports of alienation, minority 
groups continued to be disproportionately targeted similar to earlier decades. The 
normalization of counterterrorism in Britain by 2011 was matched by a longevity and 
normalization of problematic inside/outside identity structures. 
 
 The thesis builds upon existing terrorism studies on the interrelation of discourse, 
identity, and counterterrorism, such as Richard Jackson and Stuart Croft. By unpacking 
how patterns of identity construction securitized terrorism in a particular way, the thesis 
narrative underlined how unquestioned self/other understandings contributed to 
counterterrorism outcomes of normalized exception. Securitization as outlined by Buzan 
et al. in 1998 provided the theoretical starting point, but the under investigated role of 
threat/referent components in the theory itself called for further development. An 
attention to identity responds to calls from critical terrorism studies scholars such as 
Gunning to further the conceptual development of terrorism studies.22 Analyses of 
securitization that investigate threat/referent labels as temporarily stabilized effects of 
social practice build conceptual depth without ignoring the substantive side of 
counterterrorism practice. In this way the thesis brings a new theoretical framework to 
advance part of the critical terrorism studies agenda by combining securitization and 
relationalism in an investigation of British counterterrorism from 1968 to 2011. 
 
In line with Jackson et al., though the risk of violence from groups associated 
with terrorism is in some cases real, the labels of identification allocated to these groups 
are a result of social and political process.23 The thesis does not ask why security 
responses were taken, but asks how these responses were formed, justified, and 
normalized through processes securitizing terrorism in a particular way. The core 
research question became, “How was this normalization of counterterrorism in Britain 
made possible in the way that it was?” Though there are some examples of securitization 
and terrorism studies coming together in research practice, space remains for further 
analytic collaboration. Terrorism is in a sense “always already” securitized. But the way 
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 Gunning, “A case for critical”, 366-367.  
23
 Jackson et al., Terrorism. 
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that this securitization unfolds entails different consequences depending on how threats 
and referents are constructed to strengthen certain intersubjective understandings over 
others.  
 
The thesis built upon work on British counterterrorism law by scholars such as 
Donohue, Gearty, and Walker by adding a securitization and relational focus.24 This 
thesis also brought a temporal position that included discourse and practice from before 
and after major 21st century events. This attention to temporality was in large part 
inspired by the work of scholars such as Jarvis and Croft who each bring temporality 
into their analyses of counterterrorism.25 By only going back to 1968 the thesis is itself 
limited by a short temporal focus. As discussed by Hogan and Walker, with respect to 
Ireland and Britain exceptional state powers go back hundreds of years.26 However, even 
acknowledging that the thesis is not a “history”, the resulting narrative still provides a 
helpful historical account for terrorism studies in IR that are frequently dominated by a 
21st century lens.  
 
Connected with this historical element is the under-examined role the 
“international” commonplace in existing literature. This is not to ignore the influence of 
“Irish-related” and “domestic” labels, but to underscore how the “international” 
commonplace was essential for the transition to permanent counterterrorism law. 
Despite international elements being present throughout the history of terrorism, from 
American financing of republican campaigns in the late 19th century to AQ support of 
domestic actors more recently, the securitization of terrorism deployed an 
“international” label in a distinctive way at particular times. Without this externalization 
of terrorist others through an international commonplace, it would have been 
significantly more difficult to legitimize a permanent entrenchment of exceptional 
powers. This genealogical problematization of “international terrorism” speaks to 
critical scholarship connected with counterterrorism practice. For example Hickman et 
                                                 
24
 Donohue, The Costs of Counterterrorism; Conor Gearty, Civil Liberties (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007); Walker, Blackstone’s Guide. 
25
 Jarvis, Times of Terror; Croft, Securitizing Islam; Croft, Culture, Crisis. 
26
 Hogan and Walker, Political violence, 16.  
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al.’s study on suspect communities, Aradau and Van Munster’s research on 
governmentalities of risk management, and works by Bigo and Tsoukala and Jabri that 
take the illiberal nature of liberal security practices to task.27 But an analytic critique of 
the “international” commonplace has yet to be interrogated. This thesis merely scratched 
the surface of how “international terrorism” became a consequential and unquestioned 
resource for research and practice, and further research in this area would potentially 
provide important insight for security studies in IR more generally.  
 
Our understanding of British counterterrorism law and practices of lawmaking 
have been developed by Donohue and Neal, respectively. This thesis adds to such 
research by honing in on how discourses of identity are causally consequential for 
British counterterrorism outcomes in both practices of lawmaking and the resultant 
measures such practices enable. Through a securitization framework engaged with 
relational mechanisms, identity is brought to the foreground of analysis. This established 
a new narrative account to existing terrorism studies by discussing the constitutive, 
consequential, and causal ways identity and discourse influenced the emergence, 
justification, and normalization of British counterterrorism from 1968 to 2011.  
 
 
IV. Securitization 
 
Securitization as developed by Buzan et. al and CS scholarship more generally 
provided the theoretical starting point for this thesis aimed at challenging, broadening, 
and deepening security studies.28 The logic of securitization supported the research 
question of how counterterrorism developed in the way that it did from 1968 to 2011 in 
Britain considering the interrelation of discourse, identity, and practice. The theory is a 
useful framework for investigations into security as both being and doing, an essential 
conceptual advance that was most helpfully advanced by Buzan through People, States 
                                                 
27
 Hickman et al., “Suspect Communities”; Aradau and Van Munster, “Governing Terrorism”; Bigo and 
Tsoukala, eds., Terror, Liberty, and Insecurity; Jabri, “War”. 
28
 Buzan et al., Security; Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung, eds., Contemporary Security Analysis and 
Copenhagen Peace Research (London: Routledge, 2004). 
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and Fear.29 Though this text is not on “securitization”, the challenge it leveled at 
unquestioned concepts such as “the state” and “security” contributed to securitization’s 
theoretical development and empirical potential. Through securitization’s attention to 
“speech acts”, broadly defined, the theory complements terrorism studies literature that 
investigates how language matters for counterterrorism practice.30 By incorporating 
poststructural developments by scholars such as Hansen, Waever, and Campbell, 
securitization is further strengthened as a useful research pairing for critical terrorism 
studies in particular.  
 
A plethora of theoretical and empirical works on securitization have emerged 
over the years, from edited volumes on research methods to the broadening of “speech 
act” to include political cartoons.31 However, no work in securitization has yet 
satisfyingly unpacked the relational processes underlying threat/referent construction 
despite these identity components being foundational to the theory itself. Significant 
development has taken place through areas of normative research by Aradau and Floyd, 
context by Stritzel, and audience by Salter.32 But space remains with respect to how we 
understand the way particular identities become stabilized representations of knowledge 
to influence intersubjective understanding over time.  
 
It is in this vein that this thesis most directly contributes to existing literature in 
securitization. By incorporating aspects of relational scholarship from McAdam et al., 
Andrew Abbott, Patrick Jackson and Ronald Krebs, to name a few, securitization theory 
gains new explanatory potential.33 Processual-substantive tensions highlighted by 
Emirbayer, Nexon and Patrick Jackson add an important conceptual layer to 
                                                 
29
 Buzan, People, States, and Fear. 
30
 Cf. Jackson, Writing the War. 
31
 Balzacq, ed., Securitization Theory; Lene Hansen, “The politics of securitization and the Muhammad 
cartoon crisis: A post-structuralist perspective,” Security Dialogue, 42, no. 4-5 (2011): 357-369. 
32
 Aradau, “Security and the democratic scene”; Floyd, “Can securitization theory be used in normative 
analysis?”; Holger Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond,” European 
Journal of International Relations, 13, no. 3 (2007): 357-84; Mark B. Salter, “When securitization fails,” 
in Securitization Theory. 
33
 McAdam et al., Dynamics of Contention; Abbott, “Things of Boundaries”; Jackson and Krebs, 
“Twisting Tongues”. 
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securitization theory by no longer taking identity-entities as given.34 Though 
securitization has always had a relational sensibility, the potential from combining 
securitization and relational sociology remains underexplored. A burgeoning synthesis 
between relationalism and securitization is observed in Guzzini’s 2011 article 
“Securitization as causal mechanism”. But his focus was tied to the level of a 
securitization, and did not go into the processual dynamics of threat and referent 
construction preceding securitization as an outcome.  
 
Thus while there is useful overlap in theoretical conceptualization between 
Guzzini’s article and the thesis, each approach rests on different levels of analysis. 
Rather than accepting the articulation of existential threats and referent objects as 
unproblematic givens, this thesis unpacked observed identity commonplaces through a 
genealogical relational-mechanism based discourse analysis. Through this approach, the 
analytic tracing of identity commonplaces demonstrated “how historical actors have 
sought to stabilize the commonplace and produce the effect of an intrinsic essence”, 
even as no such essence actually exists.35 By investigating British counterterrorism from 
1968 to 2011, the thesis helped disentangle the processual undercurrents of identity 
foregrounding securitization.  
 
Innovative efforts have recently been made to develop securitization as theory 
through Security Dialogue’s 2011 special issue on the politics of securitization. 
Developing a discourse analysis research design that draws on the analytic potential of 
relational mechanisms builds on such initiatives to further the theory as a conceptual and 
empirical process.36 The vast majority of works, including this thesis, continue to cite 
Hansen’s book Security as Practice as the rare example of research design clarification. 
Inspired by her work, the thesis has introduced a mechanism-based analysis as one way 
to use securitization theory in empirical investigations of discourse, identity, and 
practice. Through a relational-securitization approach influenced by Buzan et al., and by 
Waever’s version of structured poststructuralism, the thesis narrative traced specific 
                                                 
34
 Emirbayer, “Manifesto”; Jackson and Nexon, “Relations Before States”. 
35
 Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy, 44. 
36
 Guzzini, “Securitization as a causal mechanism’. 
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patterns of language in ideal-typical fashion in order to address transactions among 
actors and broader identity shifts.37 The key was not just to identify when and where 
certain threats or referents arose as rhetorical tags to securitize terrorism. Rather, it was 
to use framing, brokerage, yoking, and rhetorical coercion to help identify how terrorism 
was securitized along particular relational configurations of identity to build 
intersubjective understanding and exert causal impact on outcomes.  
 
 
V. Relationalism 
 
Instructive research has been done in areas of historical sociology by drawing on 
relational approaches to analysis, for example through McAdam et al.’s focus on the 
dynamics of contention and George Lawson’s development of “anatomies of 
revolution”.38 This thesis builds upon such efforts by using securitization as a distinctive 
grounding logic for a mechanism-based analysis of identity and counterterrorism. This 
task adds value to relationalism by providing a new illustration of how a relational 
research design can be engaged in a study of identity, discourse, and security. Through 
this thesis I have demonstrated that relational mechanism based analyses can help us 
better understand how threat/referent identities are established in securitization to 
influence the substance, justification, and normalization of exceptional counterterrorism. 
For this thesis, relational mechanisms are not perceived as having been “found” by the 
researcher in the course of doing analysis. Mechanisms such as brokerage or framing do 
not constitute independently existing entities or forces “out there”. Rather, they are 
ideal-typical means to more effectively identify consequential patterns and 
configurations of how identities are constructed and thereby affect outcomes.39 
 
The relational approach of this thesis is a narrative based in securitization but 
resting on an analyticist inquiry. This type of inquiry is dscribed as “a strategy involving 
                                                 
37
 Buzan et al., Security; Waever, “Identity, communities and foreign policy”, in European integration 
and national identity. 
38
 McAdam et al., Dynamics of Contention; Lawson, Anatomies of Revolution. 
39
 Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy, 43. 
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the instrumental oversimplification of complex, actual situations…to form case-specific 
“analytic narratives” that explain particular outcomes”, with the explanation largely 
coming from a breaking down of these outcomes rather than a building up.40 Relational 
scholars Emirbayer and Abbott provide conceptual starting points on how to 
problematize securitization’s “threat” and “referent” identity components by posing 
questions of “entity-creation” and “thingness”.41 This advances research that has 
identified the fluid-fixed spectrum of identity, but has not gone into more detailed 
empirical analysis on how that spectrum operates in practice to influence outcomes.42 
Relational studies frequently depend upon discourse analysis as a methodology 
generally. But how discourse analysis is “done” remains open to interpretation. 
Relational scholarship, like securitization, continues to face methodological obstacles of 
how to design inquiry. From source selection to the researcher’s choice of methods, 
there are no theoretical or empirical guides on how to actually do research. Pairing 
relational sociology with securitization theory helped launch a useful analytic apparatus 
with which to engage in an empirical analysis of how observable structures of identity 
and instances of agency came together in different ways to influence outcomes. 
 
All dynamic accounts rely on some kind of relationality, broadly understood. But 
they rarely go into further explanation of how that relationality plays out in practice or in 
analysis itself. Thus to develop relational research and add value to IR it was necessary 
to specify the way relationalism could be used to investigate identity, securitization, and 
British counterterrorism from 1968 to 2011. Securitization’s facilitating conditions as 
presented by Buzan et al. were a helpful starting point considering the vast amount of 
research material and need for a pragmatic logic to source collection.43 However, this 
did not delineate in any way what methods would be used to then engage in discourse 
analysis itself. Notions such as “linking and differentiation” by Hansen or “repertoires of 
                                                 
40
 Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry, 142. With thanks to Sherrill Stroschein on the conceptualization of 
this inquiry as “breaking down”. 
41
 Emirbayer, “Manifesto”; Abbott, “Things of Boundaries”. 
42
 Cf. Bill McSweeney, “Interests and Identity in the Construction of the Belfast Agreement,” Security 
Dialogue 29, no. 3 (1999): 303-314. 
43
 Buzan et al., Security, 33. 
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contention” by McAdam et al. continue to be helpful.44 But relational mechanisms of 
framing, brokerage, yoking, and rhetorical coercion provided a particular set of 
interpretive methods to analyze how patterns of discourse came to exhibit a sense of 
structure and have causal influence for British counterterrorism.  
 
Through a mechanism-based approach to securitization, the thesis narrative was 
able to capture how patterns of threat/referent construction enabled and limited what was 
politically possible for the path of counterterrorism. These conclusions complimented 
observations by Campbell and Hansen who discuss the mutual constitution of discourse 
and practice in areas of foreign policy formation.45 A relational methodology added to 
poststructural approaches by enabling new empirical illustrations of how discourse not 
only describes policy shifts but can constitute the very substance of those policies 
themselves. Analyzing identity, securitization, and British counterterrorism without 
relational mechanisms would have provided an interesting and useful description. But 
this would not have demonstrated the causal impact of discourse considering how 
relational configurations of threat and referent construction securitize terrorism in 
distinctive ways and influence material outcomes.  
 
The use of relational mechanisms in a genealogical, analyticist account made for 
a robust analysis by acknowledging process and substance. Through this thesis, 
relational mechanisms have contributed to a new relational research design that better 
accounts for the causal aspects of identity than would have been the case by engaging 
with securitization theory on its “own”.  
 
 
VI. Moving forward 
 
The thesis provided a detailed empirical discussion on the causal interrelation of 
identity, securitization, and British counterterrorism from 1968 to 2011. A relational 
                                                 
44
 Hansen, Security as Practice; McAdam et al., Dynamics of Contention. 
45
 Campbell, Writing Security; Hansen, Security as Practice. 
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mechanism based approach to identity and securitization facilitated an analysis that 
foregrounded the socially constructed and materially consequential nature of identity, 
discourse, and security practice. Us/them structures provided for certain substantive 
knowledge claims to arise over others, thereby delineating which spaces for agency were 
deemed as more or less politically legitimate. In this way, discourses of identity 
construction played an essential role in how counterterrorism measures emerged, were 
justified, and became normalized. By tracing commonplaces across official British 
discourse, this narrative demonstrated that the way counterterrorism evolved was not 
predetermined. Rather, outcomes rested on particular discourses of identity that 
securitized terrorism in particular ways at different moments.  
 
In the case of British counterterrorism from 1968 to 2011 and the discourses 
under investigation in this thesis, consequential identity structures led to a normalization 
of counterterrorism practices irrespective of policy effectiveness or incidents of 
violence. The securitization of terrorism depended upon, and exacerbated, 
inclusive/exclusive boundaries of difference based on varying degrees of danger and 
distances of externalization. State power, purpose, and identity were constructed and 
reconstructed through co-constitutive cycles of us/them discourse and practice. 
Historical events provided support for certain measures. But it was the power of 
intersubjective understandings from threat/referent identity structures that enabled a 
continuance, maintenance, and normalization of such measures over time.  
 
Though this thesis narrative helps explicate some nuances of causality, discourse, 
process, substance, structure, and agency, limitations and tensions remain.  In particular, 
further work is needed on the interweaving of structure and agency as relates to identity 
and security practice in the context of relational theorizing and empirical analysis. The 
thesis is a step forward for inquiry into the consequential interrelation of identity, 
discourse, and practice. But there is significant space for continued inquiry in order to 
better clarify core conceptual assumptions and analytical narratives. As stated by Patrick 
Jackson, “ideal-types are used to generate knowledge only when we—paradoxical 
though this may sound—acknowledge their limitations” [emphasis in original], and the 
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preceding relational discourse analysis is no exception to this observation of the 
limitations from certain methodological choices.46 At the same time, however, the thesis 
is an important start to developing the relational undertones of securitization through a 
detailed case study of historical and contemporary significance. By analytically 
confronting the (mis)perception that the way things are today is the way they “must” be, 
unnecessarily binding perceptions can be more fully interrogated, conceptual tensions 
can be addressed empirically, and theoretical frameworks can continue to be developed. 
 
 
                                                 
46
 Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry, 154. 
 Appendices 
 
 
 
Appendix 1: Article 5 (1), European Convention on Human Rights, “Right to 
liberty and security”1 
 
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his 
liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: 
 
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; 
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court 
or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; 
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the 
competent legal authority of reasonable suspicion of having committed and offence or when it is 
reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having 
done so; 
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his 
lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; 
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of 
persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts, or vagrants; 
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorized entry into 
the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or 
extradition.” 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 European Convention on Human Rights [cited 15 April 2012]; available from 
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Basic+Texts/The+Convention+and+additional+protocols/The
+European+Convention+on+Human+Rights/. 
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Appendix 2: Control Orders2 
  
1 Power to make control orders 
(1) In this Act “control order” means an order against an individual that imposes 
obligations on him for purposes connected with protecting members of the public 
from a risk of terrorism.  
(2) The power to make a control order against an individual shall be exercisable – 
(a) except in the case of an order imposing obligations that are incompatible with the 
individual’s right to liberty under Article 5 of the Human Rights Convention, by the 
Secretary of State; and  
(b) in the case of an order imposing obligations that are or include derogating 
obligations, by the court on an application by the Secretary of State. 
(3) The obligations that may be imposed by a control order made against an individual 
are any obligations that the Secretary of State or (as the case may be) the court 
considers necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting 
involvement by that individual in terrorism-related activity. 
… 
(4) Those obligations may include, in particular— 
(a) a prohibition or restriction on his possession or use of specified articles or 
substances;  
(b) a prohibition or restriction on his use of specified services or specified facilities, or 
on his carrying on specified activities;  
(c) a restriction in respect of his work or other occupation, or in respect of his business;  
(d) a restriction on his association or communications with specified persons or with 
other persons generally;  
(e) a restriction in respect of his place of residence or on the persons to whom he gives 
access to his place of residence;  
(f) a prohibition on his being at specified places or within a specified area at specified 
times or on specified days;  
                                                 
2
 Prevention of Terrorism Act, c.2, 2005: section 1. 
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(g) a prohibition or restriction on his movements to, from or within the United Kingdom, 
a specified part of the United Kingdom or a specified place or area within the United 
Kingdom;  
(h) a requirement on him to comply with such other prohibitions or restrictions on his 
movements as may be imposed, for a period not exceeding 24 hours, by directions given 
to him in the specified manner, by a specified person and for the purpose of securing 
compliance with other obligations imposed by or under the order;  
(i) a requirement on him to surrender his passport, or anything in his possession to which 
a prohibition or restriction imposed by the order relates, to a specified person for a 
period not exceeding the period for which the order remains in force;  
(j) a requirement on him to give access to specified persons to his place of residence or 
to other premises to which he has power to grant access;  
(k) a requirement on him to allow specified persons to search that place or any such 
premises for the purpose of ascertaining whether obligations imposed by or under the 
order have been, are being or are about to be contravened;  
(l) a requirement on him to allow specified persons, either for that purpose or for the 
purpose of securing that the order is complied with, to remove anything found in that 
place or on any such premises and to subject it to tests or to retain it for a period not 
exceeding the period for which the order remains in force;  
(m) a requirement on him to allow himself to be photographed;  
(n) a requirement on him to co-operate with specified arrangements for enabling his 
movements, communications or other activities to be monitored by electronic or other 
means;  
(o) a requirement on him to comply with a demand made in the specified manner to 
provide information to a specified person in accordance with the demand;  
(p) a requirement on him to report to a specified person at specified times and places.  
 (5) Power by or under a control order to prohibit or restrict the controlled person’s 
movements includes, in particular, power to impose a requirement on him to remain at 
or within a particular place or area (whether for a particular period or at particular times 
or generally).  
 (6) The reference in subsection (4)(n) to co-operating with specified arrangements for 
monitoring includes a reference to each of the following—  
(a) submitting to procedures required by the arrangements; 
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(b) wearing or otherwise using apparatus approved by or in accordance with the 
arrangements;  
(c) maintaining such apparatus in the specified manner;  
(d) complying with directions given by persons carrying out functions for the purposes 
of those arrangements.  
(7) The information that the controlled person may be required to provide under a 
control order includes, in particular, advance information about his proposed movements 
or other activities.  
(8) A control order may provide for a prohibition, restriction or requirement imposed by 
or under the order to apply only where a specified person has not given his consent or 
approval to what would otherwise contravene the prohibition, restriction or requirement.  
(9) For the purposes of this Act involvement in terrorism-related activity is any one or 
more of the following—  
(a) the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism;  
(b) conduct which facilitates the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts, or 
which is intended to do so;  
(c) conduct which gives encouragement to the commission, preparation or instigation of 
such acts, or which is intended to do so;  
(d) conduct which gives support or assistance to individuals who are known or believed 
to be involved in terrorism-related activity; and for the purposes of this subsection it is 
immaterial whether the acts of terrorism in question are specific acts of terrorism or acts 
of terrorism generally.  
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Terrorism Prevention Investigation Measures, 20113 
 
The Measures:4 
 
“Overnight residence measure  
1 (1) The Secretary of State may impose restrictions on the individual in relation to the residence 
in which the individual resides.  
                                                 
3
 TPIM, 2011, c. 23.  
4
 Ibid., schedule 1, section 1. 
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(2) The Secretary of State may, in particular, impose any of the following—  
(a) a requirement to reside at a specified residence;  
(b) a requirement to give notice to the Secretary of State of the identity of any other individuals 
who reside (or will reside) at the specified residence;  
(c) a requirement, applicable overnight between such hours as are specified, to remain at, or 
within, the specified residence.  
(3) The specified residence must be—  
(a) premises that are the individual’s own residence, or  
(b) other premises provided by or on behalf of the Secretary of State that are situated in an 
appropriate locality or an agreed locality.  
(4) An “appropriate locality” is—  
(a) a locality in the United Kingdom in which the individual has a residence;  
(b) if the individual has no such residence, a locality in the United  
Kingdom with which the individual has a connection;  
(c) if the individual has no such residence or connection, any locality in the United Kingdom that 
appears to the Secretary of State to be appropriate.  
(5) An “agreed locality” is a locality in the United Kingdom which is agreed by the Secretary of 
State and the individual.  
(6) If the specified residence is provided to the individual by or on behalf of the  
Secretary of State, the Secretary of State may require the individual to comply with any specified 
terms of occupancy of that residence (which may be specified by reference to a lease or other 
document).  
(7) A requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2)(c) must include provision to 
enable the individual to apply for the permission of the Secretary of State to be away from the 
specified residence, for the whole or part of any applicable period, on one or more occasions.  
(8) The Secretary of State may grant such permission subject to either or both of the following 
conditions—  
(a) the condition that the individual remains overnight at other agreed premises between such 
hours as the Secretary of State may require;  
(b) the condition that the individual complies with such other restrictions in relation to the 
individual’s movements whilst away from the specified residence as are so required.  
(9) “Agreed premises” are premises in the United Kingdom which are agreed by the Secretary of 
State and the individual.  
(10) Sub-paragraph (8) is not to be read as limiting—  
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(a) the generality of sub-paragraph (7) of paragraph 13 (power to impose conditions when 
granting permission), or  
(b) the power to impose further conditions under that sub-paragraph in connection with 
permission granted by virtue of sub-paragraph (7) of this paragraph.  
(11) In sub-paragraph (7) “applicable period” means a period for which the individual is required 
to remain at the specified residence by virtue of a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-
paragraph (2)(c).”  
 
(This above ‘Overnight measure’ is just one of twelve Terrorism Prevention Investigation 
Measures, including ‘Exclusion measure’, ‘Movement directions measure’, ‘Financial services 
measure’, ‘Property measure’, ‘Electronic communication device measure’, ‘Association 
measure’, ‘Work or studies measure’, ‘Reporting measure’, ‘Photography measure’, and 
‘Monitoring measure’.) 
 
 
The Secretary of State can impose TPIM measures if the following conditions are met:5 
 
“3 Conditions A to E  
(1) Condition A is that the Secretary of State reasonably believes that the individual is, or has 
been, involved in terrorism-related activity (the “relevant activity”).  
(2) Condition B is that some or all of the relevant activity is new terrorism-related activity.  
(3) Condition C is that the Secretary of State reasonably considers that it is necessary, for 
purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism, for terrorism 
prevention and investigation measures to be imposed on the individual.  
(4) Condition D is that the Secretary of State reasonably considers that it is necessary, for 
purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-
related activity, for the specified terrorism prevention and investigation measures to be imposed 
on the individual.  
(5) Condition E is that—  
(a) the court gives the Secretary of State permission under section 6, or  
(b) the Secretary of State reasonably considers that the urgency of the case requires terrorism 
prevention and investigation measures to be imposed without obtaining such permission.  
(6) In this section “new terrorism-related activity” means—  
                                                 
5
 Ibid., section 3, parts A-E. 
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(a) if no TPIM notice relating to the individual has ever been in force, terrorism-related activity 
occurring at any time (whether before or after the coming into force of this Act);  
(b) if only one TPIM notice relating to the individual has ever been in force, terrorism-related 
activity occurring after that notice came into force; or  
(c) if two or more TPIM notices relating to the individual have been in force, terrorism-related 
activity occurring after such a notice came into force most recently.” 
 
 
Temporary power for imposition of enhanced measures:6 
 
“(3) An enhanced measure is a requirement, restriction or other provision which is of any of the 
following kinds—  
(a) a restriction on an individual in relation to the residence in which the individual resides, 
including—  
(i) a requirement to reside at a specified residence in the United  
Kingdom;  
(ii) a requirement not to allow others to reside at that residence without the permission of the 
Secretary of State;  
(iii) a requirement, applicable between specified hours, to remain at, or within, that residence;  
(b) a restriction on an individual in relation to leaving a specified area;  
(c) a requirement, restriction or other provision which corresponds to provision within any of 
these paragraphs of Schedule 1—  
(i) paragraphs 2 to 6;  
(ii) paragraph 7(1) and (2) and (4) to (6);  
(iii) paragraphs 9 to 12;  
(d) a requirement, restriction or other provision which corresponds to provision within paragraph 
8(1) of Schedule 1 (as read with paragraph  
8(3) of that Schedule), including—  
(i) a requirement not to associate or communicate with other persons without the permission of 
the Secretary of State, which includes provision allowing the individual (without seeking 
permission) to associate and communicate with such persons or descriptions of persons as the 
Secretary of State may specify;  
                                                 
6
 Ibid., section 26. 
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(ii) a requirement to give notice to the Secretary of State before associating or communicating 
with other persons, which includes provision allowing the individual (without giving notice) to 
associate and communicate with such persons, or descriptions of persons, as are specified;  
(iii) a requirement of the kind referred to in sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 8(2) of Schedule 1, 
which may in particular relate to association or communication which is allowed by virtue of 
provision of the kind referred to in sub-paragraph (i) or (ii) above;  
(e) provision which corresponds to provision within Part 2 of Schedule 1;and for this purpose 
“specified” means specified by the Secretary of State in an enhanced TPIM notice.”  
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4: Securitization’s life cycle, an interpretation 
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Appendix 5: Chronological Matrix, 1968-20117 
 
  
 
Institutional: 
Legislative, judicial, 
organizational, electoral 
 
 
 
 
Domestic: 
Action taking place in UK 
territory 
 
 
International: 
Involving more than 
one national territory 
or citizenship 
1967 - Formation of the Northern Ireland Civil 
Rights Association (NICRA) 
  
1968  - 5 October: Civil Rights March in 
Derry/Londonderry 
- 9 October: People’s Democracy formed 
 
1969 - 14 August: British troops deployed in Northern Ireland (28 December) 
- 9 September: “peace line” constructed 
between Catholic and Protestant areas of 
Belfast 
- 12 September: Cameron Report  
- 10 October: Hunt Report 
- 28 December: IRA split, PIRA and 
OIRA (public on 11 January 1970) 
- 3 July: Falls Road curfew in Belfast, 
house searches by British Army of 
predominantly Catholic area; two killed 
by British Army 
- 21 August: SDLP formed 
- 1 January: start of People’s Democracy 
March from Belfast to Derry/Londonderry  
- 30 March, and 4, 20, 24, 26 April: Loyalist 
(UVF, UPV) bombs at key water sources 
(pipelines, reservoir) for Belfast and an 
electric source 
- 12-14 August: Battle of the Bogside 
(clashes between Apprentice Boys, Irish 
nationalists, and RUC forces in 
Derry/Londonderry) 
 
1970 - 1 April: UDR to replace ‘B-Specials’, disbanded on 30 April 
- 18 June: Conservative Edward Heath 
elected  UK PM, Reginald Maudling 
appointed Home Secretary 
 - April: customs officers Dublin 
airport seize a consignment of arms 
secretly imported from the 
Continent for by republicans in NI 
1971 - 6 February: first soldier killed by IRA  
- 9 August: reinstatement of internment 
via the Civil Authority (Special Powers) 
Act 1920 (internment previously used in 
used in 1922, 1939 and 1956); 342 
people arrested and 17 killed 
- Formation of the UDA 
- November: Compton Report 
- 4 December: Tramore (McGurk’s) Bar 
Loyalist (UVF) bomb kills 15 
 
1972 - Internment until 30 March 
- 24 March: Direct Rule imposed 
- 18 April: Widgery Report released 
(inquiry into Bloody Sunday) 
- 20 June: Secrete meeting PIRA, British 
officials 
- 9 July: end of truce between 
government and PIRA 
- 31 July: Operation Motorman: Biggest 
British military operation since Suez 
crisis, 12,000 British troops brought to 
Northern Ireland 
- 20 December: Diplock Report  
- 30 January: Bloody Sunday in Londonderry 
/Derry kills 14 
- July 21: Bloody Friday, 22 bombs set off by 
PIRA in Belfast, 9 killed, 130 civilians 
injured 
- 22 February: OIRA bomb at Aldershot army 
barracks kills seven 
- 29 May: OIRA ceasefire 
 
- 2 February: British Embassy in 
Dublin destroyed following a 
march coinciding with funerals of 
those killed on Bloody Sunday 
- 1 December: two bombs in Dublin 
kill two and injure 127 
 
Broader international Context: 
- September Munich Olympic 
attacks  
 
1973 - EPA 1973 
- 9 December: Sunningdale Agreement  
- 10 December: Ulster Army Council 
(UAC) formed, umbrella group for UDA 
and UVF 
- Two IRA car bombs in London, over 200 
injured 
 
1974 - 28 May: collapse of power-sharing NI 
Executive following UWC strike  
- Sunningdale Agreement collapses 
- 5 March: Labour Party Harold Wilson 
becomes PM, Merlyn Rees appointed 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 
- 4 February: IRA bomb on a coach in 
England, 11 killed 
- attacks on National Defence College, 
Latimer, coach on the M62, Tower of 
London, Guilford, Woolwich 
- 14 May: start of Ulster Workers Council 
- 17 May: Dublin and Monaghan 
bombings by Loyalist paramilitaries 
kill 33 
                                                 
7
 These events are compiled from media sources, the MI5 website (https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/the-
threats/terrorism.html), and the CAIN Web Service (http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron.htm). 
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- PTA 1974 
- 9 July: End of Internment announced 
Strike 
- 5 October: Guildford bombings by IRA, 5 
killed, 54 injured 
- 21 November: Birmingham bombings by 
IRA, 21 killed. 
1975 - 10 February: IRA truce, new ceasefire 
- 22 October: ‘Guildford Four’ found 
guilty (released on 19 October 1989) 
- 5 December: Internment officially 
ended, 1,981 were detained (1,874 were 
Catholic/Republican and 107 
Protestant/Loyalist) 
- 31 July: UVF gun and bomb attack on 
Miami Showband, multiple deaths 
- 2 October: 12 killed in UVF attacks across 
NI 
- 19 December: Five killed by RHC bomb in 
Dundalk 
 
1976 - 1 March: End of Special Category 
status  
- 3 March: ‘Maguire Seven’ convicted 
- 26 March: PTA extends to Northern 
Ireland 
- 2 September: European Commission on 
HR says interrogation amounts to torture, 
sends Britain to ECourtHR 
- 5 January: ten killed by RAForce 
- 26 May: UVF ceasefire 
- 14 September: start of Blanket protest 
- 21 July: British Ambassador to 
Ireland, Christopher Ewart Biggs, 
killed  
 
Broader international Context: 
- TREVI group formed to facilitate 
counterterrorism coordination with 
policing (Secret until ‘Palma 
Document’ 1989) 
1977  - 3 May: start of United Unionist Action Council Strike (13 days) 
- 19 June: New Zealand PM Robert 
Muldoon attends Belfast peace 
talks  
- 30 August: US President Jimmy 
Carter gives speech on US support 
for NI, asks Americans to stop 
aiding the violence 
1978 - 18 January: ECourtHR decides interrogation was ill treatment but not 
torture  
- 13 June: Amnesty International Report 
on ill-treatment of Castlereagh detainees  
- Suppression of Terrorism 1978 (put 
1977 European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism into effect) 
- August: Shackleton Report 
- Ireland v. the UK (1977), European 
Court of Human Rights (interrogation did 
not amount to torture) 
- 17 February: La Mon bombing planed by 
IRA kills 12, injures 23 
 
1979 - 3 May: Conservative Margaret Thatcher 
elected UK PM 
- Maze Prison Hunger Strikes  
- 16 March: Bennett Report  
 
- 20 February: Shankill Butchers (11 
Loyalists) sentenced to life imprisonment 
- 30 March: INLA car bomb kills Con MP 
Airey Neave in London  
- 27 August: 18 British soldiers killed by 500 
pound IRA bomb near Warrenpoint, 12 
soldiers killed by bomb near Gate Lodge  
- 27 August: Lord Mountbatten 
assassinated along with three others 
in County Sligo 
 
Broader international context: 
- Iranian Revolution  
- Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
- Rhodesian Elections (frequently 
discussed by Parliament in a 
language of “terrorism”) 
1980 - 26 March: Announced end of Special 
category status 
- 30 April-5 May: Iranian embassy seige in 
London 
- Maze Prison Hunger Strikes  
- 8 December: UK-Irish summit in 
Dublin 
1981 - Five year anniversary of end to Special Category Status  
- 9 April: Bobby Sands elected MP 
- 1 September: first integrated secondary 
school in Northern Ireland 
 
- Multiple attacks in London (Chelsea 
barracks, car bomb Lieutenant-General 
Steuart Pringle, two bombs Oxford Street, 
home of Attorney General bombed, and toy 
pistol found filled with explosives) 
- 1 March-3 October: Bobby Sands starts 
Second Hunger Strike, ten deaths 
- 5 May: Sands Dies after 66 days on hunger 
strike 
- 7 May: 100,000 estimated to have attended 
Sands’ funeral in Belfast 
- 14 November: Rev Robert Bradford (UUP 
MP) killed by IRA in Belfast 
 
1982 - Jellicoe Report, mention of international terrorism 
- Northern Ireland Assembly 
reestablished (dissolved in 1986) 
 
- 20 July: IRA bombs in Hyde Park and 
Regents Park kill 11 British Soldiers, over 50 
injured 
- 24 November-12 December: Shoot to kill 
allegations (led to Stalker-Sampson report on 
RUC action) 
- 6 December: INLA bomb at Ballykelly 
disco kills 17, injures 30 
- Falklands War (contributes to a 
halt in Irish-UK rapprochement) 
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- 3 June: attempted assassination of Israeli 
ambassador Argov in London by Abu Nidal 
 
1983 - 9 June: Conservatives reelected with increased majority 
- 11 April: first ‘supergrass’ trial, 14 
UVF members sentenced to 200 years 
based on one person’s testimony 
- 13 July: Four UDR members killed by IRA 
- 25 September: 38 members of the IRA 
escape from Maze prison 
- 17 December: London Harrod’s bombing, 
six killed 
 
1984 - 24 May: Stalker Inquiry begins 
- 14 December: first soldier convicted of 
murder (released in 1987 and resumed 
service) 
- 12 October: Brighton Conservative 
conference Bombing, five killed 
 
 
- June: US President Reagan visits 
Ireland, asserts US policy of 
noninterference with issues in NI 
- 19 November: Anglo-Irish 
Summit 
1985 - 30 July: BBC documentary featuring 
Martin McGuinness (SF) banned 
- 15 November: AIA signed  
 
- 11 November: Chelsea barracks INLA 
attempted attack 
- 28 February: nine RUC officers killed by 
IRA 
- 23 November: Unionist rally (100,000 plus) 
in Belfast to protest Anglo Irish Agreement 
 
- 16 February: Gerry Adams 
refused visa to US 
- 20 February: PM Thatcher gives 
speech in US urging Americans not 
to support organizations such as 
NORAID 
1986 - 5 June: Stalker replaced with Sampson 
on shoot-to-kill inquiry 
- 23 June: NI Assembly dissolved  
- 18 September: International Fund for 
Ireland (£36 million), mostly by US 
- 10 November: Ulster Resistance Formed 
 
- 7 August: 500 Loyalists march 
with DUP leader Robinson into 
Ireland, assault Garda officers 
 
Broader international context: 
- British support of US Libyan 
airstrikes 
1987 - 12 February: 400,000 sign Unionist petition against AIA delivered to 
Buckingham Palace 
- 11 June: UK General election, 
Conservatives returned to power 
- 8 November: bombing in Enniskillen kills 
11 and injures 63 
- May: eight IRA men killed during attack on 
Loughgall Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) 
Station in County Armagh  
- 150 tons of arms/explosives from 
Libya to Ireland discovered off 
French coast 
1988 - 11 January: John Hume (SDLP) and Gerry Adams (SF) meet 
- 14 October talks in Duisburg, West 
Germany with UUP, DUP, SDLP, and 
APNI 
- 19 October: Broadcasting ban on all 
proscribed organizations 
 
- 16 March: Loyalist gunman attack during 
funeral, three killed and 50 injured 
-  19 March: two soldiers killed 
- 15 June: IRA bomb kills six British Army 
officers in Lisburn 
- 20 August: eight soldiers killed by IRA 
bomb at Ballygawley, 28 soldiers injured 
- 21 December: Pan Am flight 103 from 
Heathrow to New York crashes over 
Lockerbie, kills 259 on aircraft, 11 on the 
ground. 
- 6 March: three unarmed IRA 
members shot by SAS officers in 
Gibraltar 
- 5 July: Patrick Ryan (Catholic 
priest from Ireland) arrested in 
Brussels (deported to Ireland 25 
November)   
- Brogan v. UK, ECourtHR, 
Reaffirms the PTA powers of 
detention as in line with Article 5 of 
the EConvHR 
1989 -  PTA 1989 – Five year sunset clause 
removed, replaced with annual renewal  
- Security Service Act 1989 (MI5 on 
statute, broader powers)  
- 19 October: ‘Guildford Four’ released 
from prison after 14 years 
 
- 12 February: Patrick Finucane (Belfast 
Solicitor) murdered, UFF ( UDA) claim 
responsibility 
- 22 September: IRA explode bomb in Kent, 
kill eleven musicians from Royal Marine 
band 
- 8 October: 28 members of UDR arrested 
following Steven’s inquiry into collusion of 
security forces 
 
1990 - 17 May: Steven’s Inquiry: collusion between Loyalist paramilitaries and state 
security forces  
- 9 November: Sec State for NI Peter 
Brooke declares Britain has no selfish 
strategic or economic interest in NI 
- Colville Report 
- 22 November: Thatcher resigns, 
Conservatives elect John Major PM 
 
 
- 20 July: IRA bomb London stock exchange 
- Carlton Club bombed by PIRA in London, 
over 20 injured  
- 30 June: PIRA assassinates Conservative 
MP Ian Gow  
- 30 September: two teenagers shot by British 
Army in Belfast, officer released early and 
back  into regiment 
- 24 October: IRA attacks three Army check 
points 
- Two Australians killed by PIRA 
in the Netherlands (mistaken 
identity due to British license 
plates) 
-  1 June: British Army Major shot 
in West Germany (Dortmund) by 
PIRA 
- Hundreds of homes destroyed in 
Ballymena and Castlederg, 
Northern Ireland 
- 11 April: visit by Charles 
Haughey (Irish PM) to NI 
 
Broader international context: 
- Beginning of first Gulf War  
 
1991 - 14 March: ‘Birmingham Six’ released from prison after 16 years. 
- 17 June 3 July: official Brooke-
Mayhew talks 
- 26 June: ‘Maguire Seven’ convictions 
thrown out 
- 7 February: PIRA attacks Downing Street 
with mortar bombs during Cabinet meeting 
- Series of bombs put along rail stations by 
PIRA around London 
- 29 April-4 July: CLMC Ceasefire 
- 18 June: 500 British Army soldiers arrive in 
- 14 April: Bishop Desmond Tutu 
says SF should be invited to talks 
- 28 July: UFF explode seven 
devices in shops in Ireland 
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- 23 July: UDR merges with the Royal 
Irish Rangers (RIR) to be the Royal Irish 
Regiment  
NI, total numbers at 11,000 
- 1 September: US fact-finding delegation to 
NI, calls for Americans to stop support for 
NORAID 
- 4 December: PIRA bomb (estimated 1,200 
pounds) in Belfast 
1992 - October: intelligence effort on UK 
mainland transferred from the 
Metropolitan Police to the Security 
Service 
- 10 November: Brooke-Mayhew talks 
stall, restart 22 April 
- 9 April: UK Gen election won by 
Conservatives, John Major PM 
 
- 10 April: PIRA bombs in City of London 
day after British general election 
- 4 January: 800 pound bomb Belfast by 
PIRA 
- 17 January: PIRA bomb kills eight 
Protestants in NI 
- 4 February: off duty RUC kills three in Falls 
Road SF office, then himself 
- 5 February: UFF kills five Catholics in 
Belfast bookshop 
- 5 March: two 1,000 pound PIRA bombs in 
NI 
- 12 August: 12 tons of explosives found in 
London (PIRA) 
- 23 September: PIRA bomb (2,000 pounds) 
at NI forensic science laboratory in Belfast 
- 10 March: Garda uncover 3,500 
pounds of explosives in County 
Donegal, Ireland  
- 5 April: Bill Clinton speech to 
American-Irish Presidential Forum 
in NY promises (if elected) to 
reverse ban on Gerry Adams and 
appoint peace envoy to NI  
 
Broader international context: 
- Maastricht Treaty refers to 
terrorism as a “serious crime” 
- Single European Act: terrorism, 
drug trafficking, illegal trading in 
art/antique. 
 
1993 - 10 March: HC vote 329-202 to renew PTA, Labour Party votes “no” after 
previously abstaining 
- 24 April John Hume (SDLP) and Gerry 
Adams (Sinn Fein) issue first joint 
statement 
- 27 May: Queen Elizabeth meets Irish 
President Mary Robinson, first official 
contact between an Irish president and a 
British monarch 
- 15 December: John Major and Albert 
Reynolds joint statement, “Downing 
Street Declaration”  
- 20 March: PIRA  bombs in Warrington, 
England, two killed, 56 injured 
-24 April:  PIRA bomb (over 1,000 pounds) 
in Bishopsgate, London, killing one, injuring 
over 30, estimate £350-£1,000 million in 
damages 
- 23 October: Shankill Road PIRA bombing 
kills 10, injures 57 
- 30 October: UFF kill seven in County 
Derry, 13 injured 
- First year since 1968 the Security Services 
are not responsible for any deaths in Northern 
Ireland 
 
 
- 24 November: British intercept 
UVF arms shipment originating in 
Poland (300 assault rifles, bullets, 
4,400 pounds explosives, thousands 
of bullets)  
 
Broader international context: 
- First World Trade Center 
bombing, Al Qaida takes 
responsibility 
1994 - January: PIRA incendiary devices Oxford Street London 
- August 31: PIRA declares a "cessation 
of military operations", Sinn Féin enters 
talks 
- 13 October: UDA, UFF, UVF, RHC 
call ceasefire  
- 28 August: fourth Hume-Adams 
statement 
- 31 August: PIRA cease military 
operations 
- 16 September: British broadcasting ban 
from October 1988 lifted 
- 13 October: CLMC announce ceasefire 
- 17 February: RUC officer killed, two 
injured, by PIRA rocket attack in Belfast 
- 26 July car bomb outside Israeli embassy 
London, second car bomb outside Jewish 
charity at Balfour House 
- 9 March: first PIRA mortar attack outside 
Heathrow, two other attacks 11 and 13 March 
- multiple UVF shootings 
- 22 December: Christmas parole granted to 
97 paramilitary prisoners, in Ireland to 30 
prisoners 
- 29 January: US visa to Adams 
(against advice of British 
government and  US State 
Department) 
- 10 February: former leader of 
INLA, Dominic McGlinchey, killed 
in Ireland 
- 24  July: Sinn Féin conference in 
County Donegal 
- 24 September: Adams’ second 
visit to US 
- 27 September: European 
Parliament calls for all paramilitary 
groups to cease fire 
- 1 November: Clinton promises 
$30 million per year in aid for NI 
- 1 December: George Mitchell 
appointed  US special advisor to NI 
- 7 December: European 
Commission promises £ 230 
million aid over three years 
- British citizen Ahmed Omar 
Saeed Sheikh arrested by Indian 
forces after kidnapping four tourists 
(later involved in 2002 kidnapping 
and murder of David Pearl) 
1995 - 12 January: announcement of end to 
British Army daylight patrols of Belfast 
housing estates 
- 22 February: launch of Framework 
Documents by British and Irish 
governments 
- 1 March: British Army end patrols east 
Belfast and city center 
- 11 December: Mayhew announces 
redirection of £100 million from security 
budget if ceasefires hold 
 
- sectarian clashes around parades throughout 
the year  
- 14 March: UVF prisoners riot, subsequent 
attacks on homes of prison officers 
- March: 51 Republican punishment beatings 
and 39 Loyalist punishment beatings since 
the 1994 ceasefires  
- 14 April: RUC finds 40 weapons and 
hundreds of ammunition rounds for Loyalist 
group 
- 3 July: release of Clegg (British Army 
paratrooper convicted of killing Catholic teen 
- 7 February: 8,000 rounds of 
ammunition found by Garda in 
Ireland 
- March: Mayhew and Adams in 
Washington 
- 27 September: ECourtHR rules 6 
March 1988 killing of three PIRA 
in Gibraltar breached Human 
Rights Convention right to life 
- 10 November: Garda arrest two 
men with 1,500 pounds explosives 
- 30 November: First Clinton visit 
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in 1993) sparks rioting; Clegg back into 
Army and promoted 
to NI 
- December: International Body on 
Arms Decommissioning meet in 
Dublin 
 
Broader international context: 
- 20 March: Aum Shinrikyo Tokyo 
subway sarin gas attack, 13 killed, 
thousands injured (sickened) 
- 19 April: Oklahoma City bombing 
kills 168, injures over 680 
 
1996 - 24 January: Mitchell Report on decommissioning 
- ECourtHR found UK emergency 
legislation infringed on EConvHR 
- 10  June: Stormont talks US, Ireland, 
UK, NI representatives 
- UVF dissidents split into militant LVF 
(1996)  
- PIRA ceasefire ends 9 February  
- 10 June start of multi-party negotiations 
- 9 July: British government send 1,000 
extra troops to NI 
- 29 August: announcement for SF to 
enter talks by Mo Mowlam 
- 6 November: SF split 
- 11 December: SF delegation at 
Downing Street, first time in 76 years 
- 1 January: DAAD kill one in Lurgan 
- 9 February: end of  PIRA ceasefire with 
Docklands London lorry bomb, kills 2, 
injures 39, £85 million damage 
- 24 April: PIRA plant two bombs 
Hammersmith Bridge London (300 pounds 
Semtex, detonators went off, but charges 
failed) 
- 7 July: Drumcree Orange Order parade 
stopped by RUC 
- 13 July: CIRA bomb in Enniskillen, 1,200 
pounds explosives, 17 injured 
- London raids by the Met find bomb-making 
material 
- 7 October: two PIRA bombs (800 pounds 
each), British Army Headquarters in NI, 31 
injured 
- multiple Catholic families leave homes due 
to intimidation 
 
- 7 June: Garda detective Jerry 
McCabe killed by PIRA in Ireland 
- 20 June: PIRA bomb factory 
found in Ireland, Irish Government 
stops talks with SF 
- 27 June: over 100 pounds 
explosives in Ireland found 
- 28 June: PIRA attack on British 
Army barracks in Osnabreuck, 
Germany 
- September: Adams fundraising 
visit to the US for SF 
 
1997 - NI (Sentences) Act (prisoner release 
scheme) 
- NI Decommissioning Act 1997 
- 20 July resumptions PIRA ceasefire. 
- 1 May:  Labour Tony Blair, elected to 
PM 
- 3 June: first Nationalist Mayor elected 
to Belfast 
- 20 July: PIRA declares second ceasefire 
- January: multiple bombs defused NI 
- 6 January: PIRA rocket attack Belfast Royal 
Courts of Justice 
- 10 January: 20 bomb alerts in Belfast 
- 13 January: PIRA rocket attack RUC in 
Belfast 
- 12 February: PIRA kill Restorick (last 
soldier killed until March 2009 RIRA 
killings) 
- 26 March: 2 PIRA bombs at Windslow 
Railway, England 
- 29 March: 1,000 pound bomb left by PIRA 
outside British Army Base, County Down 
- 5 April: Grand National cancelled due to 
hoax bomb threat 
- numerous arson attacks, PIRA rail and 
motor way bombs planted in England, 
sectarian attacks by Loyalists 
- 16 June: two RUC officers killed by PIRA 
- 31 July: 500-1,000 pound bomb by CIRA, 
NI 
- Luxor, Egypt attack, 58 killed 
including British tourists 
 
1998 - 31 March: UN Commission on HR 
accuse RUC of intimidating lawyers 
defending paramilitaries 
- 10 April: GFA announced  
- 22 May: referenda endorse GFA 
- UK Human Rights Act (implemented in 
full the 2 October 2000). 
-7 May: formation of RIRA (Óglaigh na 
hÉireann) 
- 15 May: LVF ceasefire 
- August: INLA ceasefire 
- September: RIRA ceasefire 
- 11 September: first prisoners released 
- 19 November: Northern Ireland Act  
- 10 December: Hume (SDLP) and 
Trimble (UUP) receive Nobel Peace 
Prize 
- 6 January: CIRA car bomb County Down  
- January: RUC blame UDA/UFF for 
multiple killings despite ceasefire 
- sectarian violence continues in mixed areas 
and against specific targets (i.e. churches) 
- 15 August: Omagh bombing, Real IRA 
takes responsibility, 29 killed, over 200 
injured. 
- December: NIO report says intimidation 
forcing families to leave homes is the highest 
since 1973 
- 16 February: all-party talks in 
Dublin 
- 24 February: Garda discover 250 
pound car bomb destined for NI 
- 3 March: Garda discover 600 
pound car bomb (believed to be for 
CIRA) 
- Garda and police in England 
arrest nine who were planning a 
London fire-bombing campaign 
 
Broader international context: 
- 7 August: U.S. Embassies bombed 
Tanzania and Kenya, Al Qaida 
vehicle bombs, killing over 200, 
injuring 1,000s 
 
1999 - 2 July British and Irish governments Joint Statement  
- 15 July: UUP boycotts  
- 6 September: start of Mitchell review 
- 9 September: Patten Report on policing 
- January: CIRA shoot at RUC 
- multiple Loyalist pipe bomb attacks on 
Catholic homes 
- 27 January: Eamon Collins (former PIRA 
and informer) killed 
- July: Garda investigate plot 
smuggling guns from the US to 
PIRA 
- 25 October: Garda find weapons 
cache including RPG 18 believed to 
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- 2 December: End of direct rule, transfer 
of powers, AIA replaced by British-Irish 
Agreement 
 
- multiple sectarian and punishment attacks  
- David Copeland attacks against gay and 
ethnic minorities London, killing three, 
injuring 129 
- 15 March: Rosemary Nelson (human rights 
lawyer) assassinated by loyalists in NI 
 
belong to RIRA 
2000 - 11 February suspension of NI Executive following failure of PIRA 
decommissioning 
- 9 May: announce closure of five 
military installations 
- 30 May restoration devolved 
government to NI 
- 26 June first inspection PIRA arms 
dumps 
- 28 July 2000: last paramilitary prisoners 
released from Maze Prison, 428 total 
released since GFA 
- TA 2000  
- 1 June RIRA bomb Hammersmith Bridge 
London 
- 22 September RIRA fire RPG at MI6 HQ in 
London 
- pipe bombing of homes and sectarian 
attacks continue 
- 12 January: Adams meets with 
Clinton on decommissioning 
- 13 December: Clintons to Belfast 
- 10 May:  Cyril Ramaphosa 
(former sec gen of African National 
Congress) and Martti Ahtisaari 
(former President of Finland) arrive 
in NI for Independent International 
Commission on  Decommissioning 
- The Greek terrorist group 
November 17 assassinates 
Brigadier Stephen Saunders, the 
British military attaché to Greece.  
2001 - 12 October Reid specified UDA-UFF 
and LVF ceasefires over 
- 22 October: Adams asks the PIRA to 
decommission 
- 23 October IIDC confirmed PIRA 
disposal of arms  
- 4 November: RUC changed to Police 
Service of NI (PSNI) 
- 28 November dissolution of UDA’s 
political wing UDP 
- ATCS 2001  
- Lord Carlile appointed official reviewer 
of counter terrorism legislation 
 
- 6 January : George Legge (former UDA) 
killed 
- Loyalist feuds lead to multiple killings 
- February: RUC find Loyalist bomb factory 
in north Belfast 
- 4 March: RIRA bombing outside London 
BBC 
- 14 April, 6 May: post office bomb in 
London by RIRA 
- 20 June: start of Loyalist protest at Holy 
Cross Catholic Primary School  
- serious rioting in Belfast throughout the 
year 
- 2 August: RIRA bomb in Ealing, West 
London 
- 26 October: Loyalist paramilitaries throw 
pipe bomb at group of soldiers, Belfast 
- November: 200 pound car bomb found by 
PSNI (dissident republicans) 
 
- September 11 attacks U.S. (NY, 
DC, PA, over 100 British killed) 
- Richard Reid Shoe bomber 
attempt plane from London to 
Miami 
- 13 August: arrest of three Irish 
PIRA suspects in Colombia 
 
Broader international context: 
- Britain enters military action in 
Afghanistan 
2002 - January: report on 4,800 households finds segregation between communities 
and violence increased 
- 8 April: second PIRA decommissioning  
- 5 June Alex Maskey of SF elected 
mayor of Belfast 
- 14 October suspension of NI 
institutions, restoration of direct rule 
from Westminster 
 
- further attacks of schools in NI by Loyalist 
paramilitaries, subsequent rioting and 
violence with Nationalists 
- continued sectarian violence pipe bombs 
and car bombs in NI 
- 27 February: Moinul Abedin sentenced to 
20 years in prison for making large amounts 
of detonators and HMTD explosives in 
Birmingham  
  
- 5 January: Garda arrest seven 
dissident republican suspects in 
Ireland 
- March: St Patrick’s day 
celebrations in the U.S. with 
Adams, Ahern (Irish Taoiseach), 
Trimble (Paisley refused to attend) 
- planned attack on US and UK 
naval ships in Straits of Gibraltar 
thwarted 
 
Broader international context: 
- 12 October Bali disco bombing, 
kills 202, Al Qaeda linked attack 
(24 British)  
 
2003 - 21 October 3rd PIRA decommissioning   
- 26 November election victories for 
radical parties (DUP over UUP and Sinn 
Fein over SDLP) 
- CONTEST (not public) 
- Criminal Justice Act 2003: pre-charge 
detention from 7 to 14 days 
- Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre 
(JTAC) created 
- Stevens Report/Inquiry confirms 
collusion between security forces and 
loyalist paramilitaries  
 
- 1 February murder of John Gregg (loyalist 
feud) 
- Brahim Benmerzouga and Baghdad 
Merziane from Leicester sentenced to 11 
years in prison for AQ fundraising 
 
- U.S. invades Iraq, British support 
- Istanbul, AQ suicide bombers 
attack British Consulate and HSBC 
killing 27 including 3 British 
citizens 
- April George Bush visits NI 
 
Broader international context: 
- May: 5 bombs in Casablanca kill 
44 
- August Marriott Hotel Jakarta kill 
12 
 
2004 - ATCS 2001 Section 4 powers of detention incompatible with the HRA 
and the EConvHR  
- Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO) establish National Extremism 
 - June: BBC crew attacked by AQ 
in Riyadh, kill cameraman and 
injure reporter 
- September: British national killed 
by AQ in Riyadh shopping center 
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Tactical Coordination Unit (NETCU) 
(domestic extremism) 
 
- October: British engineer 
murdered by AQI 
 
Broader international context: 
- Madrid Train bombing kills 191 
injures more than 1,500. 
2005 - Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005  
- PIRA official decommissioning, 
confirmed by General de Chastelain 
- July 7 attacks on London Transport System, 
killing 56 injuring 700 
- 21 July copycat attempt thwarted 
- London security services mistakenly shoot 
and kill Jean Charles de Menezes  
 
Broader international context: 
- British teacher killed in car bomb 
Doha 
- Further bombings in Bali  
 
2006 - TA 2006  
- 90 day detention opposed in UK 
Parliament 
- CONTEST published 
- thwarted 2006 transatlantic aircraft liquid 
explosives plot, arrest of 24, 8 on trial, 3 
guilty  
- 28 September: Talbot Street bomb facility 
- February 7: Abu Hamza convicted 
incitement to murder, sentenced to seven 
years 
- November 7: AQ operative Dhiren Barot 
sentenced to 30 years after admitting to 
plotting UK/US attack 
 
 
2007 - British army leave Ulster 
- Loyalist decommissioning 
 
- January-February: UK letter bombs 
- March 1: Saajit Badat admits plotting with 
Richard Reid 
- 30 June Glasgow International Airport 
attack 
- 29 June: unsuccessful nightclub attack plot 
with fertilizer-based explosives, five 
imprisoned for life, two acquitted 
- June 15: Seven jailed for total of 136 years 
for involvement with Dhiren Barot’s plot 
- July 5: three imprisoned up to 10 years after 
convicted of using Internet to promote 
terrorism 
- July 26: five students convicted intention to 
attend terrorist training camps 
 
- Delhi bombings kill 61 injure 188 
2008 - Counterterrorism Bill 2008: 42 day detention opposed  
- 22 May: Mohammed Abdul Aziz Rashid 
Saeed (Nicky Reilly) Exeter restaurant attack 
- February 18: five convicted of plot to 
kidnap/behead British soldier 
 
- December 17: Bilal Abdulla, Iraqi 
citizen working in Paisely, Scotland 
hospital, sentenced 32 years in 
prison for role in Glasgow 
International Airport and London 
2007 attacks 
 
Broader international context: 
- November Mumbai Attacks kill 
195 injure 290 
2009 - CONTEST version 2  
- Monitoring body report dissident 
republicans more active than at any time 
in last four and a half years 
- IMC 20th report saying dissidents 
directing efforts to kill PSNI officers 
- NIA (beginning devolution of policing 
and justice to NI officials 
- Patrick Azimkar and Mark Quinsey killed at 
Massereene Barracks (March) (Brian Shivers 
convicted January 2012) 
- Dissidents blamed for 400 pound car bomb 
outside Belfast Policing Board’s headquarters  
- Republican Action Against Drugs (RAAD) 
shoot 27 year old in Londonderry 
- Bomb explodes under police car east Belfast 
- Bomb explodes inside Territorial Army 
base north Belfast 
- 600 pound bomb in south Armagh 
- RIRA claim responsibility for placing two 
explosives near police relative’s homes in NI 
- Dissident republicans suspected in bomb 
attack home of SF member McLaughlin 
- First policeman murdered in NI since 1998 
killed in Craigavon, Stephen Carroll  
- SF  blame Real IRA for Belfast rioting, 
arson attack on Murphy (SF) home in south 
Armagh 
- RIRA shoot convicted rapist in 
Londonderry 
- One of NI’s highest profile judges moves 
out of Belfast home over fears of dissident 
republican threat 
- Armed and masked men set up a 
roadblock in Meigh handing out 
leaflets warning people of 
cooperation with security forces on 
either side of the border 
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- September 2009: three plotting 2006 liquid 
explosive transatlantic flight attacks jailed for 
life 
 
 
2010 - Call for review of counterterrorism 
- 24 September, Home Secretary Theresa 
May says attack on Britain by “Irish-
related” terrorists a “strong possibility”.  
- IMC report 26 May states dissidents are 
“highly active and dangerous” 
- Police chiefs say the threat from 
dissident republicans higher than any 
time since Omagh  
- Real IRA and Continuity IRA said to 
have increased cooperation and 
recruitment 
- Policing and justice powers transferred 
to Northern Ireland (12 April)  
- publication of Bloody Sunday inquiry 2 
- Car bomb explodes on Londonderry’s 
Culmore Road (4 October) 
- Three children suffer injuries after bomb 
explodes in a bin in Lurgan (14 August) 
- Booby trap partial explosion under former 
policeman car County Tyrone (10 August) 
- Bomb found under car of Catholic 
policewoman in Kilkeel (8 August) 
- Booby trap found under soldier’s car in 
Bangor (4 August) 
- Car exploded outside police station in 
Londonderry (200 pounds of explosives) 
- pipe bombs and punishment shootings 
continue 
- Shots fired at Crossmaglen PSNI station (2 
July) 
- Car bomb outside Newtownhamilton police 
station injuring two 
- Bomb in hijacked taxi explodes outside 
Palace Barrakcsin Holywood (12 April)  
- July 8: Ibrahim Savant, Arafat Khan and 
Waheed Zaman convicted sentenced to life  
- Roshonara Choudhry (East London student) 
convicted attempted murder MP Stephen 
Timms  
- Rioting on the 11, 12, 13, 14 July in south 
and north Belfast, Lurgan and Londonderry 
- Dissidents blamed for alerts in Belfast, 
Londonderry, and railway south Armagh 
- In Belfast 40 families moved from homes  
- 12 April, Real IRA leave no-warning car 
bomb outside MI5’s Northern Ireland 
headquarters Holywood County Down 
- Bomb at Newry courthouse 
- RIRA opened fire on police station County 
Armagh 
 
- Ten arrested after Irish police find 
weapons and bomb-making 
material in Wexford and Waterford  
- McCaugherty guilty of attempting 
to import weapons and explosives 
- Dermot Declan Gregory guilty of 
making Portuguese property 
available for purpose of terrorism 
(sentenced to four years) 
- Five men arrested after stop and 
search of cars near Omeath (10 
July), suspected of moving 
explosives across the border 
- In Cork money, drugs, imitation 
guns, seized during raid targeting 
dissident republican militaries 
 
2011 - Government review counterterrorism 
released January 2011 
- Pre-charge detention lapses to 14 days 
(January) 
- CONTEST version 3  
- Control orders lapsed, replaced with 
TPIMs December 14 
 
- 23 January: PSNI find two bombs during 
security alert north Belfast  
- Dissident republicans take responsibility for 
masked gang attack in north Belfast  
- March: Marian Price charged with 
connection of two Antrim soldier murders  
- 2 April: Constable Ronan Kerr killed after 
bomb explodes under his car in Omagh, 
County Tyrone  
- 9 May: grenade thrown at police officers 
Londonderry, two children were talking to 
officers when thrown 
- July: Five men arrested investigation of 
Constable Ronan Kerr murder, raids involve 
200 officers and three counties 
- 14 September: RIRA blamed for two bomb 
attacks County Londonderry  
- 12 October: Bomb explodes outside the City 
of Culture offices in Londonderry  
- 26 September: Car bomb stopped 
Londonderry  
- Discovery of machine guns, rifles south 
Armagh, more weapons in east Tyrone  
- Mortar bomb north Belfast results in 
seventy families moved from homes (July) 
- 500 pound bomb in van, Belfast to Dublin 
road, other bomb near Londonderry 
courthouse  
- discovery of a “bomb factory” on a farm in 
County Kildare 
 
Broader international context: 
- 2 May Osama Bin Laden killed by 
US special forces in Abottabad, 
Pakistan 
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